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ABSTRACT 
The history of intersex people has demonstrated a life of invisibility with an 
imposed identity they did not choose. The lack of identity, or at least an 
autonomous one, led to a theoretical investigation into identity and how it has or 
has not been understood within international human rights. Intersex and sex has 
been used as an illustration of a multiplicity (often referred to as identities) to 
determine whether or not it has been protected and enabled through 
international human rights law.  
Before considering international human rights law, it was important to understand 
identity, what it means and how it is formed. This led to a hermeneutic inquiry into 
identity, in particular, from a Ricoeurian perspective. The hermeneutic inquiry 
leads to an understanding that what is called ‘identity’ centres on recognition of 
oneself and of others. This is a recognition of who one is and how one becomes 
one’s narrative identity. The becoming, however, develops through one of two 
interpretive horizons – vertical or horizontal – which may limit or expand one’s 
becoming. This becoming is understood through one’s narrative identity. The 
narrative identity reveals a temporal personal identity.  
Personal identity comprises of two forms or sources of identity: identity as idem 
(sameness) and identity as ipse (selfhood). How these are interpreted and 
implemented either limits or expands one’s becoming. When understood through 
the divesting of one’s personal identity from its narrative identity – identity as an 
identicality or status – it can be referred to as a problematic of identity. This 
problematic creates vulnerability of the human being, in particular, the loss of 
autonomy over who one is and how one comes to be. To prevent this vulnerability, 
one needs a moral identity living the good life of self-esteem and self-respect and 
the autonomy over one’s capabilities to speak, act, and narrate one’s life and be 
held imputable towards it. This enables relationality and respect toward others.   
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Sex is commonly interpreted by international bodies within the binary which still 
leaves intersex people invisible. This is the result of understanding sex through the 
vertical interpretive horizon – as a sex status of male or female. As such, this 
required a study whether human rights were there to protect the status or the 
human person. The analysis revealed the basis and foundation of international 
human rights was the human person as a dignified being. The duty of state and 
society was to enable this human person so that they could freely and fully 
develop their personality. This would result in a dignified being. All the rights and 
freedoms were set for this purpose.    
For an intersex person to have a moral identity, they required the ability to freely 
and fully develop to form an identity. This came through the right to privacy. 
However, this development, and therefore one’s dignity, is limited when one’s 
well-being is interfered with or violated such as through sex-normalising 
treatment and other issues. It is therefore important to protect intersex people 
from such interference and violation to ensure their well-being. The development 
of who one is and the autonomy of how one comes to be enables recognition. This 
returns to the beginning – the purpose of identity. These represent the core issues 
for intersex people – the recognition of who they are and the autonomy of how 
the come to be.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has a personal connection for me. I was born with an intersex variation 
and had operations to make me a ‘normal male’ early in life. Due to the 
information provided to my parents, they agreed as they were told it would make 
me normal and had not been provided with any information to the contrary. 
Normality is something all parents hope their children to have. However, for me, 
life was never normal. I knew I had been assigned ‘male’, but that did not match 
what I felt inside. From as young as I can remember, there was a female side 
demanding expression, and as much I tried to suppress it, it remained. I lived in a 
state of confusion not knowing what was correct, the assigned social status as a 
male or the expressions involving male and female being demanded from inside. 
However, I knew I had to fit in, so I tried to suppress the internal conflict and 
started to narrate a large part of my life, as the sex I had been assigned. Despite 
this, the internal sense kept nagging me and I was confused not truly knowing who 
I was, though knew who I was meant to be, or at least was assigned to be. 
This all came to a head when I discovered fertility issues in my late 30s. This led to 
more investigation into my early surgeries I had at infancy and as a teenager. This 
investigation which began looking as to why there might be issues of infertility 
began to unlock my world of who I am. I initially started with some basic internet 
searches of which much of the information explained why the surgeries were 
performed and how they did it. The predominant narratives were still that of the 
medical profession. These narratives reflected an understanding that ‘surgery 
enabled fixing the mistake of nature’. Such a narrative did not match what I had 
been attempting to suppress inside. However, there were also some personal 
stories that I came across showing experiences that were similar to how I felt.  
However, in 2006 I gained access to a University database. This led to a wider 
investigation beyond that of only the medical narration as a mistake of nature. I 
discovered that there was such a thing as being an intersex person and I had one 
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of the many intersex variations. Moreover, I discovered that what I was feeling 
inside, the sense of self, was the reality of being an intersex person. Intersex was 
a reality of having elements of maleness and femaleness and necessarily being 
able to define as one or the other. After discovering this, the feelings I had all my 
life made so much sense. With what I had discovered, I was able to understand, I 
was not the only person like this. There were others like me out there in this world 
intersex people who considered themselves as intersex males, intersex females, 
or intersex people who consider themselves are both male and female or even 
neither.  
My situation highlighted that if I did not have access to the academic material, I 
would have been less able to fully make sense of myself or more likely that I would 
have continued to live a life of conflict. It also highlighted the power and authority 
that medical professionals had in defining elements of our life, in particular, sex 
(identity). The information that was available on being intersex was “censored” by 
the medical profession1 either directly or indirectly. From my investigation, the 
‘censorship’ revolved around enforcing the dominant narrative of intersex as a 
medical condition or disease that needed fixing and appeared to dismiss any 
narrative to the contrary as ‘disgruntled patients’. However, for me, having had 
access to academic material, something many people do not have access to, I was 
able to understand my life in perspective and make sense of my life without being 
confined to viewing it as a disease or condition.  
This became a discovery of my identity. I had reconciled my inner turmoil with my 
identity. Moreover, I could now embrace and accept myself as an intersex person 
along with the many other parts that make me who I am. My whole life suddenly 
fell into place. I now felt like I had power over who I was and, from that point 
forward, how I was to come to be. Now that I understand who I am, I live my life, 
                                                     
1 Alice Domurat Dreger Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex (Harvard University 
Press, 1998) at 23. 
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not as who I should be according to ‘my documentation’, but have changed my 
documentation as to who I am. Although this has been a challenging journey, at 
the same time, I have had a feeling of inner peace and contentment of life that 
was my own creation involving my inner sense of who I am with my social self and 
a whole identity. This was the first time I felt as though I had real value and 
meaning in life.   
My discovery of who I am coincided with my study of law. This has also resulted in 
a broader realisation of society and the need for rights as who one is rather than 
what one is determined to be. I came to new conception of socio-legal life that 
was more fraternal and reciprocal, rather than one based on a determinative 
status such as sex. Moreover, I have come to believe that human rights are not 
about what one can achieve or is entitled to, but rights are what is necessary to 
live an autonomous full and freely developed life with others. Therefore, changing 
individuals to match what society believes a person should be, like that which 
occurs with intersex people, is not moral nor just and does not improve the rights 
of an intersex person. A just and moral society requires education to understand 
the diversity of life, including the diversity of sex, so that all humans are recognised 
and accepted as who they are. 
Intersex People through History 
My discovery led to an investigation into intersex people and sex diversity 
throughout history. Although the common narrative of sex is that there is male 
and female, there has been a wide variety of forms and expressions of sex, a 
diversity of sex. Sex was important to most societies, but each society had 
different systems of social organisation and thus meaning and value of sex. The 
domination of sex as a binary of male and female so widely conceptualised around 
the world today was not a universal system in many earlier societies. Of focus to 
this thesis is a group of people that express such sex diversity – intersex people.  
Although intersex people were not named in many earlier or indigenous societies, 
they were certainly part of the sex diversity of these societies.  
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Intersex people have bodily diversity2 inclusive of chromosomal, hormonal, and 
anatomical sexual features that are neither exclusively male nor female, but are 
typical of both at once or not clearly defined as either.3 Some of the more common 
intersex variations are:4    
5-alpha Reductase Deficiency, Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS), Aphallia, 
Clitoromegaly (large clitoris), Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), Gonadal 
Dysgenesis (partial and complete), Hypospadias/Epispadias, Klinefelter 
Syndrome, Micropenis, Mosaicism involving 'sex' chromosomes, MRKH 
(Mullerian agenesis; vaginal agenesis; congenital absence of vagina), Ova-Testes 
(formerly 'true hermaphroditism'), Partial Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome 
(PAIS), Progestin Induced Virilisation, Swyer Syndrome, Turner Syndrome. 
There may well be large populations of intersex persons worldwide,5 but few 
countries count the number of intersex people in their population or health data, 
as such, at least administratively, they are invisible. The only estimates available 
are from some medical statistics. Even medical data can be difficult to measure as 
not all places collected the same data.6 A survey of the medical literature of sexual 
                                                     
2 Silvan Agius and Christa Tobler Trans and Intersex People: Discrimination on the Grounds of Sex, 
Gender Identity and Gender Expression (2012) at 12. 
3 At 12; Katrina Roen “Intersex Embodiment: When Health Care Means Maintaining Binary Sexes” 
(2004) 1 Sexual Health 127 at 127; Sara Benson “Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: Recognising 
Fundamental Rights for the Intersexed” (2005) 12 Cardozo J L & Gender 31 at 33; Melanie 
Blackless and others “How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis” (2000) 12 Am J 
Hum Biol 151 at 161; Philip Ebels “Intersex People in EU: Ashamed and Invisible” EUobserver.com 
(12 June 2012) <http://euobserver.com/890/116578>. 
4 Garry L Warne “Disorders of Sex Development” in (online ed, Oceana Therapeutics Limited); 
Christine Muckle “Giving a Voice to Intersex Individuals through Hospital Ethics Committees” 
(2006) 2006 Wis L Rev 987 at 993; Kishka-Kamari Ford “‘First, Do No Harm’: The Fiction of Legal 
Parental Consent to Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants” (2001) 19 Yale Law & 
Policy Review 469 at 470; Neil K Kaneshiro “Intersex” (2011) MedlinePlus - US National Library of 
Medicine National Institutes of Health 
<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001669.htm>; Intersex Society of North 
America “Intersex Conditions” (1993–2008) Intersex Society of North America 
<http://www.isna.org/faq/conditions>; University of Michigan Health System “Disorders of Sex 
Development (DSD): Your Child” (2013) 
<http://www.med.umich.edu/yourchild/topics/dsd.htm>. 
5 Blackless and others, above n 3, at 159. 
6 (1) there are a wide range of intersex ‘conditions’ of which not all are counted as intersex by 
medical professionals but as cosmetic defects; (2) sex has been determined and defined by 
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ambiguity has identified the frequency of 1.7% of live births.7 Once two male 
intersex variations - cryptorchidism and hypospadias – are added, the average 
increases by another 1.8%8 to become 3.5%. However, analysis of historical 
accounts may indicate increased numbers. For example, many accounts of 
Berdaches in traditional North American societies indicated that mixed sex 
identity was quite common, unlike the frequency of intersex that is currently 
assumed to be relatively low.9  
In the West, although in many other parts of the world as well, the history of 
intersex people10 lost the right to identify as a sex identity that matches who they 
are – male, female, both or neither. The history11 of intersex people (or 
                                                     
history and culture as a binary; and (3) whether one has chosen a broad enough population 
sample including geographical variations. See: J David Hester “Intersexes and the End of Gender: 
Corporeal Ethics and Postgender Bodies” (2004) 13 Journal of Gender Studies 215 at 216; 
Blackless and others, above n 3, at 159; Some medical professionals only count specific 
variations, such as Leonard Sax, who argued that “If the term intersex is to retain any clinical 
meaning, the use of this term should be restricted to those conditions in which chromosomal sex 
is inconsistent with phenotypic sex, or in which the phenotype is not classifiable as either male or 
female” See: Leonard Sax “How Common is Intersex? A Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling” (2002) 
39 J Sex Res 174 at 177. 
7 Blackless and others, above n 3, at 159; Leonard Sax with his restricted definition of intersex 
believed the percentage was only 0.018%: Sax, above n 6, at 177. 
8 Blackless and others, above n 3, at 160. 
9 Roger N Lancaster The Trouble with Nature: Sex in Science and Popular Culture (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 2003) at 223. 
10 Including people whose sex identity is outside of the binary. 
11 For a more detailed history, refer to the following: Alice Domurat Dreger, above n 1; Gerald N 
Callahan Between XX and XY (Chicago Review Press, Chicago, Ill, 2009); Sharon E Preves Intersex 
and identity (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 2003); Elizabeth Reis Bodies in doubt 
(Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2009); Julia Epstein “Either/Or-Neither/Both: Sexual 
Ambiguity and the Ideology of Gender” (1990) 7 Genders 99; Matthew Bennett “The History of 
Intersexuality: The Emergence and Control of Intersexuality in Medical Discourse” (2009) 12 Estro 
1; Palmira Fontes Da Costa “The Medical Understanding of Monstrous Births at the Royal Society 
of London During the First Half of the Eighteenth Century” (2004) 26 History & Philosophy of the 
Life Sciences 157; Marie-Amélie George “The Modern Mulatto: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Social and Legal Positions of Mulattoes in the Antebllum South and the Intersex in Contemporary 
America” (2006) 15 Colum J Gender & L 665; M Danielsson “Intersexuality And its Medical and 
Social Implications” (Bachelor Thesis, Malmö högskola/Hälsa och samhälle, 2006); Christina 
Annalena Eckert “The Historicisation of the Hermaphroditic/Intersexed Body: From 
Medicalisation to De-Medicalisation” (Master of Gender History, University of Essex, 2003); Sara 
Edenheim “Bodies out of Place - on Abjection, Exclusion, and Adaption of Intersexed and 
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hermaphroditism as it used to be referred to) is largely the history of the struggles 
over the realities of sex – the nature of true sex, the proper roles of the sexes, and 
the question of what sex can, should and must mean.12 Due to historical 
influences, intersex people have been known as various states: mythical creatures, 
social abnormalities, and medical pathologies of sex differentiation.13  
In Ancient Greece, men and women had clearly defined social, sexual and political 
roles, and androgynes14 such as an intersex child did not fit within such roles. Rules 
were created to cleanse society of androgynes because the birth threatened the 
social order.15 Usually, the child was drowned as a reparation/sacrifice made to 
the gods.16 The Roman scholar, Pliny the Elder (AD 23-79), was the first to use the 
word hermaphrodite for beings who were just people who suffered from an 
accident of nature – not oracles or ill omens.17   
From the Dark Ages until the end of the 18th century, hermaphrodites (intersex 
people) were included under the category of “monsters” in the medieval period 
and early Renaissance, and literature about monsters and marvels was ubiquitous 
at the dawn of the age of print.18 This was because, according to Foucault, they 
                                                     
Homosexual Bodies within Legal and Scientific Discourses, 1919-1968” (paper presented to 
Gender and Power in the New Europe, the 5th European Feminist Research Conference, Lund 
University, Sweden, 2003). 
12 Alice Domurat Dreger, above n 1, at 15. 
13 Elizabeth Reis “Divergence or Disorder? The Politics of Naming Intersex” (2007) 50 Perspect 
Biol Med 535 at 536. 
14 A term used to signify one who does not fit in the male or female socio-political schema. Now 
understood as the male-female binary.  
15 Callahan, above n 11, at 26. 
16 At 26–27. 
17 At 27. 
18 Jenny Mann “How to Look at a Hermaphrodite in Early Modern England 1500- 1900” (2006) 46 
Stud Eng Lit 67 at 70; Dr Cawadias “Hermaphroditism: a Historical Approach” (1941) 2 BMJ 818 at 
818. 
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confounded the natural law that distinguished the two sexes.19 Much has not 
changed even today. Some still think of them as mythical creatures, not a person 
walking beside them on the street today. 
The Renaissance saw the growth of the medical profession. One of the results of 
this was the upholding of the ideals of sex, in particular, reproductive sex, based 
on the assumption that there are only two sexes, and therefore two genders.20 
Even though the political fact of differences between the male and female are 
exposed,21 scientists still insist on the difference and base their research around 
those differences without questioning them and do not accept the diversity of sex 
including intersex.22 They became medical observations and experiments to not 
only retain the binary of male-female but also to understand the biology of male-
female ‘sex’.23 Information about intersex people became buried in the medical 
information and held by those in power.24 Children born into the “enlightened 
world” had to be either boys or girls, regardless of how little they might resemble 
either.25 Doctors and midwives, fathers, and mothers simply took a look between 
a new born child's legs and chose a sex.26 Parents have been socialised to expect 
                                                     
19 Robert Hurley (translator) Michel Foucault The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge 
(Penguin Books Ltd, United Kingdom, 1998) at 38. 
20 This assumption of a sex binary took the religious doctrines of the Middle Ages and gave tem 
validity within the new Enlightenment era where any justification had to be through the scientific 
method. However, this method was socially constructed with the aim of upholding the ideals of 
the desired political society. See: Terry S Kogan “Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms: Law, 
Architecture, and Gender” (2007–2008) 14 Mich J Gender & L 1 at 23. 
21 Alex More “Coming Out of the Water Closet: The Case Against Sex Segregated Bathrooms” 
(2007–2008) 17 Tex J Women & L 297 at 307. 
22 Doctors have never fully incorporated intersex into their vocabulary, but rather considered as a 
disease. moreover, since the medical conference in 2005 of the Lawson Wilkins Pediatric 
Endocrine Society and the European Society for Paediatric Endocrinology, the intersex (or 
hermaphrodites) were now to be known as “disorders of sex development” (DSDs) in medical 
settings. See: Elizabeth Reis, above n 13, at 537. 
23 Cawadias, above n 18, at 818. 
24 Callahan, above n 11, at 25. 
25 At 27–28. 
26 At 27–28. 
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children to be either a boy or a girl. Having a child labelled as ‘intersex’ puts fear 
into some parents which are often negatively associated with sexuality, eroticism, 
or sexual orientation.27 This fear enables the medical profession to continue the 
ideology of male-female without others questioning it.   
Significance of the Topic 
History demonstrates that intersex people continue to face violations of both their 
identity and being – who they are and how they come to be. This has devastating 
effects on their lives. It prevents them from living to their full potential. Those 
advocating for intersex people, not only want non-life-threatening sex-
normalising treatment to stop, but to enable each person to have autonomy over 
who they are and what happens to them.  
Identity, understood as making sense of who one is and how one comes to be in a 
relational environment, is essential to everyone in all places throughout time. It 
gives meaning and purpose to each one’s life and enables them to relate to others 
around them in society. Identity has not always been named or had a special term, 
yet it has always been essential to every individual and every community. Identity 
is central to recognition, and as such, it is important to understand how identity is 
formed and how human rights can both enable and protect identity. This thesis 
uses intersex people as a study to highlight the formation or development of 
identity and whether human rights have, and moreover if it can, protect and 
enable identity in such a sense.  
This topic has been timely. When I first started researching, there were only a few 
books or articles. By the end of my thesis, those ground-breaking books have been 
supplemented by many more articles and reports. Moreover, it has had 
recognition at the United Nations (UN) as an issue of focus. Furthermore, the WHO 
                                                     
27 Elizabeth Reis, above n 13, at 537. 
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has also picked up these issues of intersex especially focusing on the enforced sex-
normalising procedures. There is a slow, yet important, making intersex issues 
visible, though for many people, intersex people is still invisible to them. This 
thesis intends to expand upon this awakening of intersex. It brings these issues 
together to illustrate the importance of identity as who one is (one having intersex 
variations) and how one comes to be whether one lives out a male, female, or non-
binary life.28 This must be autonomously derived, and not a determined existence.    
Intersex and the World of Sex Diversity  
Before considering the methodology and structure, it is time to pass through a 
story. This story may seem fantastical but relays a society where intersex people 
have recognition, yet not as intersex people, but as human beings. This story 
comes from a book John Stoltenberg wrote Refusing to be a Man: Essays on Sex 
and Justice:29   
I’d like to take you, in an imaginary way, to look at a different world, somewhere 
else in the universe, a place inhabited by a life form that very much resembles 
us. But these creatures grow up with a peculiar knowledge. They know that they 
have been born in an infinite variety. They know, for instance, that in their 
genetic material they are born with hundreds of different chromosome 
formations at the point in each cell that we would say determines their “sex.” 
These creatures don’t just come in XX or XY; they also come in XXY and XYY and 
XXX plus a long list of “mosaic” variations in which some cells in a creature’s body 
have one combination and other cells have another. Some of these creatures are 
born with chromosomes that aren’t even quite X or Y because a little bit of one 
chromosome goes and gets joined to another. There are hundreds of different 
combinations, and though all are not fertile, quite a number of them are. The 
creatures in this world enjoy their individuality; they delight in the fact that they 
are not divisible into distinct categories. So when another newborn arrives with 
                                                     
28 A non-binary life is one where one’s expression and life cannot be classed as either male or 
female, but both or neither. There is a slow, but increasing number of people who identify as 
non-binary.  
29 John Stoltenberg Refusing to be a Man: Essays on Sex and Justice (UCL Press, London, 2000) at 
22–24. 
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an esoterically rare chromosomal formation, there is a little celebration: “Aha,” 
they say, “another sign that we are each unique.” 
These creatures also live with the knowledge that they are born with a vast range 
of genital formations. Between their legs are tissue structures that vary along a 
continuum, from clitorises with a vulva through all possible combinations and 
gradations to penises with a scrotal sac. These creatures live with an 
understanding that their genitals all developed prenatally from exactly the same 
little nub of embryonic tissue called a genital tubercle, which grew and 
developed under the influence of varying amounts of the hormone androgen. 
These creatures honor and respect everyone’s natural-born genitalia—including 
what we would describe as a microphallus or a clitoris several inches long. What 
these creatures find amazing and precious is that because everyone’s genitals 
stem from the same embryonic tissue, the nerves inside all their genitals got 
wired very much alike, so these nerves of touch just go crazy upon contact in a 
way that resonates completely between them. “My gosh,” they think, “you must 
feel something in your genital tubercle that intensely resembles what I’m feeling 
in my genital tubercle.” Well, they don’t exactly think that in so many words; 
they’re actually quite heavy into their feelings at that point; but they do feel very 
connected—throughout all their wondrous variety. 
I could go on. I could tell you about the variety of hormones that course through 
their bodies in countless different patterns and proportions, both before birth 
and throughout their lives— the hormones that we call “sex hormones” but that 
they call “individuality inducers.” I could tell you how these creatures think about 
reproduction: For part of their lives, some of them are quite capable of gestation, 
delivery, and lactation; and for part of their lives, some of them are quite capable 
of insemination; and for part or all of their lives, some of them are not capable 
of any of those things—so these creatures conclude that it would be silly to lock 
anyone into a lifelong category based on a capability variable that may or may 
not be utilized and that in any case changes over each lifetime in a fairly 
uncertain and idiosyncratic way. These creatures are not oblivious to 
reproduction; but nor do they spend their lives constructing a self-definition 
around their variable reproductive capacities. They don’t have to, because what 
is truly unique about these creatures is that they are capable of having a sense 
of personal identity without struggling to fit into a group identity based on how 
they were born. These creatures are quite happy, actually. They don’t worry 
about sorting other creatures into categories, so they don’t have to worry about 
whether they are measuring up to some category they themselves are supposed 
to belong to. 
These creatures, of course, have sex. Rolling and rollicking and robust sex, and 
sweaty and slippery and sticky sex, and trembling and quaking and tumultuous 
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sex, and tender and tingling and transcendent sex. They have sex fingers to 
fingers. They have sex belly to belly. They have sex genital tubercle to genital 
tubercle. They have sex. They do not have a sex. In their erotic lives, they are not 
required to act out their status in a category system—because there is no 
category system. There are no sexes to belong to, so sex between creatures is 
free to be between genuine individuals—not representatives of a category. They 
have sex. They do not have a sex. Imagine life like that. 
This story represents a key theme to this thesis. It illustrates how important 
narrativity is to human beings to speak and act their life forming their own 
narrative which reveals a becoming, and identity. The individuals (creatures) in this 
story did not start with an identity, but at the end of the story, their identity – as 
who they are and how they came to be – is revealed. This story illustrates that 
although sex is important to society it does not necessarily require the naming or 
the categorising according to sex. Such a society represents a reciprocal society 
that respects people for who they are as a constructive member, and not what 
they can do for society. It is in this sense the story demonstrates recognition in 
society as identity. As the thesis continues, the relevance of this story becomes 
clear. 
Methodology 
This thesis is a theoretical investigation of identity, how it is or is not understood 
within international human rights law, and whether or not, if it is recognised, it is 
protected by such law. It uses narrativity and interpretive theory to aid the 
understanding of identity. There was no empirical research undertaken in this 
thesis. International human rights case law from the UN and the European Court 
of Human Rights has been used to understand and interpret international human 
rights law in relation to this thesis.  
The understanding of identity requires the understanding of and separation of two 
types of interpretation of identity: identity as identicality or sameness and identity 
as a mediation of sameness and self. This draws heavily on the philosophy of Paul 
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Ricoeur30 as well as others such as Joseph Raz,31 and Jill Marshall,32 among others. 
Ricoeurian philosophy considers the two identities – the idem identity and the ipse 
identity – and how they have been understood and applied to identity. One 
conceptualisation is the identity as identicality where the ipse or self is separated 
or divested from one’s identity.  The other understanding of identity is of a 
mediatory nature where the singularity of identity reflects the narrative of one’s 
being transformable through time. The manner in which identity is understood 
and applied affects the very lives of people and how their lives are narrated.  
As mentioned, the methodology of this thesis revolves around narrativity. To 
expand, narrativity is the basis of interpretation and understanding of who one is 
and how one comes to be. It has been the basis of life in most societies. This draws 
again on the Ricoeurian philosophy. Narrativity reveals the becoming of one’s own 
character, the protagonist of their story, as their identity. Every narrative is 
constructed in and interpreted through interpretive horizons. This draws on Hans 
Georg Gadamer’s concept of horizons.33 Drawing on his concept of horizons, I 
interconnect this with Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, and Kaplan and their work of horizontal 
and vertical type societies.34 The interconnecting of these society types with 
                                                     
30 David Pallauer (translator) Paul Ricœur The Just (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000); 
David Pellauer (translator) Paul Ricœur Reflections on the Just (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2007); Kathleen Blamey (translator) Paul Ricoeur Oneself as Another (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill, 2008); Paul Ricoeur “Narrative Identity” (1991) 35 Philososphy Today 
73; Paul Ricoeur “Capabilities and Rights” in Séverine Deneulin, Mathias Nebel and Nicholas 
Sagovsky (eds) Transforming Unjust Structures: the Capability Approach (Springer, Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands, 2006) 17; Paul Ricoeur “Becoming Capable, Being Recognized”. 
31 In particular this thesis has focused on this work of Joseph Raz, it has also used others’ works as 
well: Joseph Raz The Morality of Freedom (reprinted ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2009). 
32 Jill Marshall Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law?: Autonomy, Identity and Integrity 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden; Boston, 
2009); Jill Marshall Human Rights Law and Personal Identity (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon; New 
York, NY, 2014). 
33 Hans Georg Gadamer Truth and Method (second revised ed, Continuum, New York, 2003). 
34 Valery Chirkov and others “Differentiating Autonomy from Individualism and Independence: A 
Self-determination Theory Perspective on Internalization of Cultural Orientations and Well-being” 
(2003) 84 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 97. 
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horizons enables an explanation of identity as what or who one is and how one 
comes to be. It explains how one’s life is narrated within and through either that 
of a vertical or horizontal interpretive horizon.  
Although everyone becomes within a narrative identity, it is possible that one’s 
narrative identity may be separated from their personal identity. This is what Paul 
Ricoeur refers to as ‘a problematic of identity’. When this occurs, one’s narrative 
life is the life of an assignation and revealed through such an assignation. To retain 
one’s narrative identity and the autonomy over who one is and how one comes to 
be, one must have a moral identity. This draws upon the Aristotelian notion of the 
good life. This thesis expounds on the notion of the good life, the flourishing life, 
by writers not normally associated with Aristotle and the good life, in particular, 
Ricoeur, Joseph Raz35 and John Stuart Mill.36  
The other important lens of analysis in this thesis is human rights. This was a look 
at the history of international human rights and at how they were drafted. It 
considered the philosophy upon which it drew and the philosophy that was 
espoused from human rights. The philosophy of human rights provided the basis 
to understand how to both interpret and apply human rights. The purpose of this 
is to understand whether international human rights enables identity and 
moreover, whether it protects the enabling of one’s identity. This will be 
illustrated through intersex people and their issues. In doing so, it evaluates how 
certain rights enable and protect who one is and how they come to be – their 
identity.  
  
                                                     
35 Raz, above n 31. 
36 John Stuart Mill On Liberty (The Pennsylvania State University, Hazleton, PA, USA, 1998). 
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Thesis Structure 
The title of this thesis is: “Identity and its Protection as the Aim and Purpose of 
International Human Rights Law: The Case of (Inter)sex Identity and its 
Protection.” In unpacking this, it led to a great journey in understanding identity 
and human rights. This led to several investigations based around some questions: 
 How do the elements of personal identity connect to be what or who one is 
including one’s sex? 
 Is identity something that just is, or is it deeper? Is there a morality of identity? 
 How sex had been viewed and interpreted within international law? 
 What is the basis and purpose of human rights and what is the interconnection or 
understanding of identity in international human rights law or not as the case may 
be? 
 If applied to intersex issues, could they aid intersex people in forming a moral 
identity? 
The investigations that were based on these questions became critical to 
understanding how intersex people and their identity may or may not be 
protected under international human rights law. It was only after investigating 
each of these areas and connecting them together was the big picture brought 
into view. These investigations became the basis of various parts of the thesis.  
The first chapter considers the becoming of life. It outlines how narratives are 
critical to one’s becoming. As such to understand one’s becoming, it is important 
to understand one’s narrative. These narratives are developed within horizons – 
vertical or horizontal – that become the environment in which the narrative 
(development) occurs. There are many multiplicities which comprise the 
becoming of which sex one is. The chapter explains how sex becoming forms and 
is understood from within interpretive horizons either vertical or horizontal.  
The second chapter considers the personal identity that comes from the narrative 
identity as seen through the last chapter. It considers what occurs if the narrative 
identity is divested from one’s personal identity – the problematic of identity. This 
leaves the human condition, or as referred to in human rights language, the 
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human person, vulnerable.  It is for this reason that a narrated identity must be 
for a moral identity to protect against such a vulnerability. As such, the chapter 
explains what is needed to have a moral identity as a personal identity is open to 
vulnerability.  
The third chapter considers the way sex is currently been read into international 
instruments and understood within international organisations. Sex has not been 
defined in international law as it also has not been in most domestic jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, despite the improvement in equality, at least to a certain extent, Sex 
has remained within the conceptualisation of status. This has been viewed within 
the development of rights over time. Due to the continued emphasis on status, 
especially sex status, there is a need to consider the subject of rights?   
The understanding of the subject of rights leads was the quest in chapter 4.  The 
focus was to understand what is the foundation and purpose of human rights. The 
foundation of human rights is the dignified person and the purpose is to enable to 
freely and fully develop their personality as a dignified being. This then enables an 
understanding of how the list of rights and freedoms in the International Bill of 
Rights (IBOR) are to be applied as intended. The chapter demonstrates that rights 
and freedoms are not merely a list of independent items but have been 
intentionally brought together as necessary for the dignified being to freely and 
fully develop. When interpreted in this sense it provides an equality of being that 
is equally applicable to everyone.  
The last three chapters (chapter 5-7) return to the focus of this thesis of enabling 
and protecting intersex people to become who they are and ensure they have 
autonomy over how they come to be. Chapter 5, considers human right through 
the right to privacy. This provides for the right to autonomously shape one’s life 
and identity as a dignified being. However, chapter 6 illustrates that this may be 
hampered if well-being is inhibited as with intersex people. This chapter highlights 
some key areas that inhibit or deny intersex people’s well-being and limit their 
possibility to be who they are and how they come to be. The last chapter, chapter 
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7, considers non-recognition or misrecognition as the cause of human rights 
violations, but conversely recognition is the source of being who one is and how 
one comes to be. Recognition as a human being, not as some status feature, is 
essential to becoming a dignified moral being.  
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CHAPTER 1: NARRATIVITY AND THE BECOMING OF (INTER)SEX 
The thesis aims to consider whether international human rights understands and 
protects the identity of the human person. If it does protect one’s identity, then 
how does international human rights law protect identity? These questions 
however cannot be answered until conceptualising what identity is and how it is 
formed. This chapter will demonstrate that identity is understood through the 
narrative of one’s becoming. The next chapter, despite what is illustrated in this 
first chapter of a singularity of identity (in a point of time) is revealed through one’s 
narrative of becoming, the problematic of identity arises where one’s narrative of 
becoming is divested from one’s identity. That is, identity becomes a fixed 
determination irrespective of one’s narrative of becoming. To overcome the 
problematic of identity and return the narrative of becoming to reveal one’s 
identity, it requires a moral basis, and as such, sets out a basis for a moral identity. 
This first chapter focuses on the inquiry of identity as becoming what or who one 
is. Becoming is a narrated process involving one’s many multiplicities, often 
referred to as identities.1 They are a composition or a web of attributes that make 
each person unique.2 They include, in addition to (inter)sex as the focus of this 
thesis, many other aspects such as facial features, height, as well as religion, 
ethnicity, social group affiliation, sports team loyalty, family, profession, artistic 
                                                     
1 It is not a singular identity, fixed and immutable as a political identity would like to presuppose 
or as reductionist technology imposes. The multiple and sometimes contradictory or unresolved 
identities are inclusive of attributes, roles and memberships that are representative of that 
person and make up one’s Self including aspects such as race, culture, social class, and sexual 
orientation, are constructed in sociocultural and socio-political contexts. See: Susan R Jones and 
Marylu K McEwen “A Conceptual Model of Multiple Dimensions of Identity” (2000) 41 Journal of 
College Student Development 405 The multiplicities are sometimes referred to as multiple 
identities – race, gender, class, job, religious affiliation, national origin or something else. Often 
one of these is singled out as a person’s identity. 
2 M Montserrat Guibernau Belonging: Solidarity and Division in Modern Societies (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, UK, 2013) at 18; Jill Marshall Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law?: 
Autonomy, Identity and Integrity under the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden; Boston, 2009) at 93. 
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preferences, culinary preferences, and place of origin and so on.3 In other words, 
the intersectional becoming of each of these many multiplicities represents one’s 
becoming as a human being. Although this thesis focuses on (inter)sex it must be 
stated it is recognised that any multiplicity of one’s identity is and always will 
intersect with and interact with and through the many other multiplicities of one’s 
identity. 
Central to one’s becoming is the multiplicity of sex.4 Sex has intrigued societies 
and cultures for millennia. In their work Sex at Dawn, Christopher Ryan and Cacilda 
Jethá describe the wonder that sex poses to humanity and the way societies have 
looked for clues to understand it. They write:5 
In a sky swarming of uncountable stars, clouds endlessly flowing, and planets 
wandering, always and forever there has been just one moon and one sun. To 
our ancestors, these two mysterious bodies reflected the female and male 
essences. From Iceland to Tierra del Fuego, people attributed the Sun’s 
constancy and power to his masculinity; the Moon’s changeability, unspeakable 
beauty, and monthly cycles were signs of her femininity…Some will say, 
‘Interesting coincidence’. Others will wonder whether there isn’t an 
extraordinary message contained in this celestial convergence of difference and 
similarity, intimacy and distance, rhythmic constancy and cyclical change. Like 
our distant ancestors, we watch the eternal dance of our sun and moon, looking 
for clues to the nature of man and woman, masculine and feminine here at 
home.” 
What is notable about this is the importance of sex to the understanding of life. 
How sex is understood and incorporated within life has varied from time and 
place. Although today, it is almost universally thought of as a divide of pink and 
                                                     
3 Avner Ben-Ner and Claire A Hill “Negative Dimensions of Identity: A Research Agenda for Law 
and Public” (2008) 9 Minn JL Sci & Tech 643 at 643. 
4 Australian Human Rights Commission Sex Files: the Legal Recognition of Sex in Documents and 
Government Records: Concluding Paper of the Sex and Gender Diversity Project (2009) at 7; Susan 
K Egan and David G Perry “Gender Identity: A Multidimensional Analysis with Implications for 
Psychosocial Adjustment” (2001) 37 Developmental Psychology 451 at 451; Marshall, above n 2, 
at 103. 
5 Christopher Ryan and Cacilda Jethá Sex at Dawn (Harper, New York, 2010) at 311–312. 
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blue, male and female, it has not always been so.6 Different societies have 
understood sex in varied ways from diversity to that of one sex and of two sexes.7 
Moreover, diversity of sex has been documented across cultures and every epoch 
of history such as hijras, mahu, and two-spirited people to name a few.8 However, 
in the modern era, the binary of male-female sex is seen as fundamental to the 
dividing of the social world.9  
Whatever the conceptualisation, the multiplicity of sex is a critical part of social 
organisation and function of society. Sharon Preves writes of the importance of 
sex and its conceptualisation to social organisation:10   
“Whether we are conscious or not, gender structures our most basic sense of 
self as well as our primary social institutions. From issues of identity 
development and everyday social interaction, to the structure of family, 
economic, political, religious, and educational relations, gender is one of the 
primary organising principles of society and daily living.”  
                                                     
6 Claudia Lang and Ursula Kuhnle “Intersexuality and Alternative Gender Categories in Non-
Western Cultures” (2008) 69 Hormone Research 240 at 241. 
7 See generally: Gerald N Callahan Between XX and XY (Chicago Review Press, Chicago, Ill, 2009). 
8 Deborah Rudacille The Riddle of Gender: Science, Activism, and Transgender Rights (Pantheon 
Books, New York, 2005) at 3; Callahan, above n 7, at 143–149; Joan Roughgarden Evolution’s 
rainbow (University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 2009) at 329–351 (Two-spirit, mahu, 
and Hijiras); For example in the Dominican Republic, male female and guevedoces. See Carl Elliott 
“Why Can’t We Go on as Three?” (1998) 28 Hastings Cent Rep 36; Maori society was no 
exception here prior to colonisation First contact European explorers around the shores of 
Aotearoa on several occasions noticed the striking beauty of Māori maidens, however they soon 
realised when in more intimate circumstances, these female companions were actually male like 
themselves. (Salmond, 1993 cited in NZAF, 2005) …Māori tribal society provided space for 
transgender people to live within the comfort and confines of their whänau. (Herewini, 2003 
quoted in NZAF, 2005). - See Human Rights Commission To Be Who I Am: Report of the Inquiry 
into Discrimination Experienced by Transgender People (2008) at 24. 
9 Cordelia Fine Testosterone Rex - Unmaking the Myths of Our Gendered Minds (Icon Books Ltd, 
London, United Kingdom, 2017) at 14. 
10 Sharon E Preves Intersex and identity (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 2003) at 
15. 
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As she wrote, from identity development, social interaction and relations, to 
institutional structure, organisation and processes, sex has become integral.11 It is 
so central, at least today, that it is one of the first questions asked: ‘is it a boy or a 
girl?’12 This is despite the past revealing a diversity of sex more than only boy or 
girl (man or woman). Given the importance of sex to social organisation, it leads 
to the important question that biologist Joan Roughgarden poses about sex 
becoming: “How does one fertilized egg grow up to become a corporate CEO while 
another grows up to be a drag queen?”13 This question leads to consideration of 
one’s becoming and the connection to sex. The two becomings of sex and how 
that inhibits and enhances what sex one is or who they are as a sex and how they 
come to be will be considered in the later part of this chapter. 
Before considering the becoming of (inter)sex, this chapter first situates becoming 
as a revealing of one’s identity rather than that of a determinative or a fixed 
statement of one’s identity. Becoming is a mediatory process involving biological, 
social, and environmental factors as one narrates or authors their life. For 
example, the becoming of sex is a mediation of the sense of self (including the 
biological elements of self) and the social self as through one’s self-image, self-
expression, aspirations, sexual desires, and society’s expectations.14 It is through 
such a narrative process of becoming that reveals who or what one is and how 
they come to be – one’s identity.  
Second, this chapter makes the connection of becoming with narration. It outlines 
how all life is understood through and within narratives. The narratives, whether 
scientific or mythical for example, are what members of society use to understand 
                                                     
11 Lauren Leve “‘Identity’” (2011) 52 Current Anthropology 513 at 513; Lawrence M Friedman 
“The Concept of the Self in Legal Culture” (1990) 38 Clev St L Rev 517 at 517; Fine, above n 9, at 
14; Jones and McEwen, above n 1, at 411. 
12 Fine, above n 9, at 14. 
13 Roughgarden, above n 8, at 185. 
14 Marshall, above n 2, at 103, 104. 
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life itself and how to relate to each other and organise as a society. Although each 
person has a narrative, these narratives interconnect with others’ narratives 
weaving many stories together. It is from understanding these narratives that it is 
possible to understand what or who one is and how they come to be.  
The third part of this chapter outlines two different horizons in which one’s 
narrative develops – a vertical or horizontal. The horizon determines how one 
becomes who or what they are and what type of relations between people of the 
community there is. These horizons set the path of development. Different 
societies incorporate varying degrees of the horizons and may even switch 
between them over time.  It is from understanding the horizon that it is possible 
to understand the development of who or what one is and how one comes to be.  
The last part of this chapter brings the first two parts together the narratives 
through the horizons – in the understanding of sex becoming, and in particular, 
intersex becoming. It then is possible to understand the effect of the horizon on 
how one comes to be as one’s sex. The becoming of sex in the vertical limits sex 
becoming to particular sexes – most commonly male and female – and it prohibits 
becoming that may exhibit diversity as with intersex variations. The horizontal 
though, does not determine one’s sex, but permits the becoming of who they are. 
This enables people with intersex variations to blossom without constraint or 
manipulation into a particular sex. This becoming respects diversity of sex and 
enables who one is to come through one’s narrative as how one comes to be.  
1.1 Becoming - a Revealed not a Determinative Fixed Identity  
Becoming is essential to understand one’s identity. That is, it is impossible to know 
and explain identity without understanding one’s becoming. Becoming is a process 
from birth till death (or beyond) of what or who one is. In other words, it is through 
one’s becoming that it is possible to understand how one comes to be what or 
who one is. The process of becoming includes the many multiplicities that make 
up what or who one is including (inter)sex, the illustrative multiplicity of this thesis.  
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Human beings are relational beings, not mechanical beings. They do not “simply 
react to the circumstances as they present themselves.”15 This would indicate that 
there is no autonomy or ability of humans to make choices, have feelings, or 
determine one’s own life path. Furthermore, William Reiner, a specialist doctor in 
intersex patients and psychologist, wrote: “anatomy does not the man make.”16 
One’s anatomy, or for that matter one’s genetics, does not determine what one is 
to be lived out as circumstances dictate. That is of similar nature to referring to 
humans as a mechanical being. Suggesting that humans react to life as 
circumstances present themselves and as anatomy dictates suggests that there is 
no meaning to life but to exist and live out one’s pre-determined life. It suggests 
that human beings do not have autonomy over who they are or how they come to 
be.  
It is this relational being or relational person that George Mead refers to in his 
famous work on The Social Self.17 In that work, he explains the becoming as a 
dialectic mediation between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ in the producing of the self. For 
him, the self that results from “a ‘me’ is inconceivable without an ‘I’.”18 Yet, the ‘I’ 
does not produce the ‘me’ in some causative manner, but rather it is the dialectic 
of these two, that is, it is a dialectic of I-me. He argues that it is ‘me’ that ‘I’ 
addresses and it is ‘I’ to whom the ‘me’ observes.19 The ‘I’ produces the contents 
that make up the self,20 while the ‘me’ is the experience that is induced by this 
                                                     
15 Georgia Warnke Debating Sex and Gender (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) at 7. 
16 William Reiner “To be Male or Female—That is the Question” (1997) 151 Arch Pediatr Adolesc 
Med 224 at 2. 
17 George H Mead “The Social Self” (1913) 10 The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific 
Methods 374. 
18 At 374. 
19 At 374–375. 
20 "The ‘I’ is “just those contents which go to make up the self which is distinguished from the 
others whom he addresses.”: At 375. 
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action of the "I."21 It is also the same ‘me’ that is affected by the means of the 
social stimulation of others.22 His proposition is that it is the I that as an existential 
being with all of its biological, psychological and spiritual parts, but these become 
experienced by the ‘me’. The ‘me’ is the experiences of the biological and the 
social. 
Moreover, the social self, as it suggests, is relational in nature. The social self, 
through the introspection of the “I” by the ‘me’, enters into social relations with 
other selves.23 Mead writes that24  
“it is only as the individual finds himself acting with reference to himself as he 
acts towards others, that he becomes a subject to himself rather than an object, 
and only as he is affected by his own social conduct in the manner in which he is 
affected by that of others, that he becomes an object to his own social conduct.” 
The introspection of the ‘I’ by the experiential ‘me’ only becomes a subject to 
oneself in a relational environment. This indicates the importance of society in the 
producing of the social self.  
This producing of the self, as referred to here as one’s becoming is of mediatory 
nature. The experience of the ‘me’ results from the addressing of the ‘I’. The 
experience of the ‘me’ is not only through the biological but also the social and the 
environmental. The meaning and significance result from the experience (me) 
upon and through the biological being (I).25 For example, in relation to the 
multiplicity of sex, along with the biological and the environmental experiences, 
                                                     
21 The me is “the experience which is induced by this action of the ‘I.’ If the ‘I’ speaks, the ‘me’ 
hears. If the ‘I’ strikes, the ‘me’ feels the blow.”: At 375. 
22 “It is the same self who is presented as observing himself, and he affects himself just in so far 
and only in so far as he can address himself by the means of social stimulation which affect 
others.”: At 375. 
23 At 375. 
24 At 375. 
25 Warnke, above n 15, at 7. 
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the social experiences such as self-image, self-expression, aspirations, sexual 
desires, and society’s expectations,26 are important in producing of the sexual self, 
or the becoming of the multiplicity of sex. It is thorough this mediatory process 
that one finds meaning and significance in life which is essential to becoming who 
or what one is. Experience mediated through existentiality is the process of 
becoming rather than some pre-determined linear development of an identity 
upon what the self develops.  
1.2 Narrativity of Becoming 
Becoming, or as Mead referred to as the producing of the social self, is a narrative, 
interpretive, activity. It is this becoming that Paul Ricoeur refers to in his chapter 
Life in Quest of Narrative:27   
“It has been known and often been repeated that life has something to do with 
narrative; we speak of a life story to characterise the interval between life and 
death.”  
Becoming of one’s life from birth to death is understood through one’s narrative. 
Sandy Farquhar, suggests that28  
“Ricoeur’s position is congruent with the idea that individuals and communities 
make sense of actions and events by telling stories, where the function of 
narrative is to provide explanations of actions and events.”    
As Farquhar suggests, Ricoeur’s idea is that understanding of oneself and the 
world around them is through narratives. It is through these narratives that 
connect the experiential ‘me’ to the observed ‘I’ with the relational others of 
Mead’s work. Narratives are a universal feature of social life and a fundamental 
                                                     
26 Marshall, above n 2, at 103, 104. 
27 Paul Ricoeur “Life in Quest of Narrative” in Narrative and Interpretation (Routledge, London, 
UK, 1991) at 20. 
28 Sandy Farquhar Ricoeur, Identity, and Early Childhood (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Lanham, Md, 2010) at 10. 
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model through which the grounding of human experience in time is understood.29 
They have been expressed through various narrative forms including songs, 
stories, and art.30 They are also utilised in understanding of the scientific, religious, 
and philosophical basis of life. As Pierre Bourdieu stated: “life is inseparable from 
the sum of events of an individual existence seen as a history and a narrative of 
that history.”31 Narratives provide the means to understand oneself, others and 
the world around and how it is all interconnected. They tie people’s present with 
the past and future.  
Humans, by their very nature, are self-reflexive and self-narrating beings.32 As a 
self-narrating being, one is the protagonist, the central character33 within one’s 
life story.34 The protagonist is durable and dynamic35 representing one from one’s 
birth till death.36 Douglas Ezzy refers to the protagonist as being37  
“coherent but fluid and changeable, historically grounded but ‘fictively’ 
reinterpreted, contracted by an individual, but constructed in interaction and 
dialogue with other people.” 
                                                     
29 Lois McNay “Gender and Narrative Identity” (1999) 4 Journal of Political Ideologies 315 at 319. 
30 In addition to the use songs, stories and art, the modern era also includes such narratives in 
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they understand themselves. 
31 Pierre Bourdieu “The Biographical Illusion” in Jessica Evans, Paul Du Gay and Peter Redman 
(eds) Identity - a Reader (Sage Publications Ltd, London, UK, 2000) at 297. 
32 David R Maines “Narrative’s Moment and Sociology’s Phenomena: Toward a Narrative 
Sociology” (1993) 34 The Sociological Quarterly 17 at 23. 
33 Charles Tilly “Citizenship, Identity and Social History” (1995) 40 International Review of Social 
History 1 at 6, 7; Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper “Beyond ‘identity’” (2000) 29 Theory and 
Society 1 at 12. 
34 Maines, above n 32, at 23. 
35 Paul Ricoeur “Narrative Identity” (1991) 35 Philososphy Today 73 at 77, 80. 
36 Ricoeur, above n 27, at 20. 
37 Douglas Ezzy “Theorizing Narrative Identity - Symbolic Interactionism and Hermeneutics” 
(1998) 39 Sociological Quarterly 239 at 246. 
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One’s becoming, thus, is as the protagonist of their own life story through the 
mediated I-me and in dialogical relations with others.38 Becoming is thus 
dialogically accomplished39 as a self-reflexive, self-narrating being.   
Self-narration is relational. It always involves others - other humans and non-
humans - with oneself within one’s narrative. Although we may have an individual 
existence, it is only meaningful through the presence of others40 even where 
people have been considered as individualistic.41 As such, the interpretation of 
narratives will require the understanding of the interaction and involvement with 
others.42 The narratives indicate the sense of belonging and grounding of 
everyone43 in the understanding of what or who one is and how they came to be. 
Meaning and significance of one’s narrative comes through interpretation and 
understanding of experience of the I-me within social relations. These experiences 
are lived in the temporality of the present (clocks, schedules, etc.), but uses time 
                                                     
38 Charles Taylor “The Politics of Recognition” in Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann (eds) 
Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: An Essay (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1992) at 34. 
39 At 32. 
40 Sonia Kruks Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of Ambiguity (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2012) at 7. 
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271. 
43 Ben-Ner and Hill, above n 3, at 643. 
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in the construction of action which can be abstracted to the past and future.44 
They include one’s own feelings, pains, and pleasures acquire meaning and 
significance through one’s social self in the cultural life of the surrounding 
community.45 However, for some, there is no words to express their experiences46 
until understood within abstractions. Some examples of such abstractions are sex 
and gender, but also class, ethnicity, and other statuses. Not that the experience 
did not exist, but that it could not be conveyed or expressed until the abstraction 
was understood. For this reason, David Maine writes: humans are “self-reflexive 
organism[s] that by a fairly early age has transformed its raw experiences into 
abstractions.”47 Abstractions are the ability to place experiences within or outside 
of some frame to give meaning and significance. These abstractions are learned at 
an early age. It is through such abstractions that it is possible to understand 
oneself and the world around them. It is through understanding of the 
abstractions within oneself, one’s horizon, that it is possible to read one’s story of 
who one is and how one has come to be. David Maine writes: “the self-abstracted 
person, so clearly seen in adulthood, is one who has acquired a biography and 
thereby can tell his or her life story.48 
 The abstractions illustrate the interconnection of history and fiction in the self-
narrating of one’s becoming. All narratives involve an interweaving of fiction with 
history. As Paul Ricoeur argues, humans do not separate between the 
interconnection of history and fiction in the construction of narratives.49 This 
fusion of history and fiction incorporates the privileged mediation of signs and 
symbols borrowed from one’s interpretive viewpoint upon one’s physical 
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existentiality.50 As such, it is impossible to separate this fusion of history and 
fiction that becomes the reality of one’s narrative.51 Sandy Fahrquar illustrates this 
through the writing of a life story, even when two people either have the same 
traits or the same experiences.  She writes that52  
When we talk about our identity, as in our life story, we include some things and 
not others. This process of exclusion and inclusion is carried out in the interests 
of constituting a particular story about our self. It is in this process of making and 
telling the story that we produce the self. To do this, we draw on our memories 
and our histories. We create our own identities, interpreting past events, 
creating history and identity through storying. 
As Farquhar noted, the authoring of one’s narrative is the producing of the self 
and includes what is important to oneself. This will always be one’s own story with 
a particular mix of history and fiction. Everyone authors their narrative and it is 
only through the sum of events of one’s history that one’s identity can be 
interpreted.53 The sum of events inclusive of fictive and historical elements 
become one’s narrative.  
Human lives are only readable when interpreted in the function of the stories that 
people tell about themselves.54 Therefore, to understand life, and the individuals 
within it, one must understand both the collective and the individual narratives 
that make it up. This requires throwing light on the situation through the process 
of interpretation.55 Interpretation is trying to get meaning from a narrative as with 
any text.56 As far as the narrativity of life, this is continuous or, as Gadamer writes, 
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it is a “task that is never fully completed.”57 Such interpretation requires the 
hermeneutic task of the whole and parts to achieve a full understanding.  
This hermeneutic task of interpretation is the circular interpretation of the whole 
and parts of a narrative.58 The whole, for example, can represent one’s narrative 
identity which comprises of many parts which here is referred to as multiplicities. 
However, these multiplicities, such as sex, can then in turn be understood through 
their parts. In either case, the whole requires an understanding of its parts and the 
parts the whole. The circular understanding can be interpreted in two ways. One 
is the whole determining the parts while the other is the parts can give meaning 
and context from which the whole is to be interpreted.59 Georgia Warnke uses the 
heart as an example. The heart can be viewed as a mechanical pump that requires 
regularity and stability or as a self-organising chaotic system that is flexible and 
adaptable which can operate in a range of different situations.60 It involves a 
hermeneutic circle of one’s whole being and one’s many multiplicities where the 
multiplicities give meaning and context from which the whole is to be 
interpreted.61   
1.3 Horizons of Narrative Becoming 
Becoming occurs within a horizon with particular abstractions. These abstractions 
make it possible to interpret and find meaning and significance in one’s life. 
However, these abstractions may enhance or inhibit the autonomy over who one 
is and how one comes to be. It is for this reason, that it is important to understand 
the horizons in which someone becomes who or what they are. 
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These horizons are situational. That is, they have a particular vantage point. The 
vantage point is the situation one is in and that enables one’s becoming. This 
infers, as Hans Georg Gadamer notes, that the situation requires awareness of 
something that we are always within.62 It is such situation that Christopher Ryan 
and Cacilda Jethá refer to in discussing one’s view of the sense of normal and 
natural:63       
Like those early Europeans, each of us is constrained by our own sense of what 
is normal and natural. We’re all members of one tribe or another – bounded by 
culture, family, religion, class, education, employment, team affiliation, or any 
other number of criteria.”  
The situation requires an awareness of the vantage point one is in. It is the 
understanding of the vantage point from which one sees the world that is often 
referred to as culture.  
Culture is not inert nor is it natural. Rather it is the worldview, the vantage point, 
by which the world is understood. It becomes central to how narratives are written 
and understood. Stuart Hall defines culture as the64   
mental frameworks – the languages, concepts, categories, imagery of thought 
and the systems of representation – which different classes and the social groups 
deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the 
way society works.    
It has also been defined similarly by Dick Hebdige as65 
a particular way of life which expresses certain meanings and values not only in 
art and learning, but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour. The analysis of 
                                                     
62 Gadamer, above n 42, at 269. 
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culture, from such a definition is the clarification of the meanings and values 
implicit and explicit in a particular way of life, a particular culture.   
According to Hall referring to the Marxist thought, culture has its roots in a “double 
relation: to nature and to other human beings.”66 He goes on to write that67  
“man’s relation to nature becomes socially mediated. The reproduction of 
human society, in increasingly complex and extended forms, and the 
reproduction of material existence are fundamentally linked: in effect the 
adaption of nature to man’s material needs is affected only through the forms 
which his social collaboration with men assume. 
It is through culture that one becomes both situated and the way of understanding 
and functioning in life. It is through culture, one’s situation, that mediates value 
and significance of the narratives of life.   
The becoming of the social self is not merely a personal experience. Thus, the ‘me’ 
experiences culture through one’s feelings and behaviour which may have input 
from the ‘I’. These experiences result from a complex and arbitrary constellation 
of cultural processes68 understood through the ‘I”. To understand a human being, 
it is important to understand the situation or culture in which their narrative is 
formed. This requires, as Christopher Ryan and Cacilda Jethá write, that “we have 
to recognise the various tribes we belong to and begin extricating ourselves from 
the unexamined assumptions each of them mistakes for the truth.”69 
Interpretation involves the recognition of the situation of one’s becoming. It also 
involves examining of assumptions that may often be mistaken for the truth. Only 
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then by taking this into account will it be possible to interpret one’s life story or 
narrative. 
1.3.1 Situating One’s Horizon – Vertical or Horizontal 
The narrative of becoming occurs in and through situations. A situation provides 
the concepts and categories at their disposal of how one makes sense of the world 
through one’s experiences, perceptions, and interpretations.70 Such a situation, as 
Gadamer writes, represents “a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision” – a 
horizon.71 A horizon is a “range of vision that includes everything that can be seen 
from a particular vantage point.”72 This horizon becomes the possibility of vision 
of one’s situation. Gadamer writes the historical consciousness of one’s own past 
and that of others, the situation, “help to shape this moving horizon out of which 
human life always lives, and which determines it as tradition.”73 Historical 
consciousness involved in the shaping of the moving tradition or situation  requires 
the awareness of something that we are always within, that is, the horizon. 
Gadamer writes that a “person who has an horizon knows the relative significance 
of everything within this horizon, as near or far, great or small.”74 With no horizon, 
one cannot “see far enough and hence overvalues what is nearest him. 
Contrawise, to have an horizon means not to be limited to what is nearest, but to 
be able to see what is beyond it.”75 A horizon can expand beyond the present point 
to that which was beyond it,76 that is, it includes the ability to look to the past and 
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future. If the horizon is narrow or closed, it limits the interpretation and thus, the 
eventuating narrative. An expansive or open horizon enables a much more open 
narrative in which the vantage point is seen “within a larger whole and in true 
proportion.”77 The horizon provides the space through which the situation of 
becoming occurs whether it be an open expansive or closed restrictive situation. 
It determines the relativity of freedom and autonomy in becoming who one is and 
how one comes to be such as seen later in the becoming of sex. 
These horizons, the vantage points by which we interpret and understand things, 
may be understood within two types of horizon. The types of horizons are not 
about whether a horizon is hierarchical or not as all societies have some form of 
hierarchy.78 Rather, horizons concern relationality and meaning of human beings 
and its structure and operation within one’s situation often viewed as culture. 
Moreover, they are not particular to a ‘culture’, time or place. In any one situation, 
great or small, there may be more of a predominance of either a vertical or a 
horizontal horizon.  
The concept of vertical and horizontal horizons has been adapted from the work 
of Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, and Kaplan.79 For them, the vertical horizon has a 
hegemonic dominance through hierarchical competitive status, where as a 
horizontal horizon operates through a relational dialectic of an individual being 
with the community.80 The vertical horizon is more closed hegemonic and 
heteronomous while the horizontal is open and autonomous and relational. This 
interconnects with Gadamer’s argument of open and closed horizons. The 
horizons can be understood as the vertical being closed, restrictive and hegemonic 
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while the horizontal is open, inclusive, and fraternal or relational. These horizons 
are in relativity rather than either or and are not restricted to some time or place. 
It is by understanding the horizon that it is possible to interpret and understand 
one’s becoming and the situation in which it occurs.   
1.3.2 The Vertical Horizon 
The first, and the more common, horizon in situating one’s becoming is the vertical 
horizon. Central to the vertical horizon is the collectivity. This collectivity provides 
the situatedness for becoming. Such a horizon is described by Chirkov, et al. as:81     
Vertical collectivism as an “emphasis on loyalty to one’s in-group adherence to 
hierarchical relations within one’s group” while vertical individualism “involves 
wanting to become distinguished and acquire status, especially through direct 
competition with others, and it embraces self-assertion to achieve one’s 
personal aims.” 
This illustrates the two sides of such a horizon – collectivism and individualism – 
which interconnect together rather than being oppositional to each other. On one 
side is the strength through the collectivity while on the other side is the 
positionality and recognition of each individual of the collectivity through status. 
Together these two sides advance the collectivity. Before expounding the 
understanding of becoming within the vertical horizon, it is first important to 
consider Althusser’s metaphor of the superstructure and Infrastructure. Then, the 
section will continue by explaining how the two sides of this horizon interact to 
provide situatedness for becoming. 
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1.3.2.1 The Superstructure/Infrastructure Metaphor  
To enable a clearer vision of how such collectives operate,82 it is essential to 
consider Althusser’s metaphor83 of the superstructure and the infrastructure. The 
superstructure comprises two integrated platforms: the ideological84 and the 
institutional.85 The infrastructure86 is the productive social forces and their 
relations87 that the superstructure is built around.88 Together these enable the 
collective to retain its structure, dominance, and interests. 
The first platform of the superstructure is ideology. Ideology is values and ideals 
that structure a society. Such ideology may influence “reasoning, judgement and 
causal inference oriented towards the situation or social context.”89 On one side, 
ideology represents the dominant group in its ideas, meanings, conceptions, 
theories, beliefs, and so on, while on the other side, it forms the consciousness 
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merely reflect the base or infrastructure; on the contrary, the infrastructure embodies the 
superstructure”. See Martin, above n 82, at 404–405. 
84 The ideological includes the ideas, meanings, conceptions, theories, beliefs, and so on, and the 
forms of consciousness appropriate to such a superstructure. Refer to: Hall, above n 66, at 320. 
85 The institutional here is the political-legal institutions of the particular society. They include the 
religious institutions and the arrangements that dominate within that particular society. This 
includes the institutional forms such as civil society, the family, the juridico-political forms, and 
the state. Refer to: At 320. 
86 According to Althusser, the infrastructure is the productive socio-economic element with its 
social forces and their relations through the people. 
87 Althusser, above n 82, at 8; Martin, above n 82, at 404–405. 
88 For Althusser, infrastructure was the unity of the productive forces and the relations of 
production – see: Althusser, above n 82, at 8. 
89 Daphna Oyserman, Heather M Coon and Markus Kemmelmeier “Rethinking Individualism and 
Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-analyses” (2002) 128 Psychological 
Bulletin 3 at 5. 
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within the people.90 Such ideology, however, serves the dominant group.91 Stuart 
Hall defines ideology as the92   
 “concepts and the languages of practical thought which stabilise a particular 
form of power and domination; or which reconcile and accommodate the mass 
of the people to their subordinate place in the social formation”  
This ideology that becomes the embodiment of truth93 is not neutral and 
objective,94 but it is central in maintaining dominance and power over the people. 
It entrenches systems of inequality. Furthermore, although it has become the 
consciousness within the people and has been accepted by the people,95 its 
cultural domination has been disguised.96 Its dissemination has been craftily 
implemented through those in dominance. Craig Martin explains this process as:97  
A dominant class or group have control over both material and intellectual 
production and the ability to freely disseminate their ideas which in turn reflects 
and reinforces the ideology of the dominant class … In turn, these intellectual 
and political structures advance the control, production, and dissemination over 
the understanding of the ideological concepts and ideas which reflects and 
reinforces its dominance of the ideology over and through society. 
                                                     
90 Hall, above n 66, at 320. 
91 Martin, above n 82, at 405. 
92 Hall, above n 64, at 26. 
93 Ideology embodies the truths of the collective rather than being oppositional or distinguishable 
from it. As a Foucauldian analysis illustrates, ‘truths’ are produced discourses that in themselves 
are neither true nor false. 
94 Martin, above n 82, at 408. 
95 Hall, above n 66, at 333. 
96 Martin, above n 82, at 406. 
97 At 403. 
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Ideology is not some inert worldview, but one instigated for dominance and power 
carefully disseminated to enable dominance and control over the population. As 
Luis Urrieta defines it, it is the98    
“world views that the members of the society share and the cultural artifacts 
that convey meaning that is they are constructed around certain mythical values 
and ideals that falsely persuade and coerce people to believe in them, when in 
reality people benefit unequally from those ideals, according to their position in 
society.  
Ideology maintains positionality and the reasoning behind it so as to persuasively, 
and if required coercively, maintain a social order. The values and ideals of such 
ideology become the collectivity’s world view and modus operandi despite its 
system of inequality. 
The second platform of the superstructure is the institutions or (state) 
apparatuses. They include the state, state bureaucracies99 and even non-state 
entities and organisations. The purpose of such apparatuses is to implement and 
realise the ruling ideology.100 They present themselves as distinct and 
specialised.101 The apparatues can be ideological or repressive. The Ideological 
State Apparatuses (ISA) are, for example, religion, education, the family, the legal 
and political systems, trade unions, communications, and culture, and so.102 The 
ISAs institute particular rituals and their practices by the mass of society to 
maintain the ideology.103 The repressive state apparatuses (RSA) include the 
government, the administration, the army, the police, the courts, the prisons, 
                                                     
98 Luis Urrieta “The Social Studies of Domination: Cultural Hegemony and Ignorant Activism” 
(2005) 96 The Social Studies 189 at 191. 
99 Martin, above n 82, at 406. 
100 Althusser, above n 82, at 59. 
101 At 17. 
102 At 16–17. 
103 At 58. 
38 
 
etc,104 which may take physical and non-physical forms.105 Execution of the RSAs 
occur when the ISAs fails to take effect.106 The basic function of the ISAs and the 
RSAs is ‘in the interests of the ruling classes’ and their dominant ideology.107 It is 
through these apparatuses that the material and political interests of the 
dominant group advance.  
The last element of this metaphor is the infrastructure. The infrastructure is the 
‘unity’ of the forces and relations of the collectivity and their reproduction.108 The 
forces and relations become critical in maintaining the superstructure as the 
collective what109 through its ideology and the institutions with its specific 
subordinate elements110 – the individuals. Althusser states that “a social formation 
which does not reproduce the conditions … would not last a year.”111 As such, it 
requires a continuous process to win, to reproduce, to sustain and even to 
reinvigorate the ideology and the institutions of the system.112 The superstructure 
is at risk of collapse,113 or may even be lost114 if it is not maintained.   
                                                     
104 At 16–17. 
105 At 17. 
106 At 11. 
107 At 11. 
108 For Althusser, infrastructure was the unity of the productive forces and the relations of 
production. See: At 8; Martin, above n 82, at 404–405. 
109 Anne Becker “Identity Premised on Equality of Difference as a Fundamental Human Right” in 
Cornelia Roux (ed) Safe Spaces (Sense Publishers, 2012) 83 at 84; Chirkov and others, above n 41, 
at 100. 
110 Guibernau, above n 2, at 15; Anu Realo, Jüri Allik and Maaja Vadi “The Hierarchical Structure 
of Collectivism” (1997) 31 Journal of Research in Personality 93 at 95. 
111 Althusser, above n 82, at 1. 
112 Hall, above n 66, at 333; Dick Hebdige “From Culture to Hegemony” in Simon During (ed) The 
Cultural Studies Reader (Routledge, 1993) 357 at 366; Urrieta, above n 98, at 189; Martha 
Chamallas “Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary 
Influences” (1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 2370 at 2385. 
113 Althusser, above n 82, at 9. 
114 Hall, above n 66, at 333. 
39 
 
The maintenance and control occur through the loyalty and adherence to the 
hegemony. TJ Jackson Lears writes that hegemony is "the 'spontaneous' consent 
given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on 
social life by the dominant fundamental group.”115 It is where an individual 
internalises the collective’s ideology and structure of life and transforms them into 
his or her own subjective cognitive systems.116 This is also defined in such a way 
by The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, defines hegemony as117  
projecting its own particular way of seeing the world, human and social 
relationships, so that this is accepted as ‘common sense’ and part of the natural 
order by those who are in fact subordinated to it.    
Hegemony is ideology internalised by the masses becoming the accepted and 
consented way of life. As such, it becomes common sense and part of the natural 
order of things, whether consciously and unconsciously. It is in this way that 
hegemony, as Hall writes, “unites such a bloc from the inside, and maintain its 
dominance and leadership over the society as a whole.”118 Hall states that 
hegemony119    
is in operation when the dominant class not only dominate, but direct and lead; 
when they not only possess the power to coerce but actively organise so as to 
command and win the consent of the subordinated classes to their continuing 
sway. ‘Hegemony thus depends on a combination of force and consent.   
Hegemony demands loyalty to one’s in-group and adherence to hierarchical 
relations within one’s group120 whether by consent or force. The hegemonic 
                                                     
115 TJ Jackson Lears “The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities” (1985) 90 
The American Historical Review 567 at 568. 
116 Realo, Allik and Vadi, above n 110, at 96. 
117 Alan Bullock, Stephen Trombley and Alf Lawrie The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern 
Thought (3 ed, paperback ed ed, HarperCollins, London, 1999) at 388. 
118 Hall, above n 64, at 26. 
119 Hall, above n 66, at 332. 
120 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 100. 
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system binds and mutually obligates individuals within the society121 to adhere to 
its values and ideals. This is often seen as the “obedience, submissiveness, and the 
respect for traditions.”122 Total hegemony exists when, as Hall writes,123    
when a ruling class … is able not only to coerce a subordinate class to conform 
to its interests, but exerts a ‘total social authority’ over those classes and the 
social formation as a whole.    
This hegemony maintains the superstructure and prevents the collapse of the 
system.  
The dominance of the collective is through the superstructure of its ideology and 
its institutions. The superstructure of both ideology and institutions do not merely 
reflect the infrastructure, but the infrastructure embodies a superstructure.124 The 
superstructure becomes the driver of the community to informs the way of life 
and social relations (the infrastructure).  
1.3.2.2 Collectivity of Individuals 
At the centre of the vertical horizon is the collectivity comprising of individuals. 
This collectivity centres on the superstructure and infrastructure which ensures 
the maintenance of this collectivity including loyalty and adherence to it. On the 
other side, vertical individualism is the status by which each individual may 
participate within the collectivity.125 Individualism indicates a relativity of certain 
freedoms, or at least, some illusion of such freedoms. It often is heteronomy 
masquerading as autonomy. That is individualism is not the same as autonomy as 
discussed later in this thesis. Even in the most individualistic societies, although 
                                                     
121 Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier, above n 89, at 5. 
122 Realo, Allik and Vadi, above n 110, at 97. 
123 Hall, above n 66, at 332. 
124 Martin, above n 82, at 405. 
125 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 100. 
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self-reliance is highly valued, there will always be a relativity of dependency on 
other members of society. These represent the two parts of the same system 
within the vertical horizon.   
However, there is often confusion equating the two as two different types of 
society as either a collectivist126 or individualistic127 in which societies are either 
one or the other. This has been a mistaken belief in the vertical horizon.128 This is 
actually misleading. As in the horizontal horizon, they are two sides of the same 
horizon rather than two different societies. As will be seen, the vertical situated 
societies, whatever, the political bent, have both sides. Even the most 
‘individualistic’ of such societies does not account for the collectivist manner in 
which such societies still function. For example, it does not provide for the 
means129   
“(a) to provide the contents of the particular thoughts of particular social classes 
of groups at any specific time; or (b) to fix or guarantee for all time which ideas 
will be made use of by which classes.” 
 It is more appropriate to consider the vertical as collectives within a relativity. 
Chirkov, et al. explain this as:130   
“The dimension of individualism/collectivism refers to the relative priority given 
to the individual’s goals and preferences versus priority placed on the needs, 
norms and goals of the group or collective.”  
                                                     
126 The collective is sometimes referred to as communitarian, but in the vertical, the collective 
disregards the individual where the interests and rights are at odds with that of the collective.  
127 Individualism is “a belief system that privileges the individual over the group, private life over 
public life, and personal expression over group experience; it is a world view where autonomy, 
independence, and self-reliance are highly valued and thought to be natural; and it is an ideology 
based on self-determination, where free actors are assumed to make choices that have direct 
consequences for their own unique destiny." See: Callero, above n 41, at 15. 
128 Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier, above n 89, at 5. 
129 Hall, above n 64, at 43. 
130 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 99–100. 
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The collectives determine the relativity of ‘individuality’ that one may express, 
inclusive of what rights, entitles, and freedom are available. This is usually 
dependent upon the issue and/or situation.131 In other words, all such societies 
organised primarily through the vertical horizon are hegemonically collectivist 
with a relativity of individualism.  
1.3.2.3 Collectivity - the Focus of the Horizon 
The collectivity is the focus of this horizon. They may be varied in socio-political 
nature such as religious, traditional, liberal, capitalistic or some other form, or a 
combination of them. Irrespective of the socio-political nature, there are common 
links of the collectivity. Realo, Alik, and Vadi define a collectivity as132  
“a social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see themselves are 
parts of one or more collectives; are motivated by the norms of, and duties 
imposed by those collectives; are willing to give priority to the goals of those 
collectivities over their personal goals; and emphasise their connectedness to 
the members of these collectives.”  
The collectivities determine the social and political patterns of life within the 
collectivity. They set in motion the norms and duties by which each individual that 
comprises the collectivity must adhere and be loyal to. This determines the 
superstructure, the ideology and institutions, that bind such collectivities 
together. This is commonly referred to as ‘culture’. This ‘culture’ of the collectivity 
is maintained and enforced through the infrastructure as the metaphor has 
described. The infrastructure organises and operates through heteronormative 
hegemonies. These often have an appearance or illusion of autonomy. 
                                                     
131 HC Triandis “Collectivism and Individualism as Cultural Syndromes” (1993) 27 Cross-Cultural 
Research 155 at 159; Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier, above n 89, at 5; Realo, Allik and Vadi, 
above n 110, at 94. 
132 Realo, Allik and Vadi, above n 110, at 94. 
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While the individuals of the collectivity have the ability to make choices and have 
at least some autonomy,133 there is an underlying pull towards heteronomy. 
Heteronomy is to speak or act according to determinations outside of oneself 
wittingly or unwittingly.134 By default, heteronomy, as Anthony Elliot writes, leads 
to an identity as135     
a social product through and through, an outcome of symbolic interaction – of 
emergent, ongoing creation, thinking, feeling, the building of attitude structures, 
the taking of roles, all in a quest for coherence and orientated in the social world.  
Heteronomy refers to action that is influenced by a force outside the individual, in 
other words the state or condition of being ruled, governed, or under the sway of 
another.  
The strength of the heteronomy sways any autonomy, often subconsciously, 
within its realms. It is for this reason it is hegemonic. This maintains the 
superstructure whether through choice or coercion. Hegemony implies that there 
is political or cultural dominance, or authority over others.136 The hegemonic 
system binds and mutually obligates individuals within the society such as 
recognised through the hegemonic binary sex system.137 It determines who counts 
as equals, granting certain rights and entitlements yet also imposing certain 
                                                     
133 Autonomy is the “idea of something that cannot be substituted for” and the possibility to 
“dare to think for yourself. You and not someone else in your place.” See: David Pellauer 
(translator) Paul Ricœur Reflections on the Just (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007) at 80. 
134 Michael J Sandel Justice (Penguin Books, London, 2010) at 109. 
135 Anthony Elliott Concepts of the Self (Polity Press ; Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, UK : 
Malden, MA, 2001) at 26. 
136 Oxford Dictionaries (online ed, 2015) Hegemony (Oxford Dictionary) 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/hegemony>. 
137 Societies with strong norms repress the anatomical (intersex traits) and quassi-anatomical 
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have a stringer influence, and thus become more autonomy supporting, See: Realo, Allik and 
Vadi, above n 110, at 757. 
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obligations and expectations directly and indirectly on individuals.138 In other 
words, the hegemony holds in place the various ideology of the collectivity 
through its various institutions to the extent it appears natural and even self-
evident. It also ensures that individual is subsumed as a member through the 
adherence and loyalty to hierarchical relations within one’s status group.139 The 
ethos or morality of the collectivity by rule is lived out by the individuals for the 
collectivity.  
There has been some attempt in the modern period to contrast such collectivities 
with ‘liberalism’. However, what most people refer to as ‘liberalism’, is actually 
still a collectivity. Although relatively new and has a particular socio-political 
situatedness,140 it is interconnected with capitalism.141 The basis of liberalism is 
that individuals should be left alone and their freedom should not be limited.142 It 
assumes they act out of self-interest and that personal decisions are made so as 
to maximise private benefits.143 In fact, individualism is directly implicated within 
                                                     
138 Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier, above n 89, at 5; Sandra Fredman Discrimination law 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2002) at 4; Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 100; Peter 
Spiller (6th edition ed, LexisNexis NZ, 2005) Butterworths New Zealand Law Dictionary: a Sixth 
Edition of Hinde & Hinde’s Law Dictionary at 223. 
139 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 100. 
140 Joseph Raz The Morality of Freedom (reprinted ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2009) at 17; 
Isaiah Berlin Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 1971) at 138. 
141 The capitalist economic system is based upon core principles: (1) it depends on the idea of 
private property in the production process; (2) the labour market is essential to it by people 
selling one’s labour; and (3) it is characterised by the profit motive that drives the entire system. 
See: Callero, above n 41, at 22–23. 
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without government intervention, the better for everyone, the laws that limit freedom of 
capitalists to do what they want is bad for the economy. See: At 25. 
143 At 24. 
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the liberal capitalist economic system,144 in fact, it is intrinsic to its operation.145  
This individualism has been understood as:146    
“a belief system that privileges the individual over the group, private over public, 
and personal expression over social experience; it is a worldview where 
autonomy independence and self-reliance are highly valued and thought to be 
natural; and it is an ideology based on self-determination where free-actors are 
assumed to make choices that have direct consequences for their own unique 
destiny.”  
It assumes that individuals have total free choice and control over their lives. It 
also conceives, at least somewhat, that an individual is devoid of necessary 
connections to society, intimate others, cultural traditions and so on.147 Such 
individualism is not the same as autonomy as discussed later in this thesis. 
Although such concepts as empowered through liberalism have spread 
throughout all areas of life,148 individuals often forget that underlying this, 
sometimes more or less visible, is the hegemonic systems that maintains the 
system and structure of the collectivity. Even in the most individualistic societies 
where self-reliance is highly valued, there is strong hegemonic pull within its 
underlying ideology and institutions and upheld through its infrastructure. In the 
purest sense, individualism misunderstands the perspective and interests of 
persons as social entities.149 As such, human life becomes narrowed and poorer in 
                                                     
144 The capitalist economic system is based upon core principles: (1) it depends on the idea of 
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See: At 22–23. 
145 Berlin, above n 140, at 138. 
146 Callero, above n 41, at 15. 
147 John Christman “Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of 
Selves” (2004) 117 Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic 
Tradition 143 at 145. 
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meaning.150 Social forces shape our lives.151 The ideology behind the social forces 
determine one’s being or identity as a heteronomous entity with an illusion of 
individualism. 
1.3.2.4 Individuals of the Collectivity 
This collectivity comprises of many individuals loosely connected together as its 
parts or components.152 They are entities, independent of one another,153 yet they 
see themselves as part of the collective154 as the greater good. As explained by 
Chirkov, et al., each individual wants to155     
to become distinguished and acquire status, especially through direct 
competition with others, and [embrace] self-assertion to achieve one’s personal 
aims. 
The wording alludes to many concepts of individualism, but in context becomes 
critical to the upholding of a status in society. It must be remembered that 
collectivities are highly stratified, and inherent in such structures are interactive 
and competitive dynamics for the individual of a status within and between levels 
of the collectivity. It is for this reason that status not only positions one within the 
collectivity, but also due to the nature of the structure must, continually assert 
one’s position, or better it where possible.  
The many individuals of the collectivity are known through and organised by their 
status. This is the ascription of what one is156 based on valued social traits and 
                                                     
150 Marshall, above n 2, at 97. 
151 Callero, above n 41, at 34. 
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situational descriptors157 such as gender, race, class, and many others.158 The 
statuses are attributed by fiat159 onto an individual160 usually at birth based on 
lineage, gender, social status, and other attributes.161 Some claims to status and 
rights can occur through accomplishments or meritocracy of individuals.162 
Statuses, such as race/ethnicity and sex/gender, are stable, fixed or immutable, as 
the ‘facts of life’,163 while some, such as one’s profession, are mutable. The 
boundaries of statuses are closed and fixed, and define the in-group, acceptable 
to the collective, and the out-groups, which lead to ambiguity of the in-groups, are 
non-acceptable or even non-recognised.164 This denies variation or uniqueness of 
the human ‘categories’.165 They inhibit the very autonomous process of becoming 
who one is and how one comes to be.166  
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Statuses167 are defined and lived through the collectivity. It becomes the 
ontological experience of being human.168 Status determines whether an 
individual is recognised or not.169   Where an individual’s status is not recognised, 
they have usually been considered as non-human. It is that recognition through 
one’s status that sets out for the positionality within the collectivity and, along 
with that, any rights, benefits, entitlements, and duties. Each individual, one of the 
many parts of the collectivity, understands themselves and their place in the 
collectivity through their status. The collectivity determined the relations of life 
and how that operated. Dignity and honour is tied to one’s status and fulfilling 
one’s social role170 and accomplishments. These determine what one is and how 
one lives.171  
Although the collectivity is a hegemony, responsibility is individuated. Each 
individual is an agent. Agency is individually attributed as the “idea of the efficient 
cause” or the cause of the action.172 Each individual was responsible to the 
collectivity as the agent of their action irrespective of influence of others or the 
effect of society leading to the said speech or action. Such individuated 
responsibility was part of most vertical situated societies whether ‘liberal’ or more 
conservative/authoritarian states.  
Collectivities are highly stratified, and inherent in such structures are interactive 
and competitive dynamics for the individual of a status within and between levels 
                                                     
167 Statuses are normative categories used for identifications and organisation life and control 
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170 As opposed to being inherent as a human being: Rhoda E Howard and Jack Donnelly “Human 
Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes” (1986) 80 The American Political Science Review 
801 at 808–809. 
171 Jessica Knouse “From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics” (2009) 2009 Utah L Rev 749 at 756. 
172 Ricœur, above n 156, at 3. 
49 
 
of the collectivity. Due to competition in all areas of life from family to the broader 
socio-political life, one self-asserts themselves through personal aims to maintain 
or better one’s status and positionality.173 This can also occur through direct 
competition with others. This competition, either implicit or explicit, is a negative 
reciprocity174 that encourages maximisation of one’s own interest or benefit 
without any necessary consideration of reciprocation.175 However, the collective 
through consensual or coercive means must carefully balance competition, that is 
who can complete and how they compete, as it has the potential to be 
destabilising.176  
The situatedness of this horizon is central to any collectivity irrespective of any 
political basis. Rather than being an either/or of vertical collectivism and vertical 
individualism, it situates in a vertical collectivism with means by which an 
individual operates within the collectivity. Each individual as according to their 
status strongly adheres to its hegemonic system of its ideology and institutions. 
Although there is some autonomy in collectivities, the pull of heteronomy is much 
stronger though often it is subconsciously active. Moreover, it the ideology for the 
majority of the collectivity becomes natural and just the way of life.   
1.3.3 Horizontal Horizon 
The horizontal horizon is the other horizon that is less common though not less 
important. The horizontal horizon is described by Chirkov, et al as on one side, 
there is the person who is unique and distinct while at the same time being of 
equality in worth, dignity, and rights.177 Upon the other side, within the horizon 
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the person has “the tendency to see oneself as similar to others and to emphasize 
common goals, interdependence, and sociability.”178 Such a form does not delete 
one’s ‘individualness’ or uniqueness yet at the same time it recognises the ability 
of each individual to enhance and contribute to the sustainability of the 
community. It is in this sense that Gadamer states that this horizon, being an open 
horizon, enables one to see past one’s own prejudices.179  
The horizontal operates with a relational individual. This individual mediates 
between the dependency of sociality and the inner being of oneself. It recognises 
that each individual is necessary for the community and that the community can 
only flourish to the optimal state when all the individuals flourish. For this to occur, 
it requires an environment that provides and supports the basic human needs of 
competency, autonomy, and relatedness. This environment is mediated through 
the reciprocity of life of recognition and respect. This reciprocity of life enables 
dignity and equality of each being as equals. It is a horizon of rights as it provides 
all the rights to enable each one to flourish to potentiality.   
1.3.3.1 Basic Needs – Autonomy, competence, and Relatedness 
This environment both acknowledges and supports the basic psychological human 
needs:180 autonomy, competence, and relatedness.181 Of the three basic needs, 
competence is not horizon specific. One has competence in either horizon, but the 
horizon will outline the extent to which this has potentiality. Therefore, the key to 
competency is the other two basic needs: autonomy and relatedness. These two 
                                                     
178 At 100. 
179 Gadamer, above n 42, at 269. 
180 These basic psychological needs are as determined by the Self-Determination Theory as 
outlined in Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 97. 
181 At 97. 
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are interconnected,182 rather than oppositional.183 The interconnectability and 
utilisation of all three enable and enhance potentiality.  
Competency is the ability to exercise and extend human capacity optimal to one’s 
development.184 This can be referred to as potentiality. It is the developmental 
potentiality of what one is and what one can be. This potentiality is the need “to 
experience satisfaction in exercising and extending one’s capabilities” and in doing 
so, people “naturally seek out challenges that are optimal for their level of 
development.”185 It can be referred to as the “successful attainment of life’s goals 
and its consequences for well-being [as] a function of exploring and committing to 
choices.”186 It is something inherent within all human beings including human 
ability and consciousness of life. To achieve potentiality, it is dependent upon 
one’s well-being. Although competence may be enabled heteronomously, 
competence leads to greater well-being when it develops autonomously and 
emanates from the self (self-determined).187 Due to this, the potentiality of 
competency is horizon dependent. An enabling environment that is one that 
supports fulfillment188  also enhances well-being.189 The development of 
potentiality is only free when it emanates from the self or is autonomous.190 
                                                     
182 Autonomy is often considered to be oppositional to relatedness as it has been subsumed 
within the concept of individualism. However, this is not the case here. Autonomy is interrelated 
with relatedness in that there cannot be one without the other. The opposite of autonomy and 
relatedness is heteronomy and collective hegemony. 
183 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 99, 106. 
184 Chantal Levesque and others “Autonomy and Competence in German and American 
University Students: A Comparative Study Based on Self-Determination Theory” (2004) 96 Journal 
of Educational Psychology 68 at 68. 
185 At 68. 
186 Marshall, above n 2, at 92. 
187 Levesque and others, above n 184, at 68. 
188 While within the vertical horizon, the environment is such that it diminishes one’s well-being. 
189 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 97. 
190 Levesque and others, above n 184, at 68. 
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Autonomy is the power to determine for oneself who one is and how one comes 
to be.191 It is the dynamic state that includes the ability to freely pursue and fulfill 
one’s personal and social goals.192 It is the ability to independently make one’s 
own choices.193 Therefore, Joseph Raz writes, that an autonomous person is 
“marked out by how one came to be, not what he is.”194 To have autonomy one 
must conduct a life in a certain way (does not drift through life, is aware of his 
options, etc.) and lives in a certain environment, an environment which respects 
the condition of independence, and furnishes him with an adequate range of 
options.195 As such, Chirchov et al state196  
“A person is autonomous when his or her behaviour is experienced as willingly 
enacted and when he or she fully endorses the actions in which he or she is 
engaged and/or the values expressed by them.”  
Autonomy always connects through relatedness or interconnectedness. Early 
philosophers have noted the importance of relatedness to enable one to flourish 
through the ideas of unity and well-being.197 Relatedness is the 
interconnectedness of life. However, while relatedness is the interconnecting 
web, it is not the centre piece such as through the vertical – the hegemonic 
collectivity.198 Rather, within the horizontal, the relational individual199 is front and 
                                                     
191 John Eekelaar “Personal Rights and Human Rights” (2002) 2 Hum Rts L Rev 181 at 185. 
192 Raz, above n 140, at 391; June Statham and Elaine Chase Childhood Wellbeing: A brief 
Overview (2010) at 2. 
193 Raz, above n 140, at 391; Marshall, above n 2, at 97. 
194 Raz, above n 140, at 391. 
195 At 391. 
196 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 98. 
197 Jill Marshall Human Rights Law and Personal Identity (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, 
NY, 2014) at 93. 
198 The hegemonic collective comprises of individuals who are individuated by status competing 
with one another within the hierarchical (super)structure of the collective.  
199 I have purposely used relational individual here to differentiate from the individual of 
individualism.  
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centre.200 The relatedness within which the relational individual is placed requires 
sociability, interdependence, and common goals.  
While the vertical centres on collectivity through hegemonic adherence,201 the 
horizontal sociability centres relatedness and support. Relatedness and support 
enable a sense of well-being and an enhanced potentiality. It is thus through 
relatedness that we see others as oneself, the equality of being. Sociability 
provides a sense of belonging which is a human need to be part of something 
greater than oneself. It is through such belonging that establishes a process of 
recognition and respect and equality of being. It is the needs of all members 
constituting and constructing the community as per one’s potentiality. It is 
something of value through which one attaches value in themselves. This is 
different to the collectivity where value becomes imposed.  
Sociability has a reliance on one another. This reliance is an interdependence on 
one another. Interdependence indicates that it is a reciprocal dependence. All 
members of society are dependent upon each other.  This dependence is a willing 
reliance on the other’s care and guidance, particularly if the other is perceived as 
supportive and responsive.202 This is not about directive guidance or obedience,203 
but providing support for autonomous life. This is illustrated through research for 
example with families that shows parents who support autonomy have teens who 
rely on them more and who are more likely to internalise parental norms.204   
                                                     
200 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 100. 
201 Hegemonic adherence is the indirect and direct regulatory enforcement of ideology and 
institutions of the collective.  
202 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 98. 
203 The vertical also utilises dependence, but in the sense of force or submission, such as with a 
child forced to submit to the guidance from a parent, as opposed to autonomously accepting any 
guidance. See: At 98. 
204 At 98. 
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Sociability is the interdependence on others through common goals. While 
common goals also occur in the vertical such as socio-political or economic goals, 
in the horizontal they centre on relational well-being. One’s well-being is 
interrelated with others well-being, and thus, leads to the well-being of the 
community as a whole. This common purpose as Charles Taylor explains, allows 
one to be oneself, yet be part of the common goals: “I am not in any way pulled 
outside myself. I am still ‘obeying myself’ a member of this common project or 
‘general will’.”205  
1.3.3.2 Reciprocity of Life – Rights and Equality 
The reciprocity principle is found in most general accounts of human society.206 It 
can occur as a negative type of reciprocity207 or a balanced, or as Mauss refers, 
social reciprocity.208 Balanced209 or social reciprocity is the principle of 
equivalence.210 It expresses an equivalence between that given and that 
received.211 This is illustrated through Mauss’ discussion of Maori society where 
the given is alive, containing the spirit (hau) and brings balance or equivalence 
                                                     
205 Taylor, above n 38, at 48. 
206 MacCormack, above n 174, at 96. 
207 Negative reciprocity is not about relatedness, that is, there is no personal relationship. Rather 
it is where “each strives to outdo the other and acquire as much profit as he can. Such 
relationships range from situations of ‘barter’ or ‘haggling’ to situations characterised by a 
succession of reprisals.” See: At 98, 99; Reciprocity cannot be based on selfish or outcome-
oriented preferences, such as ‘reciprocal altruism’ where one is only willing to reciprocate if 
there are future rewards arising from reciprocal actions. See: Falk and Fischbacher, above n 175, 
at 294, Footnote 1. 
208 Edward L Schieffelin “Reciprocity and the Construction of Reality” (1980) 15 Man 502 at 503. 
209 This is sometimes referred to as balanced reciprocity. Balanced reciprocity is different to 
generalised reciprocity which is based on strong relationships. This is where the flow of goods 
and services tends to be largely from one of them to the other. There may be some expectation 
of repayment but the return gifts or services may be far inferior to what has been received or 
may be deferred for a very considerable time. See: MacCormack, above n 174, at 98. 
210 At 98. 
211 At 91. 
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back to the clan.212  MacCormack argues to the importance of reciprocity in society 
when he refers to Firth’s analysis of Maori society. Firth believed that213   
 “the principle of reciprocity as 'one of the most fundamental drives to action' 
among the Maori. What is meant is that the Maori attach great importance to 
the notion of ‘compensation’ or 'equivalent return' in many different situations. 
Reciprocity is an essential element of social life. As a principle of equivalence, it 
determines what that society views as valuable and significant. Social reciprocity 
becomes the norm214 that ratifies and constructs social relations.215 These 
relations include the social, the spiritual,216 and all other facets of life.217 This 
reciprocity that enables a behavioural response to perceived kindness and 
unkindness, where kindness comprises both distributional fairness as well as fair 
intentions.218 
This reciprocity engages the giver and the receiver through dignity and worth. This 
is best illustrated through Marcel Mauss’ writing on reciprocity of the gift. He 
states that219   
“each gift is part of a system of reciprocity in which the honour of giver and 
recipient are engaged. It is a total system in that every item of status or of 
spiritual or material possession is implicated for everyone in the whole 
community.”  
Reciprocity centres on the value and in the general sense, this value is one’s dignity 
and worth. Through reciprocity, the whole and the part is involved in the 
                                                     
212 Marcel Mauss The gift (Routledge, London, 2002) at 14; Schieffelin, above n 208, at 503. 
213 MacCormack, above n 174, at 92. 
214 At 99. 
215 Schieffelin, above n 208, at 504. 
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‘exchange’. That is, each exchange of reciprocity not only affects that part, the 
moment in time and that situation, but also that of the whole which affects that 
individual’s being and that of the community. Mauss goes on to say220 
“The system is quite simple; just the rule that every gift has to be returned in 
some specified way sets up a perpetual cycle of exchanges within and between 
generations. In some cases the specified return is of equal value, producing a 
stable system of statuses; in others it must exceed the value of the earlier gift, 
producing an escalating contest for honour. The whole society can be described 
by the catalogue of transfers that map all the obligations between its members. 
The cycling gift system is the society.”  
This principle of equivalence is relational where the dignity of two individuals or 
groups meet. The unitary equivalence is that of dignity. Dignity is the concept of 
all human beings equally worthy of respect.221 However, it is through such an 
equivalence or equality principle that politics enters into dignity.222 Dignity223 
attributes value – worth or esteem – to everyone solely by the fact of existentiality. 
This goes beyond the Kantian idea of dignity as based on status as “rational agents, 
capable of directing our lives through principles.”224 Value through worth in the 
sense of esteem is a universal human potential, a capacity that all humans share. 
This potential, rather than anything a person may have made of it, is what ensures 
that each person deserves respect.225 Indeed, our sense of the importance of 
potentiality reaches so far that we extend this protection even to people who 
through some circumstance that has befallen them are incapable of realising their 
potential in a normal way – handicapped people or those in a coma, for 
                                                     
220 At xi. 
221 Taylor, above n 38, at 41. 
222 At 39. 
223 This is significantly different to the vertical horizon which understands dignity through a 
concept of honour, achieved through status or deeds.  
224 Taylor, above n 38, at 41. 
225 At 41. 
57 
 
instance.226 Simply suggesting that one does not have potential or is not of worth 
is simply to deny human equality.227 To show that someone is of value and worth, 
one must offer recognition, respect, and esteem.  
Recognition is a process of reciprocity. Such recognition is not based on status 
identities, what one is,228 but it is the tendency to see others as themselves, as 
equal beings,229 yet while being unique and distinct.230 It enables the awareness 
of specificity and difference on an ongoing dynamic basis thus forging a stronger 
sense of identity.231 For this reason, due recognition becomes essential to the 
development of the self, one’s being.232 Due recognition not only affects the 
perception of others, but also the perception of oneself.233 It is for these reasons 
that recognition is not a mere courtesy or toleration, but as Charles Taylor states, 
it is “a vital human need.”234 Denial of such recognition, or misrecognition, is to 
suffer both a distortion of one’s relation to one’s self and an injury to one’s 
identity.235   
Reciprocity obligates or demands respect as a basic human need. Respect is the 
appreciation of others, or as Axel Honneth argues love, for one another as 
existential beings.236 This respect is not only for others and by others, but also 
                                                     
226 At 41–42. 
227 At 42. 
228 Raz, above n 140, at 391. 
229 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 100; Nancy Fraser “Rethinking Recognition” (2000) 3 NLR 
107 at 109. 
230 Fraser, above n 229, at 109. 
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towards oneself – self-respect.237 Respect is the acknowledegment of each being, 
each one’s identity and what is peculiar to each. As Charles Taylor states:238  
We give due acknowledgement only to that is universally present – everyone has 
an identity – through recognising what is peculiar to each. The universal demand 
powers an acknowledgement of specificity. 
It is “one that is particular to me, and that I discover in myself.”239 It respects one’s 
sense of self and their interpretation of their own life and surroundings.240 As such, 
within the horizontal this respect prizes241 uniqueness and difference – the 
diversity of life. Respect is appreciation, rather than toleration or acceptance. This 
respect for uniqueness and individual traits that one has enables one to 
autonomously define oneself as an existential yet relational being242 of the 
community.243 Thus, respect is a reciprocal interplay of social relations.244 It is 
through this respect of oneself and from others that one can realise one’s well-
being245 which is consistent with empowerment.246  
Respect enables integrity to one’s self, one’s being. Integrity is “being true to 
myself and my own particular way of being.”247 Without integrity, there is no 
dignity. Integrity is not socially, but inwardly generated.248 This links with esteem.  
                                                     
237 At 193; Helen MF Jones “Respecting Respect: Exploring a Great Deal” (2002) 28 Educational 
Studies 341 at 342. 
238 Taylor, above n 38, at 39. 
239 At 28. 
240 Jones, above n 237, at 343. 
241 This horizon favours or incorporates diversity as part of the natural way of life while the 
vertical horizon eliminates or disfavours it  
242 Rather than accepted as a status being of what one must be.  
243 Chirkov and others, above n 41, at 100. 
244 Tilly, above n 33, at 7. 
245 Jones, above n 237, at 343. 
246 At 343. 
247 Taylor, above n 38, at 28. 
248 At 32. 
59 
 
Esteem is the value or worth, and thus the respect, that one sees in another or 
oneself. It is an equality of esteem, a worth bestowed on all in the sense of equality 
of valued beings. It is through such a unity of purpose, through the common goals, 
that all are honoured equally through the support of the general will.249 As 
opposed to the vertical,250 the equality of esteem is incompatible with any 
differentiation.251 It is by caring about esteem that enables unity of purpose 
compatible with freedom and social unity because the society is one in the same 
operating through right reasons.252 The right reasons Charles Taylor argues is the 
Rousseauian idea of esteem characterised by equality, reciprocity, and unity of 
purpose (common goals).253  
The ‘rights’ as understood within this horizon is that which is required to be worthy 
as a human being – that of living a good life – a life where one can achieve 
potentiality. Equality of being, rather than equal treatment is essential to this 
horizon. This horizon sees everyone as similar to oneself – equally human while 
acknowledging that everyone has different needs according to each one’s 
competency and potentiality.   
Social reciprocity provides the basis for rights and equality. It recognises each 
human being as of equal worth and value. However, in doing do, it does not force 
people into statuses or categories but respects them as unique and distinct beings 
                                                     
249 At 49. 
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who have competency and potentiality and the need to autonomously author 
their own life. The rights are the ‘positive rights’ of enabling one’s being so that 
one can autonomously author who one is and who one is to be. These rights occur 
through relatedness and reciprocity based on mutual recognition, respect, and 
esteem.  
1.3.4 Horizons of Becoming 
As illustrated above, life is understood through narratives which are written within 
and understood by interpretive horizons. These horizons not only provide the 
vantage points but also the basis for understanding life. These horizons are 
important to orient a person in society. As Gadamer writes, “a person with this 
horizon knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon, as near 
or far, great or small.”254 The horizon is the principle by which not only one 
understands the world around them, but also the principles by which one becomes 
who or what they are. It may either limits or enhances one’s vision of the world. 
One horizon limits the vision to that of the collective as front and centre of the 
world view while the other enhances the world view incorporating all far and near 
with the relational being front and centre. The beginning of this chapter illustrated 
two possibilities of becoming. One was open and diverse, while the other is closed 
and restricted. In one becoming, recognition is through one’s collective status, 
such as sex status. The other is as a relational human being inclusive of whatever 
uniqueness one has been endowed with. As will be noted later, it is this relational 
human being or human person, that was conceptualised within international 
human rights. 
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1.4 Two Becomings of (Inter)Sex 
Sex is a dynamic life-long authorship of becoming.255 Understanding sex as a 
becoming brings to mind Simone de Beauvoir’s famous statement, “one is not 
born a woman, but becomes a woman.”256 Her work acknowledged the 
hermeneutic process of becoming a sex.257 She continues by saying that:258  
“No biological, psychical, or economic destiny defines the figure that the human 
female takes on in society; it is civilisation as a whole that elaborates this 
intermediary product between the male and eunuch that is called the feminine.”     
Her writing indicates that sex is not some linear biological process or phenomena, 
but it is a becoming involving many mediatory elements. As indicated by Simone 
de Beauvoir, sex is a product of becoming and belonging.259  
Like the many other multiplicities, sex is not deducible to and cannot be claimed 
as a biological nor a historical fact.260 Sex, as with other multiplicities, is 
interpretive rather than inborn.261 As mentioned that interpretive horizons are a 
hermeneutic process of the whole and the parts. This is also true for sex as it is to 
any of the other multiplicities that makeup who or what one is. Sex (the whole) 
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comprises many parts including the biological – primary262 and secondary263 sex 
characteristics, the socio-political,264 and the environmental.265 Like Warnke’s use 
of the heart example, sex may be understood as the base which informs the parts 
and enables the interpretation of the parts of sex, or it may be an interpretation 
of the parts – the biological, socio-political and environmental parts – in informing 
the whole which in turn inform the parts. The first example is the common 
understanding as a linear process of sex development. This starts from the genetic 
code and the presence of the “Y chromosome makes the embryo develop as a 
male; in its absence, the default development is along the female pathway”266 and 
from there a linear process occurs leading to the other sexual characteristics such 
as testes, scrotum, ovaries, uterus, vagina, and clitoris and most importantly the 
brain and the neural system as male or female as determined by the genetic 
code.267 While the second is the whole of sex understood through the mediation 
of the many parts that inform the whole. Unlike the linear process, there are no 
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preconceptions of what one is to become. It is like a committee of the various 
parts that negotiate the various possibilities how one comes to be a sex.268  
1.4.1 Sex - Horizons and Culture 
The whole and parts, such as one’s sex, are unintelligible without understanding 
them from the vantage point from which the becoming derived. In relation to the 
hermeneutic task to sex becoming, Georgia Warnke refers to these different 
vantage points of the hermeneutic task writing that:269    
we are bound within specific stories or wholes…that are more or less intelligible 
depending on the context in which they appear; there are different ways of 
understanding those contexts and therefore who counts as males or females or 
as men or women within them; and …our understandings of men and women 
and or males and females will depend on the understanding of the contexts in 
which we can successfully see them as parts.     
The interpretive horizon ground the basis of sex becoming. It sets how sex is 
understood and what is expected in the becoming of sex. In her work on gender 
and race Linda Alcoff explains horizons:270     
“The horizon is just the individual or particular perspective that each person has, 
that makes up who that person is, consisting of his or her background 
assumptions, form of life, and social location or position within the social 
structure and hierarchy.”     
The authorship occurs through the interpretive horizons that provide the 
perspectives and assumptions as Georgia Warnke states:271   
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“assumptions and expectations about proper and distinct gender activities erect 
the interpretive frameworks through which certain features and combinations 
of features appear to be fundamental to bodies and to comprise their sex.”  
It is the background of the interpretive horizon that provides the scene for sex 
becoming. In other words, it provides the interpretive context, the perspectives 
and assumptions though which one’s sex becomes.  
It is, therefore, the interpretive horizons that provide the basis for sex becoming. 
Gayle Rubin wrote in her renowned work The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 
"Political Economy" of Sex wrote that272 
Hunger is hunger, but what counts as food is culturally determined and obtained. 
Every society has some form of organized economic activity. Sex is sex. But what 
counts as sex is equally culturally determined and obtained. Every society has a 
sex/gender system – a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material 
of human sex and procreation is shaped by human social intervention and 
satisfied in a conventional manner, no matter how bizarre some of these 
conventions may be.  
This well-renowned statement implies the that one’s physiology is just that, 
physiology, and it only has meaning through one’s horizon. It is, therefore, the 
horizon that gives social and political meaning to sex as well as all other parts of 
life. Sex, therefore, as Rubin says, is “not ahistorical emanations of the human 
mind; they are products of historical human activity.”273 Cordelia fine argues that 
“sex is surprising dynamic, and not just open to influence from gender 
constructions, but reliant on them.”274 Thus, although biology is involved in sex 
becoming, meaning and significance come through the interpretive horizon or the 
cultural background. Sex is, therefore, an interpretation of the mediated ongoing 
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relationship between the personal and the socio-political practices and 
experiences upon the biological and not caused by it.275 Jo Bird argues that it is 
through the interpretive horizons that the socio-political nature is inscribed upon 
one’s sex. She writes:276   
“(T)he body is literally written on, inscribed by desire and signification, at the 
anatomical, physiological, and neurological levels. The body is in no sense 
naturally or innately psychical, sexual or sexed. It is indeterminate and 
indeterminable outside its social constitution as a body of a particular 
type…(T)he body...is an open-ended pliable set of significations, capable of being 
re-written, reconstituted in quite other terms than those which mark it, and 
consequently capable of reinscribing the forms of sexed identity and psychical 
subjectivity at work today.”  
The interpretive force on the biologism is often stronger than that of the inborn 
characteristics such as the ‘biological sex characteristics’.277 That is living bodies 
are responsive to the interpretive horizon. Cordelia Fine reminds us that “Living 
bodies are dynamic systems that develop and change in response to their social 
and historical contexts.”278 Therefore, to understand sex becoming, one must 
understand the interpretive horizon in which it becomes on and through one’s 
body.279    
As such all sex becoming begins the same. It starts with two gametes together in 
the forming of a new human being. This is the only point at which a perfect binary 
of male and female actually exist. Joan Roughgarden writes that:280   
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“When it comes to sex, there are only two generalisations: (1) Most species 
reproduce sexually; and (2) Among the species that do reproduce sexually, 
gamete size obeys a near-universal binary between very small (sperm) and large 
(egg), so that the male and female can be defined biologically as the production 
of small and large gametes, respectively. Beyond these two generalizations, the 
generalizing stops and diversity begins.”  
Beyond the generalisation that there are sperm and egg producers which are 
required to produce new offspring, no other generalisation of a sex binary 
exists.281 from the time they combine, that is after fertilisation, the interpretive 
horizons begin to influence on sex becoming.282 In the early stages, sex becoming 
is similar as it is mostly biological. However, the understanding of what is going on 
from without is different as will be seen. It is from this very fertilisation of the two 
binary elements that a new sex becoming begins. The next two sections will 
describe the two becomings of sex.  
1.4.2 Diversity of (Inter)Sex Becoming 
Many societies, in particular, indigenous societies, were accepting of uniqueness 
and difference seeing everyone as equal beings having interdependence and 
sociability.283 Despite what is commonly discussed as determining sex 
(chromosomes or gonads), everyone has a physiological variety of ‘sex 
anatomy’.284 While each person may have a propensity for sex diversity, we are 
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not a blank slate for gender ascription.285 The development begins from the 
moment of fertilisation of the egg but does not start with any preconceptions. It 
develops from an organic mediation of the biological, the socio-cultural and even 
the environmental influences that become part of who one is rather than any 
‘linear biological development’. As Joan Roughgarden describes:286   
“Imagine that genes are like mice at the top of the bowling lane, who scurry 
down the lane, bumping into genetic pins as they go eventually knocking down 
all of the genetic pins in a variable but directional, clamor. In my picture of how 
development works, diversity begins from the very beginning.”  
Each very element that forms our being, using the terminology from Joan 
Roughgarden, is a ‘committee’ which determines the outcome, of who we are.287 
The committee as a social entity is all independent and essential to determining 
the outcome of a unique individual. From the very moment the gametes meet, 
there is a variety of ‘social’ influences upon the possible outcomes on how the 
future individual will develop. Rather than a determination as many still assume, 
genes are a contestation for various sex of the tissues such as for the gonads 
through negotiation by a ‘committee’ of genes.288 Carlson writes that “each 
component of the reproductive system is probably the consequence of dozens of 
different genes and numerous pathways by which cells are assembled, 
differentiated, and assigned alternate functions in the male and female 
pathways.”289 Chromosomes do not operate in isolation, but require certain 
biochemicals called enzymes to makes the genes effective.290 Without the 
appropriate enzymes, variations may occur.    
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Biology is not separated from the sense of self but rather becomes intrinsic and 
integral to the whole and parts in the becoming of (inter)sex.291 I purposely use 
(inter)sex here in this section to demonstrate that sex is not a simple binary and 
the many intersex variations demonstrate the diversity of sex that is possible in 
becoming who one is. That is, the authorship of sex (the whole) mediates with the 
many parts that together become one’s sex. This relational mediation in the 
authorship of (inter)sex includes the biological, social, and even the 
environmental.292 Thus, unlike the vertical system, sex is not broken into two 
different definitions but is best described as293    
the felt sense of meaning through the belonging to and felt compatibility with a 
sex – male, female, both, or neither – relating how they see themselves, and how 
they think others see them, in performing social roles, expressions, and functions 
through their biological body.      
This indicates that from the very beginning, rather than categories of sex, sex 
should be understood as a diversity of sex potentialities where there are many 
possible combinations all of which contribute to overall human potentiality.  
Prenatal becoming has already initiated physiological structures, such as ovaries, 
uterus, vagina, clitoris, and/or penis, testes, and scrotum while at the same time 
forming the brain and the neural system.294 During the prenatal period, there may 
also be certain maternal sources such as food, medication, and even beauty 
products and other chemicals. For example, the use of endocrine disruptors in 
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utero have been linked to variations such as hypospadias.295 However, 
predominantly, at this point, the biology mediates in initiating the establishment 
of sex authorship. It is these, as well as the rest of one’s physiology that begins to 
mediate with the socio-environment relationally in authoring one’s sex.  
It is important to note that many people refer to elements of sex such as 
chromosomal sex, foetal gonadal sex, foetal hormonal sex, foetal internal 
reproductive sex, brain sex, and external genital sex,296 however, none of these in 
themselves are indicative of one’s sex, especially as a binary sex of male or female, 
but enable the becoming of a diversity or spectrum of sex.297 This diversity is most 
clearly illustrated through intersex variation that is diversity298 of sexual feature 
including Intersex people have bodily diversity inclusive of chromosomal, 
hormonal, and anatomical features that are neither exclusively male nor female, 
but are typical of both at once or not clearly defined as either.299  Diversity can 
also occur in secondary characteristics such as muscle mass, hair distribution, 
breasts and stature, pitch, menstruation.300 Each of the layers of the sex 
development process can operate independently of each other, and hence, leaves 
a person’s sex identity, unpredictable.301 It is “the like bass and treble knobs on a 
                                                     
295 Rudacille, above n 8, at 240–276; Fausto-Sterling, above n 262, at 119–120; “Endocrine 
Disrupting Chemicals (EDCs)” (2017) World Health Organisation 
<http://www.who.int/ceh/risks/cehemerging2/en/>. 
296 Fausto-Sterling, above n 262, at 10–11; Carlson, above n 262, at 111. 
297 John Stoltenberg Refusing to be a Man: Essays on Sex and Justice (UCL Press, London, 2000) at 
24. 
298 Silvan Agius and Christa Tobler Trans and Intersex People: Discrimination on the Grounds of 
Sex, Gender Identity and Gender Expression (2012) at 12. 
299 At 12; Katrina Roen “Intersex Embodiment: When Health Care Means Maintaining Binary 
Sexes” (2004) 1 Sexual Health 127 at 127; Sara Benson “Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: 
Recognising Fundamental Rights for the Intersexed” (2005) 12 Cardozo J L & Gender 31 at 33; 
Melanie Blackless and others “How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis” (2000) 12 
Am J Hum Biol 151 at 161; Philip Ebels “Intersex People in EU: Ashamed and Invisible” 
EUobserver.com (12 June 2012) <http://euobserver.com/890/116578>. 
300 Agius and Tobler, above n 298, at 12; Curra, above n 262, at 273. 
301 Fausto-Sterling, above n 262, at 11. 
70 
 
radio that can be mixed in all manner of combinations.”302 These variations are 
important to the self-authorship of sex and one’s sense of sex whether it be male, 
female, both or neither.  
At this point, it is important to interlude by introducing a key in the becoming of 
(inter)sex, and identity in general. Within the vertical system, the brain is 
considered a blank slate through which the authorship of one’s sex status/gender 
is authored. The vertical horizon does not see the brain as influencing the 
‘biological sex development. This is not within the horizontal horizon. The brain is 
not a “blank slate awaiting operating instructions.”303 It is rather the plane through 
which mediates the internal and external during the authorship of (inter)sex. This 
is illustrated by a medical researcher, William Reiner, at John Hopkins who 
states:304  
In the end, it is only the children themselves who can and must identify who and 
what they are. It is for us as clinicians and researchers to listen and to learn. 
Clinical decisions must ultimately be based not on anatomical predictions, nor 
on the "correctness" of sexual function, for this is neither a question of morality 
nor of social consequence, but on that path most appropriate to the likeliest 
psychosexual developmental pattern of the child. In other words, the organ that 
appears to be critical to psychosexual development and adaptation is not the 
external genitalia, but the brain. 
In short, he states that it is the brain that determines one’s sex, the platform where 
this mediation of the various parts occurs, and not the genitals or other physiology. 
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Moreover, a biologist Joan Roughgarden states that our personhood and identity 
emerge from the substances of the brain.305 This area becomes central to the 
mediation and negotiation between the ‘me’ and the ‘you’ and the 
institutional/general otherness. Although the brain is developing and continually 
being renewed, even at the time of birth, it is critically involved in this process.  
Thus, from the time one enters the world, there is already potential for many 
variations of sex from a biological and physiological initiation. These are waiting 
for the mediation of the ‘me’ relationality. Even prior to talking, children recognise 
the socialised and acceptable sex identities, what it means to be a particular sex 
identity – boy or a girl, both or neither and discriminate between them.306 As the 
horizontal appreciates diversity, the child feels safe to author their sex as initiated 
by or emanate from the infant/child.307 The infant learns that it is appropriate to 
act, think and feel accordingly without having to comply with sex organisation in 
society.308 Research has also shown that by the modal age of 5 (mean of 8) they 
recognise how they identify – whether it be as male, female, both or neither,309 
despite at that point not being aware of how their sexual relationships (often 
referred to as sexual orientation) may become.310  
These relational interactions develop as one matures311 within a supportive 
environment, both in the home and in the social environment generally. They 
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enable the child to have a strong sense of self. Supportive people around the child 
recognise the boundaries between their own interests and those of the children 
in their care which enable development.312 This enables the child to receive 
respect and have esteem (as will be detailed in the next chapter) to be a 
constructive member of society. It also enables the child to have worth and feel 
valued. It enables them to develop in a moral supportive environment and become 
a participatory constituent. Infants have the ability to recognise sex and 
discriminate between them.  
This does not mean that becoming of sex is complete. There is another further 
biological mediation and the socio-environmental mediation which continues for 
most of one’s life. As one’s authorship continues, the interaction with others 
continues to mediate one’s sex. At puberty, biology continues the narration 
process. The gonads which differentiated during fetal development become 
active, creating another layer – pubertal hormonal sex.313 At this stage, two other 
biological aspects add complexity to the narrative process. First, there is the flow 
of hormones which not only initiate other ‘secondary sex aspects’ (for example, 
body hair, breasts, voice, pitch, menstruation) but also influence the erotic 
sensations and desires (pubertal erotic sex) and adult differentiated anatomy – 
what John Money called pubertal morphological sex.314 During childhood, sexual 
relations and relationships were formed socially, but at puberty, one’s ‘sexual 
orientation’ becomes a factor in the narrative process.  
All of the biological and the psychological and social capabilities are in place to 
enable the child to become who it wants to be and become.315 This means that 
physiologically there is the ability to develop an array of different sex identities. 
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For this to happen, it requires the supportive environment from which the 
conditions autonomously develop.316 Thus, it requires a social environment with 
choices and options available. It also requires independence. This determines 
whether a person’s sex is developed autonomously or not. 
The ‘adult’ sex identity which is formed post-puberty, becomes one’s sense of 
self.317 By this stage, biology has predominantly done its job in the narrative 
process. Although hormone levels may change throughout one’s life as one ages 
and may change bodily appearance, the narrative process is predominantly 
influenced by the social elements. This may include some medical adaption of the 
body to match one’s identity. This sense of self, whether it be autonomous or 
heteronomous, is determined by whether one’s well-being is supported by the 
social environment. The narrative process continues, but by adulthood, for many 
people becomes relatively stable with little change throughout one’s life. For 
some, knowledge and or environmental changes, may lead to further narrative 
changes in one’s sex.  
One’s sex, whatever it turns out to be, becomes part of who one is and how one 
comes to be. This includes the connectedness to one’s intersex variations or other 
variations of sex diversity that occurs. It is through one’s sex and the many other 
multiplicities that one becomes a functioning member of society. Although there 
may be gendered roles these are not fixed and immutable in who counts as 
fulfilling such roles. They have meaningfulness and value in life.   
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The horizontal horizon centres on the relational human being. It provides the basic 
needs of humanness: competency, autonomy, and relatedness. It is thus clear that 
the horizontal tilts in favour of autonomy as is supports an autonomous life.318 The 
community within such a horizon is guided by principles which positively maintain 
the sense of community and connectedness. These principles centre on the 
reciprocity of life of recognition and respect. These principles enable all individuals 
to be treated as equals in their narrating of their life. They have the autonomy to 
become who they are. This becoming of sex enables esteem and respect of a life 
of integrity to become a constructive member of society.  
One’s becoming in the horizontal horizon is always one of reciprocity. One’s 
becoming is authored with uniqueness and diversity as even elemental to its 
understanding and structure. Although one’s becoming will always occur in and 
through social relations, they will not necessarily define us. It is never fixed, 
immutable or determinable. It is always a process of meditation. As Stuart Hall 
stated, it is “a process of articulation, a suturing, an over-determination not a 
subsumption.”319  It accepts that320  
identities are never unified, and … increasingly fragmented and fractured; never 
singular, but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and 
antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions. They are subject to radical 
historicization, and are constantly in the process of change and transformation. 
As such horizontal becoming is a process of evolving, reinventing, or transforming 
nature.321 It is a mediation between stasis and change322 where nothing is resolved 
or in closure, yet often contradictory as it accommodates the emergence of new 
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possibilities or transformations of the whole and the parts of one’s becoming.323 
It is from this ‘to and fro’ between ipse (self) and idem (sameness), between 
individual thrust, and the categories which match with or to which a person 
adheres,324 that it is possible to interpret one’s becoming. Sex becoming within 
the horizontal horizon leaves all possibilities of sex becoming. The variations of 
intersex are simply some of the many possibilities with the many expressions of 
one’s sex.  
1.4.3 The Becoming of a Linear Sex (Status) as Male or Female 
Although the beginning of the vertical becoming of sex is the same as the 
horizontal becoming, it is not the biological, but the interpretation of the 
existential and the experiences that differ. People understand their experience 
within their interpretive horizon or their worldview.325 Becoming within the 
vertical interpretive horizon is part of the collectivity. The collectivity operates as 
a hegemonic system.326 This becoming is near universal in modern societies and in 
some pre-modern societies. These societies understand sex within two parts the 
determinable (sex) and the constructed becoming (sex/gender). This is illustrated 
by Cordelia Fine:327   
“Sex is so fundamental, so the story goes. It is the timeless, unchanging seed 
from which either a male or female developmental programme unfurls. 
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Experience plays a secondary role in the individual’s developmental journey to a 
male brain and male nature, or to a female brain and female nature.”   
Fine’s description of sex becoming demonstrates the process of becoming within 
the vertical interpretive horizon. It is taken for granted that the biological basis of 
sex is so fundamental, that unless nature makes a mistake, there are two species 
– male or female – and these will biological develop in a linear pattern irrespective 
of one’s becoming. This becoming, the narrative of one’s life occurs secondary to 
one’s biological development and is interpreted and understood in relation to such 
biological development.  
Sex becoming is understood as a status determined by nature that unfurls into 
socio-political roles. There are two different species as male and female and not 
just two different reproductive systems (women have ovaries, a womb and lactate 
while men are sperm producers).328 This is based on three assumptions:329    
First, it assumes that sex is dimorphic, having two different forms, male and 
female, which have distinct anatomical structures and biological functions. 
Second, each form has different physical characteristics…Third, each form has 
different psychological and behavioural characteristics.   
These assumptions inform not only the determination of sex but also the 
becoming that follows on from such a determination. These sex statuses do not 
allow room for any variation which is considered a mistake of nature or an 
abnormality that must be erased or rectified. In other words, intersex is not 
recognised except for as an abnormality or mistake.  
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1.4.3.1 Determined Sex of Identicality  
Biological sex development begins from the very time of conception and continues 
through a linear pathway throughout life. The fertilisation of the egg begins a 
process that according to this interpretive horizon unfurls into a male or female 
biology. This initiates a pathway based on the chromosomes which are either XX 
or XY. As Cordelia Fine states that the old, but still prevalent account:330   
“is that the presence of a Y chromosome makes the embryo develop as a male; 
in its absence, the default development is along the female pathway, 
…individuals with Y will develop testes and in the absence of Y chromosomes, 
ovaries will develop.”  
Sex determination depends on the presence or absence of the Y-chromosome. The 
sex will then lead to the direction of other related sex characteristics. Biologist 
Joan Roughgarden describes this process:331   
a master gene triggers a subordinate gene, which cascades to downstream genes 
in a descending hierarchy of control. In this point of the picture, bodies develop 
as though a bowling ball were accurately rolled to hit the genetic kingpin at just 
the right spot and cause all the genetic bowling pins behind to fall down in a 
perfect order. Producing a normal baby is bowling a genetic strike.  
The chromosomes, as Fine refers to, lead to a linear development of other 
anatomical structures including those often referred to as sex structures (for 
example, ovaries, testes, uterus, scrotum, vagina, and clitoris) and most 
importantly the brain and the neural system.332 This assumes there is a close linear 
association of “3G” sex – genetic, gonadal, and genitals – as core markers of sex.333  
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From the time of birth, the linear development continues along the chromosomal 
pathway albeit at a slower pace until puberty. At puberty, sex development 
continues with ‘secondary sex characteristics’ of body hair, breasts, voice, pitch, 
menstruation, and sexual sensations and desires.334 One’s biological sex further 
develops into adulthood. Later in life, other factors change such as menopause in 
women. Up till recently, it has also been assumed that this determined sex will 
also determine one’s sexual relations, and hence the system of heterosexuality.  
This understanding excludes other variations and any differences that are 
considered as abnormalities or medical conditions, or some even refer to them as 
mistakes of nature. Joan Roughgarden explains how it is possible to understand 
through a different narrative:335   
“Although early scientists could equally well have approached developmental 
biology with an open heart, ready to embrace the diversity of molecular 
mechanisms that produce bodily and behavioural diversity, the part line has 
instead been to sound the alarm at any hint of diversity, then to label diversity 
as disease and ‘cure’ it. Of course, disease does sometimes occur, and cures for 
true diseases are needed, but the disease model of diversity fundamentally 
misrepresents human nature, inflicting needless procedures or actual harm on 
people in the name of ‘curing’ them.”  
Intersex people have been understood rather as a pathology, a disease. They are 
mistakes of nature that need a cure so that they can live successful lives in society. 
In the modern era, the majority of them undergo sex-normalising treatment to 
physically match them to the sex which the medical professionals deem them to 
be. However, in the past, they have been killed, or ostracised from society, as 
noted in the introduction of the thesis. A remaking of the body is considered where 
the body fails to fit with the gender we expect or where it fails to possess the 
appendages or sites necessary to our ideas of the form or activities and practices 
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that mark a particular gender (and its supposed heterosexuality).336 This narrative 
does not necessarily reflect the only way of understanding the world. This then 
maintains the understanding and operation of the two-sex system as either male 
or female.  
1.4.3.2 Determined Becoming of Sex 
The linear biological development of sex as male or female, according to vertical 
interpretive horizon, establishes the differences between males and females337 
through “the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and 
women.”338 For example, these physiological differences are said to divide humans 
into two species:339  
women menstruate and have developed breasts that are usually capable of 
lactating, while men do not; men have testicles while women do not. And men 
generally have more massive bones than women. 
All humans within this horizon are believed to fit within one of these two species 
with any variation from the markers of the species an anomaly. Therefore, “we are 
born as males and females” but we “become girls, boys, women, and men by 
learning from our families and societies.”340 Otobe’s wording indicates that from 
a biological point of view, sex is a foregone conclusion. Within this horizon, sex 
becoming is one’s socio-political becoming. As such, sex becoming is understood 
as:341  
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the way a person perceives, expresses, and experiences sex identity within social 
relations of a social-political environment through imposed expectations (such 
as getting married and having children), norms, qualities and behaviours upon 
an individual which vary across history societies, cultures and classes.  
Becoming from infancy is a complex process of sex becoming within the socio-
political world. The biology has caused the establishment of what one is – either 
male or female – and now one’s becoming is an integration of one’s perception 
and experiences within the socio-political expectations. In this sense, one’s sex 
becoming is a reaction to and is influenced by other's view of themselves342 such 
as through projecting through their dress code and manners.343 Most people 
accept the assigned sex which becomes their sex status and accordingly their 
sense of worth.344  
Assignation of sex occurs at birth as either male or female according to the 
‘definable’ anatomy.345 This usually is through a quick glance between the legs to 
deduce one’s status346 and at the same time both symbolically and literally reveals 
the truth of one’s gender (the modern term for social sex) that one will become.347 
One’s becoming is pre-determined, in type but not in action. It is thus, the action 
of becoming that the vertical interpretive horizon indicates that one’s becoming is 
a socio-political person with a narrative identity. 
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The process of becoming gender is a lifelong process but begins from the time of 
birth. Even prior to talking, the infant’s brain begins to recognise gender cues, 
acceptability of the cues within society, and what it means to be their gender.348 
There is a continuous process in the early years by picking up cues in the world 
around them in how to become their gender. Cordelia Fine writes that349   
“From birth, children encounter endless gender clues and hints in the real world: 
gender stereotypes transmitted in advertisements; encouraging or discouraging 
words, expressions, or body language from others; toy stores and packaging; 
movies; TV shows; the sex-segregation of adult social roles; and so on.”  
These cues are picked up both consciously or unconsciously. Their becoming of 
gender as male or female and the associated patterns of permitted freedoms of 
that gender become quickly understood. Judith Lorber writes that infants take 
note of gender and its boundaries from the men and women around them. She 
writes that the infants learn: “Whatever a ‘woman’ is has to be ‘female’; whatever 
a ‘man’ is has to be ‘male’.”350 This becomes the perpetual gender categories that 
the child will use to reference the world and author his or her life.351 Although the 
infant knows their gender by the age of five, 352 they have also established stable 
conceptions of353 
“(a) the degree to which they typify their category, (b) their contentedness with 
their assignment, (c) whether they are free to explore cross-sex options or are 
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compelled to conform to sex stereotypes, and (d) whether their own sex is 
superior to the other.”  
That indicates they are fully aware of the necessity to conceal or suppress their 
true gender if it is different from what is assigned.354 From the early years, infants 
have established boundaries of gender becoming that will guide them for most of 
their lives.  
From this point in life, gender becoming is fortified through an internal and 
external sense.355 This includes cues regarding “the socially constructed roles, 
behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for 
men and women.”356 This fortification requires the embracing of what is 
appropriate, the prescriptions and proscriptions for acting, thinking, and feeling) 
and roles and cultural responsibilities associated with one’s gender.357 The 
presentation of one’s becoming feeds back to their sex and is “interpreted by 
others using specific gender framework of an individual’s culture.”358 This is 
reinforced through carers, whether it be family or other members of society, 
reinforcing their own social interests in the child’s gender becoming.359 Cordelia 
Fine writes:360 
“Gender stereotypes operate throughout life both as expectations about the 
characteristics men and women have, and as gender norms dictating double 
standards for how women and men should behave, influencing people’s 
interests, self-concept, performance, and beliefs about capabilities in gendered 
domains. These gender stereotypes and norms are also the foundation of both 
conscious and unconscious forms of sex discrimination, like biased evaluations 
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of performance and potential, and social and economic backlash against people 
whose behaviour isn’t in line with them.”  
The stereotypes of expectations and characteristics that define male and female 
both consciously and unconsciously influence one’s becoming through one’s life. 
For example, Katrina Karkazis writes:361   
“If a baby is labelled ‘female’ at birth, it is assumed that person will grow to 
understand herself as a woman, to dress and act like a woman, and to desire and 
have sex with men. Because this is a normal course of events, it is assumed 
natural.”   
Both the sense of naturalness and the social-political hegemonic pressure have a 
strong influence on one’s self-concept of sex. For those who fail to conform, they 
are seen as outsiders to the schema something of an inhibition that stops much 
diversity of expression and maintains conformity. Due to the naturalness of 
appearance and hegemonic forces at play, there is little resistance to sex becoming 
within the vertical interpretive horizon. For those that resist, by self-defining their 
sex becoming encounter barriers to their becoming.   
Moreover, as one matures, one continues to author gender as cued by 
relationships, society, and sociality.362 This continues with the child as their status 
as sex determined, and gender authored. This becomes their socio-political status 
of life which is not escapable. It is central to and entangled within one’s social and 
legal life of recognition and relationality. At an early age, the infant uses these cues 
as a guide together with the gendered world around them in becoming their 
gender. They pick up on cues about acceptable and non-acceptable relationships, 
even though they yet may not know their favoured sexual relationships.363 As they 
turn to their teens, they begin to form relationships which usually favours 
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culturally accepted values such as heterosexuality.364 These relationships primarily 
adhere to the socio-political way of life.    
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that life is understood through the many narratives that 
give it meaning and purpose. Life is understood through narratives within the 
interpretative horizons.365 These narratives are an interpretation of many whole 
and parts which are hermeneutically interpreted. It is through the hermeneutic 
interpretation of one’s and others’ narratives that one finds meaning and purpose 
in life. It is through the narratives and the interpretive horizons which are authored 
that it is possible to answers questions about oneself.366 The narratives are the 
story of how one becomes who or what one is. It is part of life that gives meaning 
and purpose to people and communities.  
At this point, it is useful to introduce the analogy of the drama to illustrate how 
narratives reflect the life story of one’s becoming. The types of drama illustrate 
two possibilities of becoming. The first type of drama is commonly understood and 
applied. Becoming of the characters in the drama occurs according to a pre-
determined script. The details of the characters – what they are and how they 
come to be – are spelt out with minimal room for autonomous choice or options. 
The director and the writer have set the hegemony from which the drama occurs 
and is understood. This illustrates becoming within a vertical interpretive horizon. 
The second type of drama with no script. The character starts with no or limited 
pre-determinations. A director is there to coordinate or mediate but not direct. As 
there is no set script, becoming is continually in motion, even transformable. Such 
a drama is representative of the horizontal interpretive horizon.  
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Sex becoming, integrative with the many other multiplicities, is a becoming within 
interpretive horizons as explained above. While the same biological elements are 
there in both, the interpretation of these depend on the drama one is in. The first 
is sex becoming in the drama set in the vertical horizon. This drama pre-sets the 
boundaries of sex becoming at birth. One is labelled a male or female as an actor 
in the drama. The scripts are inflexible to diversity or variation and the 
introduction of diversity such as intersex will cause instability to the drama itself. 
The writer and the director have set the roles (how one comes to be) as one 
develops through the drama. Although an actor has some freedom during the 
drama, they are expected to maintain the overall set roles. One’s esteem derives 
from the fulfilling one’s role in the drama successfully and respect derives from 
one’s positionality. In the other type of drama set in the horizontal horizon, there 
is no script for gender becoming. This drama permits sex development and 
becoming over time. As there is no boundaries, sex is interpreted by the person, 
whether it be male, female, both or neither, which may transform over time. As 
such, an intersex person has the freedom to be who they are and the autonomy 
over how they come to be. This enables one to be true to oneself with esteem and 
respect others around them.  
The history of intersex people reflect such becomings. Somewhere from 
mythology to the present intersex people have gone from revered to repressed. 
Although intersex people have existed since time immemorial, although not 
always named as such, they have not always been recognised and accepted within 
society. Some societies in the past respected them as human beings, and some 
societies even revered them, while today, most intersex people are only 
recognised through the determined sexed identity as either male or female. This 
has resulted in their death, ostracism, or the physical and psychological 
manipulation of their bodies to conform them to the socio-cultural understanding 
of sex. They have been left marginalised and invisible to themselves and to others 
around them. Invisibility of intersex people has not always been the norm. It is 
dependent upon the horizon situatedness as to whether intersex people are 
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invisible. This section highlights the two types of sex becoming one accepting of 
diversity inclusive of intersex and the other not accepting and resulting in the 
intersex people existing yet invisible.   
Lives are part of, and yet in themselves make narratives. As with any narrative, 
lives are a story to be read. As Kim Atkins writes: “not only are our life stories 
‘written’, they must also be ‘read’.367 The reading of one’s story requires 
interpretation. Failing to interpret becoming within a horizon leads to the 
misunderstanding of one’s becoming and misinterprets one’s story. Gadamer 
highlights the point that failing to place oneself “within the historical horizon out 
of which tradition speaks, we shall misunderstand the significance of what it has 
to say.”368 Misreading one’s story has the potential to have effects on one’s and 
others’ lives and affect their very sense of being. It can also segregate them from 
the community and prevent them from being a valuable member of the 
community. Often today, intersex people are misread as being a deformed what 
rather than who they are. The effect of this is to ‘fix the deformity’. They are forced 
to undergo normalising surgery to remedy this reading of what they should be.   
Each life story is formed in and through interpretive horizons as explained above 
this may be vertical or horizontal. Narratives though are complex, and may contain 
segments of both horizons or even transform over time. For example, even if being 
born into a vertical interpretive horizon, they may form their character through a 
horizontal interpretive horizon.  Ricoeur explains that the narrative369     
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“constructs the identity of the character, which may be called his or her identity, 
in constructing the story told. It is the identity of the story which makes the 
identity of the character.”  
The narrative constructs the character. That is, depending on the interpretive 
horizon, it may provide a more open free horizon or closed hegemonic horizon in 
which the character develops. It is through the development of the character 
within the construction of the story that it is possible to find one’s identity. In other 
words, it is revealed through the story told. It is through the interpretation of the 
narrative, the narrative identity, that it is possible to understand who or what one 
is and how one comes to be.370 Linda Alcoff wrote that identity is revealed the 
“moment in which it suddenly emerges from hiddenness in the full functional 
context of world.”371 Identity signifies a revealing rather than a determiner. 
The complexity of identity, such as that of sex, comes through its interpretation of 
one’s becoming. Understanding of identity depends on its horizon of situatedness: 
is it a revealing of a mediated source or does it determine what one is and how 
one will come to be? The common conceptualisation of identity, as will be seen in 
the beginning of the next Chapter, is what Paul Ricoeur refers to as the 
‘problematic of identity’ – an immutable determined understanding of what one 
is. This is very much situated within the vertical horizon. To overcome the 
problematic of identity, there needs to be an attestation of a moral being over 
one’s life as to becoming who they are. The answer to this question is critical to 
the autonomy and freedom in which people may live their life. Intersex people 
clearly illustrate the issue of the problematic of identity in that through 
determination of sex (identity) they have been made invisible and forced into a 
pre-determined sex. To overcome the issues they face, they require a moral 
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identity that derives from a moral being of an autonomous capable human being. 
This is the focus of the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: MOVING FROM PERSONAL TO MORAL IDENTITY 
2  
As described in the last chapter, every person’s life story or narrative is formed in 
and through interpretive horizons of situatedness.1 It is either predominantly 
vertical based determination by the collectivity of what one is as upon which a 
narrative is constructed or a horizontal mediatory environment enabling a 
narrative that reveals who one is. The interpretive horizons are not equal in 
enabling how one comes to be or the recognition in what or who one is. 
Irrespective of horizon, becoming is part of an intentional process of the narrative 
of life. Charles Tilly supports this in relation to becoming. He writes humans are 
living bodies “to which human observers attribute coherent consciousness and 
intention.”2 These bodies were a conscious becoming of how one comes to be. It 
is both purposeful and full of meaning.3 Whether it be autonomous or 
heteronomous becoming, either way, it is an intentional becoming. It certainly is 
not a mechanical life. This intentionality of becoming reveals through one’s life-
story or narrative identity.  
The narratives reveal’s one’s character, the protagonist of the story of who, or 
what, one is and how one comes to be – one’s becoming.4 The revealing of the 
character reveals not only what or who one is, but also how one comes to be. The 
revealing of one’s character requires interpretation. As Max Latona writes, identity 
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is the product of interpretation of one’s life story, one’s narrative.5 The 
interpretation of these life stories is through the interpretive horizons in which 
they are understood. The interpretation of these narrative identities thus reveals 
the identity of the character or one’s personal identity. It emerges from the hidden 
context of the world.6  
(Inter)sex becoming, as illustrated in the last chapter, is revealed through one’s 
narrative. The horizon in which it is authored impacts on the becoming of sex. We 
know that children know their sex at a young age, and this may or may not reflect 
the assigned sex one has been given. The same is true for intersex children. That 
is, while the vertical focuses on sex status and may or may not permit other 
statuses than male or female, the horizontal permits the capability to become who 
one is – male, female, both or neither – irrespective of sex characteristics. One can 
be who one is without having to be named. In the modern world, few nations 
permit people to live in a body with sex characteristics other than ‘male’ or 
‘female’. As such, they live a determined sex that they did not decide, in a body 
that has been manipulated with lifelong physical, psychological, and sexual effects, 
and an identity that may or may not reflect who they are. Often this conflicts with 
internal notions of one’s sense of being. 
As intersex people today piece their life together, they like many others around 
them, begin to understand that becoming is not always an autonomous process. 
Intersex children’s bodies have been manipulated and their experiences relating 
to what/who they are – their sense of being - may conflict with the above sense 
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of self. This was noted by Sharon Preves in her research in intersex people. She 
wrote7  
Because most intersexuals grow up without accurate and complete knowledge 
of their physical sexual differences, they experience intense identity confusion 
when they finally piece together the mystery of their ‘gender trouble’. 
This conflict of the sense of self becomes complex, especially when one’s 
becoming has been both socially and physically interfered with and people, such 
as intersex people, cannot make sense of their life. This confusion can have flow 
on effects including psychological effects through one’s life. Moreover, for them, 
it has involved more than simply a determination of a sex even though this be 
somewhat a narrow definition. They have had their very moral identity interfered 
with their moral being and their autonomous capability to form a good life for 
themselves in and with others. For intersex people, this is their central concern. 
This leads to a problematic of identity (described below) as indicated through the 
lives of most intersex people. Their immutable identity including their sex 
(identity) has been predetermined for them from which one finds their self. This 
has issues over morality of or over one’s life and the autonomy of the capability to 
become who or what one is.   
This chapter begins with the problematic of identity where one’s personal identity 
is divested from it narrative base as its singularity. The narrative self is added to, 
and not formative of one’s personal identity.  This leads to the vulnerability of the 
human condition. The chapter then argues, to overcome and protect against the 
vulnerabilities, personal identity must retain its narrative mark of power and attest 
to one’s becoming as an autonomous capable being. This section illustrates what 
capabilities human beings have and what the conditions of autonomy are. The 
following section indicates that the autonomous capable being exists in a moral 
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form or in other words has a moral basis. This reflects the worthiness of the self-
esteem and self-respect of the capable autonomous human being. This indicates 
the identity of a dignified being. This results not in someone just having a personal 
identity but with a moral identity. The moral identity ensures autonomy over who 
one is and how one comes to be. 
2.1 Problematic of Identity 
Becoming involves, as Mead refers, a dialectic of the “I” and the ‘me’. The 
existentialism of ‘I’ to some extent is a form of identicality in that it remains the 
same. This is exemplified by the DNA a person has which remains identical through 
time. This is illustrated by intersex people who have sex characteristics unique to 
themselves that cannot be classed as clearly male or female as part of their 
existential ‘I’ despite what normalising treatments may be performed. The ‘me’ is 
the self that mediates through the reflection of the “I” with that of the surrounding 
environment. The experience of those ‘sex characteristics’ in a relational society 
are part of an intersex person’s becoming that may be as male, female, both or 
neither. It is that dialectic relationship that forms one’s narrative through life, 
including one’s sex. In this sense, identity is a mediation of these two which is 
reflected through one’s narrative identity. However, in many nations, intersex 
people have been interfered with both biologically or physically and socially. This 
interference with the existential ‘I’ has an effect on the existential ‘I’ reflected in 
the ‘me’ while this occurs, the real ‘I’ is not reflected through the ‘me’. This 
represents a disconnected I-me relationship. As such, the experience of ‘me’ is 
restricted to a determined sex as either male or female by others, usually by 
medical professionals, that they must experience. Although they still have a 
narrative it has limited autonomy, or even possibly disconnected one, from one’s 
existential ‘I’. The narrative may reveal an identity for intersex people but leaves 
them vulnerable as will be explained due to the problematic of identity.  
2.1.1 Two Identities – Idem and Ipse Identities  
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The identity of I-me revealed through one’s narrative is composed of two parts of 
a dialectic understood through two Latin words: ‘idem’ (sameness) and ‘ipse’ 
(self/selfhood). This depending on the horizon in which one’s narrative is 
authored, has one of two understandings. The first is an understanding of identity 
as identicality (idem) where the self (ipse) is narrated upon. The second is a 
becoming of a mediation of the idem and the ipse identities that results in or 
reveals one’s becoming. The second understanding has been dominated by the 
first relegating the self or ipse as a becoming upon one’s identity (idem) based on 
the understanding that it does not change over time or space. This creates a 
problematic of identity and leaves the human being vulnerable. First, it is 
important to describe these two interpretations and understandings of identity 
before leading to why the first creates a problematic of identity. Then it is possible 
to explain why the human being is vulnerable due to the problematic of identity. 
This is clearly illustrated by intersex people.  
2.1.1.1 Idem - Identity as Identicality (Separated Idem-Ipse) 
The first understanding of identity is that of identity as identicality.  The ‘idem’ as 
sameness of all times is central to this understanding. The ipse or self is separated 
from the idem and becomes incidental to one’s identity. This understanding 
understands the parts is based on the understanding of the whole – one’s idem 
identity. This conceptualisation considers that as such an identity is the same 
throughout time it is immutable and certain. It is through this understanding that 
it is possible to interpret the self or ipse.  
Identity as identicality stemmed from the Latin word ‘idem’ that arrived through 
the Middle French identité and had the meaning of “sameness, oneness, state of 
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being the same.”8 Paul Ricoeur has described this sense of identicality (idem) as 
being made up of four aspects:9  
 Uniqueness as numerical identity or re-identification of the same  
 Extreme resemblance - one substituted for the other 
 Uninterrupted continuity over the development of being from birth 
 Permanence over time10  
This identicality is in the sense of permanence, in affirming the identity of a thing, 
a plant, and animal, of a human being.11 That is, it is understood as the ‘sameness 
of a person (or thing) at all times, and in all circumstances’.12 It restricts identity, 
in the whole as the parts, to an immutable fact, an immutable substrate,13 a 
constancy. From the very beginning or till the end of life, the interpretation and 
understanding of one’s identity is understood as identicality in that the same has 
remained from beginning to end – from acorn to oak tree it is still the same,14 and 
have merely gone through the various stages of life. This is illustrated through the 
definition of identity in the Oxford Dictionary: ‘identity’ is the fact of being who or 
what a person or thing is.”15  
This understanding follows the positivist-Cartesian model based upon the 
understanding that identity is the ‘sameness of a person (or thing) at all times, and 
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in all circumstances’.16 It suggests that one remains identical from birth to death 
despite bodies ageing or having change imposed through cosmetic operation and 
experiences throughout one’s life. This understanding of identicality is illustrated 
in Pierre Bourdieu’s work The Biographical Illusion. He exemplifies this through the 
use of the ‘proper name’, that is, identity is associated with normality, and thus 
identity is understood as the constancy. The unifying of the self with the constancy 
has numerous socio-political institutions available:17  
The proper name ‘Marcel Dassault’ is, along with the biological individuality for 
which it represents, the socially instituted form, that which assures constancy 
through time, and unity through the social spaces of the different social agents 
who are the manifestation of this individual in the different fields: the 
businessman, the publisher, the official, the film producer, etc.  
That is, the proper name is the core of one’s identity that remains constant 
throughout one’s life, a universality, upon which one’s life develops and other 
elements of one’s identity are added such as an official or a banker and so on. This 
understanding has been applied to the administrative identity documents such as 
one’s identity card, birth certificate, or travel documents/passport that indicates 
identity of of one’s sex/gender and race/ethnicity as immutable and static. This 
determinable, immutable identity can only attest to the abstracted person – the 
universalised essentialised person – the identity of an abstracted socially 
constituted person.18 This understanding signifies that identity is a fact, it is 
deductible and based on that deduction the interpretation and understanding of 
one’s life is possible. As identity has identicality throughout life it is determinable 
and life processes and life events are understandable based on such a 
determination. This was illustrated in the vertical becoming of sex where one’s sex 
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was predetermined, and as such, lived out. It was through one’s determination of 
status multiplicities such as one’s sex that one’s life was interpreted.  
This conceptualisation of identity extends well beyond idem into the ipse identity 
or one’s sense of self.19 One’s sense of self becomes consequential to identity as 
determined at birth, the idem identity and understood as such.20  The ipse identity 
will develop with minimal variation from the idem determined identity as one’s 
life develops. Any study of one’s ipse or sense of self will look back to the whole, 
the determined idem identity, and understand it through such a lens. As such, the 
sense of self or ipse has also become determinable, knowable, and identical to 
one’s idem. One’s sense of self (ipse) identity is merely added to and created from 
the (idem) identity that has been established at birth. The identity determined at 
birth initiates one’s linear development.  
It is this ‘identity’ – identity as identicality – that becomes one’s socio-legal 
existence.21 Integrated across time and social space, it is manifested in official 
records, curriculum vitae, police records, obituary, or biography.22 Identity is 
reducible to identities or identity markers such as sex (that I refer to as 
multiplicities23). These are indicated upon one’s identity card or birth certificate, 
or travel documents/passport, and also on collected statistical information about 
oneself. These multiplicities become important when discussing immigration, 
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that one’s identity comprises of many multiplicities that intersect with one another and cannot 
be isolated as one’s identity. This must be contrasted identity politics.   
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nationality, ethnicity, or gender and so on.24 They become the basis of inquiries 
into identity whether official/administrative or academic. 
This understanding of identity has become so naturalised that it is used in social, 
political and academic discussion about identity. This interpretation of identity as 
an identicality of an immutable substance, a permanence in time,25 which 
becomes the determinable tag of ‘what one is’.26 This has been cemented into the 
socio-legal fabric of society as one’s civil identity and represented on 
documentation such as one’s birth certificate or identity card. It does not allow for 
mediation with the ipse, but that the ipse identity develops according to one’s 
determined immutable being. This understanding provides no room for pluralism, 
difference, nor diversity.27  
2.1.1.2 Mediated (Idem-Ipse) Identity 
Identity as identicality cannot account for an identity of a being whose biological 
and social properties are continually undergoing constant flux.28 It can never be 
pinned to a single aspect nor issue, nor a set of reducible individuated immutable 
markers.29 The reality is there is no fixed essence, universality or permanence of 
                                                     
24 Gleason, above n 12, at 910. 
25 Ricœur, above n 14, at 78–79. 
26 ‘What one is’ is the external determination of one’s being. Such determination pre-determines 
one’s path of authorship, one of heteronormativity. ‘What’ is the descriptive, or more exactly, 
the ascriptive assignation of a person - what a person is. This is similar to the common 
understanding of ‘idem’ as identicality as used today. This understanding one’s identity is 
determinable as a ‘what’. It is no longer one as the author of one’s being: David Pallauer 
(translator) Paul Ricœur The Just (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000) at 2. 
27 For Ricoeur, pluralism is the opposite of uniqueness or re-identification, difference is the 
opposite of extreme resemblance, and permanence is the opposite of diversity. Refer to: Ricoeur, 
above n 4, at 74. 
28 Bourdieu, above n 17, at 300. 
29 Jill Marshall Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law?: Autonomy, Identity and Integrity 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden; Boston, 
2009) at 90; Belonging (Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2013) at 19. 
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an identity beyond that of the existentiality of human beings.30 Identity presumes 
no fixed essence beyond the fact of the inherent temporality of human 
existence.31 Moreover, as some theorists highlight, identity is relational, 
fragmented, and transformable. Hall, for example, writes:32    
 “identities are never unified, and are … increasingly fragmented and fractured; 
never singular, but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and 
antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions. They are subject to radical 
historicization, and are constantly in the process of change and transformation.” 
As Hall writes, identity is under change and transformation throughout one’s life. 
The understanding of identity as identicality does not account for the points made 
above.  
The above issues are resolved by the other major understanding of identity – 
identity through mediation or dialectic narrative. This understanding of identity 
interprets identity as a mediated, nebulous and complex discursive process, that 
of a narrative or a narrative identity. Before getting the discursive narrative 
identity, first, the hermeneutic self must be put in perspective to make lives 
intelligible, a preoccupation that Paul Ricoeur had.33 Ricoeur and Mead, among 
others, understood identity through the mediatory nature of this hermeneutic 
self. The hermeneutic self involves the mediatory nature of the idem (sameness) 
and ipse (self34).35 While one represents the temporary permanence of one’s 
                                                     
30 Lois McNay Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory (Polity 
Press; Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, UK: Malden, Massachusetts, 2000) at 91. 
31 At 91. 
32 Stuart Hall “Who Needs ‘Identity’?” in Jessica Evans, Paul Du Gay and Peter Redman (eds) 
Identity - a Reader (Sage Publications Ltd, London, UK, 2000) at 17. 
33 Kim Atkins Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015) Ricoeur, Paul 
<http://www.iep.utm.edu/ricoeur/>. 
34 The self is also referred to as selfhood or Selbstheit in German. 
35 Ricoeur, above n 4, at 73; Khan, above n 4, at 9; Serge Gutwirth “Beyond Identity?” (2009) 1 
IDIS 123 at 125; Lois McNay “Gender and Narrative Identity” (1999) 4 Journal of Political 
Ideologies 315 at 320. 
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being, the other is the existential mode of being through which one’s becoming is 
understood. The mediation of these becomes one’s being, one’s identity.  
Idem, as sameness,36 represents the permanence over time, a structural 
permanence, such as genetic code or finger prints which has a corollary, the same 
thing over the course of some development – the acorn and the oak tree are one 
in the same tree.37  Khan refers to idem as that of “being the one and the same, 
complete with a genetic identity that allows for change and development through 
time whilst remaining the same being (for example, a butterfly that can be 
identified with the earlier caterpillar).”38 Moreover, this idem identity has several 
relations operating at the same time: (1) uniqueness, yet pluralistic, and (2) 
extreme resemblance yet different, (3) continuity of development, and (4) 
permanence over time yet temporality.39 It responds to what we call character,40 
the existentalia mode of being, that which can be given and manipulated.41   
Ipseity is the core, the source of one’s will and energy, of a human’s existence, the 
‘existential mode of being’.42 It is within this mode of being that one has the 
capacity to “interrogate itself about its own mode of being and thus relate to being 
qua being.”43 It is that sense of self and perception that relates to how one sees 
themselves and how others see them as a human person.44 This selfhood45  
                                                     
36 Ricoeur, above n 4, at 73. 
37 Ricœur, above n 14, at 78. 
38 Khan, above n 4, at 8–9. 
39 Ricoeur, above n 4, at 74. 
40 Ricœur, above n 14, at 78. 
41 Ricoeur, above n 4, at 75. 
42 At 75; Gutwirth, above n 35, at 125. 
43 Ricoeur, above n 4, at 75. 
44 Gutwirth, above n 35, at 124–125; Paul De Hert “A Right to Identity to Face the Internet of 
Things?” [2008] Global Open Access Portal - UNESCO at 1. 
45 Khan, above n 4, at 9. 
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“does not depend on something permanent for its existence, but it is 
nevertheless distinct. It is temporalized self, the self that is constituted by a unity 
of past accomplishments and future projects. There is a possibility for change 
and difference in ipseity, and certainly for reflexivity.”  
It is not made of substance, nor any substantial homogeneity, it is continuous 
through time and space, but it does not remain stable or consequent per se, let 
alone identical.46 For example, one’s experiences (including one’s experiences of 
physiology), desires and beliefs are not stable in the sense of immutability but 
transformable over time.47 Ipse covers the range of ascription of a character (the 
agent) which may vary in time and space.48 Ipse is thus the sense of self that 
mediates with one’s idem and becomes the ‘who’ the agent or author of action.49 
Ipse cannot exist without one’s idem and vice versa.  
Together both ipse and idem represent a temporary permanence of one’s self as 
one becomes who one is. This hermeneutic circle of whole and parts of the ipse 
and idem identities mediate through “genetic, cultural, and neural bases in an 
evolutionary process.”50 It weaves and transforms the physiological, psychological, 
spiritual, relational and environmental experiences51 through relational 
“exchanges and relationships involving people, situations, values, ideologies, and 
objectives.”52 It is through such a mediation that one’s multiplicities53 are 
                                                     
46 Gutwirth, above n 35, at 125. 
47 Ricœur, above n 14, at 78–79. 
48 Ricoeur, above n 4, at 75. 
49 At 75. 
50 Avner Ben-Ner and Claire A Hill “Negative Dimensions of Identity: A Research Agenda for Law 
and Public” (2008) 9 Minn JL Sci & Tech 643 at 643. 
51 Tilly, above n 2, at 7. 
52 M Montserrat Guibernau Belonging: Solidarity and Division in Modern Societies (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, UK, 2013) at 18. 
53 It is not a singular identity, fixed and immutable as a political identity would like to presuppose 
or as reductionist technology imposes. The multiple and sometimes contradictory or unresolved 
identities are inclusive of attributes, roles and memberships that are representative of that 
person and make up one’s Self including aspects such as race, culture, social class, and sexual 
orientation, are constructed in sociocultural and socio-political contexts. See: Susan R Jones and 
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authored such as sex, race, class and so on.54 It is through the mediation of these 
two identities that enables one to interrogate one’s own mode of being and thus 
relate to oneself and also relate to others.  
2.1.2 The Problematic: Identicality Replacing Mediatory Identity 
Identity in the sense of knowing who one is and how one comes to be has always 
been important to societies for the recognition of one another. However, in the 
modern world, although still important, identity has become a blurred concept.55 
This blurring has occurred through how (or not) has idem and ipse identities been 
interpreted and understood.   
The mediated becoming of identity has no fixed or determinable base from which 
a narrative derives. Elements of idem identity, including that of DNA, is always 
mediated through one’s ‘me’, the experience, and becomes part of one’s narrative 
and does not determine one’s narrative. One’s identity is not reducible to 
individuated markers but rather comprises of many intersecting and 
interconnecting multiplicities that mediate together in one’s becoming. It is 
through the mediated becoming of one’s identity that recognises a pluralism of 
diversity and uniqueness. Identity as a mediatory becoming cannot be understood 
through linear processes but must be considered from looking at how one came 
to be.  
Where identity derives from ‘identity as identicality’, on the other hand, it is 
understood to remain throughout one’s life as a constancy or certainty. It is 
                                                     
Marylu K McEwen “A Conceptual Model of Multiple Dimensions of Identity” (2000) 41 Journal of 
College Student Development 405 at 410–411 These multiplicities include all of the various 
aspects one considers compose of one’s identity which intersect and interact with each other, in 
particular race/ethnicity class, and sex. None of these can be isolated, and it must be 
acknowledged that although focusing on one multiplicity, there will always be intersections and 
interactions with other multiplicities throughout one’s development. 
54 Warnke, above n 3, at 100. 
55 Tilly, above n 2, at 7. 
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reducible to many individuated markers, such as sex as mentioned above. One’s 
existential life develops in a linear biological and psychological normality 
consistent with one’s identity. Any deviation is an abnormality or even may be 
considered as ‘pathological’. The ipse identity is the becoming of one’s life derived 
from such an identity, in other words, it is caused by it. The understanding of one’s 
becoming, the ipse identity, is understood through the interpretation of the 
individuated immutable markers that define what one is.  
It is now time to return to the topic of the problematic of identity. Although one’s 
life is understood through their narrative or narrative identity (one’s becoming), it 
is represented through a singularity of identity. In this sense everyone has a 
singularity of identity. Horizontal becoming recognises the singularity or personal 
identity as revealing one’s identity at a point in time from one’s narrative identity. 
This may not necessarily be the same identity throughout one’s life as it may 
change or transform. However, the problematic of identity arises from the 
divesting of one personal identity the singularity of one’s identity, from one’s 
narrative identity. This is indicative of vertical becoming. This personal divested 
identity is understood by determinable facts of what one is. This views ipse 
identity as inconsequential to one’s identity, rather as the forming of one’s self. It 
is upon this determined identity that one forms a narrative. It is for this reason 
that the identity as identicality creates the problematic of identity through the 
divesting of one’s narrative identity or one’s becoming as what makes one’s 
identity.  
The problematic of identity is clearly illustrated by intersex people. Although if 
they narrated their life within a horizontal horizon they would be free to fully 
become who they are as a male female or even as non-binary (both or neither), 
most nations are predominantly in the vertical horizon, therefore, this has not 
been the case. Most nations have understood, in particular in modern society, 
identity as identicality, where sex status is as either a male or female. When a baby 
is born, the assigned sex status is their identity. For an intersex person who has 
103 
 
sex characteristics not clearly definable as one or the other, this creates issues for 
an identity. When a child is born, they are assigned a sex status which becomes 
the fact of what they are either male or female. As an intersex person due to their 
characteristics do not fit the standard categories of male or female, the majority 
undergo sex normalisation treatment to ensure that their body complies with their 
assigned or determined sex. Intersex people illustrate that through understanding 
identity as identicality, although they may have a personal identity, one narrated 
upon an assigned and normalised sex, they have no control over who they are and 
how they come to be as a sex.  
Intersex people demonstrated that this problematic of identity where the identity 
is predetermined for oneself, divested from one’s narrative, is no longer 
something of autonomy, but heteronomy. They have no control over who they 
are, but have been assigned what they are, as a sex in the example of this thesis, 
and have little control over how they come to be as a sex. This leaves the identity 
of intersex people vulnerable to the dictates of the society around them. It is for 
this reason that intersex people who speak out argue that they find it hard to make 
sense of the world prior to knowing who they are as an intersex person and 
without the autonomy to become who they consider themselves to be.  
2.1.3 Vulnerability and the Problematic of Identity 
Identity concerns the making sense of oneself as who one is and how they come 
to be. While through a vertical horizon, one makes sense of oneself by referring to 
oneself or their status identity, the other makes sense of oneself through a 
mediation of the idem-ipse or through the dialectic process or I-me.56 The two 
senses of identity provoke confusion of identity. There are two excessive claims. 
The first is “the historical claim to identity with the prestige of immutability, in 
order to remove such identity from the bite of historical time,” and the second is 
                                                     
56 Khan, above n 4, at 14. 
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“the inability to attribute some identity to someone or something because we 
have not acquired the ability to apply what I have called the narrative identity.”57 
Either of such claims to identity create a problematic of identity resulting in the 
suffering of the human condition – that of being human.  
The suffering one “underscores the vulnerability of the human condition.”58 This 
has primarily occurred through the divesting of one’s personal identity from their 
narrative identity and “claim the kind of immutability we have placed under the 
idem heading.”59 Personal identity becomes a recognition of something “referred 
back to,”60 a determination, immutable and historical. Such an identity depicts the 
power relations “premised upon dubious metaphysical assumptions about 
gender, race and mind.”61 One’s status is something knowable and discoverable 
such as through contemporary analytical and post-modern philosophy, it ignores 
the fundamental basis ‘who am I’.62 Identity becomes a tool of utility and 
instrumentalism.63 It is such divesting that leads to the passivity of capacities 
creating fragility of the human condition of acting and suffering.64 Although the 
other excessive claim also has consequences, the excessive claim on personal 
identity divested from one’s narrative identity leaves one vulnerable by limiting or 
denying one’s capabilities.  
2.2 Capabilities and the Paradox of Autonomy 
In order to overcome the problematic of identity with its excessive claims – as a 
“prestige of immutability, in order to remove such identity from the bite of 
                                                     
57 Ricœur, above n 14, at 79. 
58 Paul Ricoeur “Becoming Capable, Being Recognized” at 1. 
59 Ricœur, above n 14, at 79. 
60 Khan, above n 4, at 14. 
61 Atkins, above n 33. 
62 Atkins, above n 33. 
63 Atkins, above n 33. 
64 Ricœur, above n 14, at 37. 
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historical time” or “the inability to attribute some identity to someone or 
something because we have not acquired the ability to apply what I have called 
the narrative identity”, it is important to connect the paradox of autonomy and 
vulnerability, or fragility (as Ricoeur sometimes refers to). Ricoeur argues that65  
The paradox of autonomy and fragility [or vulnerability] is the same human being 
who is both of these things from different points of view. …[t]he autonomy in 
question is that of a fragile, vulnerable being. And this fragility would be 
something pathological if it were not called on to become autonomous, because 
it were already so in some way. 
The human being is centre in the paradox at what is fragile in the paradox of 
autonomy and vulnerability is the capabilities. When one’s autonomy is affected, 
it has a double effect. The vulnerability is of two natures: the first is the divesting 
of the narrative identity transferring who one is to what – a categorical status – 
and the second is the suffering of the human condition which inhibits human 
capabilities of how one comes to be. These capabilities would be pathological if 
they were not called to be autonomous. This indicates a strong relation between 
autonomy and capability.   
2.2.1 Capable Being 
Paul Ricoeur asks “what kind of being is a human being that he can give rise to the 
problematic of autonomy?”66 before turning to the problematic of identity, it is 
important to answer this question. Again, Ricoeur writes that “I identify myself by 
my capacities, by what I can do. The individual refers to him- or herself as a capable 
person.”67 In his question to find the subject of rights, he begins with the capable 
being or capable person that answers to who:68 
                                                     
65 At 71. 
66 At 74. 
67 Ricoeur, above n 58, at 1. 
68 This is the question of ‘who’. Who is speaking? Who did this or that action? Whose story is 
this? Who is responsible for this injury or this wrong done to another person? This is not ‘what’ 
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Who is speaking? Who did this or that action? Whose story is this? Who is 
responsible for this injury or this wrong done to another person? 
In other words, the basic capacities are (to speak, to act, to tell/narrate and to 
impute/promise. These questions above indicate the “fundamental powers 
constitute the primary base of humanity, in the basic sense of humanness.”69 By 
understanding the capable person it is possible to answer these questions. 
The first primary capability is the capacity to speak, the use of language, in all of 
its forms, it is essential to a social human life.70 It involves a kind of action 
reciprocating or doing things with words71 through performance and 
relationality.72 It is a reflexive73 meaningful and spontaneous production74 that 
includes simple assertions or questions through to the most complex of 
discussions have the need of confirmation, approval, and/or response of the part 
of the other.75 It designates the “cause” or “principle” of their action in the 
narration of one’s identity.76 The capability to speak designates oneself as the 
author of one’s utterances77 and becomes the medium for the establishment and 
                                                     
as a description or ‘why’ as an explanation in terms of causes or motives. Peter Strawson and 
H.L.A. Hart speak of ‘who’ in terms of ‘ascription’ – the assignment of an action or segment of an 
action to someone (Ricoeur refers to this as assignment or assignation) which becomes closer to 
what than who as it is no longer the author of the story. Refer to: Ricœur, above n 26, at 2. 
69 Ricoeur, above n 58, at 1. 
70 Ricœur, above n 26, at 2. 
71 Paul Ricoeur “Capabilities and Rights” in Séverine Deneulin, Mathias Nebel and Nicholas 
Sagovsky (eds) Transforming Unjust Structures: the Capability Approach (Springer, Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands, 2006) 17 at 18. 
72 At 18. 
73 Ricœur, above n 26, at 2. 
74 Ricoeur, above n 58, at 2. 
75 Ricoeur, above n 71, at 18–19. 
76 At 18. 
77 Ricœur, above n 26, at 2. 
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renegotiation of identities.78 The ‘right’ to speak79 is essential to the capability in 
the authoring of one’s being.  
The second is the capability to act: “meaning of being able to make events 
happen.”80 This capability interconnects with the capability to speak as core 
capabilities to author one’s life. Ricoeur clarifies that as to act is81   
 “to produce events in society and nature. This intervention transforms the 
notion of events which are not simply what happens. It introduces human 
contingency, uncertainty and unpredictably into the course of things.”  
This capability ascribes them “the capacity to designate themselves as the true 
authors of their deeds”82 or having agency.83 Agency is the exercising of power 
over and through one’s bodily members and the course of things.84 This must be 
separated from the judicial capacity85 which disconnects one from one’s 
authorship and replaces it with assignation of causal motive.86 Rather, an agent as 
an author of one’s action implies the “action belongs to the agent who 
appropriates it and calls it his own.”87  
                                                     
78 Tilly, above n 2, at 7. 
79 Ricoeur, above n 71, at 19. 
80 At 19. 
81 Ricoeur, above n 58, at 2. 
82 Ricoeur, above n 71, at 19. 
83 Agency or being the author of one’s actions is either understood as metaphorically the master 
of the action (as suggested by Aristotle – as a father of a child, is father of the action), or as the 
primitive usage as the idea of an efficient cause – the power we exercise over bodily members 
and, through them, on the cause of things. See: Ricœur, above n 26, at 3. 
84 At 3. 
85 This capability must be distinguished from the juridical procedures forcing one to compensate 
for an injury or to suffer a penalty for some delinquent or criminal act.: See: At 3. 
86 At 2. 
87 Ricoeur, above n 71, at 19. 
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The third capability is to tell or to narrate. This enables one to tell stories about 
events and characters including oneself.88 Ricoeur argues that this capacity has a 
pre-eminent part among one’s capabilities as it is only through this capacity that89   
events of whatever origin become legible and intelligible only when recounted 
in stories; the age-old art of story-telling, when applied to oneself, produces life 
narratives which the historians articulate as history. 
This capability enables the “turning points in the story contributes to the overall 
significance of the story that is told as well as that of the protagonists.”90 It is 
through the telling or narrating of one’s life that incorporates the temporal 
dimension, that of speaking and action, within the whole of ones being (the 
sameness and the selfhood), and is thus comprehendible.91 This removes one from 
the sphere of identicality or identity of the substance92 or structure.93 It is no 
longer the identity of the same, but has its own identity that incorporates change 
as peripeteia.94 It admits change (mutability) in both characters and the story 
itself.95 It is through narrativity of identity that becomes essential to the inquiry 
into the identity of peoples and nations.96 It is through the dialectical idem and 
ipse nature of personal identity that one claims recognition at the level of juridical, 
social, and political relationships.97  
                                                     
88 At 19. 
89 Ricoeur, above n 58, at 2. 
90 Ricœur, above n 26, at 3. 
91 At 3; Ricoeur, above n 71, at 19. 
92 The identity of a substance infers the stability and immutability of a structure, illustrated by the 
genetic code of a living organism where narrativity and transformation are abnormalities as 
opposed to the norm.  
93 Ricoeur, above n 58, at 3. 
94 At 2. 
95 Ricœur, above n 26, at 3. 
96 At 3. 
97 Ricoeur, above n 71, at 19. 
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The final and the peak of the capabilities is imputation. Imputation is also the act 
of promising or a pledge98 “as the one who, in counting on me, on my capacity to 
keep my word, calls me to responsibility and renders me responsible.”99 As part of 
the pledge or promise, imputation applies reflexively as one who is responsible 
and accountable.100 Ricoeur argues that101   
“the ability to recognise ourselves as accountable for our acts in the sense of 
being their actual author. I can hold myself accountable, imputable, in the same 
way that I can speak, can act on the course of things, can recount my action 
through an emplotting of events and characters” 
This is promise of accountability for one’s speech and actions. It is the “capacity of 
a subject to designate itself, himself, or herself as the actual author of its, his, her 
acts.”102 It signals that when harm is done to others and accountability is required, 
there is the possible need for reparation and final sanction.103  
This is the capability of self-designation or autonomy.104 Ricoeur views imputation 
as the lynch pin of capabilities and the moral forms105 by creating a promise while 
at the same time cements dependability and limits unpredictability. One becomes 
accountable regardless of the organic or physical causes.106 The promise or pledge 
to be accountable for one’s actions is central to the capable subject worthy of 
esteem and respect. The capable being – worthy of esteem and respect – requires 
all of the capabilities as an autonomous being.  
                                                     
98 Ricoeur, above n 58, at 2, 3. 
99 Ricœur, above n 26, at 7. 
100 Ricoeur, above n 71, at 20. 
101 Ricœur, above n 14, at 2. 
102 At 2, 47. 
103 Ricoeur, above n 58, at 3; Ricoeur, above n 71, at 19, 20. 
104 Ricoeur, above n 71, at 19, 20. 
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2.2.2 Autonomy and its Conditions 
The capacities described above – to speak, act, to tell, and to promise/impute – 
indicate what kind of being gives rise to the problematic of autonomy.107 That is, 
although one may have capacities, it still may lead to the problematic of autonomy 
rather than giving rise to autonomy. This indicates that having capacity itself is not 
sufficient, as it can still lead to vulnerability. Ricoeur notes that “if the basis of 
autonomy is ability, then it is inability or lesser ability that human fragility 
expresses itself.”108 That is, these capacities of a capable human being require 
autonomy.109 First, this section will describe what is autonomy and then continue 
by defining the conditions of autonomy.  
Autonomy has the implication of an “idea of something that cannot be substituted 
for” and the possibility to “dare to think for yourself. You and not someone else in 
your place.”110 Autonomy is not automatic. Without the enabling as an 
autonomous being, one has a heteronomous enabling – to speak or act according 
to determinations outside of oneself wittingly or unwittingly.111 By default 
heteronomy, as Anthony Elliot writes, leads to an identity as112     
a social product through and through, an outcome of symbolic interaction – of 
emergent, ongoing creation, thinking, feeling, the building of attitude structures, 
the taking of roles, all in a quest for coherence and orientated in the social world.  
Autonomy is essential to a relational world, and when it is inhibited or denied leads 
to a heteronomous-based society where people make choices and become, but 
                                                     
107 Ricœur, above n 14, at 74. 
108 At 76. 
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this is no longer due to who they are but based on what they are. Autonomy is not 
the absence of heteronomy, but on a continuum with it. The greater one’s 
autonomy, the greater the capability of being that leads to imputability. To 
overcome the paradox of autonomy, there are three conditions of autonomy: 
ability, adequate options and independence. 
The first condition is ability, or sometimes referred to as capability.113 It enables 
the exploring of and the committing to choices required to plan and execute one’s 
life.114 It is through capabilities that one can have the “successful attainment of 
life’s goals and its consequences for well-being.”115 Joseph Raz defines ability as:116   
the mental abilities required to form intentions of a sufficiently complex kind and 
plan their execution. These include minimum rationality, the ability to 
comprehend the means required to realize his goals, the mental faculties 
necessary to plan actions, etc. 
The capability to plan and execute one’s life plans for well-being requires more 
than its latency. It requires competency or potentiality – the ability to exercise and 
extend human capacity.117 Potentiality indicates the need “to experience 
satisfaction in exercising and extending one’s capabilities.”118 This requires 
empowering and enabling of abilities.119 This empowering and enabling develops 
                                                     
113 Capabilities are sometimes also referred to as capacities. It is not limited to the juridical notion 
whether one has or does not have the juridical capacity.  
114 Marshall, above n 29, at 92. 
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through various stages of life.120 Ability signals that left to one’s own devices 
people “naturally seek out challenges that are optimal for their level of 
development.”121 Although one can enact capabilities heteronomously such as to 
speak and to act, these are done according to determinations outside of oneself 
consciously or unconsciously. This leaves one fragile in the human condition and 
thus fragile. Having autonomy over one’s capabilities reduces human fragility.   As 
such, the potentiality of ability is greater when it is autonomous.122  
This leads to the second condition of autonomy – having adequate choices. This 
requires adequate, favourable, and valuable options123 to reflect upon, to choose 
between – execute or decline them – and to adopt as one’s own.124 They require 
self-awareness, knowledge, and material resources.125  These include the trivial to 
complex options126 such as desires and impulses as well as beliefs and restraints.127 
This also includes options ranging from the short to long term with all different 
levels of consequences.128 However, having adequate options does not mean they 
need to be limitless. Joseph Raz defines two limits in relation to options:129     
                                                     
120 Raz, above n 116, at 372–373; Marshall, above n 29, at 65; Levesque and others, above n 117, 
at 68. 
121 Levesque and others, above n 117, at 68. 
122 Ricœur, above n 14, at 80; Raz, above n 116, at 369; Levesque and others, above n 117, at 68; 
Valery Chirkov and others “Differentiating Autonomy from Individualism and Independence: A 
Self-determination Theory Perspective on Internalization of Cultural Orientations and Well-being” 
(2003) 84 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 97 at 97. 
123 Raz, above n 116, at 378–379, 412; Marshall, above n 29, at 57; John Stuart Mill On Liberty 
(The Pennsylvania State University, Hazleton, PA, USA, 1998) at 16; James Griffin “First Steps in 
an Account of Human Rights” (2001) 9 European Journal of Philosophy 306 at 311. 
124 Raz, above n 116, at 371, 375, 376; Griffin, above n 123, at 311; Margaret Isabel Hall “Mental 
Capacity in the (Civil) Law: Capacity, Autonomy, and Vulnerability” (2012) 58 McGill Law Journal 
61 at 65. 
125 Griffin, above n 123, at 311. 
126 Raz, above n 116, at 374. 
127 Mill, above n 123, at 70. 
128 Raz, above n 116, at 374. 
129 At 410–411. 
113 
 
first, while autonomy requires the availability of an adequate range of options, 
it does not require the presence of any particular option among them; secondly, 
it does not extend to the morally bad and repugnant, since autonomy is valuable 
only if it is directed at the good it supplies no reason to provide, nor any reason 
to protect, worthless let alone bad options.  
First, there is no requirement for particular options and these options may vary 
from place to place and time to time. Raz illustrates some examples where 
restrictions do not lead to adequate options such as conditions leading to 
survival,130 slavery even if they do have some choices.131 He also argues that 
restricting options between ‘good and evil’ for one’s own good does not provide 
adequate options.132 Second, adequate options do not extend to the morally bad 
and repugnant that which prevents or restricts one’s pursuit of the good life.133 
The state has no authority to judge as ‘good’ or ‘moral’ where it does not judge a 
factor as valuable or valueless on its own merit.134 Morality is self-referential and 
self-regarding. Providing of morally bad or repugnant options contribute nothing 
to the value of the good life and make life worse than a comparable non-
autonomous life.135  
The last condition of autonomy is independence. Independence in relation to 
autonomy over one’s own life is what shapes and defines it, without having that 
determined on one’s behalf.136 It is generative rather than being freely willed or 
externally imposed.137 For example, slaves lack autonomy as despite having 
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options, they are not free, not independent.138 Alya Khan states that 
independence as autonomy (rather than as individualism) is in opposition to 
coercion and/or manipulation:139    
“It is the capacity of persons to self-direct, to make autonomous decisions rather 
than being primarily subject to constraints and coercions.”   
When one’s becoming is shaped by external pressures140 or it is subjected to the 
will of another, it becomes constrained.141 Necessity or coercion deny freedom 
and meaningfulness.142 These hegemonic constraints, such as coercion and 
manipulation, draw us away from independence.143 An autonomous life requires 
freedom from coercion and manipulation to make choices.144 Coercion is the 
restriction or prevention of particular choices in favour of other choices.145 
Manipulation, “unlike coercion, does not interfere with one’s options, but instead 
perverts the way that a person reaches decisions, forms preferences or adopts 
goals.”146 It distorts normal decision-making processes and forms preferences on 
basis of social convention loading them with meaning regardless of their actual 
consequences.147 This diminishes a person’s options below adequacy.148 Any 
coercion or manipulation has the potential to deny or at least inhibit autonomy, 
and thus the ability to aim towards an accomplished life. Like other areas of life, 
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coercion and manipulation occur in a matter of degree, and so, the less the more 
enhanced one’s autonomy is. Furthermore, support and guidance should not be 
confused with coercion or manipulation. Although people need support and 
guidance which can enhance autonomy, coercion and manipulation inhibits 
autonomy.    
Now is a good time to return to Paul Ricoeur’s question: “what kind of being is a 
human being that he can give rise to the problematic of autonomy?”149 This 
human being is the capable human being – to speak, to act, to tell/narrate, and to 
impute/promise – in autonomy. However, limited or no autonomy inhibits the 
capabilities of the human being, and ultimately, limits one’s imputability to oneself 
and others. This demonstrates the vulnerability of fragility of autonomy. The 
capable being requires the conditions of autonomy to be an autonomous being. 
2.2.3 Vulnerability/Fragility and Autonomy 
The capable being with its capacities (to speak, to act, to tell/narrate and to 
impute/promise) are inherent to human beings. They are essential to identity as 
Ricoeur writes:150  
I identify myself by my capacities, by what I can do. The individual refers to him- 
or herself as a capable person, but adds also… a suffering one, in order to 
underscore the vulnerability of the human condition. 
Although one may identify oneself by one’s capacities as a capable person, one 
can also connect with the suffering one. The suffering one is expressed through its 
fragility. Ricoeur writes: “if the basis of autonomy is ability, then it is inability or 
lesser ability that human fragility expresses itself.”151 This expressed fragility of the 
suffering one highlights the vulnerability of the human condition.  
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The vulnerability of the human condition is reflected through agency. Ricoeur 
highlights, there are two views of agency: either as an agent (author) of the action 
(Aristotelian sense) or as the cause of the action (Galileo or Newton).152 Agency 
must be recognised as being either autonomous as the author of the action or 
heteronomous as the cause of the action. Agency in these two respects connects 
with ability or inability where ability indicates autonomy by extension, inability or 
restricted ability signals limited autonomy or heteronomy.153 Autonomous agency 
not only indicates having capacities, as with heteronomous agency, but also the 
other two conditions of autonomy of adequate options and independence. 
Without these two added to the capable being, there is limited or no autonomy or 
in other words, it is heteronomous agency. In summary, autonomous agency 
enables the ability to independently plan, choose, and realise one’s being and 
life.154   
Much of the current understanding of agency reflects ‘agency as the cause of the 
action’. This conceptualisation has separated one’s humanity from one’s agency. 
Agency is rendered to a ‘moral question’ of “mere instrumentality or utility.”155 It 
detaches the agent and an action from interactions and externalities such as the 
hegemonic forces that may have led or contributed to such an action. This 
indicates that the agent was not at least in part responsible for an action, but it 
does not account for the hegemonic forces at play which may be stronger or have 
left the individual with few options.  
Rather agency should refer to someone having “the ability to do something”156 or 
having the ability to enact one’s human capabilities as ability is based on 
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autonomy.157 Autonomous agency infers as Joseph Raz writes the ability to “make 
their own lives” or to be the “author of his own life.”158 Autonomous agency thus 
requires not only ability, but that of adequate choices and the independence to 
make decisions on such choices. It is the power and capability to determine for 
oneself who one is and how one comes to be.159 Autonomy requires awareness 
and active engagement of who one is and how one comes to be.  
Ricoeur argues that the fragility would be something pathological if it were not 
“called on to be autonomous” and already so in some way.160 That is, personal 
identity, understood through the singularity of identity as a representation of 
one’s narrative identity, is autonomous and establishes a mark of power and the 
capability to become who one is. If it was not autonomous, in other words, if it is 
heteronomous, it is pathological. The pathology is due to the loss of the mark of 
power of one’s identity. Such pathology is personal identity being determined by 
outside oneself and one’s narrative hegemonically controlled. Although identity is 
still important, it is heteronomous and hegemonic – a product outside of oneself 
– that one’s self must adhere to. 
As Ricoeur eloquently writes, our life is called on to be autonomous and is already 
so.161 However, autonomy is not simply something one has or does not have, but 
rather a continuum from heteronomy through to full autonomy. As Ricoeur writes, 
autonomy reaches its full deployment in one’s (anthropological) capabilities.162 
That is, the full deployment of autonomy occurs only when the capable being with 
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all capacities are enabled, which ultimately occurs through the last capacity of 
imputation which leads to attestation of autonomy over one’s being. The ability 
to attest to one’s narrative identity – of one’s speech and actions – and indicates 
autonomy. If one has limited or no ability to attest to one’s narrative identity, then 
it indicates a pull through heteronomy over one’s speech and actions exposing the 
vulnerability of the human condition.   
The above sections indicate the importance of autonomy for the capable being. 
Where autonomy is limited, it inhibits the capability of the human being, and in 
particular, the ability to attest to the narrativity authored through one’s speech 
and actions. This has occurred with intersex people. Although they can still speak 
and act, the manner in which this occurs has been externally determined, and their 
bodies often have been modified without their consent to match the external 
determination attributed at birth. They live their lives not being able to match who 
they are with what they are and how they are expected to live.  They do not have 
the full deployment of autonomy of their capable being, and it could even be 
argued that their capable being has been affected as the integrity of their moral 
basis of being has been interfered with to such an extent that the autonomous 
value of their lives has been degraded.    
2.3 Basis of a Morality for an Autonomous Capable Being 
The capable autonomous being is important for all people including intersex 
people as in the case exemplar of this thesis. Intersex variations are part of who 
the person is, not some ‘appendage’ of meaningless value. That is, intersex 
variations are important in forming one’s person’s narrative identity as one forms 
through speech and action of who one is and as such are meaningful to an intersex 
person’s life. It is for this reason, intersex people demand to be recognised, not as 
an abnormality or a disease, but as a person. Intersex people claim the right to be 
recognised as and to have the ability to become who they are which may have 
various sex expressions whether it be male or female or non-binary as both or 
neither sex. 
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Paul Ricoeur argues the paradox of autonomy is not that of the temporal 
dimension – personal identity – but with regards to the test of alterity.163 The test 
of alterity is the confrontation of reflexivity. Alterity exists at the point of the 
interior split of the I/me dialectic when the idem becomes the separated 
singularity of one’s immutable personality identity.164 This confrontation “leads to 
a fracture of the reflexive relation of the self to itself, which has its moral and 
psychological legitimacy on the plane that institutes and structures the human 
person.”165 As opposed to the test of the norm, the test of alterity is 
confrontational and separative. This test leads to a state of fragility, paradoxical 
with autonomy, yet part of the very same being.166 This fragility arrives through 
the collision of social pressure upon one’s singularity of personality.167 It occurs 
through the possibility of manipulation and coercion through the hegemonic social 
forces and pressure.168 Ricoeur writes:169 
“To learn how tell the same story in another way, how to allow our story to be 
told by others, how to submit the narrative of a life to a historians’ critique, are 
al practices applicable to the paradox of autonomy and fragility.”  
To overcome such a paradox as an autonomous subject, he, continues by saying 
that a human being must be “capable of leading [one’s] life in agreement with the 
idea of narrative coherence.”170  For example, an intersex person should be able 
to lead one’s life including the mediation of their intersex variation (and the rest 
of one’s physiology) with one’s inner self and also that of the social self in a 
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narrative coherence. This requires autonomous agency. Autonomous agency is 
one that is imputable to test that of alterity.171 
Autonomous agency is that of a human being living a life with the idea of a 
narrative coherence. Although autonomy is the prerogative of the capable being, 
vulnerability limits autonomy to a condition of possibility.172 This limitation 
indicates that there is not the full deployment of autonomy. Rather, one’s life, is 
heteronomous with a degree of autonomy. Although one may be a biological 
entity, the heteronomy over their becoming exposes the vulnerability of the 
human condition when one’s humanness is separated from one’s biologism. The 
vulnerability results from the reducing of a person to the question of ‘what’ 
through the claim of immutability placed under the idem heading.173 When one’s 
humanness is separated from one’s biologism through the reducing of a person to 
the question of ‘what’, it renders the ‘moral question’ to one of “mere 
instrumentality or utility.”174 However, persons are not just mechanistic beings, 
they are spiritual-moral beings.175 But if human beings are moral beings, this 
requires a different moral question. What does it mean to be a moral being as a 
human being?  
This is answered through Ricoeur’s work on the ‘who is the subject of rights?’. In 
this work, he argues that the moral form of the human being is one who is worthy 
of esteem and respect.176 This moral form is based in dignity, not of the status of 
individuals including positionality and honour but on being worthy of esteem and 
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respect. The being worthy of esteem and respect has autonomous agency - self-
referential and self-regulating – and has the ability to independently plan, choose, 
and realise one’s being and life.177 The reflexivity of the worthy being of esteem 
and respect is understood through two forms of mores (a Latin form of morality) 
that Ricoeur applies as ethical (Greek) and moral (Latin). A moral being results 
from the reflexive application to agents of the predicates of the good and the 
obligatory.178 Ricoeur writes in regarding these predicates:179   
“We ourselves are worthy of esteem or respect insofar as we are capable of 
esteeming as good or bad, or as declaring permitted or forbidden, the actions of 
either others or of ourselves.”  
The first is ethical as the aim of the good (‘accomplished life’) and the moral is the 
norm of the aim (the obligatory).180 Together these form the basis of the moral 
being which is core to the autonomous capable being. The autonomous capable 
being provides a dynamic state that includes the ability to freely pursue and fulfil 
one’s personal and social goals.181 This expresses one’s moral being. It is through 
the esteem and respect of a moral being one forms an accomplished life centred 
around who one is and how one comes to be.  
2.3.1 The Ethical – The Aim of the Good, Accomplished Life 
The ethical predicate often is confused with external morality or values including 
values in a utilitarian sense. Rather, the central focus of the moral form through 
the ethical predicate centred through self-esteem. Ricoeur argues that there is a 
“bond of mutual implication between self-esteem and ethical evaluation of those 
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who actions that aim at the good life.”182 This predicate is the mutual bond 
through which actions are evaluated in the aim to pursue the good (in the 
Aristotelean sense) or accomplished life of well-being and potentiality.183 Self-
esteem derives from an examining life, a life worth living,184 in the evaluating and 
judging of oneself to be good.185 Self-esteem underscores imputation through this 
ethical predicate.186 Ricoeur argues that the ethical form – is the “the aim for a 
good life with and for others.”187 The aim for the accomplished life leads to self-
esteem. 
Paul Ricoeur calls self-esteem the ethical form that “clothes this claim to 
singularity.”188 Self-esteem is the acknowledgement of who one is including one’s 
uniqueness while at the same time being at ease within oneself maintaining a 
positive self-regard of oneself.189 For example, using Chazan’s example of an ugly 
person, an ugly person has self-esteem when there is an acknowledgement of190 
one’s ugliness yet maintains a positive regard of and ease with oneself.191 On the 
other hand, a lack of self-esteem192 is where one lacks self-regard and well-being 
allowing this quality (outwardly determined) to get one down or allows oneself to 
be dictated by others, and as such has no value in oneself and what is required to 
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make good of oneself and one’s life.193 Self-esteem here “refers to the valuing of 
self, that, if accurate, is in proportion to a person’s objectively observable qualities 
or in proportion to her own (correct) judgements of these.”194 These qualities do 
not determine one’s esteem but may be utilised in achieving it.195 Esteem is guided 
from within which may involve inner conflict and disunity,196 but it is not 
indifferent to others’ opinions, yet also finds the courage to resist promptings and 
pressures from without.197 This is in contrast to the traditional conceptualisations 
that esteem is based on qualities198 that must meet hegemonically agreed 
standards in order to succeed.199  
The accomplished life is a life that leads towards human flourishing. It is a pursuit 
as it is always in process, it may be achieved in part yet never achieved as a 
whole.200 The pursuit of the accomplished life is the most desirable life according 
to Aristotelian philosophy – Eudaimonia or human flourishing.201 It is the highest 
good as it is the most desirable life. Erik Ostenfeld argues that202  
Eudaimonia seems to be an end that is always chosen for itself and never 
because of something else, whereas honor, pleasure, intelligence and the virtues 
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are chosen partly for themselves partly for their consequence, i.e., eudaimonia. 
Hence eudaimonia fulfils one of the marks of the highest good.  
Flourishing is chosen for itself as the ultimate good, and not because of something 
else such as goods of short-term pleasure or honour. In other words, 
consequence203 or instrumental/utility value204 do not lead to human flourishing. 
Such things may improve the ‘greater good’, or some other good, but not human 
flourishing.  For example, status identities may improve stability and coherence of 
the collective value and meaning but lead to the vulnerability of the human 
condition. Flourishing is achieved for itself as the highest good, and as such, is the 
end in itself. Flourishing is the highest possible human good. It is a “life marked by 
contentment; doing well and living well.”205 This mark of contentment and doing 
well/living well is a sign of flourishing.  
As the ultimate end that human flourishing represents human potentiality. 
Potentiality refers to what one can be and not what one should be. It is the 
unlocking of life potential within human beings. Human flourishing is defined by 
Erik Ostenfeld as206  
a person who is well-adapted and well-functioning socially and psychologically, 
and who lives a rich life in the sense that he or she uses all human potentialities, 
i.e. not restricted to immediate pleasure seeking from e.g. television watching, 
beer-drinking and easy sex, and not even more calculated pleasure seeking, but 
involving intellect and feelings that are special to man.   
Human flourishing as an end concerns the actualisation of potentiality. It is 
predicated on the reasoned reflection, action, and actualising of one’s own 
potentials.207 It requires the cultivation and exercising of virtues that include 
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personal growth, autonomy, and self-acceptance.208 It aims at a well-adapted and 
well-functioning life both socially and psychologically. The focus is not on short-
term pleasures, but it is focused on reaching a richer sense of life of autonomously 
becoming who one is. 
Paul Ricoeur describes flourishing as “the nebulous of ideals and dreams of 
achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or less fulfilled or 
unfulfilled.”209 This occurs through the pursuit through projects and relationships 
that gives one’s life value, significance and meaning.210 The commitment to such 
projects and relationships shape one’s moral world.211 Joseph Raz considers the 
importance of value to one’s moral world. He writes: that212    
first the value of human relationships which depend on the way that individuals 
choose to develop them and the different normative implications with which 
they deliberately endow the relations; and secondly, the moral value involved in 
the justification of different ways in which persons mould their moral world is 
the value of forming and pursuing projects that give shape and content to one’s 
life.  
These projects and relationships are those that give content and shape to one’s 
moral good life. It requires the awareness and the taking account of the past, 
present and future development of one’s projects and relationships and being 
aware of one’s progress in them.213 Interference with these projects and relations 
restricts one’s flourishing of a good life. For example, many intersex people are 
aware of a sense of difference regarding their sex and yet have not been able to 
incorporate this into their projects and relationships. This has been limiting in their 
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shaping of the moral world and pursuing their good life. Value and significance do 
not come about through about success or failure.214 Neither does it come through 
a planned or unified life such as a determined life.215 Rather it is free and arbitrary 
in the sense it is not constrained by external morality.216  
Although the accomplished life and human flourishing is subjective, the window 
to such a life is well-being. Well-being is an indicator of the flourishing 
accomplished life. It is marked by “contentment; doing well and living well.”217 
Well-being requires one to be well-adapted, well-functioning socially and 
psychologically and living to one’s potentiality.218 It is a state of being that must 
be maintained. That is, there cannot be human flourishing without well-being, and 
therefore a lack of well-being inhibits the aim for the accomplished life.219 Harm 
occurs when there is a deprivation of or frustration in one’s well-being which 
affects the pursuit of becoming within one’s narrative identity.220  
Well-being implicates autonomy. That is, it is defined by and measured by the 
autonomous person, not by outside values. Joseph Raz writes “Well-being signifies 
the good life, the life which is good for the person whose life it is.”221 It demands 
autonomy over the establishing of relations and projects that form and shape over 
one’s accomplished life. John Stuart Mill states:222    
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The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is 
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign. 
Such autonomy is critical to well-being and flourishing. For this reason, Raz states 
that “a person enjoys a high degree of well-being if his life is good in a way which 
is good for him.”223 This indicates that well-being is correlative with autonomy – 
the more autonomy, the more well-being is enhanced. It is this that John Stuart 
Mill refers to when he writes:224   
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in 
our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede 
their efforts to obtain it.  
For Mill, the sole purpose of freedom is to enable the accomplished life. This 
freedom is a reciprocal duty expected from others and by others expected from 
you. It is only through such freedom that one can freely and fully pursue who one 
is and how one comes to be.  
It is in this sense Mill’s utilitarian principle connects with the principle of solidarity.  
Although the aim for the good is for whose life it is and not that of others, it will 
always be relational. Mill writes that “to do as one would be done by, and to love 
one’s neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian 
morality.”225 The pursuing of one’s good life will always be relational in that it 
occurs “in and with others.”226 The pursuance of an accomplished life does not 
disregard others or independence from others in an isolationist sense, but actually 
requires others, even a dependency of others. There will always be a need and 
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dependency of others in the form of guidance, love and care, and a sense of 
responsibility.227 It is such interconnectedness that provides a “sense of social 
need, personal responsibility and human solidarity.”228 It is the need of solidarity 
with and for each other to enable each one to lead the accomplished life that also 
leads to a flourishing society or community. This results in what John Stuart Mill 
believes is “the perfection of human nature.”229  
Self-esteem results from the aim for the accomplished life. It is the indicator of 
how worthy and capable an individual deems oneself to be.230 It is the valuing of 
oneself as worthy and capable as a human being and to be a lover of oneself.231 
This love of self becomes extendable to others. Pauline Chazan refers to the 
Aristotelian concept connecting this to the relatedness of esteem when she 
wrote:232    
The Aristotelian concept of esteem reflects the connection of love of self and 
friendship, “in that the good man is related to his friend as himself (for his friend 
is another self). … The love of self is extendable to others; one must relate to 
oneself in a certain way before one is able to relate to others in the same way.  
The extending of self-love to others through one’s moral being enables an equally 
respecting, reciprocal-based relational society. Ricoeur explains that233   
Self-esteem does not reduce to a simple relation of oneself to oneself alone. This 
feeling also includes within itself a claim addressed to others. It includes an 
expectation of approbation coming from these others. In this sense, self-esteem 
is both a reflexive and a relational phenomenon, where the notion of dignity 
reunites the two faces of such recognition.  
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Self-esteem through the accomplished life indicates how worthy one and others 
are through the flourishing life of well-being. Such a life is not only for oneself, but 
also for others. As such it is reflexive and relational and based on and in dignity. 
The ethical predicate is the aim for the accomplished life of well-being and 
potentiality – human flourishing. Human flourishing that leads to self-esteem has 
been defined as a “life marked by contentment; doing well and living well.”234 
Ostenfeld defined flourishing as “a person who is well-adapted and well-
functioning socially and psychologically, and who lives a rich life in the sense that 
he or she uses all human potentialities.”235 Therefore a lack of well-being inhibits 
the aim for the accomplished life.236 Harm occurs when there is a deprivation of 
or frustration in one’s well-being which affects the pursuit of becoming within 
one’s narrative identity.237  
This deprivation has occurred to most intersex people. For many, they lack self-
esteem due a frustration in one’s well-being dictated by others values with its 
significance and meaning over their life. The determination of their sex and any 
normalisation that is associated with it, affects their whole being, not merely a sex 
determination. It affects their very ability to narrate who they are and how they 
come to be. Most have lost the ability to have the flourishing life of well-being 
which is good for them.238 They have lost autonomy, or as Mill writes sovereignty, 
over their body and mind.239 This has derived them of freedom, and as Mill wrote, 
this is the only freedom that deserves a name. This creates harm of which 
individuals need protection from as Mill writes in his work. The end result is a loss 
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of or a deprivation of self-esteem of how worthy and capable an individual deems 
oneself to be. This must change to enable the perfection of human nature as Mill 
stated which includes intersex people.  
2.3.2 The Moral - Norm of the Aim 
The moral form, on the other hand, is ‘norm of the aim’. The norm is the obligatory 
(the deontological or Kantian heritage)240 or the obligation to respect the norm.241 
It has a double function: one as designatory (what is permitted or prohibited); and 
the other, the sense of subjective relationality.242 The moral form ensures self-
esteem of a relational society as all aim for the good, accomplished life.  
The central thread throughout the norm is self-esteem. Self-respect is self-esteem 
under the reign of the moral law.243 The moral law as the norm of is self-respect.244 
This is understood through Ricoeur’s proposed thesis in Oneself as Another. He 
sates:245    
“(1) that self-esteem is more fundamental than self-respect, (2) that self-respect 
is the aspect under which self-esteem appears in the domain of norms, and (3) 
that the aporias of duty create situations in which self-esteem appears not only 
as the source but as the recourse for respect, when no sure norm offers a guide 
for the exercise hic et nunc246 of respect.”  
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Self-esteem is the source and recourse of the norm – respect. Respect results from 
that interpretation and the importance of an awareness of the conditions247 for an 
individual to realise her or his well-being and potentiality for one’s good life.248 
This indicates that the norm of respect is a duty as a guide to social relations. 
Core to the moral form is self-respect that correlates with the love of the self: “Our 
self-esteem will fluctuate according to the respect we have for our own selves.”249 
The love of ourselves through self-respect is a norm of an active learned, 
communicative, social process.250 It is reciprocal towards oneself and others, and 
at the same time others towards.251  It is the fundamental moral relation of 
acknowledgement of one’s sense of inner worth as a human being reflected 
through one’s self-esteem as reflected through dignity.252  
The moral form tests or subjects the ethical aim to the test of the norm.253 Ricoeur 
argues that “there is a bond between self-respect and the moral evaluation of 
these same actions submitted to the test of the universalization of our maxims of 
actions.”254 The test of the norm as the designatiory element – what is permitted 
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or prohibited – is self-referential. Paul Ricoeur argues in the Reflection on the Just 
writes that255   
Morality presupposes nothing more than a subject capable of positing itself in 
the norm that posits it as subject. In this sense, we can take the moral order to 
be self-referential.  
In other words, the norm is the self-referential capable being, the subject of self-
esteem of one’s aim for the good. It is the ‘norm’ as self-esteem of an 
accomplished life which becomes the basis of human society.  It becomes the 
custom, the law by which relations are understood.  
The self-referential test of the norm “requires nothing more than a subject capable 
of imputation.”256 The norm is thus, the self-referential being through imputation 
who puts demands on themselves.257 This connects with respect through the love 
of self and by extension the love of others. Ricoeur wrote: “We respect ourselves 
in that we are capable of impartially judging our actions.”258 To impartially judge 
one’s own actions Francisco Ayala argues has three conditions:259   
(i) the ability to anticipate consequences of one’s own actions; (ii) the ability to 
make value judgements; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative 
courses of action. These abilities exist as a consequence of the eminent 
intellectual capacity of human beings.  
These conditions provide the self-referential ability as a capable subject positing 
itself as the norm. They become internal principles in self-regulating one’s good 
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life. This demands self-awareness, while at the same time one’s being is open to 
change, willing to question and challenge themselves.260  
The norm is not controlled by external values, or external morality. For example, 
it does not depend upon beliefs or feelings of others’ lives,261 nor is it achieved 
through the exercise of power or authority262 as may be considered in the vertical 
interpretive horizon. The vertical horizon is an imposed sense of values, and 
although may be absorbed as one’s own, may or may not aid the norm of the aim. 
Furthermore, it may distract from self-respect of one’s self-esteem. It may also 
affect the relationality of people to that of a collectivity of individuals.  
However, the norm of the aim is the obligation in the sense of regulation. It arises 
in this sense as a norm263 of right or wrong. Francisco Ayala describes this as 
consisting “of the urge or predisposition to judge human actions as either right or 
wrong in terms of their consequences for other human beings.”264 This is 
supported by Émile Durkheim who writes that morality is265   
“everything that is the source of solidarity, everything that forces man to take 
account of other people, to regulate his actions by something other than the 
promptings of his own egoism.  
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This obligation is an obligatory subjective relationality266 is the sense of gift 
giving267 through a process of reciprocity.268 Reciprocity is a process of considering 
others before one self,269 and respecting others and oneself as another.270 It is 
obligatory as a ‘duty’ to others by considering the humanity of the other before 
one’s self.271 The reciprocal nature of the moral form ensures accountability to the 
relational environment. It is the accountability of one’s own speech and actions 
and its impact on others in a sympathetic way.272 It is in this sense the obligatory 
nature of the norm ensures the social bonds of mutual concern, trust, 
appreciation, and affection that are crucial to successful ongoing dialogical 
relations.273 This moral form was essential to a relational society. 
2.3.3 Integrity/truthfulness 
The moral basis of esteem and respect demands integrity and truthfulness. This is 
the link of holding the capable being to the moral basis of self-esteem. Integrity 
and truthfulness require one to aim for the accomplished life even if that is the 
more difficult or less favourable life. For example, Joseph Raz says:274    
“The morally good are those who would have led a moral life even if even if the 
circumstances of their life were less favourable, yet only in the sense of being 
able to cope with the temptations and pressures normal in their society.”  
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A moral basis through self-esteem and self-respect requires living truthfully 
irrespective of being favourable or the social pressure. A moral repugnant basis, 
on the other hand, is the options or choices which may be favourable, or 
hegemonic but not holding to the integrity and truthfulness of who one is.  
As such, integrity is an essential condition of the autonomous life of a capable 
moral being.275 It is defined as the ‘commitment to a choice and being loyal to that 
commitment’.276 Lynne McFall takes this definition further and states that 
integrity requires277  
that someone (1) subscribes to some consistent set of principles or 
commitments and (2), in the face of temptation or challenge, (3) uphold these 
principles or commitments, (4) for what the agent takes to be the right reasons.  
Integrity requires the commitment and loyalty to the accomplished life one has 
chosen for oneself irrespective of the favourability or difficulty to which it might 
lead. Holding to integrity helps to prevent giving into social hegemonic pressures 
of a particular way of life and thinking and being true to oneself. This helps to avoid 
morally repugnant choices and also from being manipulated and coerced into who 
one is or how one comes to be. 
With integrity, one can exercise to the fullest truthful, social, and moral 
participation.278 It enables one to pursue the accomplished life as a relational 
social being through one’s chosen relationships and projects.279 This requires 
“being truthful to one’s very being,280 who one really is and will be,” and being 
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involved in the world truthfully.281 Holding to the integrity of who one is and the 
autonomous capability of how one comes to be enables one to live in the world 
truthfully. Without integrity and truthfulness to who one is and how one comes to 
be, it is difficult to hold oneself to the norm and reciprocally hold such a duty to 
others.  
Although they physically exist, most intersex people do not have self-esteem and 
self-respect. They have not been able to live in the world truthfully. They have lost 
the integrity over their physical (anthropological) capable and moral being. This 
prevents the fullest participation of a socio-political life and restricts potentiality 
and well-being. They require integrity as to who they are and the ability to live 
their life truthfully.   
2.3.4 Moral Basis: Predicates of Dignity (Esteem) and Relational Respect 
The moral basis, or as Ricoeur refers to as the moral form, of the human being is 
as one who is worthy of esteem and respect. This moral form has two predicates: 
first, the ethical predicate of self-esteem arrived at by aiming for the accomplished 
life and it is an evaluation of self-esteem through one’s well-being and achieving 
potentiality; and second moral predicate of the norm of the aim posits one as self-
regarding attestation while also having an obligation to oneself and others. The 
second predicate of obligation of the norm bridges the anthropological and the 
moral being and inclines a moral subject to do one’s duty. Rioeur wrote:282 
“Respect, in my opinion, constitutes only one of the motives capable of inclining 
a moral subject to “doing his duty. … I would give place of honor to one strong 
sentiment, something like indignation, which is a negative of intending of others’ 
dignity as well as one’s own dignity. Negatively, refusing humiliation expresses 
the recognition of what makes the difference between a moral and a physical 
subject, a difference called dignity.”   
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Dignity is a mediatory mechanism of the norm. It is the difference of the moral and 
the physical, or in other words, it is the attestation of one’s capacities while also 
having an obligation to oneself and others. This dignity is the fundamental moral 
relation of acknowledgement of one’s sense of inner worth as a human being 
reflected through one’s self-esteem and the expectation of approval, recognition, 
from oneself and others as a human being. Dignity is evaluative283 through the 
examination of one’s accomplished life in the aim for the good’ with and for 
others. It is within the sphere of dignity of a moral being that the capable being 
can live truthfully irrespective of being favourable or the social pressure and 
maintaining integrity to who one is and how one comes to be. This is the dignity 
of the human being.  
Dignity through self-esteem and self-respect does not simply add to the self-
designation of the capable being, but rather recapitulates it.284 Dignity is the 
fundamental moral relation of acknowledgement of one’s sense of inner worth as 
a human being reflected through one’s self-esteem. It is the expectation of 
approval from oneself and others, and indicates recognition as a human being. 
Dignity in the sense of this thesis is best described by Sandra Fredman. She writes 
that:285   
based on what people say and do, dignity seems to be a condition signified by a 
sense of contentment, satisfaction, and wellness – an integrative evaluation of 
our lives and circumstances. Inherent to the very notion of dignity is the idea 
that dignity is ultimately reckoned by each individual for him or herself.   
As such, dignity is inherent to a capable being. It separates one from being only of 
instrumental or utility value. Without dignity, what kind of being is one? Ricoeur’s 
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work illustrates that the capable being recapitulates the moral form of being – a 
being of dignity.   
Dignity is something to be evaluated. Dignity is an autonomous condition of being 
and it is reflected through the wellness and flourishing. It examines one’s life – a 
‘life worth living’ or judging one’s ‘aim for the good’ with and for others.286 It is for 
this reason, Ricoeur writes that it is “an evaluative measure that our moral feeling 
grasps.”287 It is the evaluative tool of and esteemed life as determined through 
attestation. Dignity is the indicator of how worthy and capable an individual 
deems oneself to be.288 The higher one’s dignity, the more self-esteem one has 
which indicates well-being and human flourishing.   
Such dignity is not that of self-reliance but important to a relational flourishing 
society. A person’s experience of dignity though is relational.  As Fredman 
writes:289   
Dignity is shaped by our relationships with ourselves, but also by our 
relationships with others as well as our interactions with the physical world. 
Viewed in this way, each person’s experience of dignity is inextricably coupled 
with that of others through the health and vigour of the commonwealth which 
may arise, in part, from the unique extent to which human biological fitness is 
contingent on the institutions that we develop.   
Dignity or its lack thereof, is shaped through relationships with others and one’s 
situatedness or horizon. Though understanding one’s narrative it is possible to find 
one’s experience of dignity and the well-being and flourishing of the human being. 
This indicates the connection of dignity to respect, the norm of the aim,290 
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becomes critical to ensure the dignity of self-esteem.  Such respect is more than a 
toleration. Toleration infers putting up with another. This goes beyond toleration 
extending the dignity of humanness to all humans. Respect is the treating of each 
other291 with mutual recognition and acceptance of one another irrespective of 
their uniqueness and differences.292 Respect indicates the awareness of the 
conditions to realise one’s well-being and potentiality in the aim for the 
accomplished life of both oneself and of others for self-esteem and hence, their 
dignity. As such, respect is consistent with empowerment, an active virtue with 
the potential to foster change.293  
Although respect may not be based on an inherent equality, its product is a form 
of balance or parity.294 That is respect results in a balance of human beings that 
are equally respected. This, Ricoeur writes, is when respect for the norm295   
blossoms into respect for others and for ‘oneself as another,’ and when respect 
will be extended to anyone who has the right to expect his or her just share in 
an equitable distribution. 
This equitable distribution of respect provides the “public space” and “the orders 
of recognition” as a dignified being that interacts with ‘the institutional other’.296 
The mutuality of respect, though not inherent to dignity, is critical to enable 
dignity of the human being – the capable being worthy of esteem and respect.  
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The moral basis of the autonomous capable being is a dignified being as one who 
is worthy of esteem and respect. The dignified being is the humanness of the 
anthropological being. In other words, dignity moves one from a mechanical entity 
or organism to a being of humanness. Such dignity is critical to the lives of intersex 
people to enable them to live a life of truthfullness and integrity as an autonomous 
capapble moral being.   
2.4 Moral Identity 
Personal identity is the singularity of one’s narrative identity and the singularity of 
its narrative form.297 Thus, personal identity is thus, “posed as the outcome of 
narration.”298 Personal identity is possible through the access, as Ricoeur writes, 
“to the mediation of the narrative function.”299 Personal identity gives recourse to 
others to give that personal certainty a social ‘status’,300 that is, a social 
recognition. However, although personal identity as a singularity of one’s narrative 
identity limits the unpredictability of the future and maintains dependability, it 
does so at the risk of betrayal.301 The risk results from the personal identity 
betraying the narrative identity of the capable being.   
The betrayal of one’s narrative identity occurs when it is divested from one’s 
personal identity.  Personal identity in this sense is a recognition through 
attribution rather than an outcome of a narration. It is “a term for impotence 
through the admission of all the signs of vulnerability that threaten any such 
narrative identity.”302 The process of divestment from its source of narrative 
identity threatens the narrative character of identity leaving the being vulnerable. 
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The being becomes vulnerable losing autonomy and as such resulting in the 
inability or lesser ability of the human condition.303  
The divesting of the narrative identity results in a personal identity as an attributed 
status category as the same at all times and in all circumstances.304 This is a claim 
of immutability and historicity305 under the heading of idem identity.306 This 
singularity and immutability provides certainty of being as occurs within the 
vertical horizon. It affirms the status of an individual,307 as a tag of ‘what one is’,308 
and is inscribed on one’s identity documents.309 Identity is attached to a person as 
something that is referred to or “referred back to”310 as the status identities 
attributed to an individual. As such, identity becomes a tool of utility and 
instrumentalism. Kim Atkins, writes:311  
“At the same time, contemporary philosophy of mind reduces questions of 
"who?" to questions of "what?", and in doing so, closes down considerations of 
self while rendering the moral question one of mere instrumentality or utility.”  
Identity is an instrument in the structuring and operation of society. It becomes 
part of utility considerations. This removes the basic sense of humanness and its 
morality or dignity. The mark of power over identity has shifted from the individual 
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that has a capability becoming to an outside force that determines what one 
becomes. It is to this determination that one becomes and attests irrespective of 
one’s narrative. Attestation of one’s life refers back to the status identities that 
have been attributed, and any diversion from such identities are seen as 
pathological. This is the problematic of identity as identified above that leaves 
people vulnerable in the human condition. They have lesser or an inability of the 
capacities in their humanness. Moreover, it leads to the possibility of a “fracture 
of the reflexive relation of the self to itself, which has its moral and psychological 
legitimacy on the plane that institutes and structures the human person.”312 It is 
for this reason the paradox of autonomy and vulnerability/fragility is critical to the 
attestation of an identity as noted by Ricoeur.313  
Identity is not a static attribution of characteristics of what one is, but a reflection 
of who one is as an outcome of one’s narrative identity. Although we all have a 
personal identity, it has no meaning, or purpose, without investment in the 
narrative identity in which it derives. Given the vulnerability of the human 
condition that Ricoeur illustrates, and the issues of the paradox of autonomy over 
the capable being, identity must be more than a reflection of the anthropological 
being. Human beings have an anthropological form, the capable being demanding 
autonomy, but also a moral form, the moral basis of life with interconnects with 
one’s autonomous capable being and recapitulates it. Sandy Farquhar considers 
this in her work. She writes, while reflecting on the work of Ricoeur:314  
“Although others may seem like me, I have my own personal identity – I have 
something in which I am different from all others. Being like others and different 
from others are combined in what Ricoeur calls the moral identity of a person.”  
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A moral identity includes the moral basis of the capable being making one worthy 
of esteem and respect in how one becomes who they are. This is important to not 
only retain the investment of the personal identity within and through one’s 
narrative identity but also to enable one to attest to who they are. It is in this way 
that one’s identity has legitimacy.   
It is in this sense that Ricoeur describes a personal identity as “characterized by a 
temporality that may be described as constitutive.”315 Constitutive indicates the 
“power to establish or give organized existence to something.”316 The constitution 
of this personal identity is through the capable being and its capacities. These 
capacities317 are hierarchical in order.318 They culminate in the specific capability 
of attestation.319 They work in tandem with the moral form of the capable being 
worthy of esteem and respect. Although the capacities are observable from the 
outside, they are felt or experienced in a mode of certainty.320 The certainty 
derives from one’s attestation of the autonomous capable being worthy of esteem 
and respect.321  
The full deployment of autonomy of the capable human being leads to the moral 
world of the moral being – one who is worthy of esteem and respect, or, in other 
words dignity. The moral being, while aiming for the good or accomplished life, 
through the norm is bought to a life of solidarity through social and political 
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structures for and with others in living the accomplished life. This is expressed by 
Sandy Farquhar who writes:322  
“I uncover who I am by living a good life, for and together with others, based on 
respect for the self and others. This orientation takes Ricoeur into the world of 
shared community and the social and political structures that enhance the 
development of identity.” 
The development of identity is a process by living the good accomplished life 
through respect of self and of others. It occurs in and through the shared 
structures of society. The enabling of such an autonomous capable being of 
esteem and respect is the dignified human being.323 
It is through one’s moral identity that capability underlines the main structures 
between self-recognition and attestation.324 It is only through capability that 
recognition becomes attestable. Recognition is self-reflexive and requires the 
capacities of the capable being. Recognition of the capable being that calls for 
identification of the self325 including the narratives of the personal, the social, and 
the political within one’s narrative identity. Ricoeur describes the reflexive process 
of recognition: “I identify myself by my capacities, by what I can do. The individual 
refers to him- or herself as a capable person.”326 Although capabilities may be 
observable, their certainty comes through that of imputability, the ultimate 
capability, which attests both to who one is and how one comes to be.327 In other 
words, the certainty of identity is achieved through the attestation of oneself as 
the author of one’s acts.328 This attestation is a mark of power claiming power or 
                                                     
322 Farquhar, above n 269, at 2. 
323 Ricœur, above n 14, at 74. 
324 Ricoeur, above n 71, at 18. 
325 Ricœur, above n 26, at 1. 
326 Ricoeur, above n 58, at 1. 
327 At 1; Ricoeur, above n 71, at 18. 
328 Ricœur, above n 14, at 75. 
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autonomy as to who one is and how they come to be. Ricoeur writes that 
“Narrative identity is something claimed, something like a mark of power. It also 
declares itself as a kind of attestation.”329 It is for this reason that personal identity 
cannot be divested from one’s narrative identity. Thus, the same capability that 
enables the attestation of one’s narrative identity is also the same one that self-
recognises, and in turn is recognised by others. It is in this interconnection of the 
capable being through recognition and attestation that implies a being worthy of 
self-esteem and self-respect330 – a dignified being.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Narratives are part of life and seen through one’s becoming. It is through one’s 
becoming that people belong and are part of a community. A person’s narrative 
represents one’s becoming from birth to death. Each one’s becoming occurs 
within horizons of situatedness or interpretive horizons.331 These give one 
meaning and purpose.  The first is a vertical horizon which is determinative in what 
one is (an identity) and hegemonic in formation of the narrative. The second is a 
horizontal horizon which is a mediatory environment enabling one’s becoming 
resulting in an identity – who one is. Interpretation of one’s narrative makes it 
possible to answer questions about oneself – one’s personal identity.332 However, 
the misreading of one’s story has the potential to affect one’s and others’ lives and 
affect their very sense of being. The narratives are the story of how one becomes 
who or what one is. It is part of life that gives meaning and purpose to people and 
communities. It can also segregate them from the community and prevent them 
from being a valuable member of the community. Whether within a vertical or 
horizontal horizon, each person has a becoming resulting in a narrative.  
                                                     
329 At 79. 
330 Ricœur, above n 26, at 1, 4. 
331 This includes the “personal, the social, and the political” that create and become the 
framework of the horizons. See: Farquhar, above n 1, at 11. 
332 At 11. 
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The becoming of sex, as illustrated in the last chapter, occurs through one of these 
two horizons. For most people, sex becoming is determined at birth as a sex status 
– either male or female – which defines their life and becomes the basis of their 
narrative of life irrespective of the inner self and the I-me mediation. Intersex 
people with variation of sex characteristics are misread as mistakes of nature that 
need completion as a true male or female. This often requires forced normalising 
surgery to remedy this reading of what they should be. Few have a sex becoming 
that is not pre-determined that enables the I-me mediation of sex to become who 
one is including those with many different sex variations.  
The character of one’s becoming is constructed within one’s narrative. Depending 
on the horizon, it may provide a more open free horizon or closed hegemonic 
horizon in which the character develops. The importance of identity to the 
character and the narrative is illustrated by Ricoeur. He wrote that the narrative333     
“constructs the identity of the character, which may be called his or her identity, 
in constructing the story told. It is the identity of the story which makes the 
identity of the character.”  
Identity is what results from the character of the story being told. Or, as Linda 
Alcoff wrote, identity is revealed the “moment in which it suddenly emerges from 
hiddenness in the full functional context of the world.”334 In other words, identity 
is the resultant of one’s narrative revealed to the world around them. It is through 
one’s narrative that it is possible to understand who or what one is and how one 
comes to be.335 This character is important to one’s recognition in the world. In 
most societies, sex is an important characteristic of the character.  
                                                     
333 Ricoeur, above n 4, at 147–148; See also: Ricoeur, above n 4, at 77; Khan, above n 4, at 10. 
334 Alcoff, above n 6, at 94–95. 
335 Farquhar, above n 1, at 10. 
147 
 
Identity, and the certainty it brings, has always been important for societies 
around the world, though most did not have a term for ‘identity’. For most 
societies, ‘identity’ was the recognition of oneself and others. This recognition 
entwined with one’s narrative identity. The recognition of each person through 
their narratives is by their personal identity. However, personal identity is “also a 
term for impotence through the admission of all the signs of vulnerability that 
threaten any such narrative identity.”336 This occurs through the problematic of 
identity that threatens one’s narrative identity by divesting it of its personal 
identity and leaving personal identity as an immutable substrate disconnected 
from one’s narrative by which one is recognised. This process inhibits ability and 
thus leaving a paradox of autonomy.    
To overcome this, one’s becoming requires a full deployment of autonomy for the 
capable being to make or author one’s own life.337 This also includes, as Francisco 
Valdes notes, having “control over one’s capacity to experience and express the 
self; to shape and direct personality, both socially and sexually; and to realize one’s 
being and fate.”338 It is through this autonomous capability that one can fully attest 
to who one is. This attestation reflects the moral form or basis of the capable 
being. Combined, this reflects the autonomous agency of the power and capability 
to determine for oneself who one is and how one comes to be.339 Only in this way 
is one’s narrative identity attested as a personal identity. It is such an identity that 
both Farquhar and Ricoeur refer to as a moral identity which while relationally 
situated and guided, one’s identity can be different from and alike at the same 
time. 
                                                     
336 Ricœur, above n 14, at 79. 
337 Raz, above n 116, at 369. 
338 Francisco Valdes “Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & (and) 
Sexual Orientation to Its Origins” (1996) 8 Yale JL & Human 161 at 170. 
339 Eekelaar, above n 159, at 185; Cooper, above n 159, at 250; Raz, above n 116, at 391. 
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The difference between the immutable determined identity (the problematic of 
identity) and a moral identity is dignity. The dignity of being is through self-esteem 
and self-resect that recapitulates the autonomous capable being.340 Dignity is 
reckoned autonomously and not heteronomously. It is a condition reflected 
through wellness and flourishing. It examines one’s life a ‘life worth living’ or 
judging one’s ‘aim for the good’ with and for others.341 It is for this reason, Ricoeur 
writes that it is “an evaluative measure that our moral feeling grasps.”342 It is the 
evaluative tool of and esteemed life as determined through attestation. Dignity is 
the indicator of how worthy and capable an individual deems oneself to be.343 The 
higher one’s dignity, the more self-esteem one has which indicates well-being and 
human flourishing.   
Dignity is based in self-esteem and occurs through self-resect. Self-respect is more 
than toleration, it is extending the dignity of humanness to all humans. This 
requires treating each other with equal recognition and acceptance as human 
beings irrespective of their uniqueness and differences.344 It also demands 
awareness of the conditions to realise one’s well-being and potentiality in the aim 
for the accomplished life of both oneself and of others for self-esteem and hence 
their dignity. As such, respect is consistent with empowerment, an active virtue 
with the potential to foster change.345 This enables a just share in an equitable 
distribution.346   
Intersex people clearly illustrate the issue of the problematic of identity. The 
immutable status of maleness and femaleness prevents the recognition of other 
                                                     
340 Ricœur, above n 26, at 4. 
341 Ricoeur, above n 4, at 181. 
342 Ricœur, above n 14, at 48–49. 
343 Chazan, above n 189, at 42. 
344 Jones, above n 248, at 342. 
345 At 343. 
346 Ricoeur, above n 4, at 203–204. 
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possibilities of sex multiplicities as part of one’s identity. This is clearly represented 
through the history of intersex people. Somewhere from mythology to the present 
intersex people have gone from revered to repressed. Although intersex people 
have existed since time immemorial, although not always named as such, they 
have not always been recognised and accepted within society. Some societies in 
the past respecting them as human beings, and some societies even revering 
them, while today, most intersex people are only recognised through the 
determined sexed identity as either male or female. This has resulted in their 
death, ostracism, or the physical and psychological manipulation of their bodies 
to conform them to the socio-cultural understanding of sex. They have been left 
marginalised and invisible to themselves and to others around them. This indicates 
it is not intersex people who are the difference but that recognition, and the 
opposite of invisibility, of intersex results from two types of sex becoming. Most 
societies today, have an immutable determination of sex as either male or female 
and nothing in between. When a baby is born, their sex status is assigned and 
defined. One authors their life according to one’s status. There are few societies 
that accept intersex or sex diversity, and as such, they remain invisible to society.  
Although most intersex people have a personal identity, it is questionable if they 
have a moral identity. This would require them retaining the mark of power over 
one’s sex – as a male, female, both or neither – and how they come to be including 
the autonomy over their sex characteristics. This does not occur in most places.  A 
moral identity will enable recognition of who one is including their sex multiplicity 
– as a male, female or both or neither – along with one’s many other multiplicities. 
This results in a dignified being - the autonomous capable being as one who is 
worthy of esteem and respect. Dignity centres an intersex person in humanness 
and not as a disease or mistake of nature. Such dignity is critical to the lives of 
intersex people to enable them a life of truthfullness and integrity as a moral 
autonomous capapble being.  A dignified life for an intersex person requires 
freedom to be who they are – whether male, female, both or neither – and the 
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autonomy over how they come to be. This enables them to be true to themselves 
with esteem and respect from and to others around them. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUALISATION OF SEX WITHIN RIGHTS 
3  
Core to this thesis is the recognition of intersex people as who they are and the 
respecting of how they come to be. The first chapter has detailed how becoming 
of (inter)sex is a process understood within one’s narrative identity. It is through 
this narrative identity that one’s personal identity is revealed. It is through that 
personal identity that people are recognised. However, the second chapter began 
highlighting that becoming occurs within interpretive horizons and these have led 
to two different understandings of the idem-ipse identities. The horizontal 
interpretive horizon views these as a meditative process resulting in an identity. 
The vertical, however, views identity as an identicality – the idem identity – the 
immutable characteristic by which one is recognised and understood, and that the 
ipse identity incidentally becomes accordingly. This consequentially views one’s 
identity as immutable through time and space. This has led to the problematic of 
identity as it divests one’s personal identity from one’s narrative identity 
foundation. However, due to the problematic of identity – conceptualising identity 
as identicality – intersex people like many others have been left vulnerable. They 
have lost their ability to autonomously actualise their capabilities – to speak, to 
act, to narrate and to promise and impute – to form an accomplished moral life of 
who they are and how they come to be. This accomplished moral life is central to 
all intersex people’s issues.  
The struggle for the rights and equality of sex have occurred for more than 100 
years. Primarily these rights centred around women’s rights although in the last 
25 years especially, there has been a slow but increasing focus on Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights. The question remains how has the fight 
for rights and equality supported or not the fight for intersex issues?  
This chapter will first consider the concept of rights and its development over time. 
It will then consider how rights at international law have understood sex and 
whether this has included intersex people. Through this analysis, it will be possible 
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to understand how the understanding of sex in international human rights law fits 
in with the development of rights.  
The next part of this chapter argues that the understanding of sex and the 
invisibility of intersex people in international law is not accidental, but part of the 
maintenance of sex status. It will illustrate this through how the struggle for rights 
and equality has played out within international human rights law. It will then 
continue by outlining how status, in particular, that of sex, has remained so central 
to society even using intersex to maintain the demarcation moving from biology 
to gender. This will be explained the way that rights are understood through the 
different interpretive horizons.  
The chapter finishes by arguing for rights to do its juridical task of enabling 
autonomy, international human rights law must recapture the subject of rights as 
the focus and aim of rights. To overcome the problematic of identity and its 
resulting vulnerabilities, one has to rely on one’s rights through systems of justice 
to remedy such a problem. Paul Ricoeur argues that autonomy is the prerogative 
of the subject of rights, but it is vulnerability that makes autonomy remain a 
condition of possibility that juridical practice turns into a task.1 Although 
autonomy is fundamental to the subject of rights, at times it requires a juridical 
task – the help of rights law – to enable autonomy. The importance of rights law 
is to rescue autonomy from being a possibility due to the vulnerabilities and 
enable it to be a reality. Ricoeur argues, that this juridical task of rights is as 
follows: as human beings are autonomous, they must become so.2 Only then can 
one autonomously actuate one’s capabilities to form one’s accomplished moral 
life as a sex – male, female, both or neither -  and how one comes to be which is 
so central for intersex people.  
                                                     
1 David Pellauer (translator) Paul Ricœur Reflections on the Just (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2007) at 72. 
2 At 72. 
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3.1 Sex and International Human Rights 
Sex has been included in the United Nations (UN) and its instruments in particular 
the International Bill of Rights (IBOR) from its very foundations. Despite inclusion 
in these documents, it has not been defined in the international case law, not even 
in the General Comments. As will be seen in the way sex is applied in and through 
international documents and international bodies, it has been restricted to that of 
the male-female binary status. This has also been the case in trying to achieve 
recognition of international human rights for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, 
Intersex and other sexual minorities (LGBTI) people. As will be seen rather than 
understanding them as part of the diversity of sex, there has been a tendency to 
view them as a new status of sex different to that of male and female, retaining 
the status of male and female as sex. Intersex, apart from the issue of surgery and 
normalisation processes (discussed in a later chapter) has been disregarded.   
3.1.1 Sex Incorporated into the Charter and IBOR  
The inclusion of sex came through the acknowledgement of women, their status, 
and the issues they face in socio-political and economic life. This was first taken 
up by the League of Nations in 1935, however, “it was not until the Charter of the 
United Nations and peace treaties concluded after World War II that international 
instruments called for equality of the sexes.”3 Equality of the sexes was considered 
to be one of the basic tenants.4 The push to include women came primarily from 
Latin women and a representative from China.5 The English and American 
                                                     
3 Laura A Donner “Gender Bias in Drafting International Discrimination Conventions: The 1979 
Women’s Convention Compared with the 1965 Racial Convention” (1993–1994) 24 Cal W Int’l LJ 
241 at 244. 
4 Laura Reanda “Human Rights and Women’s Rights: The United Nations Approach” (1981) 3 
Human Rights Quarterly 11 at 11. 
5 Torild Skard “Getting Our History Right: How Were the Equal Rights of Women and Men 
Included in the Charter of the United Nations?” (2008) 35 Forum for Development Studies 37 at 
42. 
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delegations were pushing for the version of the word man to include everyone.6 
In spite of the different reasoning of these two groups, we know from the 
beginning that sex was one of the statuses that the UN believed should not be 
used to prevent the free and full development of the dignified being.  
In 1946, the ‘Sub-Commission on the status on Women’ was “set up to advise the 
Commission on Human Rights on problems relating to the status of women.”7 The 
Sub-Commission began a programme of work based on the principle “that 
freedom and equality are essential to human development and women are as 
much a human being as man and therefore entitled to share with him.”8 The goal 
of this Sub-Commission was to9   
enable women to participate fully as ‘free and responsible members’ in the 
building of the new society, it was necessary ‘to raise the status of women to 
equality with men in all fields of human enterprise.  
The premise was that “throughout history women had not been considered as 
‘humans’ and most human rights had been enjoyed exclusively by men, being 
denied to women. There was hardly any sphere of life in which the rights of 
women had been respected.”10 The goal of UN Women, through the Sub-
Commission on the Status of Women, was to advocate on the respecting the rights 
of women in all spheres of life.  
From there, sex equality was incorporated through the IBOR. Unlike other issues 
of inequality, discrimination, and so on, sex even has a special article in the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International 
                                                     
6 At 42–43, 47, 51. 
7 Report of the Sub-Commission on the Status of Women to the Commission on Human Rights 
(E/HR/18 1946) at 1; Donner, above n 3, at 244. 
8 Reanda, above n 4, at 18. 
9 At 18. 
10 Skard, above n 5, at 53. 
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Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).11 The Sub-
Commission on the Status of Women continued their work in other areas with 
regards to work on sex equality and other women’s rights issues. Moreover, they 
pushed for and achieved the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1967.12 By the time CEDAW came in force, 
there had been a large shift from sex to gender. Although it appears a positive 
force, intersex people demonstrate, as seen later in the chapter, that they have 
been used to create gender and then used by gender to make them invisible.  
3.1.2 Adoption of ‘LGBT’ Rights – Inclusive of I (Intersex)? 
Although sex was explicitly mentioned in the IBOR, there has been great debate 
recently if that also includes the LGBTI population. Despite slow acceptance in 
many places domestically and internationally, almost all states still conceptualise 
sex through the male-female binary. This adherence to sex status as a binary of 
male and female remains strong.  There has been a reluctance for diversity and 
pluralism of sex. Although there was a start to include these rights within sex, they 
have moved to ‘other status’.   
The beginning of international acceptance of LGBT rights begins in 1994 with the 
Toonen case bought before the Human Rights Committee. The Toonen case13 
concerned criminal laws of sodomy that were still legal in Australia although they 
had not been enforced at the time of the case. Toonen bought the case before the 
Committee arguing that this was both a violation of privacy in Article 17 and was 
discrimination under Article 26 on the basis of sex under the ICCPR. This was 
upheld in both cases and the Committee agreed that this was discrimination on 
                                                     
11 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2200 A (XXI) Resolution 2200 A (XXI) (adopted, entered into force), Art.3, , Art. 3. 
12 Donner, above n 3, at 244. 
13 Toonen v Australia UN Human Rights Committee UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, 31 March 
1994. 
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the basis of sex. This was supported in the case of Mr Edward Young v Australia 
which confirmed the Toonen case.14 The Committee went on to argue that “the 
State party has violated article 26 of the Covenant by denying the author a pension 
on the basis of his sex or sexual orientation.”15 The Toonon and Young cases have 
been upheld in X v Colombia in 2007.16 At least in 2007, sex has included sexual 
orientation.  
From that time, there has been a struggle for LGBT rights at the UN level. A 
Brazilian Resolution to recognise sexual orientation and gender identity at the UN 
was put forward by a number of countries in 2004, but it was decided at this time 
to delay discussion for another time as there would not be enough votes for it. 
Since then, a group of experts came together in 2006 with a purpose to connect 
the existing international law that related to sexual orientation and gender 
identity. This became the Yogyakarta Principles on Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity (commonly referred to as the Yogyakarta Principles). It was decided that 
instead of creating a new convention, that there was sufficient international law. 
As such, the group collated the principles from the existing law with a 
jurisprudential guide to support it. Thus, although the Yogyakarta Principles 
themselves are not binding international law, the conventions upon which they 
have been drawn are binding.  
At the UN though, there still was little momentum. Around two years later in 2008, 
there was a discussion concerning sexual orientation and gender identity in the 
General Assembly at the UN noting the extra-juridical killing of people due to their 
                                                     
14 Mr Edward Young v Australia ICCPR Human Rights Committee Communication No 941/2000, 8 
August 2003 at [10(4)]. 
15 At [10(4)]. 
16 X v Colombia ICCPR Human Rights Committee Communication No 1361/2005, 30 March 2007 
at [7(2) and 9]. 
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sexual orientation and gender identity.17 There were two opposing resolutions, 
one was supportive of rights for this group of people while the other was opposed 
and both documents were left open for signature.  This left LGBT rights open to 
jurisdictions to decide their validity. The UN still left LGBT rights unclear.  
However, by July 2011 a resolution was passed that affirmed that human rights 
apply to all human beings without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal 
manner which recognises the acts of violence and discrimination committed 
against people because of sexual orientation and gender identity.18 The Resolution 
was an important mark in LGBTI rights at the UN level. It was a sign that 
recognition of sexual orientation and gender identity had been recognised as a 
human rights issue. The resolution also requested a report19  
“documenting the discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against 
individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, in all regions 
of the world, and how international human rights law can be used to end 
violence and related human rights violations based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity.”  
The report delivered to the UN in December of 2011 on Discriminatory Laws and 
Practices and Acts of Violence against Individuals based on their Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity20 did mention intersex as included within this group as in the 
acronym LGBTI. However, in spite of this being included in the acronym, much of 
the recognition of intersex people, still exist as an abnormality or disease. 
                                                     
17 UN General Assembly “General Assembly Adopts 52 Resolutions, 6 Decisions Recommended by 
Third Committee on Wide Range of Human Rights, Social, Humanitarian Issues” Press Release (18 
December 2008) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10801.doc.htm>. 
18 17/19 Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Human Rights Council 
A/HRC/RES/17/19 (adopted 14 July 2011). 
19 17/19 Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. 
20 Human Rights Council Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence against 
Individuals Based on their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (A/HRC/19/41 2011). 
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Current UN instruments and programmes directed towards LGBTI groups aim to 
use the term ‘gender identity’ and ‘sexual orientation’ inclusively, including 
intersex. It is assumed that gender identity issues apply to all of the sexual 
minorities including intersex individuals. This is illustrated in the statement in the 
UN fact sheet describing terms on sexual orientation and gender identity where it 
states “intersex people experience the same range of sexual orientations and 
gender identities as non-intersex people.”21 The International Day against 
Homophobia and Transphobia is “also aimed at highlighting the struggle against 
the discrimination and prejudice suffered by intersex people.”22 The UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recently confirmed that 
“gender identity is recognized as among the prohibited grounds of discrimination; 
for example, persons who are transgender, transsexual or intersex often face 
serious human rights violations, such as harassment in schools or in the work 
place.”23 However, when analysing gender identity, it is a method of providing a 
transition between the ‘sexes’ according to the sex identification of the individual 
– that it is only transgender issues that can be found.24 There is little recognition 
that some intersex people, as well as other people, may want to live a sex that is 
not male or female.  
Despite beginnings from the Toonen case, where sex included sexual orientation 
and presumably (although not explicitly stated) gender identity, LGBT has been 
moved to other status. Other status was designed to indicate grounds of 
                                                     
21 UN Human Rights Commission Fact sheet - LGBT Rights: Frequently Asked Questions (UN 
Human Rights Commission, 2013). 
22 Nils Muižnieks “A Boy or a Girl or a Person – Intersex People Lack Recognition in Europe” (9 
May 2014) The Council of Europe Commissioner’s Human Rights Comment 
<http://humanrightscomment.org/2014/05/09/a-boy-or-a-girl-or-a-person-intersex-people-lack-
recognition-in-europe/>. 
23 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No 20: Non-
discrimination in economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art 2, paragraph 2, of the ICESCR) (2009) 
E/C12/GC/20 at [32]. 
24 Dan Christian Ghattas Human Rights between the Sexes - a Preliminary Study on the Life 
Situations of Inter*Individuals (Volume 34 2013) at 8. 
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discrimination not already listed.25 Despite this case law has included sexual 
orientation as part of sex and thus not requiring separation, the General 
Comments since 2000 begun listing both sex and sexual orientation as grounds of 
discrimination in CESCR General Comments 1426 and 15.27 Although listed 
separately in these two General Comments, it could be argued that this was to 
highlight them more than shifting sex orientation, for example, from the ground of 
sex. However, in 2009, the CESCR General Comment No. 20 on Non-
discrimination28 writes that “other status” as recognized in article 2, paragraph 2, 
includes sexual orientation.29 It went on to argue in discussing ‘other status’ that 
“In addition, gender identity is recognized as among the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination; for example, persons who are transgender, transsexual or intersex 
often face serious human rights violations, such as harassment in schools or in the 
workplace.”30 Again, gender identity is defined as reflecting “a deeply felt and 
experienced sense of one’s own gender. A person’s gender identity is typically 
                                                     
25 “The inclusion of ‘other status’ indicates that this list is not exhaustive and other grounds may 
be incorporated in this category.” See: UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), above n 23, at [15]. 
26 “By virtue of article 2.2 and article 3, the Covenant proscribes any discrimination in access to 
health care and underlying determinants of health, as well as to means and entitlements for their 
procurement, on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth, physical or mental disability, health status (including 
HIV/AIDS), sexual orientation and civil, political, social or other status, which has the intention or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise of the right to health.” See: UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) CESCR General Comment No 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art 12) (2000) E/C12/2000/4 at [18]. 
27 “The Covenant thus proscribes any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, age, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, physical or 
mental disability, health status (including HIV/AIDS), sexual orientation and civil, political, social 
or other status, which has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment 
or exercise of the right to water.” See: UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) General Comment No 15: The Right to Water (Arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant) (2003) 
E/C12/2002/11 at [13]. 
28 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), above n 23. 
29 At [32]. 
30 At [32]. 
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consistent with the sex assigned to them at birth.”31 However, gender identity has 
been indicated as ‘other status’ when referring to transgender and intersex people. 
Sex, according to this General Comment since the adoption of the Covenant32 
has evolved considerably to cover not only physiological characteristics but also 
the social construction of gender stereotypes, prejudices and expected roles, 
which have created obstacles to the equal fulfilment of economic, social and 
cultural rights. Thus, the refusal to hire a woman, on the ground that she might 
become pregnant, or the allocation of low-level or part-time jobs to women 
based on the stereotypical assumption that, for example, they are unwilling to 
commit as much time to their work as men, constitutes discrimination. Refusal 
to grant paternity leave may also amount to discrimination against men. 
This is based on the assumption of a binary of male and female but does not 
explicitly state so. It does, however, strongly indicate the impact of stereotypes in 
sex discrimination. The General Comment, highlighting its reasoning from General 
Comments 1433 and 15,34 sexual orientation, gender identity, and intersex are now 
considered as ‘other status’.  
The Committee on the Rights of the Child in General Comment No. 4 (2003): 
Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child make it clear that sexual orientation is included in the prohibition of 
discrimination.35 This is also confirmed in General Comment No. 3 (2003): HIV/AIDS 
and the Rights of the Child.36 Neither of these has stated whether sexual 
                                                     
31 It goes on to describe that "For transgender people, there is an inconsistency between their 
sense of their own gender and the sex they were assigned at birth. In some cases, their 
appearance and mannerisms and other outwards characteristics may conflict with society’s 
expectations of gender-normative behaviour. See: UN Human Rights Commission, above n 21. 
32 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), above n 23, at [20]. 
33 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), above n 26, at [18]. 
34 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), above n 27, at [13]. 
35 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) General Comment No 4 (2003): Adolescent 
Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2003) 
CRC/GC/2003/4 at [2]. 
36 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) General Comment No 3 (2003): HIV/AIDS and 
the Rights of the Child (2003) CRC/GC/2003/3 at [8]. 
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orientation is included in sex or in other status. Moreover, the Committee against 
Torture, demonstrated in General Comment No. 2 - Implementation of Article 2 by 
State Parties, wrote it differently to most lists of prohibitions of distinctions. Rather 
than saying sex, they have been listed as “gender, sexual orientation, transgender 
identity.”37 It has continued by stating that38   
“Being female intersects with other identifying characteristics or status of the 
person such as race, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, age, immigrant 
status etc. to determine the ways that women and girls are subject to or at risk 
of torture or ill-treatment and the consequences thereof.”  
It has also recognised that non-conformity with stereotypes of the binary of men 
and women are often a discriminatory basis of a violation of the Convention:39  
“Both men and women and boys and girls may be subject to violations of the 
Convention on the basis of their actual or perceived non-conformity with socially 
determined gender roles. States parties are requested to identify these 
situations and the measures taken to punish and prevent them in their reports.”  
These statements indicate the discriminatory nature related to sex, but it does not 
define it as a binary. Rather it is assumed as a binary of male and female by the 
separation of sexual orientation and gender identity to ‘other status’.  
The European Union has been leading the way in providing rights to the LGBT 
population. There has been a success in highlighting the needs of the LGBT 
population. But like at the UN, limitations on how far it will provide identity in the 
narrative sense is still in the making with an insistence on immutable sex identity 
(or status) categories. Sex determined at birth and lived out through gender is still 
the predominate understanding in European law, although flexibility is being given 
                                                     
37 UN Committee Against Torture (CAT) General Comment No 2: Implementation of Article 2 by 
States Parties (2008) CAT/C/GC/2 at [21]. 
38 At [22]. 
39 At [22]. 
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for those who are desiring to change from one ‘sex’ to the other. There is still 
persistence in justifying the ‘sex determination at birth’ fiction through the 
essential basis of genetics and prenatal hormones, despite the weight of the social 
construction argument.40  
What sex encompasses in international law is complicated and also appears to be 
changing over time. While initial interpretation appeared through Toonen and 
Young to support sex as including the different facets of sex and sexual orientation, 
they have over time been separated them out from sex and placed them into 
‘other status’ as their own category with no reasoning given. Apart from being 
mentioned in the General Comment General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination 
in economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 2, paragraph 2, of the ICESCR),41 
intersex has been conspicuously absent. Yet despite such ‘interpretation of sex’, 
intersex has been pivotal to the demarcation of and stabilisation of the ‘sex’ status. 
3.1.3 The Overall Conceptualisation of Sex through International Law 
Sex is not actually defined in international law just as it is not in most jurisdictions. 
The only place in international law that defines sex or gender is in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. In Article 7(3), it states “for the 
purposes of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two 
sexes male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender does not 
indicate any other meaning different from the above.”42 The commentary on the 
International Criminal Court states that the term ‘gender’ refers to “socially 
constructed roles played by women and men.”43 The Rome Statute does clearly 
                                                     
40 Diane Richardson “Constructing Sexual Citizenship: Theorizing Sexual Rights” (2000) 20 Critical 
Social Policy 105 at 118. 
41 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), above n 23, at 32. 
42 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ACONF183/9 (adopted 16 January 2002, 
opened for signature 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002), Art. 7(3). 
43 Mark Klamberg “ICL Database & Commentary - Rome Statute” (2014) 
<http://www.iclklamberg.com/Statute.htm?zoom_highlight=gender#_ftn39>. 
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state an understanding of a binary gender.44 Not only does this Article clearly 
define them as binary, but it states that these are based on sociological 
dimensions, not the biological.  
This leaves the question how the UN Economic and Social Council came to the 
conclusion that “since the adoption of the Covenant, the notion of the prohibited 
ground ‘sex’ has evolved considerably to cover not only physiological 
characteristics but also the social construction of gender stereotypes, prejudices 
and expected roles, which have created obstacles to the equal fulfilment of 
economic, social and cultural rights.”45 Nowhere has the understanding of 
‘physiological’ understanding been captured and at most, it has been assumed 
that sex has been determined at birth. As just has been argued, the capturing of 
sex within the UN and the IBOR was the socio-political understanding of sex and 
the inequalities that women faced as opposed to men.  
This does not mean there was no understanding or assumption of physiological 
differences. Some international institutions, such as the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), define sex as “biological differences between males and 
females.”46 The World Health Organization (WHO) defines it as “the biological and 
physiological characteristics that define men and women.”47 . The WHO gives 
some examples of these different characteristics:48  
                                                     
44 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7(3). 
45 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), above n 23, at [20]. 
46 Naoko Otobe, International Labour Office and Employment Policy Department Resource Guide 
on Gender Issues in Employment and Labour Market Policies Working towards Women’s 
Economic Empowerment and Gender Equality (Internat Labour Off, Geneva, 2014) at 81. 
47 World Health Organisation “What Do We Mean by ‘Sex’ and ‘Gender’?” WHO 
<http://www.who.int/gender/whatisgender/en/>. 
48 World Health Organisation, above n 47. 
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women menstruate and have developed breasts that are usually capable of 
lactating, while men do not; men have testicles while women do not. And men 
generally have more massive bones than women. 
Sex is believed according to the WHO to be constant throughout time and 
societies.49 According to these organisations, gender as sociological roles was 
supposedly constructed upon the biological bases. The WHO refers to gender as 
“the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given 
society considers appropriate for men and women.”50 Naoko Otobe writing a 
report for the ILO refers to gender as “the socially constructed roles, rights and 
responsibilities that communities and societies consider appropriate for men and 
women.”51 The ILO definition finishes by stating that “We are born as males and 
females,52 but we become girls, boys, women and men by learning from our 
families and societies.”53 Though these are not legal definitions, they give some 
indication of what is being considered within the UN organisations. These 
definitions indicate that sex becoming within these organisations, the WHO and 
the ILO, is through the vertical horizon, where sex is determined as either a male 
or female, and through such a determination one constructs a ‘sex’ self or what is 
today referred to as ‘gender’.  
However, when the documents were being drafted and ratified, the inequalities 
discussed were not the physiological differences, but the socio-political 
differences that prevented women from having a public life the same as men. This 
historical understanding of sex is reflected through the socio-political context. This 
                                                     
49 World Health Organisation, above n 47. 
50 World Health Organisation, above n 47. 
51 Otobe, International Labour Office and Employment Policy Department, above n 46, at 81. 
52 This is as determined by medically professionals usually and inscribed on the child’s birth 
certificates.  
53 Otobe, International Labour Office and Employment Policy Department, above n 46, at 81. 
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has not changed for many years.54 It is clear from the discussion above that the 
following statement would be correct: sex being determined at birth of two 
species and live the socially constructed roles, rights and responsibilities that 
communities and societies consider appropriate for men and women.  
The belief that there were two species physiologically definable at birth had come 
to appear as natural.55 This was deemed to be immutable and as such, non-
debatable. The focus of sex at the UN has always been the inequalities and 
discrimination based on socio-political sex. Although an argument can be made 
that sex is not used for definitive but illustrative purposes, at the same time, it 
must be remembered that most discussion has been on the assumption that there 
are only two species – male or female. Although none of this is binding, it is still 
influential. Furthermore, it strongly suggests that there is still a very vertical 
interpretive horizon to the understanding of sex as described in chapter one. Due 
to the influence of this horizon, intersex people have remained predominantly 
invisible.   
3.2 Maintenance of Sex Status 
International law itself has not actually defined sex. The closest international law 
gets to a definition is in the International Criminal Court and articulation within 
CESCR General Comments. Predominantly, this refers to a social, not biological 
definition. The reason sex was initially incorporated into international law was the 
inequality that women faced in society.  Sex, has been important to the status of 
individuals, and at the international stage, it appears no different. Though not 
commonly acknowledged, intersex has been used to demarcate and separate sex 
                                                     
54 For more information see: Francisco Valdes “Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the 
Conflation of Sex, Gender & (and) Sexual Orientation to Its Origins” (1996) 8 Yale JL & Human 
161. 
55 This appearance as natural has been built upon and derived from the bio-medical work that 
was started in the 1800s. Refer to: Alice Domurat Dreger Hermaphrodites and the Medical 
Invention of Sex (Harvard University Press, 1998) at 25–30. 
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from gender and sexual orientation, while at the same time, there was non-
recognition of intersex or sex diversity as natural. As such, the use of intersex 
people have been important in the maintaining of sex status.  
3.2.1 Intersex a Tool to Demarcate Sex 
In the maintaining of sex demarcation as a status, intersex has been known to 
those in power even if not to the average person. Intersex has been first used to 
help make a divide between biology, but when that became too diverse and not 
able to hold as a strict binary, it was again used to show the break in the social 
division.  In both cases, the reality failed but the hegemonic story still remains 
strong.   
The current issues facing intersex date back to the 19th century.56 At that time, 
several things culminated in the need to categorise and differentiate sex: reports 
of sex diversity abroad, concerns about behavioural hermaphrodites – now 
referred to as intersex – (homosexuals, transgender, and feminists) and a rise in 
anatomical hermaphrodites (noticed due to the new medicine of gynaecology).57 
Scientists connected anatomical and behavioural hermaphrodites to inversion or 
broadly grouping them as homosexuals.58 They challenged the socio-political 
status of what it means to be a woman or man, thus, medical and scientific men 
saw the need to strengthen the boundaries of the male and female categories.59 
As Alice Dreger wrote: “The social sex order had to stand as it did because it was 
                                                     
56 At 26–30; Commissioner for Human Rights and Silvan Agius Human Rights and Intersex People 
(2015) at 19. 
57 Alice Domurat Dreger, above n 55, at 25–27, 30. 
58 Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 56, at 19. 
59 Alice Domurat Dreger, above n 55, at 26–27, 28. 
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the natural order of things.”60 In her writing on hermaphrodites, Alice Dreger 
writes:61   
“This is, then, a story about more than hermaphrodites and doctors. It is a story 
of bodies and beings and what these have meant to each other. It is as well a 
story about a struggle over who would decide what anatomy and identity could 
and would and should mean to each other.”  
This enabled the strict definition of the categories of male and female and what it 
meant to be a woman and man.  It began to dominate almost all societies in the 
twentieth century.62  
The importance to determine one’s sex and categorise it according to the male-
female binary was important to avoid or prevent homosexuality.63 Intersex people 
were viewed as a disgust of society.64 They blurred the social lines and the way of 
life between man and woman. Dreger writes:65   
 “Hermaphroditism was a sticky problem, one whose possible solutions held 
important ramifications well beyond the life of the individual doubtful patient. 
So…many medical and scientific men simultaneously expressed disgust at the 
very idea and resentment at the confusion hermaphrodites caused.”  
Two things derive from this period. The first was the requirement to find the ‘true 
sex’ for each individual66 and biomedicine understood the problem of 
hermaphroditism and the importance of early intervention and the need to make 
invisible the signs of ambiguity the highlight the fiction of the binary system. The 
                                                     
60 At 27. 
61 At 10–11. 
62 Stephen Whittle Respect and Equality: Transsexual and Transgender Rights (Routledge 
Cavendish, 2002) at 4. 
63 Alice Domurat Dreger, above n 55, at 8. 
64 SF Ahmed, S Morrison and IA Hughes “Intersex and gender assignment; the third way?” (2004) 
89 Archives of Disease in Childhood 847 at 848. 
65 Alice Domurat Dreger, above n 55, at 27. 
66 At 28. 
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second eventuated in the normalising of sex due to the “crude desire to eradicate 
ambiguity and prevent homosexuality, rather than a genuine concern for the well-
being and best interest of intersex people.”67   
Over time discoveries lead scientists to realise that sex was not the binary that 
everyone had assumed it to be. Whether it be genitals, chromosomes, or 
hormones, or gonads there were variations and no standard.68 This created a 
return to the socio-political sex that had been the status quo until roughly the 
1800s, but under a new name ‘gender’.  But like that of sex, it was not neutral nor 
natural.   
Prior to the 1950s, gender was merely a grammatical term. Any use of the word 
gender, although rare, prior to 1950 was synonymous with the word sex in the 
socio-political sense.69 Although feminists and non-feminists alike see gender as 
natural, intersex people and the treatment of them have played a significant role 
in the rise of gender and its mainstreaming. David Rubin writes:70    
“The dominant understandings of sex and gender have overdetermined the 
meaning of intersex, historically speaking, the concept of intersex paradoxically 
preceded and inaugurated what we call today the sex/gender distinction.” 
The use of gender in the sense of social sex, as opposed to biological, has been 
linked back to John Money and his research with intersex infants and children.71 
                                                     
67 Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 56, at 19. 
68 For more information refer to the following sources: Alice Domurat Dreger, above n 55; Elof 
Axel Carlson The 7 Sexes: Biology of Sex Determination (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
Indiana, 2013); Gerald N Callahan Between XX and XY (Chicago Review Press, Chicago, Ill, 2009); 
Joan Roughgarden Evolution’s rainbow (University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 2009); 
Christopher Ryan and Cacilda Jethá Sex at Dawn (Harper, New York, 2010). 
69 David Haig “The Inexorable Rise of Gender and the Decline of Sex: Social Change in Academic 
Titles, 1945-2001” (2004) 33 Archives of Sexual Behavior 87 at 95. 
70 David A Rubin “‘An Unnamed Blank That Craved a Name’: A Genealogy of Intersex as Gender” 
(2012) 37 Signs 883 at 883. 
71 J Germon Gender (Springer, 2009), in particular, refer to the Introduction; Rubin, above n 70, at 
886. 
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John Money proposed “using the term sex to refer to the biological classification 
of male/female and gender to refer to differences in behaviour by sex.”72 In cases 
of ambiguity, such as in intersex children, it was possible to alter the child’s 
anatomy from its ‘biological basis and the child’s “gender role could differ from 
various biological definitions of an individual’s sex.”73 He believed that a sex could 
be determined, and the child was a blank slate and could be brought up in the 
gender that was assigned. As such, one could be surgically altered and if brought 
up in that role, they would adapt and fit in.74  
John Money introduced the term into the biomedical sphere in the 1950s and later 
it became popularised in the academic and socio-political spheres.  As David Rubin 
writes:75 
“The tracing of the genealogy of intersex is underrecognized but historically 
pivotal role in the development of gender as a concept in twentieth-century 
American biomedicine, feminism and their globalizing circuits.” 
The term carried more than a distinction. It carried the heteronormative system 
that could be implanted in and through society at large.  
As biology could no longer demarcate the sexes, the enforcement of gender and 
the erasing of the ambiguity of intersex was required.  It was from this usage that 
gender became common usage within both biomedical and social sciences.76 
David Rubin argues   
“not only that intersexuality played a crucial role in the invention of gender as a 
category in the mid-twentieth-century biomedical and, subsequently, feminist 
                                                     
72 J Richard Udry “The Nature of Gender” (1994) 31 Demography 561 at 561. 
73 Haig, above n 69, at 95. 
74 Refer to this article for more detail on the connection of gender to John Money’s work and to 
the extension to feminist’s use: Rubin, above n 70. 
75 At 883. 
76 Germon, above n 71, at 2. 
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discourses and that Money used the concept of gender to cover over and 
displace the biological instability of the body he discovered through his research 
on intersex.”    
Biomedicine centred on the interpretation of gender to explain the biological 
phenomena and disease. Rubin continues that gender is the story about “the 
regulation of embodied difference through biopolitical discourses, practices, and 
technologies of normalization that materialize in, through, and as gender.”77 
Cordelia Fine argues that rearranging gender enabled a reinterpretation of the78 
“social structures, values, norms, expectations, schemas, and beliefs that 
penetrate our minds, interactions, and institutions, and that influence interact, 
and become entangled with biology.”  
These social structures with their norms and values became imbued through 
biology to appear natural over time when it fact it is a social construction 
implanted on and through the body. Alisa Sánchez refers to this binary as:79 
being founded naturally existing binary (between man and woman); is 
phallocentric; heteronormative; have the traits of male and female genders are 
fixed and also mutually exclusive; gender is inborn in a person and discoverable 
by medical science; gender is harmonious; and gender identity is socialised into 
human beings.  
This not only affects intersex people, though it does affect them more than others 
leaving them with “violations such as shame, secrecy, and unwanted normalising 
treatment’,” but it also had a wider effect in maintaining and controlling the wider 
‘sex scheme’ and preventing it from collapsing into diversity.80 This had an effect 
                                                     
77 Rubin, above n 70. 
78 Cordelia Fine Testosterone Rex - Unmaking the Myths of Our Gendered Minds (Icon Books Ltd, 
London, United Kingdom, 2017) at 191. 
79 Alisa Sánchez “Intersexuality, Human Rights, and the Colombian Constitutional Court’s Notion 
of Gender” [2010] UCLA Center for the Study of Women at 3. 
80 Rubin, above n 70. 
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of continuing the demarcation of sex as two species, but at the same time left 
intersex invisible.   
3.2.2 Upholding Status of Sex 
Although inequality was recognised as an important issue and women’s rights 
became part of the UN reality, society was not ready to give up status. It was so 
entrenched within the system. Some statuses were slowly removed, but when it 
came to sex, it was so important, and so entrenched that it was essential to 
maintain the system and sex status had to remain. This was seen through the 
implementation of LGBT rights. Even introducing them within the UN framework, 
there was careful work not to break the binary of sex status. The male-female 
binary had to remain. This section will review the status system before reviewing 
the sex status system.  
The hegemonic systems through the vertical horizon see sex status as important. 
They operate according to the “political, economic and socially constructed meta-
narratives.”81 Hegemony maintains the stability of hierarchical structures and 
social relations82 through a heteronomous becoming where one speaks or acts 
according to determinations outside of oneself wittingly or unwittingly.83 It is so-
robust that, as Joan Roughgarden explains,84  
                                                     
81 This meta-narrative may be supported by a capitalistic or labour/class consciousness, though it 
also may be through a scientific or religious one, or even a combination of these in advancing its 
hegemonic cause in both defining the collective what and the derivatives of the collective what, 
the statuses. Refer to: Anne Becker “Identity Premised on Equality of Difference as a 
Fundamental Human Right” in Cornelia Roux (ed) Safe Spaces (Sense Publishers, 2012) 83 at 86. 
82 Valery Chirkov and others “Differentiating Autonomy from Individualism and Independence: A 
Self-determination Theory Perspective on Internalization of Cultural Orientations and Well-being” 
(2003) 84 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 97 at 99. 
83 Michael J Sandel Justice (Penguin Books, London, 2010) at 109. 
84 Fine, above n 78, at 191. 
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“you can pull out a brick here and there, but the others continue to hold 
everything in place. They’re not easily torn apart and reconstructed in new 
ways.” 
For example, it permits competition,85  individualism86 and pluralism to the extent 
that it does not destabilise the system. The hegemony defines the rules or the 
“cultural norms” of the collective and those of the status (identity) groups.87 It is 
through hegemonic norms that it is possible to assign, or not as the case may be, 
entitlements, rights and duties.88  
Status is an ontological experience of hegemonic belonging.89 It is usually 
attributed by fiat at birth90 although may be attained by achievement or 
meritocracy. It determines recognition,91 ascribes positionality92 and roles. It also 
governs behaviour93 and determines who counts as equals.94 It is the “descriptive, 
                                                     
85 Competition includes the bettering or the maintaining of one’s interests and benefits. Cillian 
McBride “Demanding Recognition: Equality, Respect, and Esteem” (2009) 8 European Journal of 
Political Theory 96 at 106, 107. 
86 Individualism rather than a separate understanding of society is more of a relativity of 
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82; This relativity is thus situation and issue dependent, not society based. See: HC Triandis 
“Collectivism and Individualism as Cultural Syndromes” (1993) 27 Cross-Cultural Research 155 at 
159; Daphna Oyserman, Heather M Coon and Markus Kemmelmeier “Rethinking Individualism 
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Psychological Bulletin 3 at 5; Anu Realo, Jüri Allik and Maaja Vadi “The Hierarchical Structure of 
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87 Jessica Knouse “From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics” (2009) 2009 Utah L Rev 749 at 757. 
88 Sandra Fredman Discrimination law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002) at 4; Chirkov and 
others, above n 82, at 100; Peter Spiller (6th edition ed, LexisNexis NZ, 2005) Butterworths New 
Zealand Law Dictionary: a Sixth Edition of Hinde & Hinde’s Law Dictionary at 223. 
89 Becker, above n 81, at 84. 
90 Costas Douzinas “Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Can Hegel Teach Us About Human 
Rights?” (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 379 at 379. 
91 Chirkov and others, above n 82, at 100. 
92 Becker, above n 81, at 86. 
93 T Marshall “A Note on Status” in Jessica Evans, Paul Du Gay and Peter Redman (eds) Identity - a 
Reader (Sage Publications Ltd, London, UK, 2000) at 305. 
94 Joseph Slaughter “The Textuality of Human Rights: Founding Narratives of Human Personality” 
[2004] Interdisciplinary Law and Humanities Junior Scholar Workshop Paper at 4–5, 26–27, 29, 
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or more exactly, the ascriptive assignation of a person.”95 They are normative 
categories96 of underlying essences97 of constitutive intrinsic attributes or traits98 
such as sex/gender, race, class, social status and other attributes.99 Hegemony 
ensures the existing social arrangements and structures, while at the same time 
stifling diversity and difference and uniqueness.100  
3.2.3 Sex Status 
Furthermore, the understanding and discussion of sex within international law has 
demonstrated that the importance of status remains strong, especially in relation 
to sex, even within international law. Although not defined in international law, 
the inference to status and its definitions as male or female are not so subtle. This 
indicates that the vertical interpretive horizon is still influential at least when it 
comes to sex becoming.  
Sex status is the reproductive basis of society physically and symbolically.101 It 
regulates both socially – one’s expression, relations, roles and functions and legally 
                                                     
40; James Griffin “First Steps in an Account of Human Rights” (2001) 9 European Journal of 
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97 The categorising based on essences is the concept of ‘essentialism’: Roughgarden, above n 68, 
at 23. 
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– one’s rights, duties and entitlements.102  It is neither a natural distinction nor 
ahistorical but is a product of historical and political-cultural forces.103 While 
historical sex was male and non-male in the Greco-Roman period,104 in the modern 
period, sex is recognised as two species with not just two different reproductive 
systems (women have ovaries, a womb and lactate while men are sperm 
producers) but also different socio-politically.105 The separation was based on four 
tenets:106   
(1) the bifurification of personhood into male and female components under the 
active/passive paradigm; (2) the polarisation of these male/female sex/gender 
ideals into mutually exclusive, or even opposing, identity composites; (3) the 
penalisation of gender atypicality or transitivity; and (4) the devaluation of those 
who are feminised.  
These tenets not only separate sex into two species but also reject diversity and 
devalue difference. These tenets have remained so strong and hegemonic that 
they have come to appear as natural.  
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Sex status is essentialised through essences of attributes or traits107 – every 
attributed action, reaction or feeling, whether it is physical, psychological or 
behavioural is mapped onto and understood according to one’s sex status as 
either male or female108 as normative categories.109 Cordelia Fine further 
describes these innate, immutable essences:110    
“Of course, there is variability – not all men are identical, nor are all women. But 
amid all the ‘noise’ of individual differences, a male or female ‘essence’ can be 
extracted: characteristics of maleness and femaleness that are natural, 
immutable, discrete, historically and cross-culturally invariant, and grounded in 
deep-seated biological factors.”  
They have come to be seen as natural, “static and fixed,” and “immune or separate 
from forces of social construction.”111 These factors have been considered so 
‘natural, innate, and immutable that they do not even change through time or 
culture. Its biological nature sets life on its course, and thus one status identity.  
In fact, biology while having the possibility to narrate the diversity of nature has 
taken the narrative of hegemonic ideology upholding sex status. Joan 
Roughgarden remarks, science has been used to reinforce the status categories of 
sex. She writes this112  
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“amounts to passing the buck. Instead of taking responsibility for who counts as 
socially as a man or woman, people turn to science, trying to use the biological 
criteria for male to define male and the biological criteria for female to define a 
woman. However, the definition of social categories rests with society, not 
science, and social categories can’t be made to coincide with biological 
categories except by fiat.” 
Furthermore, development biology is a method of removing the human from 
becoming who one is. A narrated life is one that refers back to the sex that 
develops in a linear process in spite of one’s narrative. It infers that sex, in this 
case, is not in one’s control, and rather is an inert process that will occur 
irrespective of what one may think or act. Joan Roughgarden writes that113   
“developmental biology has fallen into the same trap as sexual selection theory 
has: it assumes that one master template is the norm, and that variety reflects a 
defective deviation from that ideal norm.”  
The story of sex status has become so strong much of science follows the very 
same narrative. This is illustrated by Cordelia Fine:114   
“Sex is so fundamental, so the story goes. It is the timeless, unchanging seed 
from which either a male or female developmental programme unfurls. 
Experience plays a secondary role in the individual’s developmental journey to a 
male brain and male nature, or to a female brain and female nature.”   
This narrative then rejects diversity which would disrupt the linear development 
of this sex status from which the world is built. Francisco Valdes argues that this 
“inhibits sex/gender cultural diversity, harmony, and equality, and also subverts 
individual sex/gender autonomy and dignity.”115   
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3.2.4 Where to for intersex people?  
It appears that both before and after the introduction of the UN and the IBOR, the 
sex status based on the binary of male-female still holds strong. One’s becoming 
in these societies is part of a normative story. The hegemonic forces at play,  
directly and indirectly, lead one’s becoming as a civil and social person. This social 
and civil person is understood and operated through status identities. Although 
rights are still part of the system, it depends on what one is, one’s status. The 
autonomy to develop as who one is and how one comes to be when it comes to 
sex whether it be male, female, both or neither still appears distant. To understand 
why this is the case, it is important to look at the history of rights. Then, it will be 
possible to consider the subject of rights and recapturing of rights for the subject 
to whom they belong. 
3.3 The Concept of Rights and its Development. 
Societies all over the world subscribe to moral philosophies of freedom and justice 
in a sense of reciprocation. The moral basis of life may not have the word ‘rights’ 
or even ‘human rights’ as we know it today, but the basis and conceptualisation 
often still contained the basis of autonomy for development within reciprocal 
freedom and justice. In this sense ‘rights’ dates back for centuries. They are critical 
to the enabling of autonomy and as such are important, for example, for intersex 
people to have power over who they are and how they come to be. However, 
although many societies have had such moral basis of life, there have also been 
other forces at play that may deny such moral rights or restrict them in ways that 
benefit those forces and people in power. Under those conditions, the loss or 
restriction on moral rights impacts on their integrity of being and their dignity as 
a human being and the power over how one comes to be who they are. 
Rights are central to their being, becoming and belonging. Becoming and 
belonging occur within socio-political situatedness. Paul Ricoeur argues that “the 
point where politics appears as the setting par excellence for the achievement of 
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human potentialities.”116 To actualise such potentialities, he argues “a person 
must also both interact with other capable persons and be the beneficiary of the 
continual mediation of institutionalized forms of association.”117 It is these 
institutionalised forms of association that is the place of politics, or what “Hannah 
Arendt called the ‘public space of appearance.”118 He goes on to say that119  
This notion of a public space first expresses the condition of plurality resulting 
from the extension of interhuman relations to all those that the face-to-face 
relation of ‘I’ and ‘you’ leaves you out as a third party. In turn, this condition of 
plurality characterises the will to live together of a historical community – a 
people, nation, religion, class, and so forth – itself irreducible to interpersonal 
relations. In this sense, the political institution confers a distinct structure on this 
will to live together that earlier characterised all such systems as ‘orders of 
recognition’.    
These orders of recognition determine the situatedness of the ‘political body’ and 
how belonging and rights are attributed and operate. It is through this public space 
and the orders of recognition that one interacts with ‘the institutional other’ as 
Paul Ricoeur describes in his works such as the “obligation to participate in the 
burdens related to perfecting the social bond.”120 This participation through such 
orders of recognition set the burdens of socio-political life and the rights derive 
from such a social bond.  
As is previously seen, these orders of recognition may be based through humanity 
(horizontal horizon) or through institutional structures of collectivities including 
those of the modern state (vertical horizon). These orders of recognition are 
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intrinsic to the understanding and application of rights. Such distinction in rights 
of the vertical and horizontal horizons is illustrated through the work of Anne 
Becker. She argues “that there is a distinction between claiming rights rooted in 
only what (belonging) we are and claiming rights protecting who (in togetherness) 
we are.”121 The horizontal rights protect who (in togetherness) we are and how 
we come to be as relational beings while vertical rights are based on moral 
determinations of what one is and how one lives. 
The horizontal understanding of rights focused on the individual and applied 
within relationality. It is based in who one is as a unique and distinct being worthy 
of dignity while protecting togetherness and relationality.122 The overall aim is to 
achieve well-being and potentiality (human flourishing) rather than one’s personal 
interests.123  
The vertical understanding of rights, however, centres on the morality of the 
collectivity. The morality of the collectivity and its associated social structures 
determines what (material) interest124 or benefit one has. As such, each one’s 
rights (and entitlements) are according to one’s status rights (‘what one is’),125 
including that of positionality, dignity, honour, and the associated rights and 
entitlements.126 When one is entitled to such status-based rights, there is a 
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tendency to assert and maximise them to one’s interest or benefit.127 This is often 
at the expense of others around them. ‘Liberal rights’ rather than breaking down 
statuses and the utilities involved in them, has merely increased the number of 
status groups looking to maximise their interests and benefits. Where reciprocity 
is invoked128 consideration often focuses on the expectation of returned 
benefits.129 These rights are not protecting of or based on relationality.130 Rather 
they are centred on maintaining the vertical structures of the collectivity as 
described in chapter 1.  
This section outlines the basic history of rights throughout time. It highlights that 
moral rights are not new and nor are they necessarily Western-based. There has 
been a push and pull between a vertical and horizontal understanding of rights as 
just outlined, over the last few thousand years. This is noticeable as whenever 
there has been a move to improve moral rights based in the horizontal, there has 
systematically been a pushback by those in power. This was often to suppress such 
understanding or re-interpret such moral philosophies in favour of those of their 
vertical horizon. This difference in understanding of rights at different periods of 
time and in different places varies between autonomous relationality rights of 
potentiality and well-being and the heteronomous status-based rights of the 
hegemonic collectivity.  
3.3.1 Early Moral Rights 
There are some societies throughout time where the orders of recognition within 
systems of plurality characterises a will to live together as its orders of 
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recognition.131 Within such orders, a moral obligation to live together established 
principles and rights to enable a relational society. This illustrates what would be 
called moral rights, and an early form of what today is known as ‘human rights’.  
Although the term ‘human rights’ may be modern, there have been 
conceptualisations of human rights around for thousands of years. The concept, 
even without being named, “can be traced to the origin of the human race itself” 
central to “all philosophies of our time.”132 Paul Lauren wrote:133  
“Early ideas about general human rights thus did not originate exclusively in one 
location like the West or even with any particular form of government like liberal 
democracy, but were shared throughout the ages by visionaries from many 
intellectually rich cultures in many lands who expressed themselves in many 
ways.” 
The concept of moral rights are essential to community life and have been around 
for many centuries. It has not been confined to one period or one particular 
civilisation. It is arguable that it is part of humanness.  
Some of the earliest traces of moral rights go back to the Hammurabi Code (17795-
1750 BCE). This code indicated the principle of equal protection of the law among 
other relational issues.134 Furthermore, Paul Gordan Lauren referred to the 
philosophy of Meng Zi or Mencius from over two thousand years ago. Such 
philosophy believed that135   
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“all human beings naturally share a common humanity, moral worth, inherent 
dignity and goodness, and a compassionate mind that cannot bear to see others 
suffer.” 
This philosophy indicated the importance of relationality to the maintenance of 
community and respect for others within the community. Such principles provided 
guidance for the solidarity of community and the interconnections for everyday 
functioning of that community.  
This understanding continued even in the middle of the first millennia AD. The 
natural law understanding of solidarity continued as an important principle. 
Lauren refers to Roman philosophers, such as Marcus Tullius Cicero that 
claimed136   
“natural law ‘binds all human society together’, applies to every member of the 
‘whole human race’, “marks the unique dignity of each person, imposing on all 
of us responsibilities to be keepers of others, and provides ‘eternal and 
unchangeable law … valid for all nations and all times’.”   
Moreover, Abu Al-Farabi, a tenth Century Islamic philosopher, wrote of a vision of 
a “moral society in which all individuals were endowed with rights and lived in 
charity with their neighbours.”137 Furthermore, Africa had the Idea of Ubuntu. The 
conceptualisation of Ubuntu is as follows:138  
I am a person because you are a person; that I can’t separate my humanity from 
an acknowledgement of your humanity. It presupposes that I don’t strengthen 
my personality through isolating myself from you; but on the contrary, I benefit 
from my association with you. 
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These moral philosophies which represent various areas of the world indicate the 
importance of the principles of solidarity and respect for each one’s dignity and a 
unique, yet essential relational being. This was a respect for humanness of oneself 
and of others. Moral rights enabled the upholding of such principles and remedies 
to bring them back in balance. This snapshot of various philosophies, though it 
cannot be claimed as universal, certainly indicates a widespread acceptance of 
such conceptualisation. It certainly does not belong solely to one particular 
worldview.  
 Much of the early philosophical moral rights showed similar characteristics of the 
maintenance of dignity and respect of humanness and the rights to bring about 
balance in society when dignity and respect were not upheld. Although they may 
not have had a complete list of rights and freedoms we see with the modern rights 
codes, the core principles were there including that of liberty, equality (as in 
respecting people as who they are as a human being and their flourishing) and 
fraternity. It is in this sense one can argue that human rights or the early proto 
form of them were universal.   
3.3.2 Collectivities (including States) and Rights 
There are some societies throughout time where the orders of recognition are 
situated within a vertical horizon. This is illustrated by Paul Gordan Lauren where 
he stated that139 
Throughout history most individuals in the world found themselves confronting 
hierarchical societies and imperial or authoritarian regimes of one kind or 
another in which differences mattered.  
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Such societies may have had various political basis, such as ‘traditional’, religious, 
or other forms of stratified collectivities140 such as political or economic basis or a 
combination of them including those such as authoritarian or ‘liberal’. They all had 
in common the nature of powerful stratified societies141 adhering to principles and 
practices of the collectivity.142  
The prevailing culture as expressed through their ideology was accepted as ‘the 
natural order’.143 They emphasised the hierarchical, patriarchal relationships of 
the powerful over the subordinate.144 The system was skewed in favour of the elite 
which often excluded particular groups. These societies were structured to 
maintain the interests of those in power.145 Those in power aimed “to retain 
privilege, hierarchy, hereditary rule, property, dominance, and caste.”146 This was 
upheld through respect and fear of authority.147 They148   
“aimed and still aim to maintain power and invoke cultural traditions 
subordinating, inter alia, women, children, minorities and workers. Throughout 
much of history, slavery has been widespread, often justified by distorted 
theology, and torture has been prevalent method of investigation and 
punishment.”  
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In doing so, it often resulted in violence, the subordination of women, slavery, 
military conquest, or torture.149 Adherence and conformity to the system was 
tantamount and in the worst-case scenario, methods including torture or 
imprisonment were utilised.   
These orders of recognition were inbuilt or inherent to the system. Within such 
societies orders of recognition were built into the ‘superstructure/infrastructure’. 
Bernard Dauenhauer and Michael Wells writes that within such societies one is150 
bound to these others through the mediation of different orders of large scale 
social systems or "orders of recognition" that structure the interaction. Among 
these orders are pedagogical systems, scientific systems, monetary systems, 
health systems, and, of central interest in the present context, legal systems. It 
is within these systems that persons receive recognition as holders of specific 
positions or roles, e.g., teacher or physician. In legal systems in democratic 
societies, there are multiple positions of office and there is the position of 
citizen. 
Such orders of recognition provided stability and certainty through strict 
conformity and obedience151 where everybody knew their place and role. In these 
societies, one was individually responsible for one’s action, irrespective of the 
influence and control over one’s person or the effect of society on one’s person.  
It became the natural order of things, and naturalised among the collectivity.  
The order of recognition within the collecitivty justified the natural order of 
stratified divisions.152 These were based on statuses based on caste or class, race, 
gender, belief, ethnicity, place of origin or other ascriptions.153 These statuses 
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determined one’s positionality, worth, rights and responsibilities along with 
privileges and duties.154 If one’s status was inferior or not recognised (non-
human), then there would be limited or no rights and entitlements.155 Dignity was 
tied to one’s status and fulfilling one’s social role.156  
These societies had various sizes and leadership. Power and control was vested 
through the authoritative power such as a monarch.157 As the sovereign state 
appeared, it took over where other societies had operated through such systems. 
Thomas Hobbes argued that such a state was required due to the ‘state of nature’ 
and to ensure the maintenance of order and that ruler had to be absolute to which 
the subject had to obey.158 Even with the transfer from sovereign to the States, 
the system of power and control was also transferred to the State, known today 
as State sovereignty. The principle of sovereignty was enunciated by sixteenth-
century French political philosopher Jean Bodin as the159   
“power absolute and perpetual and subject to no law…providing the 
distinguishing mark of the state. It alone possessed the power to decide how it 
would behave in the world and how it would treat its own borders and those 
under its control elsewhere.”   
Hobbesian philosophy argues that the essence of sovereignty is “the power of the 
state and the absolute monarch that acted in its name ruled without challenge, 
doing whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done.”160 He also argued that the 
social contract enables the moral-juridical action of the sovereign state as a 
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supreme power.161 They recognised no universal moral authority of natural law on 
behalf of individual rights from above and no petition from below.162  
The individual is contractually subject to rights, and obligations, in exchange for 
security and civil status, while at the same time, their association with other 
individuals in a political body is insecure and revocable.163 Although rights and 
freedoms were part of most such societies, they could be denied in part or full to 
certain statuses when deemed politically expedient or necessary, such as for 
security reasons.  Moreover, these rights and freedoms were centred on status. 
One’s rights and access to them depended on one’s status, such as positionality 
and access to resources and people of influence. There was a thought of equality 
of status or equality between equals, but the thought of equal respect was foreign 
consideration.164 Lower status or non-recognised statuses have had little or no 
access to rights and entitlements.165  
Though status maintained the superstructure and infrastructure, it had great 
effect on individuals. In particular, it has greater effect on those at the lower levels 
of the collectivity and those statuses that were not recognised, such as women or 
sexual minorities, who were treated as inferior beings.166 As Lauren states:167  
“The majority of those who lived and died found themselves confronting various 
forms of prejudice and discrimination based on gender, race, caste or class, 
belief, ethnicity, place of origin, or some other form of difference. For this 
reason, they were not regarded as being fully human, and therefore never 
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allowed to exercise whatever rights they may claim, or that others might assert 
on their behalf.” 
Even if one had entitlement, they did not have the means to enforce such rights. 
For those who were not recognised, did not have status, they had not rights to 
claim.  
3.3.3 Rights of Man 
In reaction to the absolutist states and the sovereign rulers, rebellions began in 
Spain and France, spreading to England.168 These revolutions ended the divine 
right of Kings.169 These were in reaction to and the result of the abuse of power 
over the citizens within its territories.170 The citizens sought protection of natural 
rights such as the right to life, representative government, and the rule of law.171 
The seventeenth century in political practice and liberal theory stressed natural 
rights.172 
Intellectuals sought to free the individual from dogma and traditional authority.173 
At the beginning of the era of the Enlightenment, there was the recognition of the 
need to protect and guarantee individual rights.174 They saw a need to redraw the 
social contract from that of the Hobbesian model. For Rousseau, the social 
contract was meant to be a relationship between the citizens and the state in 
mutuality. He viewed that the “relationship of the individual to the State provides 
the foundation of human rights, in which the State’s role is to protect and 
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guarantee individual rights.”175 This protection and guarantee were written into 
the documents such as the ‘Rights of Man’ as proposed by John Locke, Thomas 
Paine, and Jean-Jacque Rousseau among others.176 Thomas Paine returned to the 
theme of177   
“responsibility for being a ‘keeper’ of others by explicitly responding to the 
French Declaration in these terms: ‘A Declaration of Rights is, by reciprocity, a 
Declaration of Duties also. Whatever is my right as a man is also the right of 
another; and it becomes my duty to guarantee as well as to possess’.”  
It was these connections that later were to become influential on the IBOR under 
the UN.178 These rights of man have maintained some relevance even today, but 
they have been constrained.  
3.3.4 Reaction to and the Constraints on the Rights of Man 
However, the visions as provided for in the rights of man and the sovereignty of 
the individual did not go unchallenged and uncontested.179 They were seen as a 
direct challenge to the sovereign state and the interests of the powerful elite saw 
these ‘rights of man’ as a direct challenge to their “powerful interests, privilege 
and tradition.”180 Writing in regard to this concern, Edmund Burke wrote that the 
French Revolution would lead to the “destruction of the established tradition, 
hierarchy, inherited privilege and property, and historical continuity.”181 Reaction 
against the rights of man were such that even governments sponsored attacks on 
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philosophers, their selling and promotion of it, and even the execution of the 
philosophers or their followers.182   
These reactions to rights in protection of elite interests and maintaining the 
systems were critical to upholding the hegemony of the collectivity. Any rights 
available and access to them had to be limited so as not to destroy the status quo. 
Situated within the vertical horizon, the protection of the hegemonic collectivity 
derived from sovereign states. Sovereign states were a transition from the Middle 
Ages culminating in consolidating in Europe183 around the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648.184 Daniel Philpott writes that “For Hobbes, the people established sovereign 
authority through a contract in which they transferred all of their rights to the 
Leviathan, which represented the abstract notion of the state.”185 These states 
took on the authority to protect the hegemonic collectivity. The Hobbesian 
concept of the sovereign state ruled without challenge both from within and 
without.186 Sovereignty enabled States the full right in how to advance their own 
interests as it was "a matter exclusively within their own domestic jurisdictions.”187 
Paul Lauren referred to Jean Bodin’s work stating that188 (27) 
“sovereign power provided ‘the distinguishing mark of a state’. It alone 
possessed the power to decide how it would behave in the world and how it 
would treat its own people within its borders and those under its control 
elsewhere.” 
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The sovereign states had the right of control over the people within their 
jurisdiction. This went without challenge and ensured the protection of the 
interest of the state and maintained the hegemonic collectivity.  
At the early stages of international law, the sovereign state had the power and 
authority as international subjects of law.189 International law would not interfere 
with the States rights over the treatment of its people. As Lauren writes:190   
“How they treated their own people or those under their control was their own 
business and most certainly not subject to any outside international standards, 
scrutiny, criticism, or interference.”  
States determined the rules over the people and this was not subject to constraint 
or criticism. It left the citizens at the mercy of their own state, and “international 
law had little to say about mistreatment of persons by their own government.”191 
At that time, international law concerned the relations between states. It did 
enable the protection of states or of that of a state’s citizen when in another state 
but not the individuals within the state.192 However, a stateless person was 
entitled to no protection whatsoever.”193 International law at that time could not 
confer rights to others citizens as they only were for the protection of state 
sovereignty. The Oppenheim Treatise on International Law states the ‘Rights of 
Man’ “could not enjoy any protection under international law because that law is 
concerned solely with the relations between States and cannot confer rights on 
individuals.”194 Individuals were reliant on the state for protection. The rights of 
man were only valid if applicable within that state and its understanding of it.  
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The sovereign state established its own laws and norms. These enabled the 
protections of its interests within its own jurisdiction.195 However, over time, there 
was reaction to natural law and in particular the push of rights through natural 
law. This was achieved through legal positivism arising in the eighteenth century. 
It is synonymous with positive norms, that is, norms made by the legislator or 
considered as common law or case law.196 These laws or norms provide the 
“sufficient conditions for the truth of the proposition of the law.”197 It did not 
require, at least according to the positivists, a moral basis. It has two dualities: the 
separation of morals from the legal sphere and within the legal sphere, attention 
solely to the “legal rules enacted by the state and excludes all law whose existence 
cannot be traced to the statute books or the decisions of the courts.”198 Positivists 
such as Bentham and Hobbes argue law can only stem from the authority and 
prescription of state and officials and nothing else.199 This divorced the legal 
system of ethical and moral foundations.200 They viewed that there was “no moral 
authority of natural law on behalf of individual rights from above, no claims of an 
emperor or a pope, and no petitions from feudal barons or subjects below.”201 The 
only source of law was the state.  
Legal positivism enabled the enforcement of the sovereign state without, at least 
it is argued, the reliance on morals. The sole source of law was the state. 
Individuals had a moral duty, to the law of the state. As David Dyzenhaus wrote, it 
is a “general moral duty to obey the law even when there is no freedom,” and the 
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duty is stronger within the conditions of freedom of a democratic government.202 
This duty is the maintenance of society and the rule of law. Joseph Slaughter writes 
that203   
“[p]ositive law presses to become common sense through the force of the 
commandment – a sociohistorically contingent precept, the legitimacy of which 
depends upon the threat of violence.”  
Legitimacy was seen in the law and its source as common sense and incorporated 
the threat of violence. Rights such as ‘The Rights of Man’ were contentious as they 
were seen as abstract and irrational. Bentham saw such rights as nonsense on stilts 
and “people should know their proper place” in society.204 For example, Bentham 
believed that205   
“abstract declarations and proclamations of natural rights might easily replace 
positive law and specific legislation. ‘Rights’, he wrote, ‘is a child of the law; from 
real law come real rights; but from imaginary laws from ‘law of nature’ come 
imaginary rights. Natural rights are simple nonsense.”  
This was in reaction to the natural law based push of rights. Positivism rejects the 
pre-existence of natural law or that rights exist outside of the explicit collection of 
rules.206 As such, it became the most serious attack on natural rights, and in 
particular, the rights of man207 – a fore runner to human rights. 
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Positivist law in many states have used the vehicle of personhood208 to determine 
or recognise legal status including that of natural persons209  as a right-and-duty-
bearing unit.210 This is a legal fiction, man-made and artificial,211 in that it can mean 
‘whatever the law makes it to mean’.212 For example, it refers back to entities St. 
Thomas Aquinas called personae fictae213 and later also included granting of such 
status to business corporations.214 For a natural person, this was based on certain 
characteristics which excluded others or any variations of them215 that became an 
expression of pre-formed and complete ideological selves.216 This was supported 
through scientific positivism to justify the inequality and discrimination such as 
with racism217 and sexism.   
Recognition of personhood is essential to the granting of rights, freedoms, and 
entitlements.218 For example, it determined if one could make contracts, own 
property, sue in court or exercise civil rights as if they were an individual.219 These 
rights and freedoms were only available to a legal person when “created by explicit 
political decisions or explicit social practice.”220 They are applied narrowly as 
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“individualistic, largely ‘negative’, civil and political rights held against the 
state.”221 In so doing, there is minimal account taken of the enforcing of such rights 
on others. Such an understanding and implementation of rights does not focus on 
well-being and flourishing.222 The status of personhood determined whether one 
had rights and entitlements and moreover, dependent upon one’s status whether 
there was the ability to access such rights through class and resources and so on.    
Positivism and other politico-legal theories have impacted on the significance of 
the revolutionary rights ideals of the Eighteenth Century and distorted the struggle 
for freedom and dignity.223 Recognition or protection through personhood was 
clearly not sufficient. As Jill Marshall States:224  
“many past injustices, including legal categorisations, mean that certain types of 
humans have been disregarded as human beings with rights, and as persons who 
are legal subjects. Such injustices continue into the present and will continue in 
the future unless changes are made.”  
The violations of the human person and denial of rights do not mean they do not 
exist. Jack Donnelly explains this as the shortcoming of the institutions and not the 
rights themselves:225    
“If the world or particular societies are structured in such a way that enjoyment 
of the right is regularly denied or frustrated – that is, if the right is not widely 
implemented – that is a regrettable, even deplorable, shortcoming. However, it 
is a shortcoming of social and political institutions and practices and does not 
entail that one does not have the right, is not entitled to x, or is not morally 
justified in claiming x as a right.”  
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Thus, personhood permitted the enforcing of the rights of others while denying 
the rights to some,226 such as slaves, women, sexual minorities, stateless 
individuals, and children.227 Some groups, such as slaves were not granted 
personhood at all, while others were granted limited or conditional personhood 
such as with children.228  This enhanced inequality, injustice, and, in some cases, 
became the justified basis of it. This use of positivist personhood and the 
associated rights and entitlements justified the expansionist and segregationist 
schemes and policies of the imperial and colonising nations.229 This has led to the 
violation of rights through societies such as in Europe, and the settled colonies 
such as in North America, Latin America, Australia, and New Zealand.230 It has 
enabled the radical inequalities of racism, sexism and slavery231 and severe 
repression causing extensive suffering.232  
Even later international law, such as the ‘League of Nations’ was not sufficient to 
uphold the rights of being. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, Human Rights Commissioner, 
refers to the time under the League of Nations when he states:233  
Aside from some successes, it was stymied by military aggressions, the absence 
of the United States and the withdrawals of Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR. 
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Its treatment of colonialism was undermined from the outset by rejection of the 
principle of non-discrimination.  
This was highlighted through the atrocities of the Second World War which were 
considered some of the most “barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience 
of mankind.”234 However, due to the immediate background of the Second World 
War, the atrocities and human rights violations “shocked the conscience of human 
beings worldwide and laid the ground for a broad consensus that a new humanistic 
legal order would have to be established.”235 Although the sovereign state had 
jurisdiction, atrocities prevailed even in states who espoused the rights of man.      
3.3.5 Historical Repetition 
There has been a continuous tug of war between two types of societies that are 
through the two horizons – horizontal and vertical – and consider rights 
ideologically differently as described above over the last two millennia. History has 
demonstrated that the powerful elite and rulers have continually fought against 
the moral rights in order to retain their interests and power. The vertical societies 
aimed to maintain stratified societies that cemented a hegemonic positionality 
over them and each individual maintained the positionality deemed by one’s 
status. On the other hand, situated within the horizontal horizon provides a 
human rights environment that enhance the fraternity or community through the 
enabling of people to flourish which respects each one’s dignity. 
However, even in societies that are ‘liberal’ and espouse rights and freedoms, 
these are often constricted characterisations of human rights.236 The liberal view 
of rights often fails, as Stephen James states, “to take proper account of the role 
that duties, socio-economic rights, the interest of the community, group claims, 
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and importantly, conceptions of inherent dignity have in that heritage.”237 While 
essentialising individuals as a particular type of personhood, it denies their own 
narrativity of identity as a dignified being and the dutiful respect and duty to 
society as a capable being.   
Furthermore, liberal rights, often in the name of human rights, are fought for in 
through benevolence on behalf of those concerned. It aims to help people in ways 
that appear good for the individual irrespective of whether the person agrees with 
such a perspective or action. Joseph Slaughter argues that the liberal benevolence 
of rights is troubling through their violations of rights in name of rights 
themselves:238   
“the banalization of human rights means that violations are often committed in 
the Orwellian name of human rights themselves, cloaked in the palliative 
rhetoric of humanitarian intervention, the chivalric defense of women and 
children, the liberalization of free markets, the capitalist promise of equal 
consumerist opportunity, the emancipatory causes of freedom and democracy, 
etc.” 
These rights appear in the name of freedom but can sometimes leave some 
people, especially the vulnerable, less free. Such human rights have become 
increasingly systematic, corporate, and institutional.239 The beneficiary of such 
rights may not be the ones they are aiming to help. The treatment of intersex 
people demonstrate such benevolence. Anne Fausto-Sterling writes that after an 
intersex person begins the normalisation process so that they can240  
“quietly slip into society as ‘normal’ heterosexual males or females…The aims of 
the policy are genuine humanitarian, reflecting the wish that people be able to 
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‘fit in’ both physically and psychologically. In the medical community, however, 
the assumptions behind that wish – that there be only two sexes, that 
heterosexuality alone is normal, that there is one true model of psychological 
health – have gone unexamined.  
The benevolence is portrayed in the eyes of doing the right thing for the person, it 
often hides deeply ingrained ideology even within liberal rights-based societies. 
Another demonstration of the use of human rights in societies today is through 
non-discrimination. The most common method in solving discrimination has been 
through the difference-blind approach. This approach is paradoxical through its 
two principles: the first is that all should be treated equally (treated the same for 
all), while the second recognises and fosters particularity.241 Charles Taylor spoke 
to this paradox. He states while242  
the first makes to the second is just that it violates the principle of non-
discrimination.” He stated the “reproach the second makes to the first that it 
negates identity by forcing people into a homogenous mold that is untrue for 
them.  
While in rhetoric it supports people’s identities, in reality, it universalises people 
to an ideal standard of what a person is – the problematic of identity. Moreover, 
as critics’ state, the approach of the universalised ideal by which all are held to is 
not neutral, but a reflection of the hegemonic culture243 by which the 
marginalised, subordinated and excluded must conform with.244 This approach not 
only suppresses autonomous identity but is also highly discriminatory.245 While it 
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is based on equal treatment, the approach is using status as a yardstick to measure 
difference and equality, and also justify through various means reasons for 
unequal treatment, such as due to gender or skin colour.246 Even if the goods or 
facilities are equal, while statuses such as that of race, caste, or gender are 
retained, there will never be equality as equal beings.247 Any gains under such a 
system will always be limited while universalising people to particular statuses, 
even if the number of statuses be increaed. This simply creates competition 
through identity politics. Such a system does not recognise the difference in and 
between statuses. Nor does it recognise that statuses are intersectional. 
Moreover, it does not respect all as moral equals irrespective of differences.   
The understanding and recognition of rights for sex as illustrated at the beginning 
of the chapter has followed a similar path to that of the system of rights at large. 
There has been a push and pull between the different interpretive horizons in the 
conceptualisation of rights. The hegemonic power of the vertical interpretive 
horizon has meant that this interpretation has held greater sway in the 
conceptualisation of rights. This has even with that of the liberal societies where 
autonomy is supposed to be overriding and life of our own choosing. The 
restrictions in such societies of one’s rights and what they mean in society finish 
at the dividing line of the binary sex. The relations of what make us a man or 
woman remain strong and divided.248 There is little room for sex diversity in 
society. This has been illustrated through the discussion of sex and its 
incorporation, or not, within international human rights law as illustrated above.  
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3.3.6 Horizons of Rights 
The concept of rights like all other social concepts are situated within a horizon as 
illustrated in chapter 1. The structure and content of such rights as either orders 
of recognition may be based through humanity and dignity of who one is in the 
horizontal horizon or through institutional structures of collectivities including 
those of the modern state as orders of recognition upon and through what one is 
(statuses) in the vertical horizon. As history has indicated, there has been a push 
and pull between a vertical and horizontal understanding of rights as just outlined, 
over the last few thousand years. 
The horizontal understanding of rights is more naturally suited within 
communities but vulnerable. Relationality of unique beings is easily overrun by 
collectivities of individuals through power structures and ideologies that remove 
one’s uniqueness and replace it by statuses (what one is) – an imposed moral life 
– with associated positionality with allocated rights and duties. Improving one’s 
life including benefits and interests often involves maximising their rights at the 
expense of others. This is in the sense of a negative reciprocity where 
consideration often focuses on the expectation of returned benefits.249 The good, 
is not the moral basis as described in Chapter 2, but one of the greater good of the 
collective or in other words, those who benefit from such a system. This is seen 
even with ‘liberal rights’ so often discussed as aiding people.  
Sovereign states have been in control of such rights. They could equally implement 
rights or situate them through either horizon. History has shown that few situate 
rights in the horizontal. As explained above, the interest of those in power have 
been used to justify violation of rights to advance their own interests in the name 
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of “their own interests” as a “matter of their own jurisdictions.”250  Paul Lauren 
continues highlighting this:251   
It is precisely this reason that those with power entrenched interests in 
hierarchy, privilege, prejudice, and sovereignty wherever they might be viewed 
those who advocate rights, like Thomas Paine burned so vigorously in effigy, as 
heretics and revolutionaries who threatened to overturn their long-standing 
exercise of power. They believed that the future should reproduce the past and 
continuity should prevail over change, and consequently vowed that they and 
their successors would do whatever they could to oppose dangerous visions of 
human rights. 
Rights were permitted as long as they did not inhibit the interests of those in 
power or the superstructure and infrastructure that maintains their place in 
society.  
The rise of development of state sovereignty occur at the beginnings of positivism. 
Scientific positivism enabled a new way to maintain entrenched beliefs yet divorce 
the cloak of natural law that previously had been used to support such ideals. 
Positive law, evolving from positivism, began in the eighteenth century. This arose 
at the time of other politico-legal theories including utilitarianism, historicism, 
libertarianism, social contract and liberalism.252 This issue with positivism, was not 
that there were legal norms, but that it was believed to have divorced the legal 
system of ethical and moral foundations.253 They viewed that there was “no moral 
authority of natural law on behalf of individual rights from above, no claims of an 
emperor or a pope, and no petitions from feudal barons or subjects below.”254 
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However, legal positivism arose at the similar time to scientific positivism which 
though based on a scientific system was still imbued with a collective morality.  
The issue is not the legal system or the norms enacted, but the morality behind it. 
It is naïve to believe that ‘positivism’ as declared by some of the writers, was not 
imbued with a morality. Deeply imbedded within positivism was a mix of 
Bethamite utilitarianism, historicism, liberalism and libertarianism to name a few. 
Depending on place and time, the mix and implementation of these varied. 
Suggesting that separating out morals from the legal sphere did not mean that 
morality was no longer part of the law, but simply a rejection of natural law. The 
“proper place in society” that Bentham referred to was a new way to order and 
control society, perhaps more scientific than the past. This has maintained rights 
within a vertical horizon situated in one’s status and not the dignity of being 
human.  
This chapter has shown that rights have been part of society, but like all other 
parts of life occur within an interpretive horizon. History has demonstrated that 
through various reasons rights have been predominantly understood and 
implemented through a vertical interpretive vantage point. This is one where 
entitlement of rights are based on one’s status (what one is)255 including that of 
positionality, dignity, honour, and the associated rights and entitlements.256 The 
environment of such rights and entitlements provide for, and even encourage, the 
maximisation of one’s interests and entitlements.257 The rights are not 
relationally-based258and not centred on the dignity of the human person as will be 
described in the next chapter. Liberal rights have not removed status from rights 
                                                     
255 Chirkov and others, above n 82, at 100. 
256 Diginty is that of power and positionality as opposed to being inherent as a human being: 
Howard and Donnelly, above n 126, at 808–809; Brennan and Lo, above n 126, at 808–809. 
257 Eekelaar, above n 123, at 185; MacCormack, above n 127, at 98; Chirkov and others, above n 
82, at 100. 
258 MacCormack, above n 127, at 99. 
204 
 
issues and has actually increased the number of statuses fighting for the 
maximising of their interests. This results in the subject of rights minimised to a 
particular type of person. This is illustrated by Joseph Slaughter:259  
Becoming what one already is by right a serviceable abstract for the plot of the 
idealist, affirmative Bildungsroman, which narrates the normative story of how 
the natural and the individual might become civil and social – the story of how 
the individual will partakes of the general will without recourse to social coercion 
The human person is still being understood according to status, including that of 
sex, and although more statuses are reluctantly available such as a slow break 
down accepting sex orientation or transgender, these have not broken the binary 
of male-female. In such an environment, one’s capabilities would remain virtual, 
even aborted or repressed, in the absence of interpersonal and institutional 
mediations and rather are misconceived as accomplishments.260 Thus, there needs 
to be another model, an alternative understanding.  
3.4 Recapturing the Subject of Rights 
This other alternative to understanding and interpreting rights is from the 
horizontal interpretive horizon. From such a viewpoint, rights may be seen 
through a sense of togetherness where rights protect who one is as a unique and 
distinct being worthy of dignity, and rights261 to achieve well-being and 
potentiality (human flourishing).262 Rights are, at least from this viewpoint, not 
about the political state, but as something that precedes the state and rights 
derive from the human person.263 It is time to understand respect of the person 
and not the status. People desire to be respected for who they are and how they 
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come to be. This question leads back to Paul Ricoeur’s question: “who is the 
subject of rights?”  
One of the key tasks of Ricoeurian philosophy was the important juridical question 
“Who is the subject of rights?” The ‘who’ refers to a capable being – with human 
capabilities to speak, to act, to narrate, and to impute – that is “ultimate referent 
of moral respect and of the recognition of a human being as a subject of rights.”264 
The moral respect and recognition are reciprocal. One has a duty to the other, in 
that, in asking ‘who’ considers the humanity of the other before one’s self.265 This 
is made clear when Ricoeur articulates:266  
“like me, the other can designate himself as an I when he speaks. The expression 
like me already announces the recognition of the other as my equal in terms of 
rights and duties.” 
Ricoeur writes that “the rights attached to the capacities and potentialities we 
have spoken of constitute, in effect, the rights of humanity.”267 They do not have 
these rights because of some political community but purely as being human.268 
This human being, the who, worthy of esteem and respect is the dignified human 
being. That is, rights are available simply due to the dignity of being human. 
However, rights and duties can only be imputed on autonomous subjects. As 
Ricoeur states the269  
imputation of rights and duties can only be imputed on an autonomous person 
who has power over bodily members, and through them, and on the course of 
things to author one’s life. 
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Jill Marshall writes that270   
“The purpose of having international human rights law might be said, then, to 
ensure that the core quality or qualities of our identity – the ‘age old’ question 
of what it is that makes you who and what you are – are protected and 
enshrined, controlled or brought to fruition through the legal and political 
system.”  
Jill Marshall identifies that core to international human rights is the protecting of 
the human being from the vulnerability of hegemonic impact of status identities 
on one’s autonomy of one’s narrative identity revealed in one’s personal identity. 
Intersex people desire the esteem and respect to form a moral identity through 
an autonomous becoming that reveals how they come to be and who they are 
whether it be male, female both or neither. 
3.5 Conclusion 
On Intersex Awareness Day, Jane Fae wrote an article Intersex Rights? 'We are not 
yet even at the Starting Line. She stated:271  
“When it comes to the politics of intersex, we are not yet even at the starting 
line. That will happen when politicians, doctors and the general public finally get 
that intersex exists, that people who are intersex deserve consideration for who 
they are and not by virtue of being some 'failed' version of men or women; and 
that a natural consequence of recognition is for individuals to have civil rights as 
well as the right to full involvement in any treatment that concerns them. 
Perhaps then – and only then – can we consider the task of intersex awareness 
to be done.” 
She points out the focus of intersex rights: the rights to be recognised for who they 
are and not as a disease or as an other. Intersex people are a subject of rights as 
an autonomous capable being aiming for a good moral life as with any other 
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human being. However, at present, many have been denied the dignity of self-
esteem and self-respect as who they are as an intersex person and the freedom of 
how they will come to be.  
Given that sex has been considered in such a way by international bodies, and the 
status remains strong, it is important to investigate if that is the basis of 
international human rights. The balancing of rights, especially seen within the 
liberal rights, of an autonomous identity and others’ rights to live unmolested 
brings the thesis to consider what sorts of identities ‘count’ as worthy of Human 
Rights Law efforts to protect their active realization and full participation in society 
(presumably not serial killer) and how do we make those differentiations on the 
basis of anything besides ‘vertical’ prejudices? Have international human rights 
intended for identity to be based on status, or is that a carryover from a state 
interpretive basis of the problematic of identity? The next chapter will consider 
what foundation human rights are based. It will also consider the purpose of 
international human rights. The basis of international human rights is important if 
it is going to protect intersex people from invisibility and protect them from the 
harm caused by forcing them into identities that are not necessarily theirs. As seen 
above rights can be established and enforced through the two different horizons. 
However, it is through a relational rights which are situated within the horizontal 
horizon that enables intersex people.  
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CHAPTER 4: MORAL IDENTITY THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS 
4  
The last chapter indicated that despite being possible to understand and recognise 
sex multiplicity and its becoming as a diversity, international law, and, in particular 
international human rights law, has not tended to do so. It has retained the 
situating of sex and its becoming in the vertical horizon. Sex as a binary of either 
male or female has been retained as status quo. Although there is a slow 
acceptance of more ‘identities’ – sexual orientation and gender identity 
(transgender) – they have been separated from the very base of sex as a binary. 
That is, they are additional to, and not incorporated within, sex.  
Furthermore, sex, like other multiplicities, has been retained as a status. Sex, as a 
product of historical and political-cultural forces1 has been the reproductive basis 
of society physically and symbolically.2 The essences as either male or female3 as 
normative categories4 that are “static and fixed,” and have been seen as “immune 
or separate from forces of social construction.”5 These determine one’s personal 
                                                     
1 John Stoltenberg Refusing to be a Man: Essays on Sex and Justice (UCL Press, London, 2000) at 
25; Joan Roughgarden Evolution’s rainbow (University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 
2009) at 23; Gayle Rubin “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex” in 
Rayna R Reiter (ed) Toward an Anthropology of Women (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1975) 
at 204. 
2 Lois McNay Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory (Polity 
Press; Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, UK: Malden, Massachusetts, 2000) at 90; Cordelia Fine 
Testosterone Rex - Unmaking the Myths of Our Gendered Minds (Icon Books Ltd, London, United 
Kingdom, 2017) at 14; Carlos A Ball “Martha Nussbaum, Essentialism, and Human Sexuality” 
(2010) 19 Colum J  Gender & L 3 at 13. 
3 Jillian Todd Weiss “Transgender Identity, Textualism, and the Supreme Court: What is the Plain 
Meaning of Sex in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” (2009) 18 Temp Pol & Civ Rts L Rev 573 
at 599–600; Virginia Braun and Sue Wilkinson “Vagina Equals Woman? On Genitals and Gendered 
Identity” (2005) 28 Women’s Studies International Forum 509 at 509. 
4 Anne Becker “Identity Premised on Equality of Difference as a Fundamental Human Right” in 
Cornelia Roux (ed) Safe Spaces (Sense Publishers, 2012) 83 at 84. 
5 Ball, above n 2, at 3; See also: John D DeLamater and Janet Shibley Hyde “Essentialism vs Social 
Constructionism in the Study of Human Sexuality” (1998) 35 J Sex Res 10 at 10; Francisco Valdes 
“Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & (and) Sexual Orientation 
to Its Origins” (1996) 8 Yale JL & Human 161 at 162. 
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identity. It is based on this identity (the immutable identity divested from its 
narrative identity), that one has a socio-political life including one’s expression, 
relations, roles and functions, and thus, one’s rights, duties and entitlements.6 
Despite recognition that status identities as a ‘what’ has led to the many atrocities 
that has and still occurs around the world, this has been retained, especially when 
it comes to sex. Although discrimination based on status categories or identities 
was at the core of the violence and issues that people faced, especially women, 
there was little desire to remove these artificial barriers. Sex was still considered 
so immutable that it was natural and so consequential.  
Although this has affected many people, this has been so instrumental in 
repression of intersex people. There is no recognition either socially or politically 
without reference as to sex, and as to that, only as male or female. According to 
the European Human Rights Commissioner’s comment,7   
“The social expectations for either a girl or boy at birth, or a woman or a man in 
society, are the source of the problems intersex people face. Society does not 
usually recognise a person without reference to their sex. Yet intersex 
individuals’ chromosomal, anatomical, or gonadal characteristics do not belong 
exclusively to either sex. This is why intersex people encounter huge barriers to 
the enjoyment of their human rights.” 
That is, intersex people fail to enjoy human rights simply because society chooses 
to believe that there are only two sexes. Intersex people are still predominantly 
invisible, and sex is still seen as a binary status. They have been denied recognition 
                                                     
6 Jill Marshall Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law?: Autonomy, Identity and Integrity 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden; Boston, 
2009) at 103; Cecilia L Ridgeway Framed by gender (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) at 
4; Rubin, above n 1, at 169–170; Jennifer M Protas “Divesting from ‘The Apartheid of the Closet’: 
Toward an Enriched Legal Discourse of Sexual and Gender Identity” (2007) 38 McGeorge L Rev 
571 at 575. 
7 Nils Muižnieks “A Boy or a Girl or a Person – Intersex People Lack Recognition in Europe” (9 May 
2014) The Council of Europe Commissioner’s Human Rights Comment 
<http://humanrightscomment.org/2014/05/09/a-boy-or-a-girl-or-a-person-intersex-people-lack-
recognition-in-europe/>. 
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as a being, and rather remain solely recognised as mistakes of nature. So, the 
question is what is the basis of an international human rights law person? Is it 
based on a status, or is it based on humanity as Ricoeur infers in his discussion of 
the subject of rights? The answer to this question will aid the understanding of 
whether international human rights can help intersex people gain a moral identity 
as described in chapter two. 
Although there have been a few determinations in international law, much in 
relation to sex has been still been understood through assumption of what a male 
and female is and what it means to be male and female. This means little has 
changed in regards to sex equality. Moreover, intersex people have been used to 
reinforce the sex binary. Intersex people illustrate that status has been 
detrimental to their issues, rather than helpful. Ricoeur, through his work on the 
subject of right illustrated a system of rights that should enable human flourishing. 
The aim of this chapter is to determine whether international human rights, 
despite what has come through deliberations of sex in international human rights 
law, is centred on such a system as Ricoeur describes or whether a new system 
needs to be developed.  This chapter argues that the current system, if held to its 
foundation and purpose does support human flourishing and thus a moral 
identity. 
This chapter first reviews the establishment and moral basis of the new human 
rights system under the United Nations. It then investigates the foundation and 
basis of human rights which centres on the human personality based in dignity 
through equality. It will then consider the normative basis of such a development 
of this human personality through the fraternal situatedness for the development 
of personality. This has elements of duty to one another in reciprocity. Then 
chapter brings this together and argues this foundation and normative purpose is 
for one’s moral identity. This will then show its interconnection with Paul Ricoeur’s 
understanding of the subject of rights.  
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4.1 New International Rights System and Foundation  
It was clear that although some moral systems and even the ‘Bill of Rights’ in 
various countries included natural law human rights, they were easily overridden, 
even by positivist legal means, and led to atrocities and violations of human 
rights.8 Moreover, there are two events that completely changed the status of 
individuals under international law at the termination of the Second World War. 
Louis Sohn wrote that:9  
“The first event was the punishment of war criminals at Nuremberg and Tokyo; 
the second was the desire to prevent the recurrence of such crimes against 
humanity through the development of new standards for the protection of 
human rights.”  
The violations and events have led to the desire to reduce such suffering and 
prevent violation of human rights in a situation of peace and security. The 
resultant is this desire for peace and security and prevention of human rights 
violations such as exclusion, discrimination, and torturous violence against fellow 
human beings. This then “laid the ground for a broad consensus that a new 
humanistic legal order would have to be established.”10 
The new international order was the development of the UN. This occurred 
through four different law building stages: the UN Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and “the adoption of some fifty additional declarations 
and conventions concerning issues of special importance, such as discrimination, 
                                                     
8 Asbjørn Eide and Gudmundur Alfredsson “Introduction” in Asbjørn Eide and others (eds) The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a Commentary (Scandinavian University Press, Oslo : 
Oxford, 1992) at 10. 
9 Louis B Sohn “New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 
The” (1982–1983) 32 Am U L Rev 1 at 9–10. 
10 Eide and Alfredsson, above n 8, at 10. 
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racial discrimination and religious intolerance.”11 Joseph Slaughter states that 
“This goal is part of the UDHR’s larger intentions to facilitate ‘the advent of a world 
in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from 
fear and want’ (Preamble).”12 It enabled the enjoyment from fear and want to 
achieve economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights.13 
The purpose of this new organisation is carefully constructed alongside its 
contractual element. This is detailed in the Preamble of the Charter14 which is 
broken into two parts: its purpose and the contract. The purpose is “the 
maintenance of peace and international security and respect for human rights” 
and the contractual part is where the “government of these peoples15 have agreed 
to the Charter.”16 Although not all of the objectives and functions of the UN are 
listed in the Preamble,17 the three main pillars of the purpose are peace and 
security, development, and human rights.18 This was confirmed in the recent 
                                                     
11 Sohn, above n 9, at 10. 
12 Joseph R Slaughter Human Rights, Inc (1st ed, Fordham University Press, New York, 2007) at 4. 
13 UN Secretary-General Document A/2929: Annotations on the Text of the Draft International 
Covenants on Human Rights (Agenda 28-10th Session 1955) at 12. 
14 “We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined: to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and; to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and; to establish conditions under 
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained, and; to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom. And for these ends: to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one 
another as good neighbours, and; to unite our strength to maintain international peace and 
security, and; to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that 
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and; to employ international 
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples”: Charter of 
the United Nations, United Nations 1 UNTS XVI (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945), Preamble. 
15 The term peoples refers to the populations of the member states, see Bruno Simma and others 
The Charter of the United Nations (third ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 
2012) vol 1 at 103. 
16 At 102. 
17 Bruno Simma and others The Charter of the United Nations: a Commentary (Vol 1 ) (2nd ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2002) at 33–34. 
18 Simma and others, above n 15, at 67. 
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speech by the Secretary-General at the opening of the Human Rights Council 
where he stated that the “pillars of peace, development and human rights are 
inseparable and they are mutually reinforcing.”19 Often seen as the “pillar of glass” 
due to its fragility,20 human rights are essential to achieving the goals of the UN21 
as peace and development could only occur when there was faith in human rights 
– the dignity and worth of every human person and equal rights.22 The human 
right’s pillar was spelt out directly in the Preamble of the UDHR: “the recognition 
of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world.”23 The UN Commissioner supported this 
in his recent speech. He said, “only by first accepting fundamental human rights 
could all else – durable peace, and success in development – become possible.”24 
As will be seen later in this Chapter, human rights were conceived of as a duty “not 
only to respect human rights ourselves but also to promote their ‘universal 
respect’ and to ensure that they are observed throughout the globe.”25  
4.1.1 Morality of Human Rights Universality and Inalienability 
From the very establishment of the Charter, there was a “demand to provide for 
a respect for human rights.”26 After much discussion on inserting a bill of rights, it 
was decided to leave such a document to the organisation which operated through 
                                                     
19 United Nations Secretary-General “Secretary-General’s remarks to the Human Rights Council” 
(Geneva, Switzerland, 27 February 2017). 
20 Simma and others, above n 15, at 67. 
21 Charter of the United Nations, Art. 1(3). 
22 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble; Sohn, above n 9, at 14. 
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly 217 A (III) (adopted May 1948, 
entered into force 10 December 1948), Preamable. 
24 Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights “Opening ceremony of the 
34th session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva” (34th session of the Human Rights Council, 
Human Rights Council, Geneva, 27 February 2017). 
25 Sohn, above n 9, at 14. 
26 Simma and others, above n 15, at 103. 
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parts of Chapter IX and X of the Charter.27 It was decided to be of a declaratory 
character: “the dignity and worth of the human person as well as the equal rights 
of men and women”28 and is sometimes seen as a ‘mini’ human rights charter.29 It 
continues with more than a dozen references to human rights30 which then runs 
through it like a golden thread.31 The Commentary on the Charter highlights the 
importance for the protection of human rights:32    
“As far as the protection of human rights is concerned, Art. 1(3) has been invoked 
with respect to the improvement generally within the UN System of the effective 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”   
The UN delegated the Human Rights Commission (HRC) with oversight of human 
rights as the ‘conscience of mankind’.33 This was given substance through the 
UDHR34 and implemented through the two conventions of the International Bill of 
Rights (IBOR) and the many derivative conventions and resolutions.  
The idea of human rights within the UN and the IBOR is a central element in the 
development of international morality.35 It established a new moral set of rights, 
universal and inalienable, and not a set of legal rights.36 This was the creation of 
the conscience of mankind, a universal morality through which states and society 
                                                     
27 At 115. 
28 At 103. 
29 Simma and others, above n 17, at 35. 
30 Dinah Shelton Advanced Introduction to International Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA, 2014) at 31. 
31 At 30. 
32 Simma and others, above n 15, at 119. 
33 Joseph Slaughter “The Textuality of Human Rights: Founding Narratives of Human Personality” 
[2004] Interdisciplinary Law and Humanities Junior Scholar Workshop Paper at 24. 
34 Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (NP Engel, Kehl, Germany; Arlington, 
Va, USA, 2005) at XX. 
35 John Eekelaar “Personal Rights and Human Rights” (2002) 2 Hum Rts L Rev 181 at 181. 
36 John Tasioulas “Human Rights, Legitimacy, and International Law” (2013) 58 Am J Juris 1 at 2; 
Eekelaar, above n 35, at 184. 
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would be obliged to uphold and protect. The new world organisation was the ‘just 
institution’ with human rights as its basis of the moral and legal duties.37  
This new source of authority enabled human rights as a universally valid moral 
principle.38 This was made clear in the Charter, and through IBOR: “the inherent 
dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all the members of the human 
family.”39 The concept of inalienability was less debated and generally accepted. 
Although debated, in particular, more recently, the basic philosophy, that these 
rights apply to everyone on the basis of being human remain. 
Human rights are ostensibly inherent and inalienable and deducible.40 
Inalienability means that from the time that human beings exist, these rights exist, 
and may be violated but never taken away or transferred away, not even by a 
government.41 This interconnects the concepts of inalienability and equality 
together as a symbolic expression of equality in one’s freedom as a dignified being 
together with everyone else.42 This will be expounded under the normative basis 
of human rights. However, although inalienability is generally accepted, the 
understanding of being universal has been debated, especially more recently. The 
                                                     
37 Janne E Nijman “Paul Ricoeur and International Law: Beyond ‘The End of the Subject’ Towards 
a Reconceptualization of International Legal Personality” (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 25 at 46. 
38 Guyora Binder “Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law” (1999) 5 
Buff Hum Rts L Rev 211 at 212. 
39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) Resolution 2200A (XXI) (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), Preamble; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) Resolution 
2200 A (XXI) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976), Preamble. 
40 Slaughter, above n 12, at 3. 
41 Johannes Morsink Inherent Human Rights: Philosophical Roots of the Universal Declaration 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2009) at 20. 
42 Costas Douzinas “Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Can Hegel Teach Us About Human 
Rights?” (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 379 at 391. 
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two core critiques of the universalism of human rights are (1) generations of rights 
and (2) the universal and cultural relativism debate.  
4.1.1.1 Generation of Rights 
The ‘generation of rights’ is a schema43 introduced by Karel Vasak when he wrote 
30 Year Struggle.44 There has been a following who have continued such an 
argument or line of reasoning. It is possible to argue that legal rights in Europe and 
the USA may have been implemented in such generations. This is somewhat 
misleading, as Joseph Slaughter states:45   
“it is misleading when used to plot a neat, Eurocentric genealogy of 
contemporary human rights, or to intimate that civil and political rights (and 
have always been) divisible from and more fundamental than social, cultural, 
and economic rights.”  
The division of the ICCPR and ICESCR Covenants was due to two factors: tensions 
between the Soviet Bloc and The Americans (USA) and also possible 
implementation issues. Ultimately, the idea of separating the two Covenants was 
due to implementation reasoning, not its purpose. 46  Prior to the drafting and 
post-drafting, the interdependency and indivisibility of human rights have 
remained constant: equal, indivisible, and interdependent.47 Moreover, the 
depriving of any rights was considered not to “represent the human person whom 
                                                     
43 “Vasak’s heuristic has been mythologized to describe a smooth evolution of human rights 
legislation from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries; it has also regularly been invoked to 
celebrate the UN’s legislative activity as a process of consensus-building, and to naturalize, as 
part of a telos of human progress, the West’s prioritization of civil and political rights over social, 
economic, cultural, environmental, and solidarity rights.” See: Slaughter, above n 12, at 15. 
44 Karel Vasak “A 30-Year Struggle - the Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights” [1977] The UNESCO Courier at 29–32. 
45 Slaughter, above n 12, at 15–16. 
46 UN Secretary-General, above n 13, at 7. 
47 Nowak, above n 34, at XX. 
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the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free man.”48 Moreover, as will 
be demonstrated in the normative basis of rights, the so-called second and third 
generation of rights is actually the central and integral to the basis, interpretation 
and implementation of human rights and it is not secondary to it. 
4.1.1.2 Universal/Cultural Relativism Debate 
The other criticism is the universalism/cultural relativism debate.49 Even more 
than the ‘generations of rights’, this has overshadowed and hampered the 
universality and inalienability of human rights. Although it surfaced in the 1980s 
and 90s,50 there was warning of its possibility at the drafting of the UDHR.51 As will 
be seen, this does not focus on the foundation of human rights, but is the 
impositional understanding of a particular world view and reaction to it in 
particular from post-colonial nations who wanted to impose their own ideology.  
The first side of this debate was that pushed by the liberal states. They saw the 
world through a universal worldview often referred to as ‘Universalism’.52 This has 
                                                     
48 General Assembly - United Nations Preparation of the Two Draft International Covenants on 
Human Rights (1952) 543 (VI)-Sixth Session, Section E; UN Secretary-General, above n 13, at 4, 7. 
49 Jerome J Shestack “The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights” (1998) 20 Human Rights 
Quarterly 201 at 228–233; Jack Donnelly “Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights” (1984) 
6 Human Rights Quarterly 400; Elisabeth Reichert “Human Rights: An Examination of 
Universalism and Cultural Relativism” (2006) 22 Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 23; 
Elizabeth M Zechenter “In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the 
Individual” (1997) 53 Journal of Anthropological Research 319; Milos Bogicevic “Cultural 
Relativism and Human Rights” Year 3 Volume 3 International Journal of Rule of Law, Transitonal 
Justice and Human Rights 151. 
50 Slaughter, above n 12, at 18–19; Karen Engle “Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values 
Debate in Context” (1999–2000) 32 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 291 at 291. 
51 The Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association Board “Statement on Human 
Rights” (1947) 49 American Anthropologist 539 at 539; Tracy E Higgins “Anti-essentialism, 
Relativism, and Human Rights” (1996) 19 Harv Women’s L J 89 at 92. 
52 “a society in which is atomized and individualistic, a society of endemic conflict it presupposes 
a society of people conscious of their separateness and their particular interests and anxious to 
realize them. The legal right is a claim which the individual may make against other members of 
society, and simultaneously an obligation on the part of society to uphold this claim.” See: Claude 
Ake “The African Context of Human Rights” (1987) 34 Africa Today 5 at 5. 
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been critiqued as an essentialising of the abstract universal person53 representing 
humanity at large54 which has been imposed on other nations especially during 
imperialism.55 This person is atomised or individuated, possessing certain 
‘inalienable rights by nature’ and with particular interests.56 This understanding of 
universal human rights reflects the Western libertarian57 individualism which is 
foreign to some traditional and collectivist cultures.58  
In reaction to this, post-colonial nations rejected such an imposition and 
demanding their own ideological premises, a new view. This became known as 
cultural relativism. This originated primarily out of a rejection of colonial power 
and its ideology.59 Broadly, it is acknowledged that all cultures are equally 
contingent and equally valid.60 It believes that cultures should be in harmony and 
not divergent in interests.61 The imposed ideology was collectively imposed and 
hegemonically adhered to. This has not necessarily aided in further indigenous 
rights nor the general rights of the people within their jurisdictions. Moreover, it 
was made to feel natural and traditional although much of it was reactionary to 
                                                     
53 Legal personhood, and thus capacity has been based on this universalised (essentialised) 
personhood or person. 
54 “The liberal individual is purported to be universal: raceless, sexless, classless, disembodied, 
and is taken to represent an abstract, generalized model of humanity writ large. Many 
philosophers have argued, however, that when we look more closely at the characteristics of the 
liberal individual, what we find is not a representation of universal humanity, but a historically 
located, specific type of person.” See Celeste Friend Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online 
ed, 2017) Social Contract Theory <http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/#SSH4a.ii>. 
55 Reichert, above n 49, at 27. 
56 Slaughter, above n 12, at 18–19; Ake, above n 52, at 5; Zechenter, above n 49, at 320; Higgins, 
above n 51, at 95; Peter King “Housing as a Freedom Right” (2003) 18 Housing Studies 661 at 664. 
57 Sometimes authors have also called this liberal as well, however, in the strict sense, a liberal 
would not individuate a human being, but enable one’s good life.  
58 Slaughter, above n 12, at 18–19. 
59 Shestack, above n 49, at 229. 
60 Higgins, above n 51, at 95; Reichert, above n 49, at 28. 
61 “We do not allow that the individual has any claims which may override that of the society. We 
assume harmony, not divergence of interests, competition, and conflict, we are more included to 
think of our obligations to other members of our society rather than our claims against 
them.”See: Ake, above n 52, at 5. 
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the colonial rule. Cultural relativism in both Western and non-Western nations 
alike has been used to violate human dignity and their free and full development. 
The atrocities and violations of human rights of individuals have been committed 
even sometimes in the name of rights to further the interests of those in power 
including arbitrary rule.62 It has led to a legacy of great harm, such as through 
horrific consequences of World War II. This relativism has permitted legitimate 
violations and shown the destructive nature that an individual culture can have 
without some overriding check.63 Although it was in the name of culture, it had 
become a way to abuse power without an international check on the dignity and 
treatment of their own citizens.  
This universalism-cultural relativist debate has side-lined the morality of human 
rights which are ostensibly inherent and inalienable and deducible and exist from 
the birth of every human being.64 Neither side has recognised or supported the 
‘human rights person’ of international human rights. Joseph Slaughter argues that 
the ‘human rights person’ is foreign to both ‘Western’ and many non-Western 
cultures and societies.65 Both have defined their own ideological person of which 
neither is the human rights person or personality as will be described later. This 
has indicated that both Western and non-Western nations alike had situated rights 
in the vertical horizon. Vertical situated rights enabled the denial or rights or the 
re-interpretation of them that enabled the advancing of their interests. As earlier 
explained, many cultures both ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’, had moral codes 
reflecting the universal values of the IBOR. For example, Stephen James referred 
to Samuel Murumba stating that “the notions of freedom, the rule of law, 
procedural justice, worker’s rights, representative democracy, egalitarianism, 
                                                     
62 Reichert, above n 49, at 26; For examples of such self-interest and arbitrary rule see: Donnelly, 
above n 49, at 411–414; Zechenter, above n 49, at 320; Higgins, above n 51, at 95. 
63 Reichert, above n 49, at 26. 
64 Slaughter, above n 12, at 3; Morsink, above n 41, at 20. 
65 Slaughter, above n 12, at 19. 
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‘political accountability’ of rulers, social welfare rights, and so forth,” were 
common to all civilisations.66 For universality to succeed, human rights had to pre-
exist culture and represent all human beings.67 This has been represented in many 
philosophical moral codes, but not necessarily to that morality of states held at 
present.  This indicates that where the rights were situated, whether it be 
horizontal or vertical, made a difference in what rights one has including their 
contents of those rights, as well as access to such rights.  
The universality was required to protect human persons from such violations and 
indignity. Universality here is thus not the same universalism as mentioned above, 
but one that exists before and after culture and represents all human beings. 
Elisabeth Reichert stated that they universal in that they are “internationally 
agreed values, standards or rules regulating the conduct of states toward their 
own citizens and toward non-citizens.”68 Johannes Morsink argues that the IBOR 
is universal. He outlines its universality thesis:69     
(1) people everywhere and at all times have rights that are not man-made, but 
inherent in the human person from the moment of birth; and (2) in any of the 
world’s villages or cities, people can come to know in a natural manner – unaided 
by experts – that people everywhere have the moral birthrights spoken of in the 
first.  
Moreover, Joseph Slaughter argues that “[h]uman rights speak the language of 
universalism and absolutes written through the UDHR:70   
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’ (UDHR Article 1); 
‘Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law’ 
                                                     
66 Stephen Andrew James Universal Human Rights: Origins and Development (LFB Scholarly Pub, 
New York, 2007) at 8. 
67 The Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association Board, above n 51, at 539. 
68 Reichert, above n 49, at 27. 
69 Morsink, above n 41, at 17. 
70 Slaughter, above n 12, at 3. 
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(Article 6); ‘Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality is possible’ (Article 29).  
This universality of rights to every human being all over the world was twofold 
according to Simma et al in the Commentary on the UN Charter: all authorities are 
to respect human rights and all individuals should benefit equally from their 
protection of human rights.71 This was no longer according to a universalised 
person nor enforced by a particular culture. The IBOR applied to everyone simply 
as a human being whom international law now recognised as a subject of law.  
Although the morality of human rights is universal, they are spelt out in various 
documents that interrelate and interconnect together. Primarily, these are 
through the IBOR, although they also have other associated conventions, 
regulations. This has been explained in the Vienna Declaration in 1993:72 
“In the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 the Vienna declaration 
affirmed the “universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question” 
and that “all human rights are universal, and interdependent and interrelated” 
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal 
manner on the same footing and with the same emphasis.”  
As such these are not generational but must be understood together. These, as 
will be seen, are centred on the human person and not connected to status, 
positionality, or other instrumentality.73 The universality and interdependence of 
human rights to develop as a dignified being belong to everyone. These are moral 
rights whether or not one has them as legal rights.   
  
                                                     
71 Bruno Simma and others The Charter of the United Nations (third ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, United Kingdom, 2012) vol 2 at 1574. 
72 Reichert, above n 49, at 28. 
73 At 27. 
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4.1.2 Human Rights Based from Natural Rights of the Human Being 
Human rights were a reaction to the statist and legal positivist models of domestic 
and international law that is infused with particular ideals of society and have 
enabled inequality and the violations of human rights as mentioned above. 
However, it was also realised there needed to be a positivist law to make it 
binding. Joseph Slaughter highlighted this when he writes:74 
“Contemporary human rights is hybrid because it appropriates formal aspects of 
both eighteenth-century natural and nineteenth-century positive law without 
conscripting their substantiating metaphysics or institutionalizing the social, civil, 
and political force that underwrote those legal regimes.”  
Although the UN gave force to human rights through as a positivist law, this did 
not come with the ‘baggage’ of the of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries 
ideals, but with its own philosophy as will be outlined below. This postivised 
natural law basis of the IBOR, as established through the UN Charter, was not to 
be understood through traditional foundations.75 They were not sufficient nor 
required in formulation and establishment of the Charter and the IBOR.76 As such, 
there was a desire to return to a basis of natural law which contributed 
significantly to its drafting,77 as pushed by human rights advocates, which was 
grounded “on a source of authority superior to the state.”78 Louis B. Sohn argues 
that79   
 “The United Nations’ concept of human rights embraces this concept of natural 
law concept of rights, rights to which all human beings have been entitled since 
                                                     
74 Slaughter, above n 12, at 71. 
75 Jack Donnelly “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western 
Conceptions of Human Rights” (1982) 76 The American Political Science Review 303 at 305. 
76 Simma and others, above n 17, at 1. 
77 James, above n 66, at 9. 
78 Binder, above n 38, at 212. 
79 Sohn, above n 9, at 17. 
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time immemorial and to which they will continue to be entitled as long as 
humanity survives.”  
Thus, the rights and freedoms were neither granted by the state nor are they the 
result of one’s status or actions as the determinants of rights,80 rather, it was to 
be based on that of the human person.81 Human rights are rights to which all 
human beings have been entitled since time immemorial and to which they will 
continue to have. This became the new standard, the new legitimacy in 
international human rights.  
4.2 Foundation of Human Rights 
Dinah Shelton argues that human rights reflect the utilitarian approach. To 
understand this, it is first important to review utilitarianism. For Bentham, utility 
is the only legitimate guide to legal and social reform as “nature has placed 
mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.”82  
The principle of utility became as follows:83   
“Individuals rank alternative courses of action in terms of anticipated pleasures 
and pain and then attempt to maximise their overall balance of pleasure over 
pain.” 
Mill considered morality as critical to human beings and sociality such as that 
illustrated in Chapter 2. In order to combat selfishness, the greatest source of 
social conflict, he sought to bring it within the dignity of free individuals and the 
prospect of a new and even better life together.84 Although he supported the 
principle of utility, sought to locate it between the à priori moralists (Kantian 
ethics) and the ‘intuitive school’ of thinkers who maintained humans had a moral 
                                                     
80 Donnelly, above n 75, at 305. 
81 Morsink, above n 41, at 25. 
82 John Stuart Mill and Scott Davis Utilitarianism (Barnes & Noble, New York, 2005) at viii. 
83 At viii. 
84 At x–xi. 
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sense of what is right and wrong.85 He did so by connecting the à priori principle 
or first principle as the root of all morality,86 and where there is several ‘pleasures’ 
and in conflict, having a principle or rule for determining between them which 
becomes self-evident.87 Of all pleasures, the ultimate that a human being would 
not sink below or go without is fundamental. He attributes such an appellation to, 
or gives a name to, a sense of dignity88 
which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no 
means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a 
part of happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with 
it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.   
Having established the a priori principle, Mill was able to fill in what he considered 
Immanuel Kant missed, utility when assessing pleasures based on the first 
principle of which is more valuable and desirable. He saw utilitarianism89 
the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are 
desirable (whether considering our own good or that of other people), is an 
existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in 
enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the 
rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who, in 
their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-
consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of 
comparison.  
The comparison will always be that with the first principle, determining which is 
the most desirable. It is this that becomes the standard of morality90  
                                                     
85 At viii–ix. 
86 This is the Kantian fundamental principle becomes the common ground of obligation.  
87 Mill and Davis, above n 82, at 3. 
88 At 9–10. 
89 At 12. 
90 At 12. 
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which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, 
by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, 
to the greatest extent possible, secured for all mankind; and not them only, but 
so far as the nature of things admits to the whole sentient creation. 
This provides the basis of one’s morality and secures for all humanity. This rescued 
utilitarianism from the unrestraint and the possibility of the tyranny of the 
majority over the misery of the oppressed few. By establishing the first principle 
as the dignity of being, provides a humanitarian morality between all human 
beings.  
It is within this understanding that it is possible consider Shelton’s connection of 
utilitarianism with international human rights. She argues that:91  
International legal texts such as the Preambles to the Universal Declaration of 
human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenants on Human Rights partly 
reflect a utilitarian approach in mentioning that ‘recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,’ but the 
Covenants add that ‘these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person’.  
These texts set out the à priori or first principle by which human rights are based 
and through which the assessment of the rights and freedoms within the texts are 
made. As such, the Mill utilitarian conceptualisation is seen through the 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family.” The à priori principle is the recognition of the 
inherent dignity of the human person. James Griffin argues that by “[g]rounding 
human rights in personality and dignity, enables human rights to be substantive, 
with a source or ultimacy, as opposed to mere formalism.”92 By forming the 
                                                     
91 Shelton, above n 30, at 1–2. 
92 James Griffin “First Steps in an Account of Human Rights” (2001) 9 European Journal of 
Philosophy 306 at 311. 
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legitimacy or foundation of human rights in dignity and equality of the human 
person, it enables a basis from which substantive application can be applied within 
states. All of the rights and freedoms are for the development of personality. 
However, sometimes these rights and freedoms are in conflict (especially when 
understood through negative freedom). When in conflict, it is possible to assess 
the highest value, or which takes precedence, according to this à priori principle. 
It is through such a substantive basis of morality that enables the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world. This approach reflects the moral basis of 
humanity as described in chapter 2. Such a basis transforms law from that of 
formalism to something that is able to be implemented and workable.  
Under the new international UN regime, the natural law basis of human rights 
gained a new source or foundation and legitimacy. This has been clarified in the 
Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations: “to reaffirm the faith in 
fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth93 of the human person, in equality 
and equal rights, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and 
small.”94 This is confirmed in, and foundational to, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)95 and became the Preamble of the two Covenants of the 
International Bill of Rights (IBOR). This faith in human rights as the à priori principle 
or foundation of human rights is dignity of the human person and equality. This 
section will consider this in three sections: the dignity, the human person and 
equality. In understanding this, it then is possible to understand the foundation of 
human rights.  
  
                                                     
93 The worth of the human person is also referred to as ‘the development of personality’ which is 
not the personality of emotions, but rather what makes up a person throughout the 
development process from birth to death as a narrative process.  
94 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble. 
95 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, Art. 1, 2, and 29. 
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4.2.1 Dignity  
The first of these three is dignity. Dignity96 was core to the foundations of 
international human rights. It was not the creation of one society, culture, 
philosophy, or religious approach to life.97 The protection of the dignity of the 
human person has visible traces of civilisation going back to the dawn of recorded 
history.98 It is the story of human kind.99 Thus, Jan Mårtenson suggests that human 
dignity is revolutionary in practice,100 but not revolutionary in concept.101 It was 
returned to a position of natural law deriving “from the inherent dignity of the 
human person,”102 something that exists pre- and post-human rights.103 Although 
in the abstract, it cannot be defined, recognition of its violation can be.104 Charles 
Habib Malik proposed that the ‘dignity of man’ should be the ‘basic woof’ of the 
UDHR105 and is the interpretive principle of the IBOR106 as an essential condition 
                                                     
96 Under international human rights law, in particular in the UN, dignity, worth, inherent worth, 
and inherent dignity, or combinations of them are used interchangeably. All of these 
interdependent meanings are referred to at the same time when dignity is used.   
97 Jan Mårtenson “The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN 
Human Rights Programme” in Asbjørn Eide and others (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: a commentary (Scandinavian University Press, Oslo : Oxford, 1992) at 17. 
98 At 17–18. 
99 At 18. 
100 At 17. 
101 Human dignity is not the invention or the creation of one society, culture, philosophy, or 
religious approach to life. Protection of human dignity is a story of human kind with visible traces 
of civilisation going back to the dawn of recorded history through various societies, cultures, 
philosophies, and religions. See: At 17–18. 
102 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Preamble; UN Secretary-General, above n 13, at 12. 
103 Slaughter, above n 33, at 34–35. 
104 Oscar Schachter “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept” (1983) 77 The American Journal of 
International Law 848 at 849. 
105 Tore Lindholm “Article 1 - A New Beginning” in Asbjørn Eide and others (eds) The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: a commentary (Scandinavian University Press, Oslo : Oxford, 1992) 
at 34. 
106 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Preamble; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble; Ruth Macklin “Dignity Is A Useless Concept: It 
228 
 
of, while also a resultant of, each right or freedom. It underlines each sentence of 
each right.107 Dignity became central to international human rights under the UN, 
and also the European Union,108 and other international instruments. As such, 
dignity was essential to the basis of freedom, justice and peace in the world.109  
The importance of dignity to international human rights is understood from its 
history and meaning. It draws from its etymological root – ‘Dignitas’ – which refers 
to the worth/intrinsic worth of the one’s being.110 Basing human rights in dignity 
ensures the moral value of one’s being.111 Value and worth are based on one’s 
humanity, not status, position or other factors. Value and worth are explicitly 
important to becoming a dignified being as its goals and purpose. One is valued 
solely on the basis of being human and not on one’s status or other cultural 
interests.  Dignity infers nuanced meanings of “esteem, deference, a proper regard 
for, recognition of’112 human beings. The intrinsic worth of one’s being is reflected 
in the esteem and recognition of another as a human being, one of value. 
According to Jan Mårtenson, the core meaning of ‘being’ within the international 
human rights regime refers to the “truths of human nature and the requirements 
                                                     
Means No More Than Respect For Persons Or Their Autonomy” (2003) 327 BMJ 1419 at 1419; 
Schachter, above n 104, at 849. 
107 Mårtenson, above n 97, at 21. 
108 The derivation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms “derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person” also was central to the Helsinki Final Act declares in Principle VII 
which is what is now referred to as the European Union. Schachter, above n 104, at 853. 
109 Charter of the United Nations, Pramble; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamable; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Preamble. 
110 Schachter, above n 104, at 849. 
111 David Mattson and Susan Clark “Human Dignity in Concept and Practice” (2011) 44 Policy 
Sciences 303 at 310. 
112 Schachter, above n 104, at 849. 
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of human dignity.”113 This dignity reflects one’s physical existence, intellectual and 
spiritual dimensions.114  
Mattson and Clark explain dignity as “a condition signified by a sense of 
contentment, satisfaction, and wellness as an integrative evaluation of lives and 
circumstances.”115 At the third session of the 58th meeting of the drafting 
committee of the UDHR, Cassin stated that116  
…they should be guaranteed certain elementary rights indispensable to their 
well-being and to their dignity.  
Dignity reflects more than being an existential quality or fact of being, it is a sense 
of potentiality and flourishing, in the Aristotelian sense, which requires being part 
of a community (in the modern term having a public life).117 As Joseph Raz puts it, 
“respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning 
and plotting their future.”118 That is, they are responsible for and have the capacity 
to develop – narrate and become – their identity and make choices as a human 
person.119 Dignity is the ability to determine who one is and plot and develop one’s 
personality. 
  
                                                     
113 Mårtenson, above n 97, at 21. 
114 At 21; Johann Neethling “Personality Rights: A Comparative Overview” (2005) 38 Comp & Int’l 
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4.2.2 The Human Personality – Human Being 
The second is the human person. The human person became front and centre of 
international human rights as the human personality. However, this person was 
reconceptualised from the legal person. There was nothing accidental about the 
reconceptualising120 of the human person.121 Dinah Shelton refers to the 
inherency of such a human rights being:122  
The concept of human rights involves consideration of what ‘rights’ a person 
possesses by virtue of being ‘human’, that is, rights that human beings have 
simply because they are human beings, independent of the infinite variety of 
individual characteristics and human social circumstances.  
This is supported by another writer on human rights, Jerome Shestack:123    
To speak of human rights requires a conception of what rights one possesses by 
virtue of being human. That does not mean human rights in the self-evident 
sense that those who have them are human, but rather, the rights that human 
beings have simply because they are human beings and independent of their 
varying social circumstances and degrees of merit. 
Human rights do not determine someone as being human, but people have them 
because they are human. Joseph Slaughter argues the human person is both the 
premise and the promise of international human rights:124   
Ultimately, of course, these personalities are one and the same; underwriting 
and underwritten by human rights, the human personality is both natural and 
                                                     
120 The human person or personality became front and centre as opposed to that of legal 
personality which was status-based. Joseph Slaughter indicates that the being is the qualities 
shared as a species of a persona as opposed to individual characteristics which indicate the 
‘what’ of status based characteristics. For example, see: Slaughter, above n 33, at 5, 34. 
121 Person is used interchangeably and referred to throughout the IBOR as the “human person” 
and “human being” and sometimes personality. Refer to: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Art. 22, 26, 29; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 13. 
122 Shelton, above n 30, at 1. 
123 Shestack, above n 49, at 203. 
124 Slaughter, above n 12, at 79. 
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positive, pre-social and social, premise and promise. This double positioning, 
which occurs in the rhetoric modes of constatation (confirmed as pre-text in the 
preamble) and declaration (affirmed as text in the articles) gives the legal 
tautology a temporal dimension and ploy trajectory.  
In other words, the base or premise of human rights is the human person, the 
human being, yet at the same time it is a promise, when the potentiality of 
humanness is inhibited, human rights are a promise to enable humanity to its 
potentiality.  
The human person is the mechanism and the product of our natural law 
endowment of human rights. Slaughter writes:125  
Articulating human personality as the engine and product of development, 
contemporary international law positivizes the inalienable, self-substantiating 
categories of natural-law endowment as transitive and reflexive projects of 
attaching human dignity to human dignity, the person to the person, ‘man to 
man’ – in effect, as teleological projects of tautologization. 
For the United Nations, human rights “appertained to him as a human being and 
could not be alienated and that they constituted a law anterior and superior to the 
positive law of civil society.”126 As such, this person had a reflexivity which 
signalled that a person was “both antecedent to human rights and consequent to 
human rights at the same time through their codification and observance.”127 It is 
this person that has become normativised and naturalised in the international law 
of personality in the UDHR, and therefore the derived Conventions.128 It is this 
personality that is the moral creature capable of bearing rights and duties and is 
both a legal and moral category.129 However, it must be remembered that this 
                                                     
125 At 79–80. 
126 UN Secretary-General, above n 13, at 12. 
127 Slaughter, above n 33, at 5. 
128 At 32. 
129 Slaughter, above n 12, at 17. 
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human person/personality is as foreign to the Western nations as it was to non-
Western nations.130 The human person was not an ideological person of either the 
Western or non-Western nations. It was not an essentialised person (Western) or 
a collectivised person (non-Western). This person was simply that of a dignified 
human being. 
4.2.3 Equality 
The last element of the foundation is equality. Although many jurisdictions apply 
equality on the basis of equal treatment of statuses, to be effective, equality had 
to be more than equal treatment and the various other forms that have been 
utilised by various states and regimes. These systems had legitimately justified 
violations of inequality and distinction, exclusion, and restriction within positivist 
legal systems in the past.131 As such, equality had to depart from the liberal and a 
socialist perspective of ‘equal treatment’ and be based on a different foundation. 
Equality never featured as a term or a principle within the League of Nations.132 
Since then, the inequality of both people and states has been realised as one of 
the great issues133  which often lead to conflict and war and legally used to justify 
the exclusion or restriction of people.134 Those within the UN realised that without 
inalienable and equal rights, there will continue to be a “disregard and contempt 
for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the 
                                                     
130 At 19. 
131 Matthew CR Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: a 
Perspective on its Development (Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, Oxford : New York, 
1995) at 155. 
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Rights: a Commentary (Scandinavian University Press, Oslo : Oxford, 1992) at 58. 
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conscience of mankind.”135 Equality, like dignity, became central to the UN and the 
IBOR.   
The UN Charter articulated the importance of equality in the sense of “equal 
rights”136 from the start in the Preamble. This was confirmed in the IBOR.137 
Equality within the UN institutions and instruments is equal rights for all peoples 
of all nations.138 It became one of the two conditions of the ‘faith in human rights’ 
from the Charter. It is a ‘thread’ that runs through the heart of the Charter and 
IBOR and weaves them together.139  More attention has been paid to equality than 
any other single category of human rights.140 Its importance141 is indicated by its 
status as an interpretive principle,142 along with the dignity of the human person, 
throughout the IBOR.143 Through the equality principle (EP) meant that no 
interpretation could be construed to exclude particular groups or individuals from 
freedoms and rights of the dignity of the human person as the foundation of 
human rights.144 Equality was relational in that it enabled the dignified being of 
every member of the human family.  
The EP under the UN had become both a universalising and relational principle 
initiated from the UN Charter. This was agreed at the San Francisco Meeting of the 
                                                     
135 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. 
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Third Committee145 where two key principles were laid out: for all individuals 
should enjoy basic rights, and those rights should be enjoyed without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion.146 The terms “for all (or all human beings)”147 
and “no (without) distinction”148 are used throughout the Charter149 in regards to 
being born free and equal in dignity and rights. It is clear that the UN through the 
Social and Economic Council aimed for the “universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion.”150 The EP held prime position starting from the 
Preamble, and several times151 throughout the substantive part of the UN 
Charter.152  
The EP became enshrined and written into the IBOR.153 It runs through the heart 
of both Covenants – ICCPR and ICESCR. 154 As opposed to equality written into the 
positivist law in most states, equality was universalised “for all … without 
distinction”. That was important as status was not relevant to the realisation of 
rights under the UN. The denial of rights in its essence is the denial of humanness 
                                                     
145 Referring to the UNCIO Documents: p. iv.13. 
146 WA McKean Equality and Discrimination under International Law (Clarendon Press ; Oxford 
University Press, Oxford : New York, 1983) at 53. 
147 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble, Art. 1, Art. 76(d); Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Preamble, Art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Preamble, Art. 3. 
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as a dignified human person. Under the UN, it was realised that the dignity of 
moral value is the only thing that exists universally and can be equally distributed 
socially.155  
4.2.3.1 For All without Distinction – Universalising Difference 
The EP universalises equality. This is clearly understood in that it applies to 
everybody as through the term ‘for all’ which is used repeatedly through the 
Charter and the IBOR.156 There are no exceptions, as opposed to positivist law 
where justifications could be made. Thus, dignity and equality were provided for 
all. It is in this sense the central principle of the UN became universal:157 “the 
inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all the members of the 
human family,”158 equal for everybody – for all peoples of all nations.159 The 
dignity of the moral value of being human is the only thing that exists universally 
and can be equally distributed socially.   
The EP requires respect of all human beings irrespective of who they are or their 
differences or variations. It took a positive viewpoint of humanity valuing all 
human beings as having dignity160 and as such there was a requirement of ‘no 
distinction’ or being ‘without distinction’ of moral beings.161 This has been 
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confirmed in other UN documents such as the UN Yearbook.162 Although the IBOR 
has not clarified ‘no distinction’, this has since been clarified in Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Convention on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).163 Within these Conventions, 
distinction is defined as164    
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference … which has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on equal footing, 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, or 
cultural or any other field of public life.  
‘No distinction’ was not about treating everyone the same as in statuses or in the 
sense of equal treatment, but it was the consideration of all as human beings of 
worth. Put another way, no distinction means that everyone was of the same 
worth a dignified being. In fact, where inequality or injustice occurs, it permits the 
special measures to remedy inequality or injustice of socially deprived groups.165  
The EP maintains the philosophy of no distinction.166 Statuses inherently create 
distinction. By stating without distinction as to particular statuses which were 
illustrative and not exhaustive,167 it was a rejection of status as a basis for 
understanding and resolving inequality. The specific articles of the IBOR provide 
mechanisms for protection, sometimes referred to as ‘non-discrimination’.168 
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These articles provided protection from interference in the free and full 
development of personality which impairs or nullifies a dignified being. The goal 
and purpose of human rights. Although discrimination has sometimes been 
interchangeably used with distinction, it was recognised that it has a different 
shade of meaning.169 Many nation-states implement non-discrimination on a 
negative premise: one of equal ‘protected status’,170 had to be treated equally, 
otherwise, the treatment would be considered discriminatory. As such, there have 
been a plethora of claims for protected status through identity politics. Without 
protected status, there was no protection of the law. However, without distinction 
does away with status, and any distinction marked one out for inequality. Any 
distinction that impairs or nullifies one’s development of a dignified being is not in 
accordance with the principles of this set of rules.171 All human beings are of equal 
worth, and as such require the enabling to develop their personality as a dignified 
being. It is the equality of being dignified humans that binds us together172 as 
central to the formation of the human rights person.173  
4.2.3.2 Equal Worth 
David Mattson and Susan Clark wrote that the “Gordian knot of outside morality 
or any other reasoning has been cut simply by declaring that all humans have 
dignity or by asserting the ‘ultimate’ value of dignity.”174 The declaring of dignity 
as the foundation of human rights  as people of all equal worth cuts ties with the 
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previous philosophies such as in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and 
traditional cultures that use status to make distinction between people. So, the 
question becomes what does it mean ‘to be of equal worth’ or ‘having dignity’? 
Dignity comes from the Latin root word: ‘dignitas’175 which has the meaning of 
respect with “has nuanced meanings of “esteem, deference, a proper regard for, 
recognition of’.”176 In other words, dignity is the recognition of, the esteeming or 
having proper regard for others. Dignity is thus respect of how one feels about and 
treats another.177 It is the respect of others solely on being human, the worth of 
being human.178 It reflects how much people care about public acknowledgement 
of their worth and being valued by others.179 
While status values one’s public worth180 as a mere instrument of hegemonic 
systems,181 the EP values one’s dignity of being as a recognised and respected 
member of society.182 This is important as it is not just the right thing but becomes 
the moral thing to base rights on. As Nicholas Smith states, “basic equality such as 
that offered through distributive equality, may keep the peace, but a community 
of equals that respect each other as such can be friendlier, more cooperative, and 
recognise more eagerly what we all have in common.”183 Having equality founded 
on being equally human,184 it enables a community of equals who can develop 
their potentiality and flourish.    
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4.3 Normative Basis of Human Rights 
The normative basis of human rights derives from its foundation – the dignity of 
the human person in equality. This human person was a reflexive person who is 
both antecedent to and consequent to human rights in dignity and equality.185 The 
dignified person is not a final end result, but a state of being. That is, as one goes 
through life, there is a continuous need to remain in a dignified state. The dignity 
of this human personality central and foundational to international human rights 
interconnects in and through relationality.186 This is supported by Oscar Schachter. 
He argues that dignity:187   
“embraces a recognition that the individual self is a part of larger collectivities 
and that they, too, must be considered in the meaning of the inherent dignity of 
the person.”  
Moreover, Mattson and Clark argue that the interaction in and through the 
community shapes dignity not only through “our relationships with ourselves but 
also by our relationships with others as well as our interactions with the physical 
world.”188 Dignity of this human person occurred in and through relationships with 
others and the surrounding world.  
By legitimating human rights in such a foundation enables them to become 
substantive as opposed to mere formalism.189 The human person results from the 
rights and freedoms were to enable one to freely and fully develop their 
personality. The development of this human person the “product and medium of 
social relations.”190 The aim of development is well-being and potentiality as a 
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dignified being. The normative basis of international human rights through the 
IBOR, as well as other International conventions, centred on the development of 
one’s personality within one’s fraternity. This was reiterated by the Executive 
Board of the AAA who emphasised: (1) the respect for the personality of the 
individual, and (2) the right to the fullest development as a member of his 
society.191 In summary, the normative basis of human rights is the development of 
this personality in freedom and through and within a fraternity.  
4.3.1 The Development of Personality  
Although the foundation of human rights is the human person in equality and 
dignity, the purpose of human rights becomes the free and full development of 
personality. This personality that develops is the expression of the human person 
in equality and dignity which may be referred to as one’s identity. Together this 
forms the moral basis of human rights. The development of personality occurs in 
and through relationality, also referred to as fraternity. For the development to 
occur, relationality must be enabling or in other words, there are some duties to 
enable development.  
It became Article 29(1) of the UDHR states “Everyone has duties to the community 
in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.”192 The 
free and full development of personality of this dignified human person was 
central to the IBOR. Joseph Slaughter stated that193   
[t]he drafters of the UDHR took it for granted that that their subject of central 
concern was the human person, and that the law should stipulate the 
fundamental civil, social, and political protections and privileges necessary for 
‘free and full development of the human personality’.  
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They saw the important connection of the dignified being and the developed 
personality. Rene Cassin reminded the Committee that they were requested to 
prepare a draft of the UDHR that would "permit all to develop their personality."194 
This remained central to the UDHR throughout the drafting and is repeated 
throughout the IBOR.195 Joseph Slaughter comments how remarkable this is 
considering it was “a document in which every word was debated and revised by 
the delegations of fifty-eight states over the course of three years.”196 Thus, the 
fact that “[e]veryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible”197 became tautological within the 
UDHR.198 As such, it entered into international law through social relations that 
one freely and fully develops. 
The rights and freedoms in the IBOR are not for survival or as an existential being 
but for a moral human being.199 They are for the sole purpose of the development 
of one’s personality for the inherent dignity of the individual alone and on his/her 
relation to others and society.200 They provide the conditions of well-being and 
enable potentiality of a dignified being illustrating the interconnectedness of well-
being and potentiality with dignity.201 Well-being is the dynamic state, the 
conditions, by which one has the ability to pursue and fulfil one’s personal and 
social goals202 – potentiality. That is, all of the rights and freedoms are the 
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progressive affirmation of the dignity of the human in which the personality has 
been incorporated.203  
Dignity, well-being and potentiality, is only possible and free when it is 
autonomous.204 Autonomy is the capability205 to determine both who one is and 
how one lives.206 Francisco Valdes states that this occurs through having “control 
over one’s capacity to experience and express the self; to shape and direct 
personality, both socially and sexually; and to realize one’s being and fate.”207 It 
requires the capability to make independent choices in the authoring of one’s 
life.208 It requires the willingly enacting and endorsing of the actions and or values 
that one expresses.209  
Autonomy promotes and enhances well-being and potentiality.210 As such, an 
autonomy-enhancing culture is more suitable for enabling and enhancing well-
being.211 Well-being is central to the development of personality which ultimately 
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achieves potentiality as a dignified being. Well-being is best described by Vicki 
Grieves as:212  
the social, emotional, and cultural wellbeing of the whole community in which 
each individual is able to achieve their full potential as a human being, thereby 
bringing about total wellbeing of their community.   
Well-being is thus the platform to reach potentiality. Potentiality is the need “to 
experience satisfaction in exercising and extending one’s capabilities” and in doing 
so, people “naturally seek out challenges that are optimal for their level of 
development.”213 It can be referred to as the “successful attainment of life’s goals 
and its consequences for well-being [as] a function of exploring and committing to 
choices.”214 This is the progressive affirmation of the dignity of the human 
person215 and the purpose of human rights. Thus, when the well-being and 
potentiality of every individual increase, so does that of the community. The 
extent of well-being and potentiality is a barometer of a flourishing society. 
The development of personality aims for potentiality in well-being. It is the 
autonomous capable and moral being as described in Chapter 2. Mill writes in 
relation to such a development:216  
Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly 
the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself 
on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living 
thing. 
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Development is not a linear process, but innate and relational. It requires the 
exercise of all of its faculties including the physical, psychological, spiritual and 
relational. However, for this to be full development, it must also be a free 
development. This enables the flourishing of both individuals and the 
community.217   
4.3.2 Freedom  
The development of one’s personality requires freedom. Freedom is a foundation 
value of the IBOR, along with dignity and equality, as equal partners in the 
inalienable faith in human rights of the human family.218 Joseph Slaughter 
indicates this freedom is integral to the development of personality between free 
human beings. He wrote that the “free development of the human passions … 
leads to a harmonious personality and to harmonious co-operation between free 
men.”219 Freedom is the ability to grow and develop relationally as dignified 
human beings.  
Before explaining freedom in context of the IBOR, it is important to define 
freedom. John Stuart Mill considers liberty or freedom as essential to human 
society. He refers liberty as comprising of:220  
first the inward domain of consciousness; … Secondly, the principle requires 
liberty of tastes and pursuits; framing the plan of our life to suit our own 
character; of doing as we like subject to such consequences as may follow; 
without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not 
harm them even though they should think our conduct is foolish, perverse, or 
wrong. Thirdly, from the liberty of each individual follows the liberty, within the 
same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any 
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purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combing being supposed to 
be of full age, and not forced or deceived.  
Freedom thus requires three things, the consciousness of mind, the ability to plan 
and suit one’s own life, and the relationality among others. Mill, though, places 
the balance or proviso of weighing one’s pursuits with the possibility of harming 
others. This harm must not be taken as what one thinks as foolish, perverse, or 
wrong. Before going into how freedom is understood within human rights, it is first 
important to explain the two types of freedom, as Isaiah Berlin describes – 
negative freedom and positive freedom.221  
He describes negative freedom as the “area within which the subject – a person 
or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, 
without interference by other persons.” 222 Negative freedom emphasises on the 
prevention of the role of external barriers.223 It becomes an absence rather than a 
presence224 of interference. At its extreme, being free when left alone permits one 
“to do whatever one wants” without interference225 leaves people at the whims 
of society. Such freedom is often seen as innately separate, individualistic, 
unconnected, rights-oriented, and even possibly antagonistic.226  
Positive freedom is “what or who is the source of control or interference that can 
determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that.”227 Whereas positive 
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freedom is a wish to be one’s own master of one’s life and decisions and not 
through external forces of any kind.228 It refers to a person that has229   
a wish above all to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, 
bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by reference to 
my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true 
and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realise that it is not.   
It is to be the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, 
or be, this rather than that.”230 It seeks “to prevent and pre-empt inequality, by 
requiring and encouraging certain potentially preventative behaviours and 
practices.”231 In the extreme, it has the potential to be paternalistic and over-
bearing upon one’s life, even deterministic. Both of these in the extreme can 
violate human rights.  
Freedom is repeated inserted throughout the IBOR. Freedom is integral to two key 
interpretive articles of the UDHR – Articles 1 and 29. This is echoed throughout the 
Charter and the IBOR. Human rights recognise that one is born free. This is stated 
in Article 1 of the UDHR: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights.”232 Although everyone may be born free and equal in human rights, this 
freedom may be inhibited or denied at any time through one’s development. This 
inhibition or denial of freedom violates one’s dignity of being. So while one may 
be born free, dignity is a state that must be maintained, and it is not automatic. 
According to the Conventions of the IBOR, “the ideal of free human beings” can 
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy one’s 
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rights and freedoms which derive from the “inherent dignity of the human 
person.”233 This freedom underlines the equality and dignity of being.  
Freedom is the ability to fully develop one’s personality. This is a duty of everyone 
according to the IBOR.234 It incorporates two sides of freedom: negative freedom 
is the ‘freedom from’ inhibition and denial and the positive is the ‘freedom to’ 
enable235 the development of one’s personality as a dignified human being. This 
correlates freedom with dignity and empowerment.236 As such, freedom is tied to 
the enabling, and protection of such development and also indicative of whether 
one has dignity. State, and non-state parties, must ensure the conditions for one 
development are sufficient. In other words, as indicated in Chapter 2, there are 
adequate choices to enable one to freely and fully develop. Moreover, the state 
may need to interfere when conditions permit or others to violate one’s dignity of 
being and inhibit or deny one’s development of personality. Jill Marshall notes 
that237 
States are increasingly responsible for human rights violations in failing to ensure 
that people have the enabling conditions to live their lives in peace, in safety, 
with clean water, with a roof of some type over their heads.  
From the perspective of the IBOR, the state is not a bystander watching but 
proactive ensuring the conditions are favourable to the free and full development. 
Only then can there be dignity of being.  
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From a ‘liberal’ perspective, freedom is commonly associated with ‘being left 
alone’.238 It rests on the idea of a pre-social self of being by nature free and 
unconstrained.239 The individual, if left alone, will self-realise what one is240 as 
according to the determination of the pre-social self. Jill Marshall writes in relation 
to this negative freedom and development:241  
Underlying the notion of a person being free, and a person’s rights being 
preserved if left alone, not being interfered with, usually by the state. It implies 
that human rights laws are needed to stop state action from abusing individual 
rights. On this view, personal identity will develop absent from state 
interference, this largely corresponds to an idea of negative freedom. Yet when 
probed, we see that human rights law goes much further than this. With the 
growth of positive obligations, there is an understanding that individuals’ rights 
are not protected when left alone. If this happened from birth, we would not live 
very long. 
The developed personal identity within such freedom is that of the problematic of 
identity as described in Chapter 2. One is left alone, but physically, psychologically 
and spiritually, one is not fully developed if left alone. As human beings, 
development requires relationality, in particular that of support and guidance.   
For that reason, the freedom as demanded by the IBOR is autonomous-enhancing. 
Freedom indicates that one has autonomy242 to create one’s own story line and 
being loyal to that.243 Mill refers to the importance of this freedom to autonomy 
in the development of one’s personality. He writes:244    
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He who lets the world, or his own part of it, choose his plan of life for him, has 
no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses 
his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, 
reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, 
discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to 
hold to his deliberate decision.  
It permits one can ask “whether a person is free to ask how he or she is ‘in the 
world’ or whether or not he or she is involved in the world truthfully.”245 This 
freedom is irrespective of repugnancy of others of their moral sense.246 It is 
something derived internally,247 innately connected, communitarian, even 
selfless, concerned with responsibility.248 Freedom suggests active processes, that 
is to make someone free. For example, to make people free, there is an emphasis 
on growth and learning and the reliance on one’s environment.249 Being left alone 
or left to one’s own devices is not sufficient on developing their human potential 
and capacities. This freedom means social pressures need to be removed and 
other social conditions improved if individuals are to develop their human 
potential and capacities to the full.250 The freedom in the IBOR is active and 
intentional. The goal of such freedom is to enable full development of personality. 
In this perspective, it is now possible to understand that Mill’s describing a 
particular type of freedom as freedom. Freedom may have different names and 
conceptualisations, but for Mill:251   
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The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in 
our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede 
their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether 
bodily, or mental or spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each 
other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as 
seems good to the rest.  
This freedom is essential to the development of personality. It gives one autonomy 
over both who one is and how they come to be. Moreover, it enables people to 
relate together and ensure that each person is equally able to develop as a 
dignified being.  
4.3.3 The Duty of Fraternity 
The freedom to development one’s personality cannot occur outside of one’s 
community in which one lives. Mill argues that freedom is not only a necessary 
part, but conditional to a society. He writes that:252 
free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being; 
that it is not only a coordinate element with all that is designated by the terms 
of civilization, instruction, education, culture, but it is itself a necessary part and 
condition all of those things. 
The freedom to develop personality leading to well-being is integral to having the 
right to the fullest development as a member of his society.253 The desire is to live 
in and through a community as a fraternity or a solidarity. Fraternity is relational 
that enables the “free and full development of one’s personality.”254 Such 
development required support and guidance. During the establishment of the 
IBOR, it was realised that the free and full development of this person could not 
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develop outside of the community.255 This was recognised by Alexei Pavlov of the 
USSR in the drafting of the UDHR and became the most persuasive argument even 
against that of the “Enlightenment heuristic of natural man.”256 This was also 
central in the submission that the American Anthropological Association (AAA) 
made to the drafting Committee of the UDHR. It argued that “groups are 
composed of individuals, and human beings do not function outside of the 
societies of which they form a part.”257 It went on to say that the Committee 
must258   
formulate a statement of human rights that will do more than just phrase respect 
for the individual as an individual. It must also take into account the individual 
as a member of the social group of which he is a part, whose sanctioned modes 
of life shape his behaviour and with whose fate his own is thus inextricably 
bound.  
Fraternity259 became an interpretive principle of UDHR together with dignity and 
equality that was incorporated through the Preamble, and Articles 1, 29, and 30. 
This is explained by Jan Mårtenson describing the spirit and philosophy of the 
UDHR. He writes that although rights were focused “on the individual, the rights 
necessary to the inherent dignity of the individual alone, and on his/her relation 
to others and society.”260 It is this respect as equals, as equal beings of value, which 
creates the moral value of human rights. It acknowledges both one’s own and 
other’s moral value as a human being as a part of a shared humanity.261  
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A fraternity is difficult when one places oneself above others. Although human 
rights centre on the dignified being, it is far from being the rights of individualism. 
Human rights were not intended for selfish gains. During the drafting at the Third 
Committee of the UDHR, the Chinese delegate, Chang,262  
felt that the aim of the United Nations was not to ensure selfish gains of the 
individual but to try and increase man’s moral stature. It was, therefore, a 
necessity to proclaim the duties of the individual, for it was a consciousness of 
his duties which enabled man to reach a high moral standard. 
Rather, human rights were there to increase the moral stature of human beings. 
As referred to in Chapter 2, the moral basis of esteem and respect revolves around 
the dignified being. This involves considering others as oneself. Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Na’im writes that “in placing oneself in the position of the other, one should 
not impose one’s own perceptions on the other’s position.”263 This requires the 
respecting of oneself and others in the aim of development of one’s personality. 
In doing so, while developing one’s personality, one will consider actions in terms 
of their consequences for other human beings.264 This regulates one’s being to 
take account of others and not just the promptings of his own egoism.265 This 
connects the principle of reciprocity to fraternity. Albie Sachs refers to this 
principle from the African understanding of Ubuntu. He states:266  
I am a person because you are a person; that I can’t separate my humanity from 
an acknowledgement of your humanity. It presupposes that I don’t strengthen 
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my personality through isolating myself from you; but on the contrary, I benefit 
from my association with you. 
It recognises the dignity of another as well as one’s own one and that through such 
associations enables the development of each one’s personality. It is this principle 
of reciprocity, that Johannes Morsink refers to as the Golden Rule is written into 
the IBOR. The Articles of the IBOR are deduced from the understanding of 
reciprocity in light of Article 1 and the Preamble.267 This sense of reciprocity was 
indicated in Article 1 of the UDHR with the insertion of ‘endowed with reason and 
conscience’ which was a Westernised translation of ‘ren’ as “two-mindedness or 
in ordinary English terms ‘consciousness of his fellow man or sympathy’.”268 That 
is, there is a duty to enable others to develop their personality and in developing 
one’s own, one must also take into account others ability to freely and fully 
develop. 
Edward J Eberle wrote that as a human family we are “bound by a sense of moral 
duty, a sense of social need, personal responsibility, and human solidarity.”269 The 
recognition of such a duty or responsibility to one another was written into the 
IBOR. This was made clear by Rene Cassin who noted in preparing for the UDHR 
that the270  
task of society being to permit all to develop their personality, without one being 
sacrificed for others, on man’s dependence on society and thus duties towards 
it, and on limitations on everyone’s rights by those of others.   
This duty and responsibility was included within key interpretive parts of the UDHR 
and then woven into the derived Conventions. They are referred to in Article 29(1) 
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of the UDHR which states: “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone 
the free and full development of his personality is possible.” This is stated in Article 
1 of the UDHR271 that states: all human beings … “should act towards one another 
in a spirit of brotherhood.”272 Article 1 was written into a key position of the 
interpretive Preamble of both Conventions of the IBOR – the ICCPR and ICESCR:273   
Recognizing that these [equal and inalienable] rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person,…having duties to other individuals and to the 
community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the 
promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.  
The Preambles of both the ICCPR and ICESCR clearly indicate such duties in the 
phrasing: “duties to other individuals and to the community to which he 
belongs.”274 Such duties have also been included in other international human 
rights conventions.275 As a member of the human family, there is a moral duty to 
one another. It is this duty that Sandy Farquhar writes is “duty-bound in asking 
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one human being to consider the humanity of the other before one’s self.”276 This 
enables the blossoming of respect “for others and for ‘oneself as another’,” and 
extend respect “to anyone who has the right to expect his or her just share in an 
equitable distribution.”277 It becomes a morality as part of a shared humanity278 
which was reflected in the IBOR. This is demonstrated through the process of 
conferring of rights on a dignified being or person.279 This obligation is to enable 
the free and full development of ‘all the members of the human family’.280 
4.3.4 Summary 
The normative basis of human rights centres on the enabling of the development 
of one’s personality. Enabling is essential to remain in a dignified state. This 
enabling of one’s personality moves the moral rights and freedoms from mere 
formalism to something substantive, something with meaning and significance. 
This requires freedom and fraternity. Development is a product of human 
relations.281 Freedom and fraternity enable the fullest development as a member 
of his society.282  
The focus of the IBOR is the free and full development of the personality of the 
dignified being. All of the rights and freedoms are there for such a purpose and 
foundation. Article 30 of the UDHR states:283  
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Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein. 
However, this does not indicate that development has free reign irrespective of 
the effect on others. There are limitations on rights and freedoms. These 
limitations are to ensure the recognition and respect of others and oneself within 
a society, a fraternity. This is clarified in Article 29(2) of the UDHR:284   
 In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the 
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society. 
These limitations may inhibit some pleasures and interests where they may 
conflict or inhibit others’ ability to develop their personality as a dignified being. 
Despite such limitations, they must be kept in context. They must not be 
interpreted inhibiting one’s dignity. Torkel Opsahl wrote: “Article 29 should be 
interpreted in accordance with Article 30, that is, not limit the human rights of the 
individual.”285 Moreover, the exercise of one’s rights shall not be contrary to the 
foundation of human rights – the equal dignified human person. This is contained 
within Article 29(3) of the UDHR states: “These rights and freedoms may in no case 
be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”286 
They are there to be exercised in the developing one’s personality and maintaining 
the dignity of oneself and others. In doing so, there will be a balancing of certain 
pleasures or interests to ensure an equality of dignity of being. The limitations 
noted in Article 29(2) again reflect the principle of reciprocity and positive freedom 
required to enable all human beings to develop and flourish. 
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4.4 Foundation and Purpose for One’s Moral Authored Identity 
Paul Lauren articulates well that the “issue of human rights addresses the age-old 
and universal questions about the relationship between individuals and their 
larger society, and thus is one that has been raised across time and across 
cultures.”287 He sums it up well describing the differing world views:288   
Instead of seeing the best in human nature, they saw the worst and had much 
history to support them. Rather than the universal, or what people share in 
common, they stressed the particular, or what divides them…. In place of rights, 
they demanded obedience. Instead of justice, they wanted privilege. Rather than 
change, they pressed for tradition and continuity….Instead of being a keeper of 
all brothers and sisters, they frequently looked no further than themselves or 
their own exclusive group.  
This quote illustrates the two sides or interpretive view points on life and also on 
rights. One, the vertical interpretive frame was negative based. The horizontal was 
positive based. Within the vertical rights and freedoms will be negative based and 
confrontational. There is the aim for maximisation of oneself and one’s resources. 
There is little desire for reciprocity unless there is a benefit for oneself. This is a 
universal within strong more authoritarian type) or weak (more democratic type) 
collectives. The rules and regulations dictate life, what one is, and how one should 
be. One makes choices from the choices that are available and is committed to 
them. Human rights do not fit successfully within a vertical interpretive horizon. 
Negative freedom289  is where there is a duty not to be interfered with.290 It may 
lead to a sense that one’s interests are of more importance than others. Non-
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interference is not always in one’s best interest. It may not always protect rights 
and enable the development of personality. Peter King argues:291   
We might, if we are selfish, see our interests as more important than those of 
others, and therefore ours should take precedence. However, once we 
appreciate that our selfishness is likely to be reciprocated, and consequently all 
this boils down to is power relations, we might wish to return some recognition 
that the interests of others count as much as our own.  
The vertical system though is based on power relations and status. Thus, the 
selfishness is the inherent maximisation of those who benefit from such systems. 
It centres on the recognition of interests who counts. Maximising will always cause 
harm. 
The horizontal is centred on the dignified being at the centre who must have 
esteem and respect to enable one’s capabilities in togetherness. This horizon 
operates through principles with the main one of reciprocity. It centres on what 
required for well-being and reaching potentiality while at the same time enabling 
others to do the same. It does not define one but recognises each one for who 
they are building each one into constitutive and constructive members of the 
community. This is summed up by John Stuart Mill as a flourishing life:292  
It is not by wearing down into conformity all that is individual in themselves, but 
by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and 
freedoms of others, that human beings become the noble and beautiful object 
of contemplation; and as the work partake the character of those who do them, 
by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, 
furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and 
strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the 
race infinitely better worth belonging to. 
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This flourishing life exists through positive life where everyone is enabled to live 
their good life.  
The foundation and purpose of international human rights have been defined in 
above. The foundation and purpose are reflexive occurring interdependently. 
Through this, the human person is front and centre as the subject of human rights. 
This is summed up by Joseph Slaughter:293    
Like the Eighteenth-century counterparts, the Universal Declaration enlists the 
human person in its legitimizing activity with the exhortation that every 
individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive … to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by 
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and 
effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member 
States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.  
This is summed up as: The rights and freedoms of the IBOR protect the dignified 
being and enables the development of their personality. This foundation of the 
human person in dignity and equality of the IBOR cannot be overemphasised in 
the interpretation and implementation of human rights.  
The concept of dignity is central to the human condition. It is the interconnected 
human capability to author one’s being. Dignity is ultimately autonomous in 
reckoning and not based on position, status, or merit or other such basis. Sandra 
Fredman illustrates this in connection with well-being and potentiality:294   
Dignity is “based on what people say and do, dignity seems to be a condition 
signified by a sense of contentment, satisfaction, and wellness – an integrative 
evaluation of our lives and circumstances. Inherent to the very notion of dignity 
is the idea that dignity is ultimately reckoned by each individual for him or 
herself. Dignity is shaped by our relationships with ourselves, but also by our 
relationships with others as well as our interactions with the physical world. 
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Viewed in this way, each person’s experience of dignity is inextricably coupled 
with that of others through the health and vigour of the commonwealth which 
may arise, in part, from the unique extent to which human biological fitness is 
contingent on the institutions that we develop.”   
This is supported by Oscar Schachter who connects dignity with identity, 
autonomy and responsibility:295   
a complex notion of the individual. It includes recognition of a distinct personal 
identity, reflecting individual autonomy and responsibility. 
Any loss of dignity leads to a loss of self-respect undermines the aim for the good 
life which is the basis of a dignified life of the human person. The loss of self-
esteem and self-respect undermines what is valuable and worthwhile.296 
Equality and dignity arise as having shared characteristics of the human family and 
this demands equal respect which is part of the social bond operating within 
human rights law. This is expressed by Matthew Craven:297     
The idea that humans have some basic shared characteristics and as a result 
should be viewed as members of a human race rather than members of a 
particular group; recognition of the shared qualities gives rise to the principle of 
equality which requires all members to be treated with equal respect; certain 
forms of state or governmental behaviour which consistently exploit or degrade 
men and deny both the possession of the shared humanity and the moral claims 
that arise from these by certain groups while conceding and indeed recognising 
them in the case of others should be excluded.     
The bonds of human rights are there to protect human persons from state and 
governmental behaviour, exploitation and degradation that prevent them from 
being part of a shared humanity. These bonds did not push one particular ideology, 
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bar the dignity of the human person and its free and full development. As Joseph 
Slaughter writes:298     
International human rights law consists of principles by which states parties 
agree to abide for the promotion and protection of the rights of their own 
citizens, calibrating the limits of legitimate state power by the abstract (moral) 
anthropometrics of the ‘inherent dignity’ and ‘worth of the human person’ and 
its capacity for free and full development.  
It was based on this foundation – the equal dignified person that the purpose 
could be enabled the free and full development of personality – and these are 
both circulatory in nature in that they cannot occur without the other. These 
human rights are more than a list of rights, freedoms and obligations. Rather, all 
of the rights and freedoms affect the foundation and purpose of human rights: the 
human person in solidarity. It is in this respect that Richard Gardiner states in 
relation to the interpretation and understanding of human rights:299   
Elements can only be taken up one at a time, but they are to be evaluated 
together.” The claim of protection or enablement may come through an article 
but must be interpreted in light of the IBOR as a whole.  
All human rights must be interpreted through and in accordance with the purpose 
and intention of human rights and their principles. Only then will human rights 
function as to their foundation and purpose.  
Human rights are thus the social bond between peoples and more importantly 
between peoples and the state to enable people to flourish in free and full 
development as a dignified being.  It is these rights that the capable subject of 
rights requires as part of a shared humanity to develop a moral identity. These 
rights are imputed on the capable subject. As Ricoeur states,300  
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the ethico-juridical imputation of rights and duties can only be imputed on an 
autonomous person who has power over bodily members, and through them, 
and on the course of things to author one’s life.  
The subject of rights becomes one of imputation through the ethico-juridical plane 
as an autonomous capable being authoring one’s life.301 It is this human person as 
part of a shared humanity through dignity, equality and reciprocity.   
The influence from a legal positivist model of rights based on one having a right 
and the duty of society to uphold that right may tempt us to overlook this very 
important connection of the foundation and purpose of human rights being 
central to any interpretation of the rights and freedoms in the IBOR. For this 
reason, the aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that international human 
rights are not a list of things people can claim in grievance, but actually are a set 
of requirements to protect on one hand and enable on the other the moral human 
person. Human rights as a whole are there to enable a moral being to write a 
narrative identity that will reveal a personal identity as a moral identity.  
The dignified being author’s one’s own moral world. This requires that the 
adequate choices are available to independently and autonomously make 
commitments and be loyal to them in forming that moral world. For this very 
reason, the IBOR was established to provide the rights and freedoms that enable 
development of the dignified being. Personal freedom is the notion of universal 
right that everyone should have the right and capacity to be themselves, and as 
such, there is a requirement that every person's personal autonomy and identity 
require recognition by others.302 This freedom is essential to the developing of a 
dignified being.  However, there is no dignity if persons are “perceived or treated 
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merely as instruments or objects of the will of others,”303 whether it is by states or 
other collectives in forming their moral world as this would lead to a violation of 
human rights.   
4.5 Intersex Hermeneutic Justice 
The history and current issues facing intersex represent hermeneutic injustice.  
Hermeneutic injustice is the prevention of someone with a lived experience from 
making sense of their own experience.304 Miranda Fricker describes hermeneutic 
injustice as305  
someone is trying to make sense of a social experience but is handicapped in this 
by a certain sort of gap in collective understanding – a hermeneutic lacuna 
whose existence is owning to the relative powerlessness of a social group to 
which the subject belongs.  
Morgan Holmes illustrates this sense of hermeneutic injustice. She writes: 
“knowledge of myself and where I fit in is what was stolen from me by being 
medicalised and by having my body altered against my will.”306 The feeling of a 
stolen life for intersex people is common. They desire to reclaim their moral 
identity.   
Identity is much more than an immutable identifier as understood within the 
problematic of identity as described in chapter two. Identity cannot be separated 
from a moral life, a life of esteem and respect as a capable being forming an 
autonomous good life in and with others. This is one’s moral identity. It is to this 
that intersex people aspire. A moral identity requires living in truthfulness and 
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integrity, and in the case of intersex people, this requires them to live the sex they 
are – male, female both or neither – and have autonomy over how they come to 
be.307  
As a human rights person, an intersex person requires a state of dignity. For this 
to occur, they must be able to freely and fully develop as to who they are and how 
they come to be. This does not arrive automatically. It requires one to make sense 
of oneself. Referring to a Socrates phrase: “an unexamined life is not worth 
living.”308 For intersex people, the examining of one’s life to find meaning and 
significance is the fight for human rights. A moral identity for an intersex person is 
the autonomous capability to be who they are both internally and externally and 
have autonomy over the capability of how one comes to be, even if it be later in 
life. This may be the acknowledging of the uniqueness of one’s sex in the 
developing of personality. The goal of a moral being with a moral identity is human 
flourishing. It is to this end, to use John Stuart Mill words, one becomes the 
“perfection of human nature.”309   
The next three chapters will evaluate some of the many rights and freedoms that 
enable an examined life for intersex people to live a moral life and reveal a moral 
identity. The next chapter will consider the enabling of who one is and how one 
comes to be through the right to privacy. However, for this to happen, it requires 
well-being. The state of well-being, so critical to a dignified being, and issues of 
well-being for intersex people will follow in chapter 6. The last chapter, chapter 7 
will return to a focus of identity and recognition. Recognition is both a cause and 
a solution to intersex issues. These chapters while not covering all areas of rights 
and freedoms for the good life of intersex people, it brings together some key 
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components to enable them to live a good or accomplished life with a moral 
identity.     
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CHAPTER 5: THE RIGHT TO AUTONOMOUSLY SHAPE ONE’S LIFE AND 
IDENTITY 
5  
First and foremost, the key issue for intersex people is to have control over who 
they are as a sex – whether it be male, female, both or neither – and the power 
over how they come to be. Chai Feldblum writes that intersex people desire 
control “over the definition of one’s existence and over their anatomy, identity 
and expression from physicians, parents and society at large.”1 This is core to 
intersex people’s rights. They desire the ability to have a moral life with self-
esteem and self-respect. This cannot occur without the dignity to autonomously 
become the sex one is. This requires the autonomous capabilities of humanness 
to enable one to become who they are which will reveal the sex one is. This is the 
basis of international human rights.  
Although sex at international law has commonly still been understood within the 
interpretive horizon as a status, international human rights law argues that it is 
through and for the dignified human being, not that of status or other utilities, 
that international human rights must be applied. Furthermore, to maintain the 
dignified being, the human person must be enabled to freely and fully develop. 
Referring back to status identities such as sex as it is currently assumed, denies the 
very purpose and foundation for which human rights were created. They were 
created to overcome statuses that had denied people the freedom to freely and 
fully develop as a dignified being. It also denies one’s moral identity.  
A moral identity is central to the human rights person. A central place where this 
is found in human rights law is through the ‘right to privacy’. The right to privacy 
protects the core areas that enable the dignity of the human person in becoming 
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who one is such as autonomy, identity, personal development and relationships, 
the integrity of the person and dignity. Together these are representative of what 
is required for the capable being to autonomously become who one is. This 
chapter will first understand what is the right to privacy before applying it to 
intersex people who aim to make sense of themselves which is central to one’s 
self-esteem and self-respect as a dignified being.   
5.1 Ordinary Meaning of Privacy 
The common interpretation and assumption has been the classical understanding 
of privacy. The classical understanding took a classical right through a negative 
freedom understanding of such rights in in constitutional and tort law such as the 
protection from others “to gain, disseminate, or use information about oneself.”2  
 Such an interpretation guarantees freedom from the “inviolability of home and 
correspondence and the classical problem of unreasonable searches of the body.”3  
This understanding had been understood by some state parties coming before the 
HRC. For example, in Toonen v Australia, the Federal Government, after reviewing 
the travaux préparatoires of article 17, subscribed to the view of privacy/private 
as: “matters which are individual, personal, or confidential, or which are kept or 
removed from public observation."4 Here, the State inferred the meaning to be 
that of the negative freedom classical understanding. The Oxford Dictionary has 
defined privacy as “A state in which one is not observed or disturbed by other 
people” or “The state of being free from public attention.”5 This has continued the 
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classical understanding of privacy. Furthermore, in a commentary on the ICCPR, it 
has listed some of the common suggested definitions:6     
It has been categorised as a choice, a function, a desire, a right, a condition 
and/or a need. It has also been defined as the desire of individuals for solitude, 
intimacy, anonymity, and reserve. It has also been defined as a right to be left 
alone and narrowly as a right to control information about one’s self. 
The above definitions have retained the classical view of protecting information. 
It also infers ‘to be left alone’ and seclusion or being private and away from other 
people. The ordinary meaning as the ‘right to be left alone’ or the ‘right to control 
information about oneself’ is about access to and control of information rather 
than the right to privacy as will be seen below.  
However, if the right to privacy is not that as described within the classical 
meaning of privacy, then what was it intended to mean? Why was it included the 
first place of the Article? What did it mean as an umbrella term and what does it 
include? Given that elements of the classical meaning are already included in the 
Articles of the different Declaration/Conventions, it is obvious that it meant 
something else.  
5.2 The Right to Privacy 
The right to privacy is an important article in the IBOR though relatively unknown. 
It was established in Article 12 of the UDHR and repeated in Article 17 of the ICCPR. 
The articles are almost identical except the ICCPR had also included the phrase “or 
unlawful”. Article 17 of the ICCPR states:7  
                                                     
6 Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2000) at 
348–349. 
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A 
(XXI) Resolution 2200A (XXI) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), 
Art. 17(1). 
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No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful8 interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 
It is interesting to note that during drafting the terms privacy and private life were 
used interchangeably9 with no discussions as to why particular forms were 
chosen.10 A similar article was part of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) in Article 811 however, the drafters of the ECHR chose private life and not 
privacy. Prior to the drafting of the International Bill of Rights,12 few countries had 
a right to privacy as identity included in any state constitution.13 Even today, it is 
not a commonly utilised part of the IBOR. 
                                                     
8 Added into the ICCPR Article 17, but not in the UDHR Article 12. 
9 The UDHR Art.12, and ICCPR Art. 17 eventually settled on privacy, while ECHR Art. 8 settled on 
private life. This chapter will use privacy unless it is a quote from European law. 
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 17; European Convention on Human 
Rights, Council of Europe (adopted 3 September 1953, signed 4 November 1950), Art. 8; Manfred 
Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (NP Engel, Kehl, Germany; Arlington, Va, USA, 
2005) at 385; Diggelmann and Cleis, above n 3, at 441. 
11 “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence; 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others”: European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8. 
12 The drafting history of the UDHR Article 12 and ICCPR Article 17 indicate that the fundamental 
question of whether or not to include such an umbrella term, or of the implication of such a step 
did not take place. It is clear that privacy is a contested subject, but there was no clarification 
why or how this concept was to be defined and possibly any understanding of its implications. 
With regards to the UDHR, John Humphrey (United Nations Director of Human Rights) supplied 
the ‘working paper’ for the drafting committee, Article 11 read as follows: Working paper version 
of Article 11 - “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary searches or seizures, or to unreasonable 
interference with his person, home, family relations, reputation, privacy, activities, or personal 
property. The secrecy of correspondence shall be respected.” This covered the classical privacy 
topics. During the drafting stages, privacy/private life was included and eliminated several times, 
however, the final draft read as follows: “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks (emphasis 
added). The same occurred with the ICCPR Article 17 with no debate. The wording was identical 
with the UDHR except there was the inclusion of ‘and unlawful’ after arbitrary. This indicated that 
it covered a wider area of interference. Refer to: Diggelmann and Cleis, above n 3, at 441. 
13 At 441. 
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The right to privacy is not the name of the Article, but the first identified right14 in 
this article.15 It has been considered as an umbrella term within this Article in both 
the UDHR and the ICCPR.16 It has likewise been considered in the ECHR. This 
indicates a difference between privacy and other items such as correspondence 
and home with inference of property. Given the heated debate over every word it 
is no accident that there is a separation of these items even if we are not told the 
intended meaning. We do know that if privacy included the non-interference of 
correspondence and so on, the other items would not have been separate items. 
As they are separate items, this chapter is not concerned with non-interference of 
“family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation, but solely focuses on the right to privacy. This rest of this chapter will 
show, it has been interpreted to incorporate a purpose to protect one’s definition 
of who they are and how they come to be. This is a core article in the enabling of 
the human rights person with a moral identity.  
5.2.1 Digging out the ‘Meaning’ or Rather the Purpose of Privacy 
Privacy was not included in the first draft presented to the Drafting Committee. 
When it was included during the drafting stages, the drafting process did not 
indicate or give any clues as to why it was included or to its meaning. Moreover, 
the General Comment on the Article 17 also provides no source of interpretation 
                                                     
14 Its importance is seen both in its location and also in its protection from arbitrary and unlawful 
interference, for example, as compared with ‘honour and reputation’ which has less protection, 
the ‘freedom from attacks’. See: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 17(1); 
Nowak, above n 10, at 381. 
15 Alex Conte “Privacy, Honour and Reputation” in Alex Conte, Scott Davidson and Richard 
Burchill (eds) Defining Civil and Political Rights: the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (Ashgate, Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT, 2004) at 148. 
16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly 217 A (III) (adopted May 1948, 
entered into force 10 December 1948), Art. 12; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Art. 17; Diggelmann and Cleis, above n 3, at 447. 
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or understanding.17 It is for this reason the right to privacy has been left to much 
debate, and often been considered through the thought of ‘to be left alone’ in the 
sense of negative freedom.   
It is for this reason, that it is necessary to turn to case law at the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). However, 
unlike other Articles which have been defined in general comments or case law, 
the case law has specifically indicated that it does not intend to provide a specific 
meaning. This was noted in the dissenting opinion of Mr Herndt in Coeriel et al v 
the Netherlands.18 The same was discussed in several cases at the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR). These cases stated that it “does not consider it possible 
or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion private life.”19 This 
suggests that the term privacy is deliberately left broad and purposely has not 
been narrowed to one particular meaning. 
Article 17 of the ICCPR states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy.”20 This indicates a protection and thus the 
question becomes a protection of what? What is being protected through the right 
to privacy is demonstrated through the cases of the HRC and the ECtHR. They 
demonstrate that the right to privacy has been utilised to protect one’s 
autonomous right to become who they are. This includes the keys factors in 
becoming a moral being with a moral identity: autonomy, identity, personal 
                                                     
17 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) CCPR General Comment No 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy) 
- The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour 
and Reputation (1988). 
18 Coeriel et al v the Netherlands Human Rights Committee Communication 453/1991, 9 
December 1994 at [Appendix 2(a)]. 
19 Bensaid v the United Kingdom (2001–I No 44599/98) 6 February 2001 at [47]; Case of Van Kück 
v Germany (35968/97) 12 September 2003 at [69]; Case of Niemietz v Germany (13710/88) 16 
December 1992 at [9]. 
20 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 17. 
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development and relationships, the integrity of the person, and dignity.21 Jill 
Marshall has referred to this as developing jurisprudence on the concept of an 
autonomous identity.22 As will be seen through the case law, the role of the right 
to privacy is to protect the role of autonomy to shape and form who one is and 
how one comes to be.   
Central to the right to privacy is the protection of the integrity of being of one’s 
identity. Cases of the right to privacy arise when integrity is at stake. For example, 
as stated in the Case of X and Y v The Netherlands, issues of integrity arise where 
“fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake.”23 Integrity 
is autonomy over who one is and how one come to be. Without integrity, identity 
and being become instrumental values of little worth to human beings. 
First, the case law on the right to privacy highlights the importance of autonomy. 
An earlier connection to the right to autonomy over who one is and how one 
comes to be. A dissenting opinion in the Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The 
United Kingdom connected autonomy with private life in a case relating to the 
transition of transgender applicants and the importance of autonomy. The Judge 
wrote:24    
Thirdly, and most importantly, what is at stake here is the fundamental right to 
self-determination: if a person feels that he belongs to a sex other than the one 
originally registered and has undergone treatment to obtain the features of that 
other sex to the extent medically possible, he is entitled to legal recognition of 
the sex that in his conviction best responds to his identity. The right to self-
determination has not been separately and expressly included in the 
Convention, but is at the basis of several of the rights laid down therein, 
                                                     
21 Case of Van Kück v Germany, above n 19, at [69]. 
22 Jill Marshall Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law?: Autonomy, Identity and Integrity 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden; Boston, 
2009) at 104. 
23 Case of X and Y v The Netherlands (8978/80) 26 March 1985 at [27]. 
24 Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom (31-32/1997/815-816/1018-1019) 30 July 
1998 at [Dissenting Opinion-Judge van Dijk-5]. 
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especially the right to liberty under Article 5 and the right to respect for private 
life under Article 8.  
This was the first case connecting autonomy with the right to privacy. Autonomy 
is implicit in the ECHR in especially certain Articles including Article 5 and 8 as it is 
in the UDHR and the ICCPR. It was emphasised that at stake within this right is the 
“fundamental right to self-determination”. It underlines the importance of such 
an element in regard to the right to privacy. 
The same importance of autonomy was seen in a case of assisted dying. In the 
Case of Pretty v the United Kingdom, the Court held that:25     
although no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination 
as being contained in Article 8, the notion of personal autonomy is an important 
principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees.  
This case re-affirmed autonomy as a guarantee of the right to privacy. This was 
also supported in a later Case of Van Kück v Germany.26 These cases indicated that 
self-determination in the sense of autonomy was central to the right to privacy. 
This is supported by one of the main commentaries on the ICCPR. Manfred Nowak 
commented that “the right to privacy protects that particular area of individual 
existence and autonomy that does not reach upon the sphere of liberty and 
privacy of others.”27 This indicates that autonomy was an important principle 
within the right to privacy.  
The importance of autonomy in the right to privacy is there to enable the free and 
full development of personality. This includes the right to autonomously ‘establish 
details’ of who one is. This was indicated by the ECtHR. The ECtHR stated in the 
Case of Mikulić v Croatia that “respect for private life requires that everyone 
                                                     
25 Case of Pretty v The United Kingdom (2346/02) 29 April 2002 at [61]. 
26 Case of Van Kück v Germany, above n 19, at [69]. 
27 Nowak, above n 10, at 385. 
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should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings.”28 
These details are what it means to be who one is – one’s personality.  It is for this 
reason, the Court argues “that an individual's entitlement to such information is 
of importance because of its formative implications for his or her personality.”29 
Various cases have illustrated examples of details of what it means to establish 
one’s personality such as name, heritage, and sex which will be outlined in the 
following passages. Although one requires access to information and knowledge 
about such details for one’s development, the right to privacy is not about keeping 
details from public observation nor about being left alone. It is simply the 
autonomy over how one comes to be who one is - freely and fully developing one’s 
personality as a dignified being. The details are important as they give value, 
meaning and significance to the dignified being.  
A person’s name is one of the first identifying features in recognising someone. 
Having a word to call someone is crucial for social relations. In the modern world, 
this also becomes a legal necessity including some first name(s) and a family or 
surname. In Coeriel et al v The Netherlands, a case regarding the ability to change 
one’s surname, the Committee stated that “A person’s surname constitutes an 
important component of one’s identity.”30 Even the dissenting opinion of Mr 
Herndt concurred that a person’s name is an important part of one’s identity 
which is central to Article 17.31 In other words, a name, first or surname, is critical 
to one’s identity.  This case highlighted the importance of surnames, as with first 
names, to a person’s life. Although people do not usually choose their name as 
they are usually given (first names) and or inherited (surnames) at birth, most 
people retain the name given them. Having autonomy means the power to retain, 
                                                     
28 Case of Mikulić v Croatia (53176/99) 7 February 2002 at [54]. 
29 At [54]; refer also to: Case of Gaskin v the United Kingdom (10454/83) 7 July 1989 at [39]. 
30 Coeriel et al v the Netherlands, above n 18, at [10(2)]. 
31 At [Appendix 2(a)]. 
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to change or amend as suits the development of one’s personality. It is for this 
reason, the Court stated in that case:32   
A person’s surname constitutes an important component of one’s identity and 
that the protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy 
includes the protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference with the right 
to choose and change one’s own name. For instance, if a state were to compel 
all foreigners to change their surnames, this would constitute interference in 
contravention of article 17.   
The right to privacy includes the non-interference with the retaining or the 
changing of one’s name. This includes limiting what one’s name may be. The 
Committee in that case found:33 
The State party based its refusal of the request also to change their surnames on 
the grounds that the authors had not shown that the changes sought were 
essential to pursue their studies, that the names had religious connotations and 
that they were not 'Dutch sounding'. The Committee finds the grounds for so 
limiting the authors' rights under article 17 not to be reasonable. In the 
circumstances of the instant case the refusal of the authors' request was 
therefore arbitrary within the meaning of article 17, paragraph 1, of the 
Covenant. 
Although there may be reasonable grounds for certain limitations, as the above 
case demonstrated, such limitations should not be arbitrary. Limiting one’s name 
like any area of life is possible, but public grounds are related primarily to those 
that may cause harm to society such as indecency. Apart from that, the State has 
limited grounds by which to limit the ability for one to change a name, and in the 
above case, it was found unreasonable and arbitrary.  The state may demand to 
record one’s name or any changes to it, but not interfere with it within the 
reasonable limitations. One’s name, whether it is retained from birth or changed 
is critical to one’s free and full development of the human person.  
                                                     
32 At [10(2)]. 
33 At [10(5)]. 
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Sex is another detail of one’s life that is important to one’s free and full 
development of personality. It is strongly connected to who one is and in many 
senses important to the ability to live even socio-legally. Today, this is commonly 
referred to as gender. Sex and gender identity are “one of the most intimate areas 
of a person’s private life”34 and are intrinsic to who one is – one’s identity.35 Sexual 
identity has been developed within the ECtHR case law of Article 8.36 The 
dissenting Judge in the Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom 
highlights that one is “entitled to legal recognition of the sex that in his conviction 
best responds to his identity.”37 This indicates autonomy over one’s sex identity, 
rather than an immutable determinative sex. This is irrespective whether one’s 
assigned sex matches or not with who one is. It indicates the importance of having 
autonomy over their sex identity. In Bensaid v The United Kingdom,38   
The court has already held that elements such as gender identification, name 
and sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal 
sphere and protected by Article 8.  
This has been supported in other cases.39 No matter what one’s sex (identity) is or 
whether it changes over time, one must have autonomy over one’s sex. Sex, 
including one’s gender, is more than a biological determination, it is part of who 
one is as a moral being. Interference with one’s sex violates one’s right to privacy.  
                                                     
34 Case of Van Kück v Germany, above n 19, at [56]. 
35 Marshall, above n 22, at 95. 
36 At 104. 
37 Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom, above n 24, at [Dissenting Opinion-Judge 
van Dijk-5]. 
38 The applicant was attempting to appeal the immigration order of removal on the basis that it 
would cause him a relapse in his mental health and would amount to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. Bensaid v the United Kingdom, above n 19, at [47]. 
39 At [47]; Case of Van Kück v Germany, above n 19, at 69; Case of Pretty v The United Kingdom, 
above n 25, at [61]. 
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A further example is detail such as heritage in the development of one’s 
personality. Heritage is integrally interconnected with who one is and how one 
comes to be. This is illustrated in a case, Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v. 
France, of a hotel being built on ancestral burial grounds. In that case, it was 
considered that the “relationship to their ancestors [was] an essential element of 
their identity” and it played “an important role in their family life.”40 The 
Committee accepted that connections with ancestors, such as through traditional 
burial grounds are part of an individual’s identity.41 The connections with family, 
past and present, are bonds to their essence of being and essential to 
development. These bonds give value and meaning to one’s life. Ignoring or 
separating such bonds from one’s development interfere with the shaping of one’s 
being and forming or development of one’s personality and thus one’s right to 
privacy.  
One last example for the development of personality is the interconnectedness of 
relationality. This becomes important to human existence and development as a 
relational dignified being. Development is shaped in and through relationships 
whether alone or with others. No one exists or becomes in isolation. In this sense, 
relations are central to one’s dignity and development. Nowak in his commentary 
on the ICCPR wrote that the right to privacy views that autonomy may be exercised 
“alone or together with others.”42 It must, therefore, comprise the right to 
establish relationships with other human beings.43 The Human Rights Committee 
of the ICCPR in Coeriel et al v The Netherlands44     
                                                     
40 Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v France ICCPR Human Rights Committee Communication 
No 549/1993 (CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev1), 29 December 1997 at [10(3)]. 
41 At [10(3)]. 
42 Nowak, above n 10, at 388. 
43 Case of Mikulić v Croatia, above n 28, at [53]; Case of Niemietz v Germany, above n 19, at [29]. 
44 Coeriel et al v the Netherlands, above n 18, at [10(2)]. 
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considers that the notion of privacy refers to the sphere of a person’s life in 
which he or she can freely express his or her identity, be it entering into 
relationships with others or alone.   
This understanding was supported in Niemietz v Germany.45 The Court stated 
that46    
It would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an ‘inner circle’ in which the 
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom 
entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for 
private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings.  
This relationality includes the close and wider connections of people 
interconnected with one’s free and full development of one’s personality. In 
Bensaid v The United Kingdom, the Court reiterated the right to privacy protects 
the “right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world.”47 This connection with the outside world includes not only people 
but also with other things such as the land.48 Connections with others and the 
surrounding environment are critical to becoming who one is or the free and full 
development of one’s personality and a dignified being.  
Becoming who one is, and having the power and autonomy over how one comes 
to be, is essential and critical. It enables the free and full development of one’s 
personality which is the purpose of human rights. As is illustrated above, the right 
to privacy is not secrecy or keeping details from public observation and not about 
                                                     
45 This is a case regarding German law enforcement authorities searched the law office premises 
of the applicant to find the identity of someone who had written an insulting letter under a false 
name, which was a criminal offense in Germany. 
46 Case of Niemietz v Germany, above n 19, at [29]. 
47 Bensaid v the United Kingdom, above n 19, at 47; Case of Van Kück v Germany, above n 19, at 
[69]. 
48 See in relation to burial grounds, but this would also relate to ancestral land: Francis Hopu and 
Tepoaitu Bessert v France, above n 40. 
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being left alone, but it is about enabling the development of one’s being, the 
shaping of one’s life. As such, the ECtHR considers that the right to privacy protects 
the right to development.49 Joseph et al describe it as:50  
The sphere of individual autonomy has been described as the field of action 
[that] does not touch upon the liberty of others where one may withdraw from 
others, to shape one’s life according to one’s own egocentric wishes and 
expectations.  
This right to development, through the establishment of who one is,51 is important 
“because of its formative implications for his or her personality.”52 This connects 
the right to privacy back to the purpose of human rights the ‘free and full 
development of personality’. Development within the right to privacy enables one 
to form a dignified being.  
Central to the right to privacy is not only elements of being, but also the integrity 
of being. Integrity requires a moral being of esteem and respect (a set of 
principles) that in the face of challenge – such as non-favourable challenges or 
difficulty due to social hegemonic pressures – uphold one’s moral being for the 
right reasons.53 The right reasons are living one’s truthfulness – truthful to one’s 
being54 and being involved in the world truthfully55 – as an autonomous capable 
being – a dignified being. It is through integrity that one can exercise to the fullest 
                                                     
49 Odièvre v France (Application No 42326/98) 13 February 2003 at [29]; Bensaid v the United 
Kingdom, above n 19, at 47; Case of Van Kück v Germany, above n 19, at [69]. 
50 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 6, at 349. 
51 establish details of their identity as individual human beings 
52 Case of Mikulić v Croatia, above n 28, at [54]; refer also to: Case of Gaskin v the United 
Kingdom, above n 29, at [39]. 
53 This is a reworked definition of Lynne McFall’s definition of “integrity”. For her definition refer 
to: Lynne McFall “Integrity” (1987) 98 Ethics 5 at 9. 
54 This includes one’s physical, psychological, social and moral being. 
55 Richard N Williams “The Human Context of Agency” (1992) 47 American Psychologist 752 at 
757–758. 
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truthful social and moral participation.56 Any interference with one’s integrity 
devalues one’s being and thus one’s dignity.  
Integrity requires the protection of the interconnectedness of one’s being. This 
includes that of the physical, psychological, social, and sexual being. For example, 
the ECtHR indicated that integrity includes the person's physical, psychological, 
and sexual integrity and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical 
and social identity.57 Integrity requires autonomy over one’s being, including one’s 
body. The case of Y.F. v Turkey confirms that a person’s body is the most intimate 
aspect of private life.58 The body is an intimate part of one’s being and central to 
who one is, and so interfering with another’s body, affects their integrity of being. 
This is something that transgender and intersex people face. Their bodies are 
either prevented from treatment and change even with autonomous consent 
(transgender people) or forced sex normalisation treatment without their consent 
(intersex people). Either way this is interference with one’s autonomy over their 
intimate being and their integrity.  This interference can also occur within one’s 
socio-political life interfering with one’s intimate being. In the Case of Sheffield 
and Horsham v. The United Kingdom, the Court stated:59 
the applicants, just as much as Miss B., daily find themselves in a situation which, 
taken as a whole, is not compatible with their right to identity and to respect for 
their private life.  
The right to privacy clearly indicates that integrity is critical to the shaping of one’s 
being and identity. Interference with such integrity impacts on one’s autonomous 
                                                     
56 At 758. 
57 Case of Van Kück v Germany, above n 19, at [69]; Case of YF v Turkey (24209/94) 22 July 2003 
at [33]; Case of X and Y v The Netherlands, above n 23, at [22]; Case of Mikulić v Croatia, above n 
28, at [53]. 
58 Case of YF v Turkey, above n 57, at [33]. 
59 Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom, above n 24, at [Case of Sheffield and 
Horsham v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [3(c) Partly Dissenting Opinion-Judge Casadevall]. 
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being and the ability to develop a free and full personality. It prevents one from 
being true to oneself and who one is. It may also impact on one’s becoming.    
The purpose of the ‘right to privacy’ is the development of one’s personality and 
thus the revealing of one’s identity. As such, the ultimate goal or purpose of this 
right is one’s identity. This is described in a dissenting opinion in Coeriel et al v The 
Netherlands. Mr Herndt in that case stated that “privacy protects the special 
individual qualities of human existence and a person’s identity.”60 This is 
supported by a later case. In Odièvre v. France61 at the ECtHR, the Court stated 
that “Article 8 protects a right to identity.”62 At face value, the ‘individual qualities 
of human existence’ of a person’s identity’ could infer protection of immutable 
status characteristics of one’s personal identity, that is, the identity divested of 
one’s narrative identity as an immutable personal identity as described earlier.  
However, a joint dissenting opinion of Odièvre v. France took this even further. It 
stated:63  
We are firmly of the opinion that the right to an identity which is an essential 
condition of the right to autonomy and development is within the inner core of 
the right to respect for one’s private life.  
As such, identity and autonomy are inseparable and central to the free and full 
development of the dignified being. This indicates that the autonomy over one’s 
existence and development is not the maintenance of facts of what one is (a 
person of status identities), but the capability to become a moral being. 
Understood in the context of human rights, the right to privacy protects the 
identity of the person – a dignified being with the ability to freely and fully develop 
                                                     
60 Coeriel et al v the Netherlands, above n 18, at [Appendix 2(a)]. 
61 The applicant was attempting to retrieve information regarding her birth mother who had 
been allowed to remain anonymous under French law. The decision did not permit the breaking 
of the seal, but it did expounded important discussion on the right to identity.  
62 Odièvre v France, above n 49, at [29]. 
63 At [11]. 
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one’s personality. This indicates the narrative identity, not the divested immutable 
personal identity. As such, the right to privacy protects one’s right over autonomy 
and therefore over one’s existence meaning one has power over both who they 
are and how they come to be. 
Ultimately the purpose of the right to privacy returns to the foundation of human 
rights – dignity. Dignity is the basis upon why there is need for the protection of 
one’s identity and its free and full development (a narrative identity). The 
connection of dignity to the right of privacy is highlighted in the Case of Sheffield 
and Horsham v The United Kingdom where two transgender applicants bought 
issues under Article 8 of the ECHR (respect for their private life). The case 
highlights the in inhibition to the claimants’ narrative identity denying autonomy 
over who they are, as illustrated in this case, that autonomy over one’s sex – an 
interference with the dignity of being. In a dissenting opinion connecting 
autonomy to identity and its importance to the dignity of being through the righto 
privacy, the Judge wrote:64    
Moreover, it is a vital element of the “inherent dignity” which, according to the 
Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, constitutes the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 
Autonomy is a vital element of dignity. This highlighted that autonomy of who one 
is and how one comes to be – one’s identity – is central to one’s dignity. This 
wording is important as it highlights that autonomy and dignity are correlative. 
This was strengthened in a later transgender case. In the Case of Van Kück v. 
Germany the Court stated:65 
                                                     
64 Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom, above n 24, at [Dissenting Opinion-Judge 
van Dijk-5]. 
65 Case of Van Kück v Germany, above n 19, at [69]. 
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Moreover, the very essence of the Convention being respect for human dignity 
and human freedom, protection is given to the right of transsexuals to personal 
development and to physical and moral security.  
The foundation of human rights and its very essence is dignity. Dignity is critical to 
enable the right to privacy of the free and full development of personality – 
becoming who one is – as one’s narrative identity. Ultimately, the right to privacy 
concerns the upholding of one’s integrity of being to enable the free and full 
development of personality – a dignified being. This moves privacy away from the 
concept of ‘keeping details from public observation and not about being left 
alone’. Rather, it centres the right in the autonomous being developing a 
personality which results in an identity. As such, the right to privacy and its 
purpose (enabling development of personality) centre this right to the foundation 
of international human rights.  
5.2.2 Summary – Right to Privacy 
Privacy here is not about being left alone, separateness or secrecy. However, if 
there is a restriction on information, such as through secrecy, it impacts on 
relationality and the ability to author one’s being in and with others. This may 
apply to other parts of the Article, but through analysing the right to privacy in 
case law, secrecy would be counter-productive. The right to privacy is impacted by 
an isolated environment and it restricts the autonomous development of who one 
is and as such it affects one’s integrity.  
The right to privacy does not require a meaning as indicated by the HRC and the 
ECtHR. Rather, this right requires an understanding of what is protected from 
interference. If there was interference, it must be lawful, not be arbitrary, and be 
in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Conventions.66 The 
protection from interference certainly was not the normal elements often 
                                                     
66 Coeriel et al v the Netherlands, above n 18, at [10(4)]. 
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considered as they were already detailed in the article. Rather, as indicated from 
case law at the HRC and the ECtHR, it was a sphere, an area of being and becoming. 
This sphere included: autonomy, identity, personal development and 
relationships, the integrity of the person and dignity.67 This is summed up by two 
different cases. In Coeriel et al v. the Netherlands, the Committee stated that the68  
notion of privacy refers to the sphere of a person's life in which he or she can 
freely express his or her identity, be it by entering into relationships with others 
or alone.  
And, in a joint dissenting opinion of Odièvre v. France they stated:69  
We are firmly of the opinion that the right to an identity which is an essential 
condition of the right to autonomy and development is within the inner core of 
the right to respect for one’s private life.  
Privacy can thus be summed up as the protection of the very sphere in which the 
right to autonomous free and full development of one’s personality in integrity 
occurs be it by entering into relationships with others or alone as a dignified being. 
This reveals one’s narrative identity. This connects the right to privacy with the 
purpose and foundation of international human rights. It also provides protection 
from unlawful and overbearing control over such an identity.   
5.3 Shaping Moral Intersex Identity – Making Sense of Oneself 
The right to privacy on face value would seem an intriguing place to begin in 
human rights law to make sense of oneself and establish a moral identity. 
However, the case law has demonstrated that it is. This is centred around the 
integrity of being oneself and making sense of who one is. It argues that this 
provides for the right to establish details of their identity as individual human 
                                                     
67 Case of Van Kück v Germany, above n 19, at [69]. 
68 Coeriel et al v the Netherlands, above n 18, at [10(2)]. 
69 Odièvre v France, above n 49, at [11]. 
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beings (who they are) and for the development of themselves (how they come to 
be). This interconnects with the basis for international human rights. Dignity is the 
foundation of international human rights and is a state of being. Interference of 
or the violation of one’s sphere of becoming affects one’s moral being of self-
esteem and self-respect and inhibits one’s ability to live the accomplished life in 
and with others. Human rights and freedoms are there to enable one to return to 
the state of dignity as a moral being. In other words, all of the rights and freedoms 
must be interpreted for and according to this principle. 
In this case, the right to privacy is essential to a dignified being for an intersex 
person. They require the integrity so they can autonomously define who they are 
and shape how they come to be. The right to privacy provides the right to shape 
how an intersex person comes to be. Dignity is either enabled or disabled 
depending on the protection and enabling of one’s autonomous free and full 
development in integrity as a dignified being. As such, the right to privacy draws 
identity back to the first two chapters relating to identity to a narrative identity 
(one’s free and full development of personality) and a moral identity (the dignity 
of the human person). These two are inseparable. Alya Kahn articulates the 
importance of one’s narrative identity to making sense of one’s being. She 
writes:70  
“If my personal identity is a narrative identity then I make sense of myself (as 
opposed to simply referring to myself) only in and through my relation to others. 
I must achieve my selfhood – and this is dependent on the regard, words and 
actions of others, as well as on material conditions. So I am a social being, and a 
being that finds myself in the world of experiences, telling the story of my life, 
along with other story tellers. I articulate my story in language, and in so doing I 
bear witness to who I am both to myself and others. But my narrative is never 
complete, it’s never the whole story – it is always in the process of becoming 
what it is. It’s therefore, always open to change and development.”  
                                                     
70 Alya Khan “Using Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another: Narrative Identity, Gender and Relational 
Autonomy” (paper presented to Thinking Gender - The Next Generation, United Kingdom, 2006) 
at 14. 
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Relationality is central to making sense of oneself. Becoming is dependent upon 
one’s and others’ capabilities as well as on material conditions. This is 
encompassed within a narrative identity which is never competing and always 
open to development and is transformable. Such an identity contrasts with the 
immutable identity that one simply ‘refers back to’. It is not relational and has a 
pre-determined story to it.  
The article indicates the importance of defining who one is and how one comes to 
be for one self – one’s own good life. This is reflected in Anne Becker’s writing 
when she says: “They were free to define themselves in the equality of their 
difference by who they were by confessing their individual autobiographies.”71 
Moreover, Kim Atkins writes that our lives must be “taken as one’s own and 
integrated into one’s identity and self-understanding.”72 This was clearly 
illustrated in the Case of Sheffield and Horsham v. The United Kingdom, the Court 
argued, referring to the case of a transgender person, that this was not an issue of 
“minorities, but rather as one of privacy: everyone’s right to live one’s life as one 
chooses without interference.”73 In the Case of Christine Goodwin and the United 
Kingdom, The Court wrote:74  
Under Article 8 of the Convention in particular, where the notion of personal 
autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its 
guarantees, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, 
including the right to establish details of their identity as individual human 
beings.  
                                                     
71 Anne Becker “Identity Premised on Equality of Difference as a Fundamental Human Right” in 
Cornelia Roux (ed) Safe Spaces (Sense Publishers, 2012) 83 at 86. 
72 Kim Atkins Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015) Ricoeur, Paul 
<http://www.iep.utm.edu/ricoeur/>. 
73 Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom, above n 24, at [Dissenting Opinion-Judge 
van Dijk-2]. 
74 Case of Christine Goodwin v The United Kingdom (28957/95) 11 July 2002 at [90]. 
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The right to privacy is the protection of the private sphere to enable one to 
establish a sense of who they are as a human being and this includes one’s sex.  
However, as yet, this is not a right afforded to the majority of intersex people. 
Their sense of physical, and psychological being has been interfered with 
restricting this ability granted to them through this right. Due to the socio-legal 
structures, Ghattas writes that75   
It is barely possible to develop an identity as a person (e.g. inter*woman or man) 
with an intersex body that has a right to remain unmodified, even if the 
respective individual so wishes.   
The interference with one’s body and psychology inhibits development and sense 
of being. As indicated in the Case of Affaire A.P., Garçon et Nicot v. France, 
interference with one’s bodily integrity such as sterilisation or in the case of 
intersex people sex-normalising treatment breaches the guarantee of the right to 
privacy.76 This interference denies intersex people the ability to develop a sense 
of being as to who they are, not only due to the assigned sex but as to the other 
issues to do with that assigned socialised sex including the effects of the sex-
normalising treatment. Cabral continues by saying:77 
I want to tell you a story of how prejudices about how bodies should be sexed or 
gendered can lead to the surgical mutilation of children…These mutilating 
                                                     
75 Dan Christian Ghattas Human Rights between the Sexes - a Preliminary Study on the Life 
Situations of Inter*Individuals (Volume 34 2013) at 17–18. 
76 This has been translated from the French version of the case: "Partant, le rejet de la demande 
des deuxième et troisième requérants tendant à la modification de leur état civil au motif qu’ils 
n’avaient pas établi le caractère irréversible de la transformation de leur apparence, c’est-à-dire 
démontré avoir subi une opération stérilisante ou un traitement médical entrainant une très 
forte probabilité de stérilité, s’analyse en un manquement par l’État défendeur à son obligation 
positive de garantir le droit de ces derniers au respect de leur vie privée. Il y a donc, de ce chef, 
violation de l’article 8 de la Convention à leur égard.": Affaire AP, Garçon et Nicot v France 
(equêtes nos 79885/12, 52471/13 et 52596/13) 6 April 2017 at [135]. 
77 Mauro Cabral “ILGA - UN 2004 - NGO statement: Intersexuality” (27 May 2004) International 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Intersex Association <http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/61>. 
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surgeries, aimed at transforming intersex bodies into culturally acceptable ones, 
violate our autonomy of decision as well as our bodily integrity.  
They are denied the ability to be protagonists in their own story. They have been 
forced to live a life not of their own making in a sex that may or may not match 
who they are and a physical and psychological integrity that has been interfered 
with. The secrecy and shame around intersex people and their lives deny them the 
ability to author their lives. The very denial to the right to autonomy over their sex 
and one’s sex becoming in how it shapes one’s life affects the very sphere which 
is protected by the right to privacy. As such, this violates the right to privacy.  
Moreover, the right to privacy is not about efficiency, group status or any other 
matter. It is about the autonomous development of one’s identity. This 
development is referred to in the IBOR as the ‘free and full development of 
personality’. This includes one’s physical, mental or psychological and spiritual 
development. The fact intersex people only make up a small population, does not 
weaken their argument.78 The claim to the free and full development as a dignified 
being is universal for everyone.  
Intersex people have been denied this ability to free and full development. The 
very actions performed and the process in do so denies and even violates their 
ability to develop that most people take for granted. Dan Ghattas wrote, they79   
“are, for the most part, denied the development of a gender identity of their 
own which may be located between the socially dominant bipolar sex/gender 
model of male or female.”  
                                                     
78 Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom, above n 24, at [Dissenting Opinion-Judge 
van Dijk-2]. 
79 Ghattas, above n 75, at 7. 
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The enforcement of sex status which is so entrenched in society has impacted 
severely on intersex people. They have lives, but their self-esteem and self-respect 
have been diminished. Mauro Cabral writes:80  
“Medical secrecy also violates our right to identity, to our personal history and 
to our status as subjects entitled to all human rights, protagonists and not victims 
of our own history.” 
As subjects of human rights, intersex people have been deprived of the basic 
human capacity to narrate their lives within their own history. They are writing a 
history on their body of a life that is not theirs.  
Ultimately, the right to privacy concerns one’s dignity, the foundation of human 
rights. The result of one’s dignity is dependent upon the ability for personal 
development and also physical and moral security.81 The denial of the 
autonomous ability to write one’s own story and freely develop within it denies 
one the state of dignity. As autonomy and dignity are correlative, when autonomy 
is denied to intersex people over who they are and how they come to be, they are 
also denied dignity.  
This dignity is critical to the development of their being. However, as indicated 
earlier, well-being is an indicator of dignity. If well-being has been impacted, then 
it also impacts on one’s dignity. As indicated in this chapter, there has been a 
devastating impact on many intersex people’s life and well-being. As will be seen 
in the next chapter, this impact denies the right to privacy and impacts on the very 
foundation of human rights – the dignity of the human person.  
 
                                                     
80 Cabral, above n 77. 
81 Case of Van Kück v Germany, above n 19, at [69]. 
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CHAPTER 6: WELL-BEING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF DIGNIFIED BEING 
6  
The right to privacy on face value would seem an intriguing place to begin in 
human rights law to make sense of oneself and establish a moral identity. 
However, the case law has demonstrated otherwise. In the last chapter, privacy 
was summed up as “the very sphere in which the right to autonomy and (free and 
full) development of one’s (personality) identity occurs be it by entering into 
relationships with others or alone through the integrity as a dignified being.” In 
other words, the right to privacy is critical to the integrity of being oneself and 
making sense of who one is. As the last chapter indicated, the right to privacy 
provides protection for the becoming who one is – one’s moral identity. Dignity 
and integrity protect the autonomy of who one is and also over how one comes to 
be. It is through this that one’s narrative identity is written and revealed as a 
temporal singularity of personal identity.  
The dignity of being infers human flourishing which is indicated through one’s 
state of well-being. However, as indicated at the end of the last chapter, intersex 
people do not have such an ability to freely and fully develop their personality.  As 
Dan Ghattas writes, “It is barely possible to develop an identity as a person (e.g. 
inter*woman or man) with an intersex body that has a right to remain 
unmodified.”1 This indicates that the right to privacy has been interfered with at 
the very least, and at most denied.  Their dignity of being is impaired. Maural 
Cabral continues by saying that the mutilation of intersex bodies “transforming 
intersex bodies into culturally acceptable ones, violate our autonomy of decision 
as well as our bodily integrity.”2 This inhibits the human flourish of intersex people 
                                                     
1 Dan Christian Ghattas Human Rights between the Sexes - a Preliminary Study on the Life 
Situations of Inter*Individuals (Volume 34 2013) at 17–18. 
2 Mauro Cabral “ILGA - UN 2004 - NGO statement: Intersexuality” (27 May 2004) International 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Intersex Association <http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/61>. 
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affecting their well-being. The secrecy and shame around intersex people and 
their lives deny them the ability to author their lives. This violates the right to 
privacy.  
This chapter focuses on well-being as the basis of dignity as human flourishing as 
illustrated through the issues of intersex people. It defines how the level of 
flourishing or accomplished life is seen through one’s well-being. A dignified being 
indicates a life which is good for them, developing as a sex whether it be male, 
female, both or neither in a way that is good for them. But for intersex people, this 
is not usually the case. As such, this chapter highlights some of the key issues are 
rights to life, health, and being free from torture and ill-treatment. This affects 
their well-being, and thus inhibits their human flourishing.  
6.1 Dignity through Flourishing and the State of Well-being 
This first section will refresh the connections between dignity, human flourishing 
and well-being. These three are not only essential for an individual but also for the 
community. The flourishing of a community is diminished when the flourishing of 
one or more of its members are inhibited. By improving the well-being for each 
member enhances the well-being of the community at large and enables the 
greatest potential of human flourishing. It is through well-being that one is 
enabled to pursue human flourishing and be a dignified being.  
The state of dignity infers human flourishing and well-being. According to Jan 
Mårtenson, the core meaning of ‘being’ within the international human rights 
regime refers to the “truths of human nature and the requirements of human 
dignity.”3 Summing up from earlier chapters, dignity refers to the intrinsic worth 
                                                     
3 Jan Mårtenson “The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Human 
Rights Programme” in Asbjørn Eide and others (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
a commentary (Scandinavian University Press, Oslo : Oxford, 1992) at 21. 
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of a human being.4 It incorporates “esteem, deference, a proper regard for, 
recognition of’5 human beings. This dignity reflects one’s physical existence, 
intellectual and spiritual dimensions.6 This dignity is the moral value (or worth) of 
one’s being7 based on one’s humanity, not status, position or other factors 
including or other cultural interests.  
Having dignity infers human flourishing. Human flourishing is living the 
accomplished life for both an individual and the community. It is the highest 
human good as recognised through Aristotelian philosophy. As human flourishing 
is the goal, the achieving of the accomplished life, as Richard Kraut writes, requires 
a “fuller understanding of what it is to flourish.”8 Using Aristotelian philosophy, 
Erik Ostenfeld provides a definition of human flourishing. He writes:9  
“The flourishing man or woman to Aristotle is a person who is well-adapted and 
well-functioning socially and psychologically, and who lives a rich life in the sense 
that he or she uses all human potentialities, i.e. not restricted to immediate 
pleasure seeking from e.g. television watching, beer-drinking and easy sex, and 
not even more calculated pleasure seeking, but involving intellect and feelings 
that are special to man.”   
                                                     
4 Oscar Schachter “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept” (1983) 77 The American Journal of 
International Law 848 at 849. 
5 At 849. 
6 Mårtenson, above n 3, at 21; Johann Neethling “Personality Rights: A Comparative Overview” 
(2005) 38 Comp & Int’l LJ S Afr 210 at 210; Merriam-Webster Merriam-Webster.com (online ed, 
2015) Personality <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/personality>; Oxford 
Dictionaries (online ed, 2015) Personality 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/personality>. 
7 David Mattson and Susan Clark “Human Dignity in Concept and Practice” (2011) 44 Policy 
Sciences 303 at 310. 
8 Richard Kraut “Aristotle’s Ethics” in Edward N Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(spring 2016 ed, 2016). 
9 Erik Ostenfeld “Aristotle on the Good Life and Quality of Life” in Lennart Nordenfelt (ed) 
Concepts and Measurement of Quality of Life in Health Care (Springer Netherlands, 1994) 19 at 
31. 
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Flourishing is one who is well-adapted and well-functioning socially and 
psychologically with a full rich life aiming to and using one’s potentialities. It is not 
centred on short term pleasures. Human flourishing is predicated on the reasoned 
reflection, action, and actualising of one’s own potentials.10 It requires the 
cultivation and exercising of virtues that include personal growth, autonomy, and 
self-acceptance.11 The focus is on reaching a richer sense of life, and thus not 
focusing on short-term pleasures, of autonomously becoming who one is. 
Flourishing is a “life marked by contentment; doing well and living well.”12 In other 
words, human flourishing is indicated through well-being or it is a barometer of 
the human flourishing of a dignified being. It indicates whether the state of the 
dignified being is enhanced or diminished. Mattson and Clark explain dignity as “a 
condition signified by a sense of contentment, satisfaction, and wellness as an 
integrative evaluation of lives and circumstances.”13 The purpose is to remain in a 
dignified state of being. When such a state is inhibited, interfered with, diminished 
or even denied, there is a loss of dignity. The goal is to remedy the issue and to 
return one to the state of dignity. By understanding one’s well-being, it is possible 
to determine one’s state of dignity.  
Well-being is commonly thought of as physical and psychological health issues, but 
it includes far more than that.14 It is an objective state, a barometer, of one’s 
flourishing. John Eekelaar writes, including15   
                                                     
10 Dana S Dunn and Clint Brody “Defining the Good Life following Acquired Physical Disability” 
(2008) 53 Rehabilitation Psychology 413 at 414. 
11 At 414. 
12 At 414. 
13 Mattson and Clark, above n 7, at 313–314. 
14 Jill Marshall Human Rights Law and Personal Identity (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, 
NY, 2014) at 42. 
15 John Eekelaar “Personal Rights and Human Rights” (2002) 2 Hum Rts L Rev 181 at 185. 
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“physical and mental health, the opportunity to establish and maintain 
important relationships, the ability to benefit from educational, social, and 
economic activity, to integrate into society and to achieve life plans.”  
This thought has very traditional roots. Many traditional societies have a wide 
conceptual view of well-being. Vicki Grieves describes well-being as not just 
physical well-being, but16  
“the social, emotional, and cultural wellbeing of the whole community in which 
each individual is able to achieve their full potential as a human being, thereby 
bringing about total wellbeing of their community.”   
Well-being can be summarised as the physical, social, mental/emotional, and 
cultural ability of each individual to achieve their full potential, their life plans, as 
a human being, thereby bringing about total wellbeing of their community.17 As 
such, well-being is key to flourishing.18 It is key to the enabling autonomy over who 
one is and how one comes to be.  
As Joseph Raz stated, “a person enjoys a high degree of well-being if his life is good 
in a way which is good for him.”19 It is through everyone being in a state of well-
being that brings about the well-being of the community. Well-being “includes 
physical and mental health, the ability to establish and maintain important 
personal relationships, the ability to benefit from educational social and economic 
activity, to integrate into society and to achieve life plans.”20 Well-being is the key 
                                                     
16 Vicki Grieves “What is Indigenous Wellbeing?” in Joseph Selwyn Te Rito (ed) Mātauranga 
Taketake - Traditional Knowledge: Indigenous Indicators of Well-being: Perspectives, Practices, 
Solutions, 2006 (Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga, Auckland, NZ, 2007) at 109. 
17 Eekelaar, above n 15, at 185; Grieves, above n 16, at 109. 
18 Marshall, above n 14, at 220. 
19 Joseph Raz The Morality of Freedom (reprinted ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2009) at 270. 
20 Eekelaar, above n 15, at 185. 
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to a flourishing life21 and as such, it becomes a barometer of a flourishing life of 
individuals and communities.  
The above understanding of well-being is not foreign to international human 
rights. Well-being covers all of the aspects that relate to well-being and 
development of one’s personality. It is encapsulated throughout the rights and 
freedoms but is highlighted within some articles of the IBOR. The UDHR articulated 
this as:22    
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”  
This was transferred to several articles in the ICESCR: the right to social security in 
Article 9, the right to an adequate standard of living in Article 11(1), and the right 
to health and well-being in Article 12. Article 11(1) of the ICESCR incorporates the 
right to the adequate standard of living. It states:23   
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 
The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this 
right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-
operation based on free consent. 
This covered the basics of subsistence living or that which is required to maintain 
a basic quality of life. The adequate standard of living was incorporated in the 
                                                     
21 Marshall, above n 14, at 220. 
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly 217 A (III) (adopted May 1948, 
entered into force 10 December 1948), Art. 25(1). 
23 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2200 A (XXI) Resolution 2200 A (XXI) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
3 January 1976), Art. 11(1). 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as “States Parties recognize the right 
of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral and social development.”24 This interconnects adequate living with 
that of well-being.  
Article 12 incorporates the right to health and well-being stating that: “the right 
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health.”25 Health in this article did not refer to the restricted sense of 
disease, but the wider sense of well-being. This understanding was replicated in 
the Constitution of the World Health Organisation (WHO)26 that states:27 “Health 
is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity.” This has also been confirmed by Paul Hunt, the 
UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health in 2004. He wrote in regards to 
sexual health that health is “a state of physical, emotional, mental and social well-
being related to sexuality, not merely the absence of disease, dysfunction, or 
infirmity.”28 This has been encapsulated within the General Comment on the Right 
to Health. It encompasses a wide scope of the right to Health. It notes:29  
The right to health is not to be understood as a right to be healthy. The right to 
health contains both freedoms and entitlements. The freedoms include the right 
to control one’s health and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, 
and the right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from 
                                                     
24 Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN General Assembly Resolution 44/25 (adopted 20 
November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990), Art. 27(1). 
25 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 12(1). 
26 UN Secretary-General Document A/2929: Annotations on the Text of the Draft International 
Covenants on Human Rights (Agenda 28-10th Session 1955) at 111. 
27 World Health Organisation “Constitution of WHO: principles” WHO 
<http://www.who.int/about/mission/en/>. 
28 Paul Hunt and Special Rapporteur The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health (E/CN4/2004/49 2004) at 8; Sonia Corrêa, 
Rosalind P Petchesky and Richard G Parker Sexuality, Health and Human Rights (Routledge, 
London, 2008) at 212. 
29 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) CESCR General Comment No 
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art 12) (2000) E/C12/2000/4 at [8]. 
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torture, non-consensual medical treatment and experimentation. By contrast, 
the entitlements include the right to a system of health protection which 
provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level 
of health. 
Both Articles 11(1) and !2(1) of the ICESCR refer to and interconnect through well-
being. They indicate back to the core raison d'être of international human rights 
the free and full development of the dignified human being. Core to one’s well-
being is the human capabilities that enable one to be worthy of esteem and 
respect through one’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social spheres. Any 
diminishing or restriction on well-being affects one’s autonomy in becoming in 
becoming who one is. In other words, autonomy enhances well-being.30  
Rights are often considered protect the interests of the rights-holder.31 John 
Eekelaar argued that though this be true, he “would refer to the well-being rather 
than the interests of the rights-holder.”32 For intersex people, their well-being as 
a rights-holder has been affected by many other areas including that of health, 
housing, social security, employment and more. However, there are two central 
issues of well-being that limit their ability and power over who they are and how 
they come to be. There are two prongs relating to health and the prevention of 
torture and ill-treatment:33    
“(i) avoiding involuntary and unconsented treatment and interventions that 
have negative lifelong consequences to their physical and mental health, (ii) 
having access to general health services that are appropriate, adequate and 
respectful of their bodily diversity.”  
                                                     
30 Marshall, above n 14, at 42; Eekelaar, above n 15, at 185; Valery Chirkov and others 
“Differentiating Autonomy from Individualism and Independence: A Self-determination Theory 
Perspective on Internalization of Cultural Orientations and Well-being” (2003) 84 Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 97 at 97, 106. 
31 Eekelaar, above n 15, at 185. 
32 At 185. 
33 Commissioner for Human Rights and Silvan Agius Human Rights and Intersex People (2015) at 
32. 
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They desire well-being like all other human beings, but they do not want forced 
impositions of what their sex should be unless they decide it is what is best for 
them. This requires them to decide what health means to them and have access 
to necessary information and services that enable their health and well-being. It 
also requires that they must not undergo any treatment in regards to sex-
normalising procedures unless they consent or it is life-threatening. Without their 
consent, such treatment has the possibility to be considered as torture and ill-
treatment which is prohibited even in times of emergency. These desires of well-
being are opposite to what occurs generally around the world. Due to the forced 
treatment upon the majority of the intersex people, they have a reduced ability to 
live in well-being. There have been numerous reports and case studies 
demonstrating the ill-effects and the long-term effects of the sex-normalising 
treatments. This has been physical, psychological, and sexual.  
6.2 Health 
Health is central to well-being. However, one must be careful not to restrict this 
concept to that of a biomedical term – the absence of disease. Health is ensuring 
that one has an environment that is supportive of and enhances well-being. These 
demands knowledge and education and access records to give them power over 
their health. Research and data must be managed in such a way not to diminish 
people’s autonomy while still promoting health and well-being. It is also required 
that the individual have power and autonomy over what happens to them and not 
parents or medical professionals except in cases of emergency, in particular when 
it relates to parts of their health such as their sex of which the procedures will 
have life-long impacts.  When intersex people are claiming the right to health, they 
are in effect claiming the wider context relating more to well-being. They desire 
control over how they are and how they come to be. Improving well-being must 
be responsive to the needs of the individual concerned. Research and data should 
be for well-being, of a flourishing society. This indicates that it should be 
autonomy-centred. Finally, non-disease issues should be pathologised to return 
dignity to one’s being.  
299 
 
6.2.1 Responsive to Needs 
Despite the negative effects that many intersex people have faced within the 
medical system, they do not reject the system completely. They demand like all 
people a system that is responsive to them and their needs rather than a 
paternalistic system. Although they are purportedly done for well-intended 
reasons or benevolence, they actually have no medical or therapeutic purpose.34  
The Report on Torture stated that “health-care providers must be cognisant of, 
and adapt to, the specific needs of lesbian, gay, transgender, and intersex 
people.”35 It is not sufficient just to provide a system, but it must be suitable to 
the population. Moreover, it must be provided on an equal basis as others. The 
World Health Organisation has recently stated:36    
“States parties’ obligations to respect the right to health requires that they 
abstain from imposing discriminatory practices. This includes an obligation to 
respect the rights of … intersex persons, who also have the right to retain their 
fertility and the right to have access to sterilization and other family planning 
services on an equal basis with others.”  
Intersex people have a right to resources as others and on an equal basis. Access 
to health services should not be according to discriminatory basis such as on a 
binary basis. Intersex people have a need that includes both male and female 
aspects which may not always be sided one way or the other. Equality and access 
to health also include that of fertility and reproduction which is essential to a 
person’s future development.37 Any treatment without their consent may lead to 
                                                     
34 Erik Schneider An Insight into Respect for the Rights of Trans and Intersex Children in Europe 
(2013) at [144, 145]. 
35 Juan E Méndez and Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (A/HRC/22/53 2013) at [38]. 
36 World Health Organisation Eliminating Forced, Coercive and Otherwise Involuntary Sterilization 
(An Interagency Statement OHCHR, UN Women, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO 2014) 
at 10–12. 
37 Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 33, at 32. 
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interference with their fertility and reproduction, even if there may only be a slim 
chance. Each person must have the right to how they see sexual and reproductive 
health, as an autonomous decision, not one forced upon them.   
Central to any health system is access to medical records. Although these are held 
by institutions, the information equally belongs to the individual concerned. Many 
intersex people have noted the withholding of records, or in some cases the 
destruction of records.38 Mauro Cabral writes that in general, as intersex people,39    
[we] are not told about the surgeries performed on us during our early 
childhood, or we receive misleading information about it. We do not often have 
access to our medical records: they are hidden or destroyed. 
The WHO noted the issue in its report on sterilisation. The report stated 
“Censoring, withholding, or intentionally misrepresenting information about 
sterilization can put health and basic human rights in jeopardy.”40 However, 
withholding or destroying records does more than putting health in jeopardy. It 
impinges on one’s dignity as a human being as with intersex people. Furthermore, 
it prevents the free and full development of personality as fundamental to 
international human rights. The locking of such information by whatever means 
inhibits the right to privacy and therefore also violates that right including one’s 
right to autonomy and integrity.  
Responsive and supportive health systems would be knowledgeable and accepting 
of the diversity of sex. This includes expertise and services available. This expertise 
should include multidisciplinary teams that have the knowledge and expertise to 
enable intersex people.41 Where centres are small, they should have the ability to 
                                                     
38 Ghattas, above n 1, at 15. 
39 Cabral, above n 2. 
40 World Health Organisation, above n 36, at 10. 
41 Senate Community Affairs References Committee and Australian Government Involuntary or 
Coerced Sterilisation of Intersex People in Australia (2013) at 73. 
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use technology to interact with such teams. These teams are for the good life of 
the individual and not for the social good. These teams should operate in 
accordance with a human rights framework, in particular, focusing on the 
individual’s autonomy and consent. The Report on Involuntary or Coerced 
Sterilisation of Intersex People in Australia recommended:42    
 “The committee recommends that all medical treatment of intersex people take 
place under guidelines that ensure treatment is managed by multidisciplinary 
teams within a human rights framework. The guidelines should favour deferral 
of normalising treatment until the person can give fully informed consent, and 
seek to minimise surgical intervention on infants undertaken for primarily 
psychosocial reasons.”  
These teams are there to enable, not disable one’s development inclusive of 
health as articulated in the right to health. These medical teams are not there to 
shape an intersex person’s life, but support them if they need their support and 
service.  
Important in the health and well-being of intersex children and adults is the 
supportive and accepting community. For a new born, health and well-being 
require a supportive enabling environment including a supportive, caring, and 
accepting family. This may involve the counselling of those caring for and 
surrounding intersex children with education and an understanding regarding the 
diversity of sex and its needs. This aids in the free and full development of the 
young infant and helps to avoid stigma and help the family with an understanding 
of their new child’s diversity. An advocate group argues that “a focus on family 
counselling rather than surgical options, and supported changes to the basis on 
which medical management of intersex is approached.”43  Erik Schneider writes 
that “a major campaign should be run to raise awareness about the existence of 
intersex children in a society polarised by the gender dichotomy and it is important 
                                                     
42 At xiii. 
43 At 70. 
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to devise specific parenting aids.”44 This will help prevent negative effects and 
enable the child to adjust positively in the society as who they are as an intersex 
child without having to undergo sex-normalising treatment unless they choose to 
later in life.   
6.2.2 Research and Data 
There are several issues relating to data on intersex people. The first issue relates 
to getting data on intersex people. The estimated size of the population and the 
actual population do not match. Erik Schneider highlights in his report the issue of 
doing research to support the needs of intersex people:45  
“With regard to research on intersex people themselves, there is a 
methodological problem which should be highlighted. Given that a large number 
of people do not know that they may be considered intersex because of the 
incomplete information given to them by doctors, it is difficult to establish 
contact with them”  
Moreover, Dan Ghattas reported that46    
The amount of data available on individual countries for this preliminary study 
depends on the efforts of NGOs to collect cases and identify the number of 
cases.”  
 As most intersex people do not even know they are intersex, there are 
methodological issues in finding people to do research.47 This leaves main subjects 
of research of any kind are those who have ‘come out’ or publicly acknowledged 
themselves as intersex. 
                                                     
44 Schneider, above n 34, at [177]. 
45 At [208]; Referring to: SM Creighton and LM Liao “Changing Attitudes to Sex Assignment in 
Intersex” (2004) 93 BJU International 659. 
46 Ghattas, above n 1, at 15. 
47 Schneider, above n 34, at [208]. 
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Medical research that is done has bias due to populations size. This type of bias 
was noted in the Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of Intersex People in Australia 
inquiry report:48  
Study bias or methodological problems are frequently encountered. Studies may 
experience poor patient participation or low numbers because these disorders 
are so rare. Selection bias is likely to be problematic because of the rare 
prevalence of the conditions or of the complexities of accruing research subjects. 
This limited access to data affects intersex people who do not know about 
themselves and also the ability for health systems to be responsive to intersex 
people’s needs.  
However, the major issue is relating not only to intersex but biomedical research 
in general. There are two major flaws that affect biomedical research today. The 
first is the bias on subjects by only recognising two sexes and excluding variation 
of sex.49 The second assumption is that the assigned sex at birth is congruent with 
all of the ‘biological factors’. Unless this is checked, it would leave the results 
questionable.  Due to these assumptions, from which most biomedical studies are 
done, it leaves the real validity in debate and the true usefulness for health open 
to question. The results leave the possibility of a distorted picture of society. 
Furthermore, it excludes the possibility of critical information that intersex people 
may need help to explain for their health and well-being. The standardising of 
groups to male and female restricts the ability of health systems to support well-
being. This is especially true for intersex people who are looking for services and 
resources suitable for who they are and not what they should be. 
Despite the fact of doing such normalising treatment for well over 60 years, there 
has been no solid evidence or medical data on its benefits to intersex people, and 
                                                     
48 Senate Community Affairs References Committee and Australian Government, above n 41, at 
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as such it remains experimental,50 even stated by the medical associations 
themselves.51 There is a “striking lack of independent quantitative and qualitative 
research worldwide.52 Despite the continued recommendation and use as a 
standard of care for most intersex variations, there has been little research 
undertaken in this area. Creighton et al state that this includes the lack of data not 
only concerns of medical treatment, such as guidance for best timing and surgical 
approach but also non-medical dimensions of intersex life.53 Medical professionals 
have carried out few, if any, long-term studies of the effects on their patients. The 
medical respondents in the Australian Report admitted that:54      
“Current international guidelines recommend long-term follow-up of children 
with DSD who have early surgery. This does not occur in Australia, as there is no 
co-ordinated registry regarding the management and outcomes for people with 
DSD.”  
This was also reflected in Erik Schneider’s report:55  
“There is also a need to take stock of the normalising surgery and hormone 
treatment being carried out in Europe and its long-term effects. Such studies 
should be centred on the perception of their treatment by the persons 
concerned and not just on that of their doctors.” 
                                                     
50 Senate Community Affairs References Committee and Australian Government, above n 41, at 
[6(2)]; Sarah Creighton and others “Timing and Nature of Reconstructive Surgery for Disorders of 
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Creighton et al also state that there “is little obvious moves towards a global 
programme of research.”56 Most research that has been done is on the 
methodology and quality of surgery.  Despite treatment being performed for so 
long, the medical professionals do not appear concerned with the quality of life 
due to non-necessary cosmetic surgery. Although little research has been done by 
medical professionals and the groups doing the treatment, there have been some 
done by sociologists and advocate and human rights groups. The studies and 
reports have indicated serious and life-long effects as noted by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO).57  
Research is important for the well-being of intersex people, but the incorporating 
of sex diversity in general research could also benefit all of society. However, any 
further research, as Erik Schneider states, must:58  
“Because of the lack of widespread knowledge on the subject, it is imperative 
that such studies: (1) adopt a participatory approach involving intersex 
organisations with long experience in the field; (2) be independent from the 
medical community so as to guarantee that the information collected is not 
biased; and (3) be devised outside the gender dichotomy framework as, 
otherwise, intersex children could effectively be excluded from them or there is 
a risk that their situation will not be properly reflected.”  
It must allow the participant, such as the intersex person, be participatory and 
have a voice. To improve well-being, taking account of the above factors are 
critical if health and well-being are to mean something for whose life it is.  
6.2.3 Depathologising  
Finally, well-being requires medical support for biomedical issues such as disease. 
Having intersex variations in itself is not a disease. there is no health issue from 
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58 Schneider, above n 34, at [210]. 
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being a sex not recognised. That is a social issue that needs socio-legal change. 
There are some rare diseases connected with a few intersex variations. Dr Susan 
Stred, a professor of paediatrics, said there are “two rare instances where surgery 
is required:59  
“One is where the internal organs are on the outside of the body as if they were 
turned inside out. And the other one would be to ensure there is a way for urine 
to leave the body. Any other surgery on the external genitalia of a new born is 
cosmetic surgery and is not medically necessary.”  
Any surgery outside of this is not necessary and can wait until the child is old 
enough to make informed decisions on their own. This includes all forms of 
cosmetic surgery on genitals or any removal of gonads.   
The making of intersex as an abnormality, even a pathology, means they are 
treated as something abnormal or as a disease.60 This marks them as a disease and 
not a human being with sex variations. As such it becomes discriminatory. For 
example, a male is not considered as a disease simply because he is a man. He is 
simply a man. So why is an intersex person considered a disease just to make them 
a man or woman? Furthermore, normalising surgery presupposes that there is an 
abnormality in need of correction.61 It marks intersex variations as a disease, an 
abnormality. Such marking can cause discrimination as well as stigmatisation. The 
presence of intersex variations has marked the presence of disease and 
abnormality, rather than variation. 62 This is despite the fact, in most cases, no 
                                                     
59 Human Rights Watch and InterACT “US: End Irreversible Genital Surgeries on Intersex Infants” 
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medical intervention is required.63 This stigmatises intersex, and due to the 
normalising and concealing of records makes intersex invisible.  
To improve health and well-being for intersex people, intersex variations must be 
depathologised. Prior to 2006, they were referred to as intersex disorders, but that 
name was changed from intersex disorders, to ‘disorders of sexual development’ 
or (DSD) after a 2006 professionals of the Endocrine Society decided on the 
‘Consensus Statement on the management of Intersex Disorders’.64 Although 
there may be sometimes an associated health condition, the intersex variations 
themselves are not. Any pathological term is only used for just that – a 
pathology.”65 This avoids the prevention of harm to physical health of those 
variations that do not necessarily require medical intervention.66 For this reason, 
the Australian Senate inquiry recommends that “governments and other 
organisations use the term 'intersex' and not use the term 'disorders of sexual 
development'.”67 As intersex people like other male and females, they desire 
respect and dignity of who they are. This is essential to their well-being.  
6.3 Intersex Normalisation as Torturous Treatment  
The dignity and integrity of the human have been a fundamental goal of human 
rights. ‘Torture’ is “most serious of violation of the human right to personal 
integrity and dignity presupposes a situation of powerlessness, whereby the victim 
is under the total control of another person.”68 To insure against the atrocities of 
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and XY (Chicago Review Press, Chicago, Ill, 2009) at 115, 116. 
65 Senate Community Affairs References Committee and Australian Government, above n 41, at 
xiii. 
66 At xiii. 
67 At viii. 
68 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (A/HRC/22/53 2013) at [31]; Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment: Note (A/63/175 2008) at [50]; Civil and Political Rights, Icluding the 
308 
 
WWII and that they were not repeated, the drafters included Article 7 of the ICCPR 
which is derived from Article 5 of the UDHR. It states69       
 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his 
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”  
Its purpose is to “protect the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the 
individual.”70 Other International instruments/conventions have also included 
such an article such as the ECHR. There is no definition of the concepts covered by 
Article 7, nor does the Committee consider it necessary to draw up a list of 
prohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions between the different kinds of 
punishment or treatment; the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and 
severity of the treatment applied.71 
Torture and ill-treatment, though, has been expanded within a separate 
convention: The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). This Convention has given a 
clarification of what is meant by torture and ill-treatment. According to Article 1(1) 
of the Convention against Torture:72   
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on 
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information 
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or 
                                                     
Questions of Torture and Detention: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture 
(E/CN4/2006/6 2005) at [39]. 
69 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A 
(XXI) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), Art. 7. 
70 CCPR General Comment No 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
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71 CCPR General Comment No 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment), para 4. 
72 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
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is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It 
does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions. 
In summary, torture in relation to this thesis means any act which (1) creates 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (2) intentionally inflicted, including 
being based on discrimination, and (3) by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. These three prongs must be present to constitute torture. A person’s 
physical and psychological/mental integrity comes under the definition of torture, 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment when it is purpose is discriminatory in 
hands of statutory authorities. It does not count as torture when pain and 
suffering arises inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions.   
This is an absolute as well as a non-derogable right in both the ICCPR and the CAT. 
The ICCPR Committee reaffirms that even in the case of a public emergency such 
as those referred to in Article 4 of the Covenant, no derogation from the provision 
of Article 7 is allowed and its provisions must remain in force.73 The Committee 
observes that no justification or extenuating circumstances may be invoked to 
excuse a violation of Article 7 for any reasons, including those based on an order 
from a superior officer or public authority.74   
The treatment of intersex people will be used to illustrate the various 
characteristics of the parts that comprise torture. In February 2013, Juan E. 
Méndez Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
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Degrading Treatment or Punishment discussed the issue of sex-normalising 
treatment in the context of torture.75 The report focuses on certain forms of 
abuses in health-care settings that may cross a threshold of mistreatment that is 
tantamount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
and it identifies the policies that promote these practices and existing protection 
gaps.76 This is set out by Juan E. Méndez in his report on torture in health care 
settings:77  
“The UN Special Rapporteur on torture pointed out that intersex children are 
often subject to irreversible sex assignment, involuntary sterilisation and/or 
genital-normalising surgery, performed without their informed consent or that 
of their parents “in an attempt to fix their sex” as they fail to conform to socially 
constructed gender expectations. This leaves intersex children with permanent, 
irreversible infertility and causes severe mental suffering.”  
This has been supported by a number of other reports. One such report is the 
latest WHO report.78  
6.3.1 Prong 1- Suffering 
The first prong is that it creates “severe physical or mental pain or suffering”. This 
is confirmed by the General Comment on Torture.79 The case of LNP v Argentina 
also supports this. In that case, the author suffered and endured being questioned 
about her sexual life and morality superfluous to the sexual assault.80 The 
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Committee concludes that the author was a victim of treatment of a nature that 
is in breach of Article 7 of the ICCPR81 regarding82   
“the constant inquiries by the social worker, medical personnel, and by the court 
into the author’s sexual life and morality constitute arbitrary interference with 
her privacy and an unlawful attack on her honour and reputation, all the more 
so because those inquiries were not relevant to the rape case and related to a 
minor.”  
Moreover, in VDA v Argentina, a case where the state forced a mentally impaired 
person to continue with a pregnancy, despite legal provisions allowing her to 
abort, 83   
“The Committee considers that the state parties omission, in failing to guarantee 
LMR’s right to termination of pregnancy, as provided for under art. 86(2) of the 
Criminal Code, when her family so requested, caused LMR physical and mental 
suffering a violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR that was made especially serious by 
the victim’s status as a young girl with a disability.”  
Pain and suffering can also occur when the state or its delegated authorities omit 
or refuse to uphold a person’s integrity. This is demonstrated in K.L. v Peru, where 
a girl was forced to continue with a pregnancy that not only had a danger to the 
foetus but also endangered the girl’s life. In this case, “the omission on the part of 
the state in not enabling the author to benefit from a therapeutic abortion was, in 
the Committee’s view, the cause of the suffering she experienced,” and as such a 
violation of Article 7.84 These mentioned cases initially had physical and mental 
suffering was exacerbated by the treatment of the state authorities. Thus, torture 
                                                     
81 At para 13(6). 
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is the mental and physical suffering at the hands of authorities or delegated 
authorities, such as through the government health systems.  
Intersex people have suffered from sex-normalising treatments., It includes both 
mental, physical and even sexual pain and the interference with one’s dignity. For 
example, it leaves intersex children with permanent, irreversible infertility and 
causes severe mental suffering.85 Juan E. Méndez wrote in his report on torture in 
health care settings:86 
This has been clearly as expressed as avoiding involuntary and unconsented 
treatment and interventions that have negative lifelong consequences to their 
physical and mental health. 
This is supported by the WHO that commented: “Children are being subjected to 
irreversible interventions that have lifelong consequences for their physical and 
mental health.”87 The treatment affects all parts of an intersex person’s well-
being.  
In more detail, these procedures are rarely medically necessary; can cause 
scarring; loss of sexual sensation, pain, incontinence and lifelong depression; can 
potentially be harmful; and contributes to stigma.88 It has also been criticized as 
being unscientific.89 This has been demonstrated through several national or 
provincial, or shadow reports which include  
A Human Rights Investigation into the Medical "Normalization" of Intersex 
People - A Report of a Public Hearing by the Human Rights Commission of the 
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City & County of San Francisco”90 in 2005, the report “On the Management of 
Differences of Sex Development - Ethical Issues relating to Intersexuality”91 in 
2012, the “Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of Intersex People in Australia”92 
in 2013, and various NGOs such as Zwischengeschlecht (Human Rights NGO).93  
As illustrated above, the sex-normalising treatment on intersex people creates 
‘severe physical or mental pain or suffering’ constituting the first prong of torture.  
6.3.2 Prong 2 - Intention and Purpose – Intersex Discrimination 
Although suffering may be horrific, there are situations when people suffer which 
do not constitute torture. Many operations have suffering, some even severe, but 
do not constitute torture. This is illustrated by Manfred Nowak.94 After analysis of 
the travaux préparatoires of CAT, ICCPR and the associated rulings, he pointed out 
that torture is “more than the intensity of the pain or suffering inflicted, concerns 
the purpose of the conduct and the powerlessness of the victim.”95 This introduces 
the second prong the purposeful intentional infliction of treatment. Intention and 
purpose is defined as:96  
“is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or 
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind.” 
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Intentionally infers knowingly or purposely rather than accidental. One of the 
indications of intentionality is when it is involuntary. This is illustrated for intersex 
people by a statement of the World Health Organisation. It states:97  
“Intersex persons may be involuntarily subjected to so-called sex-normalising or 
other procedures as infants, or during childhood, which in some cases, may 
result in termination of all or some of their reproductive capacity.”  
Intentional infliction indicates torturous or ill-treatment occurs without their 
choice. Although usually thought of as occurring through ‘bad intentions’, this is 
not always the case. Often intentional treatment occurs because of good 
intentions. This is most clearly seen within the health care or medical context. This 
is especially so in dealing with vulnerable groups by medical authorities.98 Méndez 
in his report defined intent, as required under Article 1 of the Convention against 
Torture, effectively being99   
“implied where a person has been discriminated against on the basis of disability. 
This is particularly relevant in the context of medical treatment, where serious 
violations and discrimination against persons with disabilities may be defended 
as ‘well intended’ on the part of health care professionals.”   
Especially in the health care setting, treatment can occur in a paternalistic manner 
seen as doing the right thing for the person, irrespective of that person’s desire. 
Most often this occurs to vulnerable groups such as young, mentally vulnerable 
and the disabled. For intersex people, the treatment is often phrased in ‘good 
intentions’ for the person upon whom it is performed. However, good intentions 
of normalising cannot justify mutilation because it never normalises but does the 
opposite.100 It stigmatises intersex as a monstrosity, a mistake of nature. Despite 
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‘good intentions’ it is still treatment that is forced upon someone for some 
purpose. 
Intention requires a purpose of which there are various ones listed in the definition 
above. There is no sufficient space to discuss them, all, and thus will concentrate 
on the purpose that relates to intersex people – discrimination. The intentional 
treatment occurs purely due to discrimination fulfilling this prong of torture.101 
Many policies and practices that lead to abuse in health-care or other statutory 
settings are due to discrimination targeted at persons who are marginalised.102 In 
the case of intersex people this discrimination is because of sex. It is discriminatory 
because this treatment is only performed on those who have sex characteristics 
that cannot be clearly defined as male or female and non-ambiguous babies and 
infants do not meet the same consequences. 
As far as Intersex people, sex discrimination underlies the treatment violations 
that they face.103 The prejudices and stigmatisation of not fitting within the male-
female binary require that one be forcefully manipulated within the system. As 
such, the discriminatory treatment occurs “in an attempt to fix their sex” as they 
“fail to conform to socially constructed gender expectations.”104 Treatment is 
supposed make them as the ideological or essentialised form of male or female as 
they have been assigned. For example, Creitghton et al write that its purpose is 
“to improve the cosmetic appearance of the genitals, to allow for vaginal-penile 
intercourse, and to achieve an unobstructed, sex-typical manner for urination (i.e. 
standing for male).”105 These are essential elements of the social constructed 
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society of what it means to be human – a male or female – and any variation will 
confuse society. Furthermore, it is couched terms of reducing stigmatisation of the 
individual to make others around them more comfortable and help them fit into 
the social structure. It reduces “the stigmatization of living with genital ambiguity” 
for the patient and family.”106 Schneider writes:107  
Such procedures are based on the idea that they are enabling children to have a 
good quality of life. [They are] given the following advice by a doctor: ‘Just bear 
in mind that if anyone hears about it, it will be the end for your child, from a 
social viewpoint. Think of school, sport or swimming!’  
The good quality of life is to overcome the social stigma. Without such treatment, 
it is considered that one will have a 'legacy of shame', difficulties within the child's 
family unit, adult personal and psychological distress, sexual anxieties, and 
uncertainty about personal and gender identity.108 The treatment improves the 
bonding with parents and family. The Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of 
Intersex People in Australia Report refers to the reasoning for treatment:109  
“To the extent that this refers to facilitating parental acceptance and bonding, 
the child's avoidance of harassment or teasing, and the child's body self-image, 
there is great danger of this being a circular argument that avoids the central 
issues. Those issues include reducing parental anxiety and ensuring social 
awareness and acceptance of diversity such as intersex. Surgery is unlikely to be 
an appropriate response to these kinds of issues.”  
Although there maybe discrimination in society, support from family and loved 
one’s can help overcome this. This treatment rather than overcoming the 
discrimination with family support, it changes a person’s body to match societies 
expectations so others around the person does not feel uncomfortable. In doing 
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such treatment it has the potential to disassociate one’s being and self from one’s 
determined sex and its social identity. Even if one is comfortable with the sex 
expression one was assigned, there are still elements of one’s being one’s has lost 
involuntarily.  
6.3.3 Prong 3 – Done by Authority 
The third prong is that torture and ill-treatment is ‘at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity’.110 It is commonly thought to be under the auspices of security, however, 
it can also be in other fields of statutory authority such as in medical facilities. In 
the health-care context, which in most jurisdictions fall under statutory authority, 
clearly, comes under this requirement. Juan Méndez in his report made it clear 
that States are obligated to prevent torture not only by public officials, such as law 
enforcement agents, but also doctors, health-care professionals and social 
workers.111 Further, he connects state-sponsorship with such treatment112  
“State-sponsored forcible anal examinations for the prosecution of suspected 
homosexual activities, and invasive virginity examinations conducted by health-
care providers, hormone therapy and genital-normalizing surgeries under the 
guise of so called ‘reparative therapies’.”   
Such state sponsored treatment is illustrated through understanding that it is 
‘standard practice', such as with intersex people undergoing genital-normalising 
under the guise of ‘reparative therapies’.113 Being standard practice limits liability 
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of the medical professionals in civil and or criminal cases. Standard practice does 
not necessarily prevent the treatment from being evaluated as torture.  
The medical authority often occurs through the ‘doctrine of necessity’. This allows 
treatment to be carried out under legal protections of ‘emergency’ and 
therapeutic privilege. If an emergency, it can even be done without consent in 
extreme cases. This can obscure torture in health-care settings. In his report on 
torture and ill-treatment in medical settings, Méndez states:114  
The doctrine of necessity continues to be an obstacle to protection from abuses 
in health-care settings. It is therefore important to clarify that treatment 
provided in violation of the terms of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities – either through coercion or discrimination – cannot be 
legitimate or justified under the medical necessity doctrine.  
The doctrine of necessity leads to involuntary treatment. For example, intersex 
people, these are done as a psycho-social emergency.115 Such treatment usually 
occurs in infancy or as soon as possible. This is argued, as Creitghton et al in their 
article point out, to “maintain that the procedures are easier to perform and the 
results better in the young child.”116 Dan Ghattas writes that117  
“as a rule, Western medicine aims to allocate intersex individuals to one or the 
other of the two sexes/genders as quickly as possible and to apparently 
normalise, that is, conceal the intersex body, using surgical and other medical 
means.”  
As such intersex children are still pathologised as abnormal in need of medical care 
of which parents are urged to do as early as possible.118 With treatment forced 
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upon someone with or without informed consent. This may not even have 
therapeutic purpose.  
To avoid being classed as torture, the authority such as in medical or health care 
settings rely on concepts such as capacity and consent. Capacity is the ability to 
exercise free will and informed consent of some treatment and as such it has legal 
effect as an agent.119 This is a fundamental feature of guaranteeing the respect of 
an individual’s autonomy, self-determination and human dignity in an appropriate 
service or care such as within health-care services.120 Any incapacity which is a 
rebuttable presumption that must be proven before a person can be designated 
as incapable of making choices,121 passes the decision-making to others on one’s 
behalf such as with children or the disabled.122 The intimate link between forced 
medical interventions based on discrimination and the deprivation of legal 
capacity has been emphasised both by the Committee on the rights of Person with 
Disabilities and the previous Rapporteur on the Question of torture.123 
Substitutive consent, such as that from one’s parents in the best interests of the 
child may not be sufficient to prevent it from constituting torture. There are cases, 
where it could still constitute torture. In the report for the Human rights 
Committee on Torture, it recognised that124   
“medical treatments of an intrusive and irreversible nature, when lacking 
therapeutic purpose, may constitute torture or ill-treatment when enforced or 
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administered without free and informed consent of the person concerned, in 
particular when performed on patients from vulnerable groups.”  
When there are situations of incapacity, substitute must ensure it is for a 
therapeutic purpose and in the child’s best interest which is a high threshold.  
Manfred Nowak noted this as the Special Rapporteur for Torture:125   
“States must ensure that health professionals carry out such interventions only 
if they serve a therapeutic purpose, are in the best interests of the child, and are 
based on the free and informed consent of the parents (though parental consent 
must be disregarded if the treatment is not in the best interest of the child).”  
Even in cases where substitutive informed consent has been obtained, there are 
still three important factors to prevent it constituting torture. It must be in the 
child’s best interest and it must be therapeutic and have informed consent. The 
doctrine of necessity is only in extreme life-threatening circumstances.   
People are often powerless and vulnerable to any type of physical or mental 
pressure.126 In other words, it would be impossible, or near impossible, to resist 
even for those in power to give substitute consent. For example, in the Case of YF 
v Turkey, although the State submitted that a gynaecological examination without 
consent of the person, the Court determined that,127    
“in the circumstances, the applicant’s wife could not have been expected to 
resist submitting to such an examination in view of her vulnerability at the hands 
of the authorities who exercised complete control over her throughout her 
detention.”  
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This vulnerability is worsened through structural inequalities, such as the power 
imbalance between doctors and patients, exacerbated by stigma and 
discrimination, resulting in individuals from certain groups being 
disproportionately vulnerable to having informed consent compromised.128 This is 
the case for intersex children. As reports have indicated (refer to the reports list 
under prong of suffering), few parents had sufficient information129 and few were 
in the capacity130 to make a decision that would have such impact on their child’s 
life. Intersex people have to live with interference with the integrity of their body 
and psychological being and the life-long effects. This affects their well-being and 
inhibits one’s human flourishing. Most of all it denies one dignity the central focus 
of international human rights. 
6.3.4 Intersex treatment as Torture 
The prohibition against torture and ill-treatment is an absolute, as well as a non-
derogable right. There is no justification or extenuating circumstances. Health care 
settings are not immune from this right. In summary, there are three prongs to 
constitute particular treatment as torture: any act which (1) creates severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering (2) intentionally inflicted, including being 
based on discrimination, and (3) by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. All 
three prongs must be present to constitute torture. 
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For intersex people, this sex-normalising treatment has been cloaked in 
benevolence. Medical professionals often argue such treatment as preventing 
discrimination and enhancing the lives of the child and the family. They also argue 
that calling the treatment as mutilation or torture is unhelpful. The question must 
be asked: unhelpful to who? For intersex people who have to live with and after 
such treatment it is torture and mutilation, as Mauro Cabral refers, it is “the 
surgical mutilation of children.”131 Even though some have come to accept the sex 
designated them, few accept or believe that the treatment should have occurred 
without their consent. In such cases substitutive consent is not sufficient. Most 
intersex people continue to live with the pain and suffering. They also live with the 
effect of the denial of their being and the sex-normalising treatment on their 
identity. 
For intersex people, sex-normalising treatment violates autonomy and integrity as 
it is non-therapeutic and it is without the consent of the individual of concerned. 
This is set out by Juan E. Méndez in his report on torture in health care settings:132  
“The UN Special Rapporteur on torture pointed out that intersex children are 
often subject to irreversible sex assignment, involuntary sterilisation and/or 
genital-normalising surgery, performed without their informed consent or that 
of their parents “in an attempt to fix their sex” as they fail to conform to socially 
constructed gender expectations. This leaves intersex children with permanent, 
irreversible infertility and causes severe mental suffering.”  
This has now been supported by the WHO report.133 This treatment constitutes 
torture as it satisfies each of the three prongs as identified below.  
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First, as demonstrated above, there are numerous reports and studies 
demonstrating the suffering and the physical and mental pain of such treatment. 
The sex-normalising treatment is more than suffering of necessary medical 
treatment because of disease. Moreover, the second prong has also been 
demonstrated. The sex-normalising treatment is intentionally performed for a 
discriminatory purpose. The treatment has minimal therapeutic value. The WHO 
stated that these procedures are done “on the basis of weak evidence, without 
discussing alternative solutions that would retain the ability to procreate.”134 
Rather, intersex people generally have healthy bodies, the cosmetic purposes135 
“solely serve to socially adapt the intersex individual to the socially dominant 
corset of two sexes/genders.”136 This ensures all bodies conform to the sex binary 
of male and female. Furthermore, these are performed by medical professionals 
who, as the third prong, is at the “instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” The 
UN Special Rapporteur on torture Juan E. Méndez pointed out many of the 
treatments of intersex people are “performed without their informed consent or 
that of their parents”137 The medical professionals are performing such treatment 
to ensure conformity to the socio-legal norms of sex without consent and as such 
becomes forced treatment or torture. Understood together, this constitutes the 
prongs of torture especially when it is it has little therapeutic effect while 
discriminatory interfering with one’s integrity of being to ensure conformity to the 
binary of male and female without the consent of the person concerned.  
As demonstrated, the pathologising of intersex variations is purposeful. It provides 
a way to medically fix a social issue. The sex-normalising treatments fixing the 
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social issue is often done in the guise of benevolence. Even if the sex expression 
that one is assigned matches who one is, the effect of such treatment has its legacy 
whether physical psychological, sexual or a combination of them. While treatment 
continues, even in the name of benevolence, this does not take away the issue of 
loss of dignity through the violation of autonomy and integrity. As this treatment 
satisfies the three prongs, it may constitute torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.138 Merely using substitutive consent to enable early for a treatment of 
a social issue is at a minimum, questionable. This violates the integrity of who one 
is and inhibits their free and full development of personality. This dehumanises an 
intersex individual and removes their dignity of being. It is these very reasons that 
torture, and ill-treatment, has long been considered non-derogable under 
international law and especially under international human rights law. 
Without preventing torture and ill-treatment it denies the dignity of being having 
autonomy over one’s sex becoming which is central to international human rights. 
In order to prevent torture, Juan Méndez in his report on torture and ill-treatment 
summarises the importance and necessity of informed consent and autonomy in 
medical settings. He states139   
Safeguard free and informed consent on an equal basis for all individuals without 
any exception, through the legal framework and judicial and administrative 
mechanisms, including through policies and practices to protect against abuses. 
Any legal provisions to the contrary, such as provisions allowing confinement or 
compulsory treatment in mental health settings, including through guardianship 
and substituted decision-making, must be revised. Adopt policies and protocols 
that uphold autonomy, self-determination and human dignity. Ensure that 
information on health is fully available, acceptable, accessible, and of good 
quality; and that it is imparted and comprehended by means of supportive and 
protective measures such as a wide range of community-based services and 
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supports (A/64/272, para. 93). Instances of treatment without informed consent 
should be investigated; redress to victims of such treatment should be provided.   
Firstly, he emphasises the importance of informed consent with no exception. The 
state must ensure systems are in place to protect against such abuses. Information 
must be supplied to ensure full informed consent of the person concerned and 
those significant one’s around them such as one’s parents. Secondly, he 
emphasises autonomy over how one comes to be. Autonomy requires that if 
treatment occurs, it must have therapeutic benefit, be in the child’s best interest, 
and have the consent of the person concerned. Where not life-threatening, 
substitutive consent would not be sufficient for treatment of psycho-social 
reasons.  
Another important point made by Méndez is prevention of such treatment to the 
enacting or amending of law and policy. Laws and policies must change to give 
effect to well-being and integrity. At present, only Malta has legislation in place to 
protect intersex from such treatment:140  
It shall be unlawful for medical practitioners or other professionals to conduct 
any sex assignment treatment and, or surgical intervention on the sex 
characteristics of a minor which treatment and, or intervention can be deferred 
until the person to be treated can provide informed consent. 
Few other countries have amended policies and laws to protect intersex people. 
The purpose of law is prevent unwanted treatment being performed that create 
life-long suffering on persons to simply uphold some discriminatory purpose. Such 
laws as in Malta need to be enacted in more nations. This protects one’s autonomy 
over one’s being and becoming while also protecting one’s dignity. This also 
protects the right to privacy which is critical to the integrity of being oneself and 
making sense of who one is. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
Privacy is the sphere in which the right to autonomy and (free and full) 
development of one’s (personality) identity occurs be it by entering into 
relationships with others or alone through the integrity as a dignified being. A 
dignified being is one aiming to achieve one’s potentialities and well-being- human 
flourishing. Well-being is critical to human flourishing and the sphere of the right 
to privacy in having autonomy in becoming who one is. For this reason, this 
chapter illustrates some of the needs of intersex people and key issues that 
prevent their well-being. This moves discussion beyond that of property rights to 
that of the foundation and purpose of human rights – the dignified being and the 
autonomy to freely and fully develop it. It is only through this one has a moral 
identity.  
While health has the potential to improve well-being, for intersex people, health 
and the State health systems and the social ideology associated with it create well-
being issues rather than enhancing it. As intersex people’s well-being is impacted, 
it affects the dignity and integrity of one’s autonomy over who they are and how 
they come to be. As already point out, and eloquently written by Dan Ghattas: “It 
is barely possible to develop an identity as a person (e.g. inter*woman or man) 
with an intersex body that has a right to remain unmodified.”141 This prevents the 
very sphere of the right to privacy in which one develops one’s sex or becomes 
one sex. The mutilation of intersex bodies “into culturally acceptable ones, violate 
our autonomy of decision as well as our bodily integrity.”142 This fails dignity as it 
inhibits or denies the enabling achieve one’s potentialities and well-being- human 
flourishing.  
                                                     
141 Ghattas, above n 1, at 17–18. 
142 Cabral, above n 2. 
327 
 
This chapter highlighted key issues that enable and enhance well-being and some 
that inhibit or deny the well-being or the pursuing of one’s potentialities. 
Regarding the health of intersex people and health services they have access to, 
the key issues are as follows:143    
(i) avoiding involuntary and unconsented treatment and interventions that have 
negative lifelong consequences to their physical and mental health, (ii) having 
access to general health services that are appropriate, adequate and respectful 
of their bodily diversity.  
Although these may seem fair requests they are not easily provided for due to 
discriminatory understanding of sex as a male-female binary and they manner in 
which the system is based on such a discriminatory understanding. This makes 
intersex people invisible to themselves and others degrading them as a dignified 
human being. This is discriminatory. The Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights has indicated that the ICESCR prohibits any discrimination that “has 
the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise 
of the right to health” in access to health-care and the underlying determinants of 
health.144  
Sex-normalising treatment that occurs soon after the assignment to a ‘best-fit’ sex 
severely impacts on one’s well-being. This simply occurs due to the discriminatory 
nature of understanding sex in the socio-legal world and is enforced within 
biomedicine. This discriminatory treatment nullifies and impairs an intersex 
person’s physical, mental, and sexual health.  Thus, as the Senate community 
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report on Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of Intersex People in Australia 
wrote:145   
The argument that normalising surgery is required to protect the child from 
discrimination was strongly contested. Rather than altering the child, it was 
submitted that societal attitudes are in need of reform.  
Changing a child’s features to satisfy society in an area such as one’s genitalia 
without that person’s informed consent is pure discrimination. There is no health 
reason for it at all. Any associated health needs do not require sex-normalising 
surgery nor removal of gonads. It is far more appropriate to educate the public 
about the diversity of sex than discriminate against intersex people simply because 
they do not fit social norms of the binary.  
But this goes further than just discrimination, it also constitutes torture and ill-
treatment as described above. The current standard of treatment in most states 
is still experimental despite its operation for more than 60 years. There are few, if 
any, studies legitimately supporting its use. This has come to the attention of the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture. Juan Mendez recommends that146   
all States to repeal any law allowing intrusive and irreversible treatments, 
including forced genital-normalizing surgery, involuntary sterilization, unethical 
experimentation, medical display, ‘reparative therapies’ or ‘conversion 
therapies,’ when enforced or administered without the free and informed 
consent of the person concerned. He also calls upon them to outlaw forced or 
coerced sterilization in all circumstances and provide special protection to 
individuals belonging to marginalized groups. 
The call upon states has even till today not been taken up. Only Malta has 
implemented legislation to protect intersex children from such treatment. A 
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Resolution at the Council of Europe has also indicated that Children have a right 
to bodily integrity, but the resolution falls short of banning it.147 Intersex 
organisations around the world are calling for the ban on such treatment without 
the consent of the person concerned. For example, Truffer and Bauer in Intersex 
Genital Mutilations - Human Rights Violations of Children with Variations of Sex 
Anatomy write:148  
In Switzerland, like in every intersex community, meanwhile several generations 
of intersex persons, their partners and families, as well as NGOs and other 
human rights and bioethics experts, have again and again described IGM as a 
human rights issue, as harmful and traumatising, as a western form of genital 
mutilation, as child sexual abuse, and have called for legislation to end it.  
This needs to be taken as serious as it is and can only be so by calling it what it is 
– torture. Reducing to benevolent terms as the bio-medical profession so often 
does covers the effect and impact it has on intersex people. In the Truffer and 
Bauer on Intersex Genital Mutilation, they refer to Mauro Cabral’s Statement in 
2004 to the CESCR on the effects of such normalising treatment:149  
Genital mutilation of intersex children damages genital sensitivity in irreversible 
ways; it causes postsurgical trauma and the internalization of brutal prejudices 
denying or stigmatizing the diversity that in reality, human bodies show. [...] The 
difference in genitalia cannot justify, under any pretext whatsoever, ethical and 
political hierarchies: cannot justify mutilation, because it never normalizes but 
does the opposite. For us, mutilation creates a permanent status of human rights 
violation and inhumanity. 
Torture through sex-normalising treatment creates a permanent status of human 
rights violation and inhumanity. Intersex people desire well-being like all other 
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human beings, but they do not want forced impositions of what sex and the sex-
normalisations of that sex should be unless they decide it is what is best for them. 
If intersex people are to have well-being and any ability to pursue potentiality, 
then it is time to protect them to such violations and enhance their well-being. 
Mauro Cabral writes that in the light of what the right to health means, “we 
advocate a review of medical practices around intersexuality and the adoption of 
concrete measures to eliminate genital mutilation of intersex children.”150 Intersex 
advocates acknowledge there are instances of necessity for emergency treatment, 
but only when life-threatening, that is, in preserving of life, of which sex 
assignment and normalising surgeries is not one. In this case, well-being, for most 
intersex people, is the prevention of normalising treatment without their (the 
individual concerned) free and full informed consent.151 One change that the 
Australian Inquiry recommended was requiring the consent of the Court:152 
The committee recommends that all proposed intersex medical interventions for 
children and adults without the capacity to consent require authorisation from 
a civil and administrative tribunal or the Family Court. 
Such changes, as this, may be necessary until society itself comes to embrace 
people of all diversities of sex. Intersex people desire the health and well-being, as 
do all other people, which includes the right to freely and fully develop as who 
they are and determine how they come to be. This results in a dignified being. 
They desire the ability to develop in the sex that matches who they are as a male, 
female, both or neither.  
                                                     
150 “ILGA - UN 2004 - NGO statement: Intersexuality” (27 May 2004) International Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transsexual and Intersex Association <http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/61>. 
151 Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 33, at 8. 
152 Senate Community Affairs References Committee and Australian Government, above n 41, at 
xiii. 
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Health and well-being are essential to the ability to freely and fully develop as a 
dignified being. Inhibiting one’s well-being inhibits one’s pursuit of potentiality. 
Well-being requires the “right to control one’s health and body, including sexual 
and reproductive freedom, and the right to be free from interference, such as the 
right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical treatment and 
experimentation.”153 These are all current issues for intersex people. It is time to 
return to a system of well-being based on human rights. This puts the dignity of 
the human being first. This needs a reform based on a human rights approach 
where all treatment that is non-life-threatening requires the consent of the 
individual concerned. This is critical to enable them to freely and fully develop 
their personality inclusive of one’s sex without discrimination. 
They need the protection of the law. But for this to happen they also need to be 
recognised before the law. Intersex people, having sex diversity or variations that 
make it difficult to clearly define someone as male or female, requires the ability 
to develop a sex which is good for them – whether it be male, female, both or 
neither – and the ability to develop in that sex or amend it as one’s narrative of 
life changes. This indicates that through the recognition of one’s autonomously 
defined sex is a dignified being achieved.  
However, in the past recognition of one’s sex has been through a determined sex. 
This sex has been considered as immutable and biological in nature. This is despite 
the many variations intersex people’s bodies highlight, society and the law are still 
restricted to binary status of sex which is reflected on a birth certificate, although 
there are slowly a few states that are slowly recognising a space for non-binary. 
To become visible, intersex people need to be recognised as who they are, not 
who they have been determined to be.  This is critical as a human rights being with 
dignity.  
                                                     
153 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), above n 29, at [8]. 
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CHAPTER 7: NON-RECOGNITION OF THE DIGNITY OF (INTER)SEX 
7  
The dignity of the human being is central to international human rights. The 
enablement and protection of such a dignified being is seen through the right to 
privacy. Privacy is the “sphere in which the right to autonomy and (free and full) 
development of one’s (personality) identity occurs, be it by entering into 
relationships with others or alone through the integrity as a dignified being.” The 
integrity of such a moral being requires human flourishing as indicated by one’s 
well-being as described in the last chapter.  The right to privacy is critical to the 
integrity of being oneself and flourishing. It is essential to making sense of who 
one is one’s moral identity. 
Recognition is critical to the dignity of the human person through one’s moral 
identity. It is central to the organisation and structure of societies and thus is 
central to the revealing of who one is and how one comes to be as a human being. 
The social bond through recognition includes the idea of reciprocity, a 
“consideration of alterity connected to the self-assertion of the subject of 
capabilities.”1 However, if one’s moral identity is not recognised, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to get protection to freely and fully develop one’s personality 
through a narrative identity of one’s dignified being. Moreover, non-recognition 
also affects the claim on rights affecting one’s moral being of self-esteem and self-
respect2 and the effective relations from that of familial to that of the juridical 
level.3 The struggle for recognition is at the heart of modern social relations.4  
                                                     
1 Paul Ricoeur “Capabilities and Rights” in Séverine Deneulin, Mathias Nebel and Nicholas 
Sagovsky (eds) Transforming Unjust Structures: the Capability Approach (Springer, Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands, 2006) 17 at 21. 
2 Jill Marshall Human Rights Law and Personal Identity (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, 
NY, 2014) at 189. 
3 Paul Ricoeur “Becoming Capable, Being Recognized” at 4. 
4 At 4. 
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In brief, protection comes through recognition. It is recognition that ties back to 
the beginning of this work. Identity since time immemorial is about recognition of 
oneself and others. One’s being, and thus, identity is only recorded status when it 
has recognition from others.5 However, as the earlier chapters have illustrated, 
recognition (or non-recognition) produces vulnerabilities when it divests the 
personal identity as a form of recognition from one’s narrative identity. This has 
occurred through taking identity as immutable characteristics (essentialised 
attributes) as one’s status. People become recognised not for who they are but 
according to and by one’s statuses. This impacts on one’s dignity and personal 
freedom.  
Central to claims for justice is that of recognition. This is at the heart of every call 
for minority rights as part of one’s socio-legal personhood.6 Non-recognition 
causes significant impact on the hermeneutic injustice of intersex people. In the 
case of intersex people, being mislabelled and mis-determined is no doubt a 
challenge to one’s identity development and stability.7 Due to the invisibility of 
who they are, it prevents the free and full development of their dignified being, 
and thus prevents the protection of the law. If well-being rights fail, then the rights 
for the previous chapter also fail.  This is not an interest right but a right to freely 
and fully develop as a dignified human person. As long as the issues that affect 
intersex people’s well-being are not socially recognised, then they are not given 
their rights. The call is to be recognised for who they are, with an expression that 
matches their sex and an identity that respects how they come to be. 
Recognition as an autonomous human being is not only a good thing, it is the moral 
right of every human being. Rights and access to them are interconnect to socio-
                                                     
5 Jill Marshall Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law?: Autonomy, Identity and Integrity 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden; Boston, 
2009) at 90. 
6 Lauren Leve “‘Identity’” (2011) 52 Current Anthropology 513 at 513. 
7 Sharon E Preves Intersex and identity (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 2003) at 4. 
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legal recognition. John Eekelaar argues that “people have rights to the extent that 
their own identification of what enhances their well-being is socially recognised.”8 
This is not always the reality. Most people have access to rights to the extent they 
are socio-legally recognised which may or may not enhance one’s well-being. This 
demonstrates a difference in the reality of rights and the foundation and purpose 
of interntional human rights. The former enhances the status of individuals while 
the later enhances the human rights dignified being. This difference is critical. 
While international human rights were about removing status as a distinction of 
human being, much of human law still applies rights law through status distinction.  
The chapter will first concentrate on registration at birth, in particular, sex 
registration, before turning to recognition before the law. The chapter will 
conclude by considering how recognition before the law can be positive to enable 
the human rights person. This enables the intersex person to be who they are and 
autonomously how they come to be as a moral being. Recognition both socially 
and legally begins through registration at birth. Non-recognition before the law 
and society is the cause while recognition is the solution to many of the issues 
intersex people face. 
7.1 Sex Registration and Recognition before the Law 
Intersex people in most countries are only recognised as either male or female as 
they have been determined at birth. Few countries recognise somebody as a 
variant sex, that is one other than male or female. At most today, there are few 
states beginning to permit non-binary sex. This indicates the non-recognition of 
who they are and the misrecognition through the assigned sex. This has not only 
caused indignity of being but issues in relation to integrity and well-being. Their 
becoming has been truly restricted due to recognition issues. The birth certificate 
has more impact on one’s life than many people may assume.   
                                                     
8 John Eekelaar “Personal Rights and Human Rights” (2002) 2 Hum Rts L Rev 181 at 185. 
335 
 
This has resulted from the identifier on the birth registration. Almost universally, 
birth registration includes sex. This registration which includes sex is central to 
one’s socio-political life, and without it, life would be near impossible. Registration 
not only recognises that being, but also the statuses of that being, such as sex, 
place of birth, and parentage.9 Protection of the law extends to one’s statuses. The 
importance of registration is to ‘preserve the historical record of facts’.10 The state 
uses these records of facts for a number of reasons. Julia Epstein writes:11 
“For the state, there has been several reasons for requiring that newborns be 
registered with a name and a sex designation at the time of birth: to establish a 
means of social organisation and to prevent fraud; to regulate the granting of 
different privileges and responsibilities according to sex; and most crucially to 
regulate morality and family life by prohibiting sex acts and marriages involving 
persons of the same sex.”  
Although one reason is that of legal personhood, registration also performs many 
administrative and protective functions. Furthermore, it provides certainty of 
identity. As such, this registration is not only for identification, but also for 
recognition before the law and to enable protection of the law.  
It is accepted in the modern state that accuracy of registration records must be 
kept to prevent issues such as fraud and help to rectify them when they go wrong. 
Therefore, what is at issue here is not the keeping of records but the are those 
records about one’s status or humanness, one’s autonomy over those records and 
the one’s ability to change the records. These very questions are central to intersex 
human rights issues. First, this section on registration will consider the issue of 
registration at birth before considering the issue of sex registration.  
                                                     
9 Marshall, above n 2, at 7. 
10 Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom (31-32/1997/815-816/1018-1019) 30 July 
1998 at [54]. 
11 Julia Epstein “Either/Or-Neither/Both: Sexual Ambiguity and the Ideology of Gender” (1990) 7 
Genders 99 at 101. 
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7.1.1 Birth Registration and International Law 
Birth registration, in particular, was noted as a human rights issue at the time of 
drafting the ICCPR. It was noted that some countries did not register some infants 
which meant that they went through life undocumented. As such, this was 
considered as an essential right which enabled protection of the law. Manfred 
Nowak writes that:12   
The right of each newborn child to immediate registration of his or her name in 
a State register of births is closely related to the right of every person to his or 
her own identity, which follows from the protection of privacy, and the right to 
recognition as a person before the law guaranteed by Art. 16. 
The right to registration at birth is recognised as an essential interconnector with 
the right to recognition before the law. Nowak notes that it is “only through such 
registration that the existence of a newborn child is legally recognised.”13 It is 
through such documentation interconnecting with the right to privacy that 
provides one a right to an identity.   
Registration focused on recognising the child as it entered the world. This ensures 
recognition before the law throughout one’s life. It has been a central element of 
children’s rights. It is the basis of their identity. Article 24 of the ICCPR states:14  
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of 
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, 
society and the State. 
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name. 
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. 
                                                     
12 Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (NP Engel, Kehl, Germany; Arlington, 
Va, USA, 2005) at 559–560. 
13 At 560. 
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A 
(XXI) Resolution 2200A (XXI) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), 
Art. 24. 
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The aim of this article was to recognise, due to the vulnerability of age, children 
would be protected by law. They did not have the own ability instead relying on 
others for support and protection. Moreover, it ensured that every child had an 
identity and that this was protected.15    
This was illustrated in Mónaco de Gallicchio, on her behalf and on behalf of her 
granddaughter Ximena Vicario v. Argentina (Mónaco de Gallicchio v Argentina). 16 
The Committee considered that the national courts had respected Ximeno's 
identity rights in issuing her papers according to her identity at birth not affecting 
her recognition before the law.17 However, they also stated that18 
While these circumstances do not raise an issue under article 16 of the Covenant, 
the initial denial of Mrs Mónaco's standing effectively left Ximena Vicario 
without adequate representation, thereby depriving her of the protection to 
which she was entitled as a minor. Taken together with the circumstances 
mentioned in paragraph 10.5 below, the denial of Mrs Mónaco's standing 
constituted a violation of article 24 of the Covenant.  
                                                     
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 24(1). 
16 Facts of the case: Ximeno Vicario’s parents were apprehended by police in 1977 and never 
seen again. The National Commission on Disappeared Persons investigated the disappearance in 
1983, but the parents’ whereabouts were never established. Ms. Monaco, the grandmother of 
Ximeno, launched her own investigation and found her granddaughter living with a nurse, S.S.. 
Ms. Monaco was granted temporary guardianship over Ximeno and S.S. was granted visitation 
rights while an investigation was undertaken as to whether to bring criminal charges against her. 
Ms Monaco sought to end the visitation rights of S.S. on the basis that they were having a 
negative effect on her granddaughter, but was denied the standing to do so as she was not the 
child’s parent or permanent guardian. Ms. Monaco also tried to apply for identity papers to be 
issued under Ximeno’s birth name but, again, this lacked standing. Ms. Monaco made the 
complaint on behalf of her granddaughter and herself alleging, inter alia, that Ximeno was denied 
her right to be recognised as a person (art. 16), that the forced visits of S.S. amounted to an 
arbitrary interference with her and her granddaughter’s right to privacy (art. 17) and that the 
ambiguous situation was harmful to the integrity of the family (art. 23). Before the complaint was 
addressed by the Committee, Ms. Monaco was granted full guardianship of Ximeno, the visits of 
S.S. ended according to Ximeno’s express wishes as she had then turned 18: Mónaco de 
Gallicchio, on her behalf and on behalf of her granddaughter Ximena Vicario v Argentina CCPR 
Human Rights Committee Communication No 400/1990, 27 April 1995. 
17 At [10(2)]. 
18 At [10(3)]. 
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In this case, the HRC recognised that the state did rectify the issue of the child not 
being registered, yet highlighted the period of time in which the child was without 
registration the child lacked the protection of the law. As such, this case also 
highlighted the interconnection of Art. 24 with that of Art. 16 of the ICCPR.19 The 
Committee at the HRC stressed the importance of Art.24 in promoting recognition 
before the law and the State's obligation to facilitate this. It stated:20   
Bearing in mind the suffering already endured by Ms. Vicario, who lost both of 
her parents under tragic circumstances imputable to the State party, the 
Committee finds that the special measures required under article 24, paragraph 
1, of the Covenant, were not expeditiously applied by Argentina, and that the 
failure to recognize the standing of Mrs. Mónaco in the guardianship and 
visitation proceedings and the delay in legally establishing Ms. Vicario's real 
name and issuing identity papers also entailed a violation of article 24, paragraph 
2, of the Covenant, which is designed to promote recognition of the child's legal 
personality.   
The purpose of registration, as highlighted in this case is to recognise everyone as 
a person before the law from the time of birth, irrespective of their capacity to act. 
This ensures that it complies with Article 16 of the ICCPR. This then not only 
recognises the child before the law, but also gives the child the protection of the 
law.  
The purpose of birth registration is to recognise the new human being before the 
law and enable protection of the law. Like Article 16, this Article is not concerned 
with the capacity to act, but recognition of the new human being into the world. 
Recognition is interconnected with dignity. Nonrecognition or misrecognition 
creates a state of indignity.  
                                                     
19 “(1) Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are 
required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State; (2) Every child 
shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name; (3) Every child has the right to 
acquire a nationality.”: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 24. 
20 Mónaco de Gallicchio  v Argentina, above n 16, at [10(5)]. 
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7.1.2 Sex Registration  
According to international law, birth registration is mandatory. It provides the 
basis for socio-legal recognition and access to rights and freedoms. The mandatory 
fields are name and nationality. However, in most jurisdictions, the field of sex is 
almost a universal ‘identity marker’ on official birth registration.21 Few 
jurisdictions recognise a person without reference to their sex.22 The sex marker 
is utilised in administrative matters of the state. Once recorded, it is then utilised 
in all areas of one’s life within the administrative state. In that sense, sex is central 
to one’s socio-legal personality.23  
The sex marker was determined at birth. All infants were assigned a sex. However, 
when intersex variations (usually referred to as conditions or disorders) are 
identified, they attempt to discover one’s ‘true sex’ and assign that the sex of 
either male or female, furthermore, in most cases to ensure adherence to and 
conformity to that sex, mandatory (almost everywhere) sex-normalising 
treatment is performed to ensure the genitals matched one’s assigned sex. This 
assignment has been considered a historical fact irrespective of the 
acknowledgement of the sex diversity of that person.  
The assignment was considered a natural process. The assignment has been 
considered a matter of ‘labelling something of nature. As such it was seen as a fact 
of what one was as a historical record in the administration of the state. For 
                                                     
21 Commissioner for Human Rights and Silvan Agius Human Rights and Intersex People (2015) at 
37. 
22 Nils Muižnieks “A Boy or a Girl or a Person – Intersex People Lack Recognition in Europe” (9 
May 2014) The Council of Europe Commissioner’s Human Rights Comment 
<http://humanrightscomment.org/2014/05/09/a-boy-or-a-girl-or-a-person-intersex-people-lack-
recognition-in-europe/>. 
23 Marshall, above n 5, at 103; Leve, above n 6, at 513; Lawrence M Friedman “The Concept of 
the Self in Legal Culture” (1990) 38 Clev St L Rev 517 at 517; Cordelia Fine Testosterone Rex - 
Unmaking the Myths of Our Gendered Minds (Icon Books Ltd, London, United Kingdom, 2017) at 
14. 
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example, in Sheffield and Horsham, the State continued to rely on these 
justifications for24   
 preserving the register of births as a historical record of facts subject neither to 
alteration so as to record an entrant’s change of sex nor to abridgement in the 
form of an extract containing no indication of the bearer’s registered gender.  
This line of argument continued in the Rees and Cossey cases.25 The argument was 
this ‘recorded sex’ was a record of fact and not one’s identity.26 Moreover, this 
fact had been determined at birth. The linking to the fact was on the biological 
nature of which it was determined. In the Case of Cossey v The United Kingdom 
the State argued sex is determined on ‘biological criteria’ – chromosomal, gonadal, 
and genital sex:27   
the criteria for determining sex of the person was not laid down in the act nor in 
any regulation made under it. However, the practice of the Registrar General is 
to use exclusively the biological criteria: chromosomal, gonadal and genital sex.  
However, as bought up in the case, this ‘biological criteria’ was not a legal 
criterium but a ‘norm’. Case law, especially that derived from Corbet v Corbett28 
onwards, has enforced such a norm.  
Furthermore, States have been reluctant to make amendments to records or 
adaptions to the sex registration system. Change in many States was only 
permitted in cases of mistakes such as administrative error, for example, or wrong 
                                                     
24 Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom, above n 10, at [54]. 
25 Case of Rees v The United Kingdom (9532/81) 17 October 1986 at [21]; Case of Cossey v The 
United Kingdom European Court of Human Rights Strasbourg 10843/84, 27 September 1990 at 
[18]. 
26 "All people can be clearly designated as belonging to either of the provided categories” – “the 
‘F’ and ‘M’ dichotomy.”: Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 21, at 37; European 
Agency for Fundamental Rights The Fundamental Rights Situation of Intersex People (2015) at 4. 
27 Case of Cossey v The United Kingdom, above n 25, at [20]. 
28 Corbett v Corbett [1971] P 83 (United Kingdom). 
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‘determination at birth’.29 This upholding of the system as it was claimed in the 
public interest. For example, the Sheffield and Horsham case stated:30   
The Government have relied in continuing defence of the current system of 
births registration on the general interest grounds which were accepted by the 
Court in its Rees and Cossey judgments as justification for preserving the register 
of births as a historical record of facts subject neither to alteration so as to record 
an entrant’s change of sex nor to abridgement in the form of an extract 
containing no indication of the bearer’s registered gender.  
The public interest claim centred on preserving the record as it was a historical 
record of fact. The state argued that any change or exceptions to the system 
undermine the system and its function.31 In the case of Rees, the State claimed 
that requesting the State to permit amendments for transgender people is 
“tantamount to asking that it should adopt a system in principle the same as theirs 
for determining and recording civil status.”32 This they were suggesting was 
interfering with state sovereignty. Furthermore, they also claimed that it would 
cause other administrative flow on effects in “in the field of birth registration, but 
also in the areas of access to records, family law, affiliation, inheritance, criminal 
justice, employment, social security and insurance.”33 This, in essence, would put 
complications on the system if such changes were permissible despite the fact that 
people can change one’s name on birth records. Due to their insistence on the 
immutability of sex, it is difficult, near impossible to amend causing significant 
disadvantages for the person concerned.34 This has affected both transgender and 
intersex people.  
                                                     
29 Case of Cossey v The United Kingdom, above n 25, at [20]. 
30 Case of Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom, above n 10, at [54]. 
31 Case of Christine Goodwin v The United Kingdom (28957/95) 11 July 2002 at [86]. 
32 Case of Rees v The United Kingdom, above n 25, at [42(a)]. 
33 Case of Christine Goodwin v The United Kingdom, above n 31, at [91]. 
34 Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 21, at 37. 
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This ‘fact’ labelled on the birth certificate has denied intersex people existence 
and the purpose of registration according to international law, protection of the 
law. The very insistence on sex marker, not an international human rights law 
requirement, as factual and immutable indicates the importance of sex status. This 
historical fact based on biological criteria in reality for most infants is a 
determination made by quick look between their legs.35 Although the argument is 
on biological criteria, few children ever get tested for congruence between their 
chromosomal, gonadal and genital sex. In other words, sex assignment is arbitrary.  
However, this arbitrary assignment has a greater impact on intersex people than 
the average child. Unlike most children who they can guess from a quick look, in 
some cases, they do tests on intersex children to find their ‘true sex’. Furthermore, 
along with the assignment, there is often sex-normalising treatment. This denies 
any autonomy not only over who they are but also how they come to be. This is a 
violation the many human rights, especially the ones mentioned in the last two 
chapters. As registration at birth is so important to one’s socio-legal recognition, 
it is important to consider the right to recognition before the law. This is a 
universal and non-derogable right. As registration is important to recognition 
before the law and the protection of the law, it is important to clarify what it is 
and what it means to intersex people.  
7.2 Recognition before the Law 
The importance of socio-legal recognition was noted at the creation of the IBOR. 
There were numerous examples of where nonrecognition or misrecognition had 
led to the lack of access to rights and resources to live a public life freely and fully. 
History has demonstrated non-recognition of people, such as women, children 
and slaves. What has not been so widely recognised was the misrecognition of 
intersex people. Although they exist in the modern world, they exist in a 
                                                     
35 At 13. 
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misrecognised form. They exist in a sex that is assigned to them as either a male 
or female, whether or not it matches who they are, and they have undergone 
normalising treatment to ensure compliance with the assigned sex.   
Therefore, given the importance of being recognised before the law, the drafters 
of the IBOR constructed this right within both the UDHR and the ICCPR. It is 
commonly recognised as the ‘right to be recognised before the law’. The purpose 
is to formally ensure that everyone is recognised before the law. It is included in 
the UDHR as Article 6 stating “Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere 
as a person before the law.”36 This was the same was included in Article 16 of the 
ICCPR: “Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person 
before the law.”37 There is one notable difference in the later which has a 
difference in the verb – ‘shall have’ instead of ‘has’ –  which imposes an obligation, 
a duty, as opposed to a statement. It has also been included in other international 
instruments.38 It has not been an article that is widely applied nor articulated 
within international law. It has had limited discussion even when evoked before 
the HRC.  
7.2.1 Defining Recognition before the Law 
There were two key elements of discussion regarding this article. One centred on 
the capacity to act and its connection to this right (this is discussed later in this 
                                                     
36 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly 217 A (III) (adopted May 1948, 
entered into force 10 December 1948), Art. 6. 
37 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art. 16. 
38 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 6;  It has also been included within the American 
and African Charters: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (adopted 27 June 1981, 
signed 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986), Art. 5; American Convention on 
Human Rights, Organisation of American States (OAS) - International Conference of American 
States (signed April 1948, entered into force 18 July 1978), Art. 3; however, the European 
Convention took a different approach by assuming that it is deduced from the other articles in 
the Convention. See: Nowak, above n 12, at 369; Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2000) at 201. 
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section). The other main discussion was with reference to who was to be 
recognised before the law. As illustrated earlier in the thesis, due to different 
interpretive horizons, there has been a difference of focus between the ‘what’ and 
the ‘who’. This difference of what and who became central to this discussion of 
this article.   
It was clear in some of the early drafts of the IBOR that some nations were pushing 
for their focus on the legal person or ‘juridical person’. However, it was recognised 
that this “did not have a well-defined meaning in some systems of law.”39 It was a 
creation in and through law and did not necessarily have an existence independent 
of the law, as corporate entities or associations have.40 Person or personhood was 
jurisdictional dependent, and as such, the language was not the same from place 
to place. Even where it is used the language and meaning were sufficiently clear 
and precise.41  
                                                     
39 UN Secretary-General Document A/2929: Annotations on the Text of the Draft International 
Covenants on Human Rights (Agenda 28-10th Session 1955) at 46. 
40 Michael Bogdan “Article 6” in Asbjørn Eide and others (eds) The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: a Commentary (Scandinavian University Press, Oslo : Oxford, 1992) at 112. 
41 This right was drafted ‘juridical personality’ but was not considered as sufficiently clear and did 
not have a well-defined meaning in some systems of law. This was modified through a Philippines 
initiative to “recognition as a person before the law.” The only substantial objections came from 
Anglo-American delegates as there was no equivalent in Anglo-Saxon law. Latin America and 
Eastern Bloc countries spoke of the importance of the concept, as did some like ‘Western’ states 
like Germany who were not represented at the UN. For example, Germany had included the 
‘human person’ in its Constitution. They argued that the Commission should not be afraid to 
make an innovation just because it is not established usage in the ‘Commonwealth’ based 
countries. However, the Latinite versions of the UDHR retain the term juridical personality, while 
the compromise language in English as ‘person before the law’ was accepted by Roosevelt’s 
delegation. Despite the reassurance from the UK delegation, the committee voted to change 
everyone and every person to every human being to distinguish from legal person, however, the 
English and French text still bear the unmodified term ‘person’. This resulted in human rights in 
some language versions of the UDHR such as German, formalising it as the civil person through 
personality: UN Secretary-General, above n 39, at 46; Nowak, above n 12, at 371; Joseph 
Slaughter “The Textuality of Human Rights: Founding Narratives of Human Personality” [2004] 
Interdisciplinary Law and Humanities Junior Scholar Workshop Paper at 31, 36, 48. 
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Furthermore, some of the early drafts discussed the ability to exercise rights 
where there has been a ‘deprivation of the legal person’.42 There were a couple of 
reasons: one the legal person did not necessarily include every human being and 
the other is the use of the language was imprecise. As far as exclusion, it had been 
recognised that the ‘juridical person’ had not always recognised every human 
being before the law. Some people had been degraded to mere outlawed 
objects,43 or as slaves44 and sometimes resulted in ‘civil death’.45 Other people 
such as women, children, and slaves were only recognised through their husbands, 
fathers, or masters respectively, and in such cases, were without their own legal 
personality.46 This deprived them of legal rights and obligations47 and gave no 
protection of the law. In the sense of the juridical person, it would not achieve the 
aims and purposes of the IBOR.   
Through the interpretation of international human rights law, it requires that the 
‘person’ referred to in Article 6 (UDHR) and Article 16 (ICCPR) be interpreted in the 
ordinary meaning in their context and in light of its object and purpose. There was 
a general agreement during the drafting of the ICCPR, that every human being 
would be a subject, not an object of the law.48 This signalled along with the 
foundation and purpose of the IBOR that it was the human person or the human 
being, and not status or legal personhood that was to be ‘recognised before the 
law.’49 This human person, the dignified being, was to be the “potential bearer of 
                                                     
42 UN Secretary-General, above n 39, at 46; Nowak, above n 12, at 370. 
43 Nowak, above n 12, at 369. 
44 This was the case with slaves under Roman law, during colonial periods, and Jews under Nazi 
rule. 
45 Bogdan, above n 40, at 112; Nowak, above n 12, at 369; Slaughter, above n 41, at 32. 
46 Nowak, above n 12, at 369. 
47 At 369. 
48 Marc J Bossuyt Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (M Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht ; Boston : Hingham, MA, 1987) at 336. 
49 Nowak, above n 12, at 369. 
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legal rights and obligations.”50 As the Secretary-General stated regarding the draft 
of the ICCPR51 
the expression of a ‘person before the law’ was meant to ensure recognition of 
the legal status of every individual and of his capacity to exercise rights and enter 
into contractual obligations.   
It affirms that every human being holds and exercises human rights from birth to 
death which is indispensable to any jurisdiction operating under the rule of law.52 
This indicated that though these rights from birth, they may be interfered with or 
violated by the state or other actors which affect one’s ability to exercise such 
rights.   
The other major discussion was that of ‘capacity to act’. Discussion varied as to 
whether this was central or not to the focus of this article. Some of the early drafts 
provided for exceptions to this person as to whether it applied.53 The parties, in so 
doing, were referring to the capacity to act – the ability54 to “handle one's 
affairs.”55 Within such a conceptualisation, some people would still be excluded 
from recognition before the law. However, drafters and the General Committee 
were well aware that ‘capacity to act’ and ‘recognition before the law’ were not 
the same, and that formulating the ‘capacity to act’ was beyond the ability of an 
internationally binding treaty to incorporate such a right.56 The recognition before 
the law would exist irrespective of capacity to act. Any lack of capacity would not 
                                                     
50 Bogdan, above n 40, at 111. 
51 Nowak, above n 12, at 370. 
52 At 369, 372; Michael Galchinsky “Quaint and Obsolete: The ‘War on Terror’ and the Right to 
Legal Personality” (2013) 14 Int Stud Perspect 255 at 256. 
53 Minors, those of unsound mind/insane, and those convicted of certain crimes. Refer to: UN 
Secretary-General, above n 39, at 46; Nowak, above n 12, at 370. 
54 If one does not have the capacity to act, then one requires a representative of legal 
personality. Refer to: Bogdan, above n 40, at 112. 
55 At 112; Bossuyt, above n 48, at 336; Nowak, above n 12, at 369. 
56 Nowak, above n 12, at 370. 
347 
 
dissolve the one’s rights and obligations as a human rights being.57 Thus, Joseph 
Slaughter wrote:58 
Nonetheless ‘so obvious a principle’ entered the UDHR in its characteristic 
tautological form; the preamble already recognises the inherent ‘dignity and 
worth of the human person’ that Article 6 prescribes to every person as a right.  
The ‘capacity to act’ was not in consideration within this article, and hence 
something for each jurisdiction to consider. What was essential, irrespective of the 
‘capacity to act’ was that everyone was recognised before the law as a human 
person with rights and responsibilities. As such, the purpose of this article was 
clear. To have the protection of the law, one had to be recognised before the law, 
or be treated as a person in the eyes of the law.59 If someone was not recognised 
before the law, the law could not protect their rights and obligations. 
The last important element of definition regarding this article was that of 
application. The purpose was that everyone was to be recognised before the law 
irrespective of the capacity to act. The past has demonstrated that this has 
sometimes been denied or taken away from people at certain times in different 
jurisdictions. As such, there was the need to make this article non-derogable. Non-
derogable means that even in times of emergency, there is a prohibition of the 
restriction or suspension of the right to recognition for any reason. It contractually 
and universally covers everyone both within and across all territories.60 This is 
clarified under Article 4(2) of the ICCPR where it states that Article 16, ‘recognition 
before the law’, is non-derogable due to factors such as nationality, race, religion, 
                                                     
57 At 370; Jessica Berg “Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal Personhood” 
(2007) 59 Hastings L J 369 at 373; Galchinsky, above n 52, at 256. 
58 Joseph R Slaughter Human Rights, Inc (1st ed, Fordham University Press, New York, 2007) at 
77. 
59 Bogdan, above n 40, at 111. 
60 Slaughter, above n 41, at 32; Galchinsky, above n 52, at 256. 
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or sex.61 The non-derogable nature of this Article does not permit anyone to be 
invisible, erased, or removed from being recognised before the law. Despite what 
one has done, for example, a criminal act which may require some form of 
discipline, punishment, or rectification, that human being is still to be recognised 
before the law. 
7.2.2 Invisibility and Mis/non-recognition before the Law 
Non-recognition and misrecognition are central to issues facing intersex people. 
They are both non-recognised and misrecognised at the same time. They are not 
recognised as an intersex person. They are assigned a sex at birth, and based on 
that assignation, whether or not that is who they are, they are recognised before 
the law. This becomes an issue for intersex people, as if they are not recognised 
as who they are before the law, then they have no protection of the law as to who 
they are. In other words, they only have protection based on and according to the 
‘determined identity’. Many of the issues they face are not in the recognised sex, 
but the invisible sex that is not recognised. As intersex people are invisible in most 
societies, despite the fact they exist, the invisibility leads to no or little protection 
of the law.  
Such invisibility is not unique to intersex people. In the past women and slaves 
were invisible before the law, even though they physically existed. Invisibility is 
where one exists in society, but there is no trace of them, especially legally, but 
sometimes also socially. There is limited case law in this area, but there is some in 
an analogous one – enforced disappearances. Enforced disappearances are62   
considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of 
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons 
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by 
                                                     
61 Nowak, above n 12, at 369; Galchinsky, above n 52, at 256. 
62 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
(signed 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010), Art. 2. 
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a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate 
or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside 
the protection of the law.   
It is important to note here that the analogy with intersex people differs in one 
major respect. Unlike in enforced disappearance there where is a detention 
element, this does not occur in the invisibility of intersex people. Rather they live 
in a state of socio-legal invisibility while still living in society. This is a major 
difference between the two cases. The cause of the analogy and that of intersex 
people differ. The cause of both in a different way has led to violations. Those of 
enforced disappearances have often been illegally detained, with other violations 
sometimes quite horrific, but often the whereabouts never discovered. Intersex 
people, for different reasons primarily socio-legal, have been made invisible 
through elements including that of torture as described last chapter. However, 
what both of these cases have in common is not the cause, but the effect of being 
invisible before the law. Both occur at the hand of the state, or through the 
authorization, support or acquiescence of the state. Due to their concealment, 
they have limited access to and protection of the law. 
Invisibility not only hides the person from view but also makes many of their issues 
invisible too no matter how grave they might be. For that reason, it is difficult for 
both society and the law to know what social issues they face and what rights and 
freedoms they require. However, in both cases, there are some who have 
recovered from the invisibility. For example, when there is the fortunate case of 
rescuing someone who has been through an enforced disappearance, their story 
enables us to have a window on what has occurred and what is required to prevent 
it from occurring again.   
In the case of intersex people, escaping invisibility utilises a term borrowed from 
the LGBT community – coming out. Coming out is where intersex people publicly 
reveal themselves as intersex, irrespective of the sex expression as male, female, 
both or neither. Despite the estimated population size of intersex people, this is 
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still a limited number of the overall population indicating that the majority are still 
socio-legally invisible. However, those who have come out have revealed stories 
of pain, suffering, and consequences that will continue for the rest of their life. 
Much of these stories and effects have been covered in the last chapter. Due to 
their invisibility, they had no access to the law and no protection of the law.   
7.2.2.1 Case Law 
With regard to Article 16 of the ICCPR before the HRC, the majority of cases are 
due to enforced disappearances. In such cases, as with two from Libya, the HRC 
emphasised the important connection between ‘recognition before the law’ and 
‘protection of the law’. The Committee63       
reiterates its established jurisprudence according to which intentionally 
removing a person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time 
may constitute a denial of his or her right to recognition as a person before the 
law if the victim was in the hands of the State authorities when last seen and if 
the efforts of his or her relatives to obtain access to effective remedies — 
including judicial remedies (art. 2, para. 3, of the Covenant) — have been 
systematically impeded.  
Importantly, the HRC states that “removing a person from the protection of the 
law for a prolonged period of time may constitute a denial of his or her right to 
recognition as a person before the law.” The issue is not the length of time, short 
or long, but the removal of the person from the protection of the law. Even if the 
State party was not involved in the disappearance directly, the failure of the State 
party to provide information as to the invisibility or disappearances enables non-
                                                     
63 Mufteh Younis Muftah Al-Rabassi v Libya ICCPR Human Rights Committee Communication No 
1860/2009, 18 July 2014 at [7(7)]; Youcif Almegaryaf and Hisham Matar v Libya ICCPR Human 
Rights Committee Communication No 2006/2010, 21 March 2014 at [7(8)]. 
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recognition before the law and thus violated Article 16.64 This demonstrates that 
a person can existentially exist, yet not be recognised before the law.  
The above cases demonstrate that if the person is invisible before the law, there 
is no protection of the law. Such cases highlight the necessity for the non-
derogation of this Article. One had to be recognised before the law to have any 
protection of the law and to exercise one’s rights and obligations. In other words, 
when one is anonymous or invisible, there is no ability to enforce one’s political, 
civil, and social rights.65   
7.2.2.2 Rendering of Intersex Invisibility 
A difference with enforced disappearances is that they know they have been taken 
even if those around them may not. This is completely different with the majority 
of intersex people. Few know who they are, whether or not they have come to 
make peace with their sex expression. In some cases, parents may know, but in 
many cases, even parents do not know. They have been officially concealed into a 
new identity that the state recognises. This is a unique form of invisibility that 
cannot even be compared with that of enforced disappearances.   
Intersex people, due to different reasons, yet still directly and indirectly through 
state involvement have been rendered invisible before the law through social, 
medical and legal means and had limited or no protection of the law. Even today, 
few people recognise that they even exist.66 As Philip Ebels writes “intersex people 
                                                     
64 Mufteh Younis Muftah Al-Rabassi v Libya, above n 63, at [7(7)]; Youcif Almegaryaf and Hisham 
Matar v Libya, above n 63, at [7(8)]. 
65 Serge Gutwirth “Beyond Identity?” (2009) 1 IDIS 123 at 125. 
66 Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 21, at 14; Dan Christian Ghattas Human 
Rights between the Sexes - a Preliminary Study on the Life Situations of Inter*Individuals (Volume 
34 2013) at 7. 
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in the EU live largely in the dark.”67 As Barbara Unmüßig and Jana Mittag remark,68 
the   
physical and gender diversity of inter* individuals are marginalised, if not 
invisible, even in the concept of gender identity – a conceptual void.  
Many intersex people remain invisible both socially and legally. Even if they do 
come out socially, legally they predominantly remain invisible. Intersex is a legal 
and conceptual void that leaves people existing yet invisible at the same time.  
Historically, in some places, there was non-recognition as they did not exist 
because they were killed. Although it still occurs in some places,69 a different non-
recognition occurs today. They are medically made invisible. However, the medical 
treatment does more than erase parts of the body. It also reconstructs some new 
ones. As reported in the Australian Government report, Involuntary or Coerced 
Sterilisation of Intersex People in Australia,70    
“normalisation surgery is more than physical reconstruction. The surgery is 
intended to deconstruct an intersex physiology and, in turn, construct an identity 
that conforms with stereotypical male and female gender categories.”  
Sex-normalisation is not simply fixing what is there, it is an essentialising of the 
body to conform to the status categories society accepts. As such, along with the 
physical deconstruction/reconstruction is a whole psychological education 
programme to ensure the child complies with the gender. It is a “preventive 
                                                     
67 Philip Ebels “Intersex People in EU: Ashamed and Invisible” EUobserver.com (12 June 2012) 
<http://euobserver.com/890/116578>. 
68 Ghattas, above n 66, at 8. 
69 At 7, 24; but also in history, see: Alice Domurat Dreger Hermaphrodites and the Medical 
Invention of Sex (Harvard University Press, 1998); Epstein, above n 11; Elizabeth Reis Bodies in 
doubt (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2009). 
70 Senate Community Affairs References Committee and Australian Government Involuntary or 
Coerced Sterilisation of Intersex People in Australia (2013) at 69. 
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psycho-sexual normalisation.”71  The reconstruction of the bodies maintains the 
belief that there are only two sexes to uphold the social structure of society.  
The normalisation into social male or female renders them invisible medically, 
socially, and legally. They only have recognition, thus, protection, in the form of 
sex they have been normalised into. The effects of this invisibility of intersex 
people are numerous. The report Human Rights and Intersex People notes that 
invisibility impacts in many areas of an intersex person’s early life:72   
The invisibility of intersex people in society is another serious problem. Their life 
experience is often shrouded in secrecy and shame, also as a result of their 
frequently being unaware of the surgeries or treatments that were performed 
on them early on in their life. Access to medical records is often rendered very 
difficult, as is access to personal history, including childhood pictures and other 
memories. Intersex individuals who are discovered later on in life may 
experience the same invasive treatment – without their free and informed 
consent – as intersex individuals who are identified during childhood. 
This result is an intersex person living in an altered body they did not choose which 
results in life-long serious physical and mental issues in a registered sex that may 
or may not match who they are. Being intersex is thus invisible, possibly even to 
themselves, and definitely to the socio-legal world around them. This has slightly 
different facts to a disappearance case, but the principle is the same. It is the very 
denial of the existence of human persons with a sex that is different to the male-
female binary.  This erases a part of one’s person and as such affects, one’s right 
to privacy as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Many intersex people are unaware of their uniqueness of their biological 
variations due to their history and medical interventions that have been hidden 
                                                     
71 Ghattas, above n 66, at 10. 
72 Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 21, at 14. 
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from them.73  This prevents them from finding the support of others like them. 
This invisibility prevents not only identity but also connectedness of others who 
are intersex. It also prevents support networks for protection before the law.  As 
Ghattas states:74  
The resulting invisibility of intersex individuals prevents community-building 
among intersex individuals. In addition, intersex individuals frequently 
experience massive psychological and physical problems due to medical 
interventions and discrimination in everyday life. These aspects prevent or 
impede intersex self-organisation and activist work. 
Due to the fear of stigmatisation and exclusion, many “stay “in the closet”, even 
when they become aware of their sex.”75 This leaves intersex people invisible, but 
those who do come out face discrimination and stigma. Due to the strong stigma 
and taboo, when people come out, they face structural76 and verbal discrimination 
and also face violence and life-threatening situations.77 As Dan Ghattas wrote:78   
Inter[sex] individuals are socially barely visible worldwide, since intersex is still a 
strong taboo. For fear of stigmatisation and social exclusion, many inter* 
individuals do not come out. If it becomes known, in rare cases, they are not only 
exposed to verbal and structural discrimination, but also experience physical 
violence and lifethreatening situations.  
The invisibility prevents recognition before the law and inhibits their ability to have 
the protection of the law because they are not recognised, it diminishes the 
                                                     
73 Erik Schneider An Insight into Respect for the Rights of Trans and Intersex Children in Europe 
(2013) at [164]. 
74 Ghattas, above n 66, at 15. 
75 Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 21, at 14. 
76 Structural discrimination refers to the “policies of dominant race/ethnic/gender institutions 
and the behavior of the individuals who implement these policies and control these institutions, 
which are race/ethnic/gender neutral in intent but which have differential and/or harmful effect 
on minority race/ethnic/gender groups.” See: Fred L Pincus “Discrimination Comes in Many 
Forms: Individual, Institutional, and Structural” (1996) 40 American Behavioral Scientist 186 at 
186. 
77 Ghattas, above n 66, at 7; Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 21, at 14. 
78 Ghattas, above n 66, at 7. 
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violation against them which often may be devastating. The stigma and exclusion 
are simply a result of non-recognition and devaluing of difference.   
7.2.3 Summary 
There are no cases in international law on intersex issues. The domestic law 
around the world has minimal cases too. Most of them are in Colombia. Few of 
them discuss recognition before the law. It is for this reason, the closest cases that 
have some resemblance to intersex issues regarding recognition before the law 
are those of enforced disappearances. Although some elements of enforced 
disappearances differ from the situation of intersex invisibility, the result of both 
cases is similar. They are both invisible to the law, and thus have little or no 
protection of the law.  
7.3 Recognition of (Inter)Sex before the Law 
Registration at birth is an important part of being recognised before the law. This 
recognition is important to have the protection of the law. These two go hand in 
hand. The purpose of Article 24 gives children recognition, an identity, to protect 
children their vulnerability due to age and size and so on so that they can be 
protected by the law.79 The capacity before the law is different yet interconnected. 
Their vulnerability indicates that they need support and protection for the very 
reason that they do not have ‘capacity to act’. 
Due to the ‘historical nature’ of the sex registered at birth, intersex people are first 
confronted with a legal issue at birth when their biology is not recognised before 
the law, and as such they get assigned as a ‘male’ or ‘female’.80 The sex is 
recognized only as a pathology, an object to be assigned, by usually medical staff,81 
                                                     
79 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 24(1). 
80 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, above n 26, at 4. 
81 In the modern era, prior to any assignment, ‘tests’ may be done to help medical professionals 
decide upon a sex they feel best fits that individual.   
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as sex that is recognised by law. The “medical identification of a ‘preponderant’ 
sex” leads to the “legal imposition of a ‘male’ or ‘female’ sex” which more often 
includes normalising treatment on very young intersex children.82 This assignment 
of sex is usually accompanied by medical treatment to ensure one’s ‘sexual 
characteristics’ matches the assignment.83 This assigned sex at birth then becomes 
one’s sex for life.  
However, for intersex people, despite being registered, they are not recognised 
for who they are and do not have protection over their autonomy of how they 
come to be. At present in most States, intersex people must meet various legal 
requirements in order to fit into one of the two possible categories of 
gender/sex.84 Rights are only afforded once a person has legal recognition. 
Because recognition is still primarily gender focused, intersex people are still 
invisible. Moreover, the binary prevents any recognition of those outside. This 
illustrates that the current ‘gender’ conceptualisation prevents intersex human 
rights. Therefore, ‘recognition as a person before the law’ is at the heart of the 
claim for rights for intersex people.85 Their claim for recognition is complex in that 
while they want recognition of their biology, they don’t want to be mis-sexed in 
                                                     
82 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, above n 26, at 4. 
83 This normalising treatment transforms one’s sex anatomy to what the medical profession 
determine as this infant/child’s ‘real sex’. It denies the person any autonomy (or self-
determination) of one’s own being. As such it becomes torture and inhumane treatment. Despite 
presumption that this was done under the auspices of the ‘best for society and that child’, it does 
not take into account the autonomy of the child nor the long-time effect on the child’s health. 
Moreover, it removes the ability for that child to freely and fully develop into a constructive and 
constituent member of society.    
84 Silvan Agius and Christa Tobler Trans and Intersex People: Discrimination on the Grounds of Sex, 
Gender Identity and Gender Expression (2012) at 5. 
85 Leve, above n 6, at 513. 
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the sense that all intersex bodies assuming are a third sex.86 What they do want is 
the autonomy to be recognised as either male, female, both or neither.87 
7.3.1 Recognition of Sex before the International Law 
Nonrecognition affects people’s lives and leads to vulnerability, humiliation and 
anxiety, especially where sex is of legal relevance and distinctions are made 
between men and women88 and even more so when your sex is invisible. It is for 
this reason that recognition of one’s sex is important, not to classify, but to 
recognise them as who they are and protect and enable who they are.   
Chapter 3 highlighted the way that sex had been interpreted and adopted by some 
bodies in international law. There was a trend to retain the binary sex status of 
male and female, and anything else was considered ‘other’. This has even been 
included in the general comment of the ICESCR body on non-discrimination.89 This 
very process of classing as the other, a problem facing women for many years is 
discriminatory. Intersex people are human beings with a sex but not a clearly 
classifiable one.  Sex is actually as elusive in international law as it is in most 
jurisdictions. As it is not defined, it is important to understand according to basic 
principles. Given the impetus of international human rights to focus on the dignity 
of the human person, not one’s status, it is intriguing that sex status still remains 
so important critical as defined above. The question becomes has sex been used 
for definitive or illustrative purposes?  
                                                     
86 OII Australia and Morgan Carpenter Submission to the Australian Human Rights Commission: 
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Rights Snapshot Report (2015) at 2. 
87 At 2. 
88 Case of Christine Goodwin v The United Kingdom, above n 31, at [76–77]. 
89 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No 20: Non-
discrimination in economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art 2, paragraph 2, of the ICESCR) (2009) 
E/C12/GC/20 at [32]. 
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At the time of compiling the UN Charter and the IBOR, knowledge and awareness 
of sex diversity was limited, or possibly even unheard of. Few people had 
connections with sex diverse people at that time. Due to social exclusion, the 
chance of meeting someone was minimal. To envisage the inequality, 
discrimination and violations they faced were impossible at that time. Intersex 
people were invisible and few LGBT people were ‘out’ in public. Although 
homosexuals were among the many sent to death camps, this was often 
overlooked during the drafting, of the IBOR, or at least it appears so as there has 
never been any mention of them.  
Moreover, from a textual understanding, when the Charter and the IBOR refer to 
“the equal rights of men and women,”90 it is referring to the gendered organisation 
of society – socio-political sex status – and not one’s ‘biological sex’. The reason 
equal rights of men and women were specifically mentioned in the Preambles in 
the Charter and the IBOR was due to the great inequality that they faced which 
was acknowledged at the time of drafting such documents. Moreover, the 
Conventions within the IBOR contained a special Article, Article 2, specifying the 
equality of men and women. Again, this was key in the issues as stated above in 
the establishment of the Sub-Commission on the Status of Women. The equality 
of men and women was thus about the relational environment, not the biological 
sex makeup. 
Furthermore, from the very time of the formation of the UN, and in particular the 
IBOR, statuses or status categories were a barrier to the equality of human beings. 
Rather than utilising statuses, the equality principle (EP) regarded that there 
should be no distinction, especially due to the statuses.  To uphold the foundation 
and achieve the purpose of human rights, statuses would be a barrier. From a 
human rights perspective, human life is irreducible to attributive status 
                                                     
90 Charter of the United Nations, United Nations 1 UNTS XVI (signed 26 June 1945, entered into 
force 24 October 1945), Preamble; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. 
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identities.91 Holding onto the sex status would set human rights up for failure. The 
effect of status and its denigration or denial of the dignity of the human person 
and the restriction of the free and full development of personality was 
acknowledged during the drafting and a reason for the shifting the foundation 
from the legal person to the human person under international human rights.92 
The categories were examples of statuses that had denigrated of the dignity of the 
individual, a denial of a person's capacity to choose and act on his or her 
responsibility.93 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the purpose of the equality and non-
discrimination was to remove the inequality by focusing on the dignity of the 
person as a whole rather than on a single status element of a person. 
Finally, the listing in the IBOR, like in many treaties, it was not possible to capture 
all areas, so the lists were indicative of the purpose of the article, rather than an 
exhaustive list of contents. There has been careful wording through the use of 
phrases ‘such as’ or other such terms. In the majority of these cases, these have 
been purposely as an illustration. What the delegates were aware of as issues at 
that time were noted and illustrated through the use of phrases “such as,” “and 
the like,” “and other status” indicated that the lists were not exhaustive.94   
Sex is not defined in international law. To maintain the position of sex status in 
international human rights law goes against the very basis for which it was 
established. It was acknowledged that statuses were the basis of inequality and as 
such there shall be no discrimination as to the statuses. The wording is clear. The 
basis of rights was to remove status as an identifying and discriminating point and 
base rights back in the human person. Autonomy is central to human rights and 
                                                     
91 Davina Cooper “‘And You Can’t Find Me Nowhere’: Relocating Identity and Structure within 
Equality Jurisprudence” (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 249 at 251. 
92 Refer to Chapter 4 for more detail.  
93 Oscar Schachter “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept” (1983) 77 The American Journal of 
International Law 848 at 850. 
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this includes over one’s sex irrespective of whether one’s sex be male, female, 
both or neither. A human rights person is irrespective of sex yet still respects and 
enables one’s sex at the same time.  
7.3.2 Intersex, Registration and Recognition 
The human rights person is not a dependent upon one’s sex. Despite the current 
interpretation sex is still part of social and legal recognition but does not have to 
be controlled by it. Moreover, status was not the goal of human rights, but the 
issue it was trying to resolve. The human rights person respects who one is 
whether male, female, both or neither. As such recognition and registration must 
be autonomously controlled, even though it is administered by the State.    
The purpose of recognition before the law is to enable everyone access to the law 
and also the protection of the law. One of the important elements to this is birth 
registration. The ultimate purpose is to ensure every child is recognised before the 
law, irrespective of their capacity to act and thus enable them to have legal 
protection.  
In spite of such a goal by international human rights, for intersex people, this is 
still elusive. Although they are registered, it is through a sex determined and 
normalised process which interferes with their right to privacy and has affected 
their very well-being. The report Human Rights and Intersex People notes:95   
The classification of a ‘boy’ or a ‘girl’ indicates just “how fundamental sex and 
gender classifications are to our society, as well as the binary manner in which 
the human sexes are categorised. It also demonstrates our limited 
understanding of sex, given that the rigid line with which we separate the sexes 
into two mutually exclusive categories does not have a parallel in nature.  
                                                     
95 Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 21, at 13. 
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The current classifications currently in place are so fundamental that they appear 
natural. This provides strict rigid categories within society that many cannot see 
past. Its prejudicial norms focused on the binary, as Agius and Tobler write, mean 
that “[p]eople who do not easily fit these norms, such as trans and intersex people, 
encounter numerous difficulties, both at the practical level of everyday life and at 
the legal level.”96 Dan Ghattas refers to the invisibility of intersex within the 
administrative system:97 
“Problem areas arise from the legal situation of intersex individuals. Their gender 
is legally and administratively non-existent due to the worldwide dominance of 
the gender binary. This codified invisibility is supplemented by invisibility in 
everyday life, the taboo on intersex and the experience of discrimination and 
violence.”  
This pressure leads many parents and medical professionals to ensure the child is 
both socially and legally unambiguous,98 that is they are either male or female. 
However, at the same time, it has made intersex people invisible both socially and 
legally.   
The registration systems around the world do not normally provide space for 
diversity. There are some that give temporary time to determine one’s true sex 
such as in Germany and New Zealand.99 Germany has recently amended the law 
to enable the sex designator to be left blank at the time of birth,100 but this only 
amounts to an existence at birth, it does not protect the right to physical 
integrity.101 There are some that permit changes to birth certificates from one sex 
to another but that is usually after a medical sex change. However, some now 
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accept such changes without medical intervention such as Denmark, Argentina 
and Malta.102 There are few that have open categories or do not requires sex at 
all. Furthermore, there are some that permit non-binary option ‘X’, for example, 
on secondary documents such as passports and drivers licences in places like 
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Nepal, and South Africa.103  
However, even if the state has a provision for a neutral or non-binary sex 
designation, this does not mean that intersex people are visible, although it is an 
important step. Without control of medical normalisation and education of 
diversity, rather than binary, the invisibility will remain. For example, Dan Ghattas 
notes:104       
“Inter* individuals encounter legal obstacles in many countries when registering 
their sex/gender for a critically important birth certificate, which needs to be 
acquired a few weeks after birth. In Germany, it is only with a birth certificate 
that, for example, parental pay can be applied for, health insurance coverage can 
be granted, separate fatherhood can be recognised and a childcare place can be 
reserved. The pressure on parents to have their child surgically assigned to an 
‘unambiguous’ sex at an early age is high.”  
As such, sex registration even if providing for the difference may not benefit the 
child if those surrounding the child are not ready to accept difference.     
Therefore, until society changes, many intersex advocate groups argue for a 
temporary designation as ‘male’ or ‘female’ that is easily amendable by the 
individuals as their sex identity develops.105 Another option could be that this is 
left blank for all children,106 thus not stigmatising any child. This was supported in 
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105 Schneider, above n 73, at [201 and 204]; Commissioner for Human Rights and Agius, above n 
21, at 39; Markus Bauer and Daniela Truffer Intersex Genital Mutilations - Human Rights 
Violations of Children with Variations of Sex Anatomy (2014) at 20. 
106 Schneider, above n 73, at [204]. 
363 
 
the final statement made by the intersex advocates from around the world in 
relation to sex registration at the Third Intersex Forum:107  
 To register intersex children as females or males, with the awareness that, like all 
people, they may grow up to identify with a different sex or gender. 
 To ensure that sex or gender classifications are amendable through a simple 
administrative procedure at the request of the individuals concerned. All adults 
and capable minors should be able to choose between female (F), male (M), non-
binary or multiple options. In the future, as with race or religion, sex or gender 
should not be a category on birth certificates or identification documents for 
anybody. 
For intersex people, even if there are alternative categories, several issues remain: 
they should not be forced into one category or another; they must be 
autonomously chosen; the category should not be stigmatising by imposing the 
‘third’ sex’ on all intersex people; and lastly, it must be in conjunction with the 
prohibiting of sex-normalising treatment and procedures without that fully 
informed person’s consent.108 The aim of intersex people is to have space to 
identify who they are – male, female, both or neither – while having autonomy 
and integrity over their body.  
7.3.3 Recognition and Dignity of Intersex People 
Recognition is core to dignity. The failure to recognise one as an equal human 
being debases one’s dignity. Jan Mårtenson argues that the spirit and philosophy 
of the UDHR are “on the individual, the rights necessary to the inherent dignity of 
the individual alone, and on his/her relation to others and society.”109 These are 
expressed through the rights and freedoms within the IBOR. Dignity is 
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relational,110 in respecting one another as equal human beings, and, as Oscar 
Schachter argues, dignity:111   
“embraces a recognition that the individual self is a part of larger collectivities 
and that they, too, must be considered in the meaning of the inherent dignity of 
the person.”  
Mattson and Clark argue that the interaction in and through the community 
shapes dignity not only through “our relationships with ourselves but also by our 
relationships with others as well as our interactions with the physical world.”112   
The right to dignity as a human being is reflected by the physical and the 
intellectual and spiritual dimensions of what it means to be human - personality.113 
It is the recognition of the person as a physical and spiritual-moral being that 
guarantees their enjoyment of his own sense of enjoyment.114 These very 
dimensions are critical for intersex people to enable their well-being and to enable 
the right to privacy to establish and shape autonomously who they are and how 
they come to be.   
They need the protection of the law due to not only the effects of the normalising 
treatment but when they do identify themselves as intersex, the discrimination 
and issues they face. A report in the Netherlands in 2014 found that “virtually all 
of the intersex people interviewed encountered problems in their social situation. 
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They talked about being lonely and experiencing shame and embarrassment.”115 
It leads to difficulties and anomalies in the daily life of intersex people, as with 
transgender people.116 Intersex people face the same issues. 
Recognition and protection of the law must free them from the current bind of sex 
status. This has already caused them significant impact on their life. The 
foundation of human rights cannot be upheld as a dignified person while people 
such as intersex people are forced invisible as who they are and forced into some 
pseudo-identity the state wants them to be as some sex status. Ellen Feder 
writes:117 
Surely it is a measure of how entrenched the prevailing views of sexual difference 
remain that the recognition of bodies that do not clearly show how to the stand 
for male and female could seem to require the creation of new categories or 
constitute an argument for the abolition of sexual difference itself.     
This indication of the strength is the fact that many intersex groups have resisted 
the fight for this and stop at ending the surgeries.118 However, as Feder notes, 
freedom and dignity will only ensue when the freedom to define exists. Catherine 
Harper supports this point when she writes:119   
With the subject as the ultimate governor of ‘his’ or ‘her’ sex identification, and 
with the self-identificatory tool being the psyche rather than the physical 
manifestation of the body, there is real potential for liberation from the binary 
and a completely fresh approach to how sex is constituted or indeed – in more 
radical discourse – how many sexes there actually might be. 
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This indicates the issue is not the recording itself, but whether one has autonomy 
over who they are, the freedom to make changes as and when necessary as one 
shapes one’s own good life in and with others. Although the fight to prevent sex-
normalising surgery, unless the individual concerned agrees through informed 
consent, is a just fight, this is not sufficient. Liberation and dignity will only result 
when the binary of sex status is gone. This does not mean male and female do not 
exist, they still will but in many forms, as well as people who see themselves as 
both or neither as well.  
The claiming of intersex identity is a means of claiming dignity. It is a means of a 
sense of being, regaining a mark of power over their narrative identity, something 
that had been taken away. Catherine Harper reports about one of the interviews 
of the book named Chris:120  
Chris is reclaiming an intersex identity from societal insistence on binarism as a 
way of acknowledging and strengthening his/her identity…’I personally had felt 
differently for years, feeling more feminine than I did male, yet neither one nor 
the other – ever since I was a very young child…A real mixture of both in almost 
every respect, but who would believe or understand me.” 
This interviewee is not alone. Many intersex people feel the same. This does not 
mean that all intersex people claim an intersex identity but may still claim their 
intersex diversity as part of who they are. It is high time for international human 
rights to enable such recognition so intersex people can freely write their story of 
becoming.  
It is at this juncture, it is important to relate recognition, such as that of intersex 
people on the basis of the thesis. Recognition, as defined in the introduction of 
the thesis, is about making sense of oneself – who and how one comes to be – that 
enables self-esteem and self-respect and relationally give esteem and respect to 
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others. This gives meaning and purpose to each one’s life and enables them to 
relate to others around them in society. This recognition occurs through one’s 
narrative identity. Anne Becker writes that the human ability to freely confess 
their narratives has a twofold relevance to identity construction and human 
rights:121  
In the first place, it emphasizes the freedom and responsibility which every 
individual has to the sharing of his or her unique life-story as being of 
irreplaceable value to the constitution of reality and construction of the world. 
Secondly, in sharing individual narratives, humans confess who they are and not 
what they are and where they belong. In narrating individual life-stories and 
experiences, every individual through his or her autobiography individuates 
himself or herself as an equal and dignified partner in constituting reality and 
constructing the world. 
Enabling every human being to narrate is enabling the basic capabilities of 
humanness as Paul Ricoeur argues – to speak, to act, to narrate and to impute. 
This enables intersex people to be who they are without having to construct 
themselves in some system. The responsibility Becker discusses derives through 
human imputability.  This is a responsibility to share one’s story, and in so doing 
reciprocates esteem and respect upon other moral beings. This reveals one’s 
moral identity. As each one reveals their life story, their personal identity, they 
demonstrate they are an equal and dignified partner in constituting reality and 
constructing the world. No matter who one is as a sex and what variations they 
may have. A flourishing society must equally respect each person enabling them 
to their potentiality irrespective of the role one had in the society 
7.4 Conclusion 
This Article is not accidental to this thesis, but actually is the link to identity as 
discussed in the early chapters. The right to be recognised before the law and the 
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protections it gives is essential to be a human rights person – a dignified member 
of society. This right to recognition is not the abstract person of law, but the 
human person which is the foundation of international human rights. Joseph 
Slaughter connects this to recognition before the law:122    
’Personality’ is the technical term that means the quality of being equal before 
the law – to put it tautologically, the quality of being a person. It is the basis of 
law’s symmetrical disposition to each human being. Thus, ‘person’ is the legal 
vehicle of human dignity, what is common to each of us a social human beings 
and as theoretically equal subjects – subjects of the legal and literary interest 
like and other, possessing equal capacity to be represented within the law and 
literature.  
The person, the dignified being, is the vehicle that becomes freely and fully 
developed. The invisibility of intersex people before the law and society is a 
violation of Article 16 of the ICCPR. Even if they have the ability to register as 
through Article 24 in an open sex marker or have freedom of choice to a sex 
marker, this has little meaning while they remain invisible generally within society. 
Legal personality is the vehicle of the human person through fraternity in liberty 
and equality by which the dignified human person can freely and fully develop. 
Thus, they must have the autonomous capability to author their sex as male, 
female, both or neither and have the control of their natural variations that are 
recognised before the law.   
One’s existence must be recognised by the law,123 and if the state, including the 
law, does not recognise one, then one may exist, but in effect is invisible. The right 
to recognition as a person before the law reconciles one’s existential (physical and 
spiritual) being with one’s legal or juridical being. The right to recognition as an 
existential sex before the law is essential to intersex people. The imposition of a 
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sex, and not providing a method to permit change violates international human 
rights law, in particular, Article 16, 24, and 26 of the ICCPR.   
Although there have only been a few rights and freedoms highlighted in this thesis, 
it does not mean that the other rights and freedoms do not apply. As mentioned 
earlier, all of the rights and freedoms are for the duty, the purpose, to permit all 
human beings to freely and fully develop their personality as an equally dignified 
human being. Many of the other rights and freedoms are to enable well-being and 
potentiality, and any restriction or denial of them inhibit well-being and 
potentiality of one as a dignified being. The three chapters here were identified to 
specifically illustrate how ‘identity’, as defined in the introduction, has been 
provided for and protected by the IBOR. There has been no need for a separate 
Article mentioning ‘identity’ as what is required to have autonomy over who one 
is and how one comes to have already been provided for.     
Paul Ricoeur argues that recognition of the human being as a subject of rights is 
“intimately connected with personal and collective identity.”124 The right to 
privacy enables such a subject of rights to produce a moral identity. It is within this 
identity is possible then to read one’s own story and be held impute for it. Denial 
or inhibition of one’s autonomy over how one comes to be, and especially over 
who one is, violates the right to privacy and one’s well-being. This is illustrated 
clearly in the lives of intersex people who very sense of being is violated, and 
furthermore, their ability to freely and fully develop has been violated and 
debased their dignity as a human being. Recognition results from a moral being 
through one’s own good life who shapes who they are and how they come to be 
in and with a constitutive reciprocal society. It is this recognition that is to be 
recognised before the law and protected by the law not that of determined 
statuses, such as sex. It is this reason that intersex people demonstrate the reality 
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of the fight for identity as recognition of who they are – male, female, both or 
neither – and the autonomy over how they come to be. Both the State and society 
have a duty to enable such an identity.      
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CONCLUSION 
The issues resulting from the history of intersex people and their recognition, or 
not, through time and societies has led to this thesis. Some societies that have 
accepted sex diversity, and as such, sex-diverse people became part of the social 
organisation fulfilling their roles and functions as who they are. They did not 
necessarily have a special term for intersex variation as it was covered within a 
broader concept such as two-spirited people. This has not always been the case 
though. Some societies such as the Greeks did not accept them even sacrificed 
them. The modern history of intersex people is no less frightening. This led me on 
a journey of intersex and identity, what identity means and whether international 
human rights could protect intersex people’s identity.  
I purposely used a story quoted from John Stoltenberg in the introduction of my 
thesis even though it is longer than most quotes are. This story, though seeming 
fantastical, represents the basis of my thesis. This is a story of the living 
contradictions of reality. Through that story, one can see a society where sex was 
important to the functioning and relationality of the society, yet not a determinant 
of a being nor the society. The beings were recognised for who they were and 
permitted to become who they considered themselves to be. Yet this recognition 
did not come at a cost of categorising and making one group or another inferior. 
Each being was equally needed and equally respected irrespective of the role one 
had in the society.  
That story is an important introduction to the meaning of identity as conceived in 
this thesis. Recognition is about first making sense of oneself and then being 
recognised by others. To be recognised is the reciprocity of esteem and respect. 
One cannot give esteem and respect unless one has self-esteem and self-respect. 
Such recognition enabled society to function and operate through a system of 
respect for others, their needs of development and support while living in and with 
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others. The thesis recognises that societies although not all societies had a term 
for identity, in the above sense, identity has always been important to societies.  
Intersex, identity and human rights was a huge topic to comprehend. To break it 
down, I started my thesis asking some questions as written in the introduction. 
These were as follows: 
 How do the elements of personal identity connect to be what or who one is 
including one’s sex? 
 Is identity something that just is, or is it deeper? Is there a morality of identity? 
 How sex had been viewed and interpreted within international law? 
 What is the basis and purpose of human rights and what is the interconnection or 
understanding of identity in international human rights law or not as the case may 
be? 
 If applied to intersex issues, could they aid intersex people in forming a moral 
identity? 
These questions eventually became critical to the structure of the thesis. After 
beginning in this journey, I began to understand that personal identity was not 
necessarily so simple to understand. This eventually has been set out over the first 
couple of chapters. I have known that identity is interconnected with human rights 
issues. However, I was aware that international human rights did not refer to or 
state identity. As such, to understand how identity was reflected, I had to 
understand the basis of identity in a moral form and not just an administrative 
one. Like many traditional or indigenous cultures, there was no term for identity. 
Identity was the result of who one was and how one came to be. It was only by 
understanding this, that I could apply it to human rights and the issue of intersex 
people.   
The term identity is a new term, as well as being an elusive and ubiquitous one.1 
Recognition of one another has always been important for societies, but not 
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necessarily in the sense that identity is used today. Today, identity is 
conceptualised through a positivist-Cartesian model as an immutable identicality 
something that does not change throughout time, irrespective of what one makes 
of their life.2 As such it is the identity of what one is. This is illustrated through the 
definition of identity in the Oxford Dictionary: ‘identity’ is the fact of being who or 
what a person or thing is.”3 This identity remains constant and is interpreted and 
understood through identity makers (often referred to as identities)4 or 
multiplicities.5 These are the attributes that make up who or what one is.6 It is 
these identity markers by which people are recognised. A moral person, an equally 
dignified being, must have autonomy over who one is and how one comes to be.  
The becoming of (inter)sex as with one’s being is a becoming. It is a process, a 
development rather than a state of being. This becoming is understood in and 
through narratives.7 Narratives thus indicate the sense of belonging and grounding 
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of everyone.8 As such, the interpretation of narratives will require the 
understanding of the interaction and involvement with others.9 Therefore, to 
understand life, and the individuals within it, one must understand both the 
collective and the individual narratives that make it up. This requires a process of 
interpretation, a task as Gadamer says, is never fully completed.10 Interpretation 
is a hermeneutic task of wholes and parts and finding meaning and significance.11 
This task occurs through either vertical or horizontal interpretive horizons.12     
Regarding sex, becoming occurs through and in either the horizontal or vertical 
interpretive horizons. Through the horizontal horizon, it is a mediated becoming 
of who one is, whether it be male, female both or neither. This mediated becoming 
continues throughout one’s life and is transformable at various points in one’s life. 
As a mediated becoming, intersex variations are part of one’s existence, yet are 
not marked out as it is recognised for who one is and not by what one is. The 
vertical horizon, on the other hand, begins by a determining of what one is. 
Despite what mediated existence occurred prior to birth, it is interpreted as a 
linear development as either a male or female. This is considered a fact 
determinable at birth. This continues a linear development from that point upon 
which one constructs a narrative identity upon. Sex, together with the other parts 
of who we are understood within one’s narrative identity, the story written 
through their life. This narrative identity reveals their personal identity the 
temporal form of one’s narrative identity. 
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Identity is a mediation of two forms: idem (sameness) and ipse (self). While it can 
be understood as a mediation of these two through the narrative identity as it is 
revealed in one’s personal identity, commonly the two have become separated. It 
is through the separation of the two sense or forms of identity that the 
problematic of identity arises. The problematic arises as the self of the narrative 
identity is separated from the personal identity which becomes one’s an 
immutable status identity, an identicality. It bases one’s identity on the idem 
immutable structure as to what one is. This has now become the common 
understanding of identity and the way it is most commonly interpreted. However, 
this separation of the two identities leaves the human being vulnerable. 
Furthermore, it affects one’s autonomous capabilities. However, human beings 
are called on to be autonomous. 13 This demands a moral identity. A moral identity 
is what is revealed from living a moral life – the good life in well-being aimed 
towards human flourishing in self-esteem and self-respect in and with others. This 
moral life demands autonomy and capability.    
Although human rights have been established, sex remains understood through 
the sex status lens or the vertical interpretive horizon. Sex becoming, especially in 
the modern era, has been within a vertical interpretive horizon where one has 
their sex determined at birth, and then authored hegemonically within that 
horizon. This in most societies has limited sex and its authorship to a heterosexual 
male-female binary. This specifies the bounds upon which a sex is authored. Roger 
Adkins argues that the14   
“specific notions of my own gender, sex, and sexual orientation—as given to me 
by such cultural actors as family members, friends, peers, teachers, and religious 
leaders—were products of a power structure in and through which the authority 
                                                     
13 David Pellauer (translator) Paul Ricœur Reflections on the Just (University of Chicago Press, 
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of certain dominating classes is everywhere (even in me and my actions) 
legitimated and deployed as natural.”  
This limits the self-esteem and self-respect possible in authoring one’s sex as a 
dignified human person. Rather, than amoral sex, it is a determined sex whereby 
one then authors a life with a personal identity. There is a question of what esteem 
and respect is possible in such cases as required by international human rights law. 
Although this is constricting to everyone, whether it appears to conflict with their 
life or not, for those LGBTI people, it affects more than most. Intersex people, like 
others in the LGBTI community, face numerous inhibitions and violations all over 
the world. This is detailed in a UN Multi-agency Statement:15 
The United Nations and others have documented widespread physical and 
psychological violence against LGBTI persons in all regions - including murder, 
assault, kidnapping, rape, sexual violence, as well as torture and ill-treatment in 
institutional and other setting. LGBTI youth and lesbian, bisexual and 
transgender women are at particular risk of physical, psychological and sexual 
violence in family and community settings. LGBTI persons often face violence 
and discrimination when seeking refuge from persecution and in humanitarian 
emergencies. They may also face abuse in medical settings, including unethical 
and harmful so-called “therapies” to change sexual orientation, forced or 
coercive sterilization, forced genital and anal examinations, and unnecessary 
surgery and treatment on intersex children without their consent. In many 
countries, the response to these violations is inadequate, they are 
underreported and often not properly investigated and prosecuted, leading to 
widespread impunity and lack of justice, remedies and support for victims. 
Human rights defenders combatting these violations are frequently persecuted 
and face discriminatory restrictions on their activities.  
However, intersex people who have the same ‘genders’ and ‘sexual orientations’ 
as everyone else, are more often forgotten in the whole picture. Everyone has 
                                                     
15 Statement from International Labour Organisation and others “Joint UN statement on Ending 
Violence and Discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex People” 
(September 2015). 
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some form of sexual orientation and gender identity16 and sex characteristics. 
Although intersex people are at the intersection of every part of sex – sex 
characteristics, social sex expression (gender), and sexual orientation – they 
remain invisible to society. Although there is still a stigma to being LGBT, they 
somewhat still fit into the binary, while intersex people do not. They have always 
caused much distress for those who attempt to maintain such a binary system.   
As the enforcement of rigid male/female dichotomy has assumed an 
unquestioned status as biologically natural, it has affected intersex people whose 
anatomy did not conform as well as those whose bodies were considered 
normal.17 This has left them invisible both to themselves and to others around 
them and society at large. This invisibility, except for a few nations around the 
earth where the infants are still killed, leaves a shell of the individual as a living 
being while the sexual characteristics require fixing to the male-female norms. 
They are forcibly ‘fixed’ through sex-normalising procedures without consent from 
the person concerned to conform to the cultural norms of male and female.18 
These procedures are not a physical reconstruction, but a deconstruction of 
intersex physiology that is then constructed into the stereotypical form of male 
and female gender categories.19 These procedures are done in the name of the 
benevolence of the person and society. However, these procedures lead to serious 
violations of well-being – physically, mentally/psychologically, and sexually – that 
amount to torture and ill-treatment. 
                                                     
16 Vitit Muntarbhorn - Special Rapporteur(SOGI) and Human Rights Committee Report of the 
Independent Expert on Protection against Violence and Discrimination based on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity (A/HRC/35/36 2017) at [2]. 
17 Elizabeth Reis “Impossible Hermaphrodites: Intersex in America, 1620-1960” (2005) 92 J Am 
Hist 411 at 414–415. 
18 Juan E Méndez and Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (A/HRC/22/53 2013) at [77]. 
19 Senate Community Affairs References Committee and Australian Government Involuntary or 
Coerced Sterilisation of Intersex People in Australia (2013) at 69. 
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This issues and violation that intersex people face hit at the heart of foundation 
and purpose of human rights. The result is an intersex person is living in an altered 
body they did not choose which results in life-long serious physical and mental 
issues in a registered sex that may or may not match who they are trying to live a 
life they may never comprehend. This has led to a two-fold harm of the individual: 
one is the loss of well-being, and the other is the loss of the ability to value to 
pursue happiness according to one’s conception of the good life.20 This inhibits 
their ability to author a moral life. This not only violates many of the rights and 
freedoms, but also means that the community and the state have failed the basic 
duty of the IBOR: to enable one to author their being, including that of their sex, 
through the free and full development as a dignified being – the foundation and 
purpose of human rights.  
Human rights centred on the human person as “anterior and superior to the 
positive law of civil society”21 and reflexively “antecedent to human rights and 
consequent to human rights.”22 This, James Griffin argues, “enables human rights 
to be substantive, with a source or ultimacy, as opposed to mere formalism.23 This 
was foreign to Western and non-Western nations alike24 yet at the same time 
found in most major philosophies around the world. This human person is both 
the premise and the promise of human rights. The human person was both equal 
and dignified. Human rights articulated this through the EP as universality – for all 
                                                     
20 Paul Ricoeur “Becoming Capable, Being Recognized” at 5. 
21 UN Secretary-General Document A/2929: Annotations on the Text of the Draft International 
Covenants on Human Rights (Agenda 28-10th Session 1955) at 12. 
22 Joseph Slaughter “The Textuality of Human Rights: Founding Narratives of Human Personality” 
[2004] Interdisciplinary Law and Humanities Junior Scholar Workshop Paper at 5. 
23 James Griffin “First Steps in an Account of Human Rights” (2001) 9 European Journal of 
Philosophy 306 at 311. 
24 Joseph R Slaughter Human Rights, Inc (1st ed, Fordham University Press, New York, 2007) at 
19. 
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without distinction25 – and the equal value of all human beings. The dignity of the 
equal human person is demonstrable through the authored narrated being. In 
summary, human rights exist because one exists yet also are there to enable the 
well-being and potentiality of one’s existence as one becomes within their 
narrative identity. This requires the free and full development of personality - as 
the premise and promise of human rights. These rights to be a dignified being or 
human person exist from one’s entry to the world. As such, it is possible to violate 
them but never taken away or transferred away, not even by a government.26  
The dignified human person results from human worth, that of esteem and 
respect. Positive self-esteem is to be a lover of one-self or to value oneself.27 It 
acknowledges one’s uniqueness while being at ease with oneself, positive self-
regard.28 Respect correlates with the love of oneself and of others. It is the 
recognition and acceptance of who one is and how one comes to be. This 
recognition and acceptance of one another become the basis of social relations 
and social bonds. Esteem and respect encompass one’s moral form enabling a 
worthy subject. 
The focus of international human rights is to enable and protect the authorship of 
the dignified human person. This is the sole function of each of the rights and 
freedoms within the IBOR. It does assume that there are “national and regional 
particularities,” but that there are universality and indivisibility in regard to its 
foundation and purpose.29 Vitit Muntarbhorn, the Special Rapporteur for Sexual 
                                                     
25 This removed status as the category of distinguishing and marking one form another. While 
many national positivist systems retained such a system, within human rights, this was seen as 
violating the EP and as discriminatory.  
26 Johannes Morsink Inherent Human Rights: Philosophical Roots of the Universal Declaration 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2009) at 20. 
27 Pauline Chazan “Self-esteem, Self-respect, and Love of Self: Ways of Valuing the Self” 26 
Philosophia 41 at 50. 
28 At 49, 50. 
29 Muntarbhorn - Special Rapporteur(SOGI) and Human Rights Committee, above n 16, at [8]. 
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Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) reiterated this as written in the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action:30   
Recalling that the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action affirms that all 
human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated, that 
the international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis, and that while the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, 
regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and 
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
If one’s well-being and/or potentiality has been inhibited or violated, then it 
interferes with the state of the dignity of being. The States duty is to protect 
against such violations. This has been illustrated through a few of the rights and 
freedoms in relation to intersex people as dignified beings: the right to privacy, 
recognition before the law and well-being. These rights have been denied to 
intersex people. They have been denied the very basis to autonomously author 
their identity of which sex is a part and even if they could in most places this would 
not be recognised before the law. Furthermore, the well-being has been left in a 
state that has life-long consequences affecting all parts of their life. This results in 
no or low self-esteem and self-respect that leaves intersex people living in a state 
of indignity.  
Intersex people demand that they have a right to a dignified life in the state of 
well-being and potentiality of sex that they determine as who they are – male, 
female, both or neither – and how they come to be. At the Third Intersex 
                                                     
30 At [8]; UN Human Rights Council Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 30 June 
2016 (A/HRC/RES/32/2 2016), Preamble ; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN 
General Assembly A/CONF157/23 (entered into force 12 July 1993), Preamble . 
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International Forum, the group produced a public statement with a significant first 
sentence: 31    
We affirm that intersex people are real, and we exist in all regions and all 
countries around the world.  
Making them invisible harms them and harms society as a whole. It restricts the 
diversity of humanity. The last three chapters discussed three key areas central to 
the formation of and the protection of one’s identity. The right to privacy provides 
for the right to autonomously shape who one is and how one comes to be or the 
free and full development of personality. It correlates this right to the central 
foundation of human rights - dignity. However, this dignity is impinged upon or 
violated when there is inhibition or restriction on one’s well-being. This chapter 
demonstrated the devastating effects and some of them have been mentioned 
above. To protect intersex people, it requires the protection of the law, but for 
that, one must be recognised before the law. Due to the strength of the binary 
system, this has been restricted, especially through the registration system of sex 
to male or female. However, according to the basis for human rights, while 
protecting sex, the human rights person - the foundation – does not require a 
particular sex. The purpose is to recognise every human person before the law. As 
such intersex people need freedom from the binary to enable the application of 
an autonomous being as provided for through the right to privacy. The Special 
Rapporteur on SOGI stated that there needs to be a respect for diversity of sex:32  
The report is anchored on the belief that while the diversity among human 
beings on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity should be 
recognized (“diversity in humanity”), it is essential to harness and reinforce, from 
a young age, mutual respect, tolerance and understanding, compliance with 
                                                     
31 “3rd International Intersex Forum Concluded” (2 December 2013) ILGA Europe 
<http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/news/latest/intersex_forum_2013>. 
32 Muntarbhorn - Special Rapporteur(SOGI) and Human Rights Committee, above n 16, at [Note 
by the Secretariat]. 
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human rights, and a sense of humanity and inclusivity inherent in that diversity 
(“humanity in diversity”), to accord protection for all and to all. 
This respect is to recognise an intersex person as who they are. This enables them 
to have a moral identity and John Stuart Mill’s words, results in the ‘perfection in 
human nature’. This recognition, as demonstrated through (inter)sex is important 
to the functioning and relationality of the society, yet not a determinant of 
individuals nor the society. 
My history highlights the similar plight that many intersex people face. As their 
history is invisible, often to themselves, as well as others around them, it has been 
impossible for them to make sense of who they are. Like me, many have lived in a 
state of confusion and a low self-esteem and self-respect. They have lost 
autonomy and control over their life over who they are as a sex, what has 
happened to their bodies (sometimes conflicting with what they have been told, 
if they have been told at all), and how they have come to be as a sex. As such, 
intersex people have suffered a hermeneutic injustice. Taking back power over 
who one is and how one comes to be is liberating, but this requires recognition 
before the law and protection of the law. Only then can intersex people be 
dignified human beings as provided for by international human rights.  
Human rights must fulfil their promise to enable all people to have autonomy over 
who they are and over how they come to be, such as described in the example 
here of intersex people, who at the same time have many other intersecting 
multiplicities. This requires the free and full development of personality. This is 
the subject of rights a capable moral being. Human rights are essential to a society 
of solidarity  - a just and moral society. This requires education to understand the 
diversity of life, including the diversity of sex, so that all humans are recognised 
and accepted in society as who they are and not as some determined status. This 
I believe will result in peace and harmony, both within oneself and society at large. 
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